The pace and scope of Japan’s diplomacy in the Middle East have expanded over the course of the past decade. Tokyo has long viewed the region’s vast energy resources as vital to fueling the nation’s economic growth; recently, however, Japan’s ties with the Middle East have both deepened and grown more complex. Japan has harnessed its industrial and technological know-how to establish itself as a critical partner for major regional powers, such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Thus, not only is Japan a valued market for energy exports, it is also an important partner in a wide range of sectors, from emerging technologies to space exploration.

The Japan-U.S. alliance remains the bedrock of Japan’s national security strategy and informs Japan’s engagement with the Middle East. In 2008, it appeared that Japan was coming into closer alignment with the United States in the region. With Japan having deployed Self-Defense Forces (SDF) troops to assist in refueling operations for the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan and having provided reconstruction assistance in Iraq, Japan appeared in lockstep with U.S. security preferences in the region. However, today, Japan is much more reluctant to be seen as outwardly participating in U.S. military operations in the Middle East. Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who was returned to office a second time in December 2012, has recalibrated Japan’s embrace of Washington’s priorities in the region and embarked on setting a more independent course in the pursuit of Japan’s interests. Japan’s latest SDF deployment to the Gulf of Oman in early 2020 highlighted this new course in practice, as Japan did not formally join the U.S.-led multinational maritime security mission to secure commercial shipping lanes in the Strait of Hormuz.

Japan’s diplomatic approach to the region, which emphasizes Japan as an “honest broker,” is crucial to understanding how Japan pursues its interests in the Middle East. Japan’s regional engagement is often understood as a delicate balancing act between the overriding imperative of maintaining a strong security alliance with the United States on the one hand and not putting Japan’s energy and economic ties at risk by antagonizing regional capitals on the other. While Tokyo certainly is highly sensitive to Washington’s foreign policy preferences in the region, this narrow focus on balancing U.S. preferences versus Japan’s energy interests obscures Japan’s growing diplomatic, economic, and cultural outreach in the region. Japan’s interests in the Middle East are far greater and more diverse today than they were 10 years ago.

Japan’s Middle East priorities are in line with Tokyo’s broader strategic goal of managing its relationships and growing its influence in the context of a more assertive China and growing uncertainty over the future U.S. role in the Middle East. Tokyo is cautiously charting a more independent course by building relationships to secure Japanese interests in the face of China’s growing regional footprint. Therefore, in redefining Japan’s own role, Abe prefers to put an emphasis on how Japan’s approach to the region differs from that of Tokyo’s competitors and the added value that a strong relationship with Japan can bring to the region.

Energy has long dominated Japan’s economic ties with the Middle East and that remains the case today. As of 2017, petroleum still accounted for more than 90% of the total value of imports into Japan from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar. However, both Japan and its Middle Eastern partners have taken steps to broaden their economic ties and expand trade relationships beyond energy resources.

Japan is the world’s fourth-largest importer of oil, and as of 2017, Japan was the second-largest export market, behind China, for Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar. On the other hand, the Middle East, as a market for Japan’s exports, remains small compared to Japan’s two biggest export markets, the United States and the European Union. Nevertheless, the Middle East is an important market for Japanese automobiles and machinery. The top destination in the region for Japan’s exports is the UAE, with exports valued at $7.18 billion in 2019. The second-largest export market for Japan in the region is Saudi Arabia, which accounts for $5.11 billion in exports. The UAE and Saudi Arabia also host the most commercial locations abroad registered to Japan-affiliated companies according to data published by the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO). 

As of 2020, Japanese companies have been active in oil exploration and production throughout the Middle East. Today, one of Japan’s largest oil development and production projects is the Japan Petroleum Exploration Co. (JAPEX) Garraf Oil Field in southern Iraq. In a consortium with PETRONAS of Malaysia, JAPEX won the Garraf Oil Field contract in December 2009. Oil production at the field began in 2013; as of 2019, production volume at the field averaged approximately 90,000 barrels per day. The plan, prior to COVID-19, was to increase production to 230,000 barrels per day by the end of 2020. Also in Iraq, Japan has recently approved an approximately $1 billion loan through the Japan International Cooperation Agency for the Basra Refinery Upgrade Project II in southern Iraq. It was the largest project funded by a $3.6 billion loan package to finance projects in Iraq’s oil and gas sectors.

Japan had been Iran’s second-largest trade partner after China in the 2000’s; however, in 2010, Japan took a step back due to U.S. pressure in light of Iran’s developing nuclear program. In 2010, Japan’s total exports to Iran were valued at more than $2 billion, whereas in 2019 Japan’s exports to Iran had fallen to just $66 million. Meanwhile, for comparison, Japan’s exports to the UAE in 2019 were valued at $7.18 billion.

Japan’s past experience in Iran allowed Tokyo to quickly capitalize and jumpstart commercial ties with Iran once the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was secured in 2015. The Japan-Iran Investment Agreement was signed in early 2016 to facilitate the return of Japanese investment and businesses to Iran. Japanese companies, such as Mitsubishi and Toyota, were among the first to enter the Iranian market after the JCPOA took effect, and many more Japanese companies signaled an interest in Iran. With Tokyo underwriting some of the financial risk, it appeared that Japan-Iran trade relations were on the cusp of expanding. By 2017, the value of Japan’s exports to Iran had risen back to almost $1 billion, and serious discussions over the purchase of aircraft, major infrastructure projects, and investment in Iran’s energy sector had all taken place.

The Trump administration’s withdrawal from the JCPOA in May 2018 and its pressure campaign on Tokyo and other capitals to halt trade with Iran effectively froze Japan-Iran economic ties for the second time in a decade. This led to a retreat of Japanese firms from the Iranian market and a move to source oil from alternative sellers. Although Japan initially secured a waiver from Washington in November 2018, allowing Tokyo to continue to import Iranian oil, this waiver was not renewed in May 2019, bringing an end to Japan’s imports of Iranian oil. In 2008, Iran was Japan’s third-largest oil exporter; however, by 2020, oil exports from Iran had all but stopped.

As Japan faces growing competition from China and South Korea in Middle East markets, the pace and scope of Japan’s diplomacy in the Middle East have steadily increased. Numerous visits to regional capitals by Prime Minister Abe and other senior government officials attest to this, as do the increasingly frequent and high-level visits to Japan by Middle Eastern leaders. However, it would be a mistake to view Japan’s diplomacy as narrowly promoting a mercantilist agenda or reflexively serving U.S. interests in the region. To continue to be perceived as an honest broker and to secure Japanese interests in a region where China’s footprint is growing, Japan has been careful not to be seen in Tehran as too closely aligned with U.S. interests in the region. Japan has also become a significant contributor to humanitarian efforts, from supporting reconstruction and development in Iraq to providing humanitarian assistance for refugees fleeing from the war in Syria. In addition, Japan has flexed its diplomatic muscle in conflict mediation efforts to reduce tensions in the Gulf. In 2019 and 2020, Prime Minister Abe sought to leverage Japan’s relationships in the region to reduce escalating tensions between the United States and Iran. In addition to these efforts, Japan has navigated the cultivation of closer ties with Israel, while also maintaining a commitment to a two-state solution for Palestine. Overall, Japan’s strategic outreach to the Middle East can be seen as consistent with a broader strategic vision in Tokyo to strengthen a rules-based international order.

Prime Minister Abe’s diplomacy toward the Middle East is largely consistent with that of previous governments in Tokyo, which balanced Japan’s own interests with U.S. preferences. It was Prime Minister Yuichiro Koizumi who broke from this practice in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks on the United States by openly aligning Japan’s foreign policy in the region with the U.S. Global War on Terror. Abe, on the other hand, has been much more cautious in deploying the SDF to the Middle East, instead pursuing policies aimed at reinforcing the image of Japan as a more neutral broker in the region. To be perceived as a partner in the Middle East, Tokyo is aware that it cannot be seen by Tehran as being in lockstep with Washington. Japan’s complex web of relationships reflects Japan’s attempt to strengthen its ties across the region. Two of Japan’s most important relationships are with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Japan also enjoys warming relations with Israel and has expended a great deal of diplomatic capital, in terms of bilateral visits and facilitating mediation efforts, to maintain ties with Iran over the past few years.

The growing importance Japan attaches to its Middle East relationships today is illustrated by the number of times senior government ministers from Japan visited regional capitals in recent years. For example, Prime Minister Abe has conducted more visits to the Middle East than any previous Japanese prime minister; in 2019, Abe became the first sitting Japanese prime minister to visit post-revolutionary Iran.

Saudi-Japan Vision 2030

While the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia remains Japan’s top oil supplier and energy continues to dominate the Japan-Saudi trade relationship, Japan has sought to support Saudi Arabia in its ambition to transition to a post-oil economy. Japan’s support has been well received in Riyadh, and Japan is now described as a key “mentor” for Saudi Arabia in its quest to achieve energy transition.

In March 2017, King Salman bin Abdul-Aziz al-Saud became the first Saudi king to visit Japan in almost five decades. While his visit was largely symbolic, it was the size of King Salman’s delegation that highlighted the importance Riyadh put on its relationship with Japan. With more than 10 aircraft required to transport a delegation that occupied more than 1,000 Tokyo hotel rooms, it was clear that Riyadh was seeking to build lasting ties with Tokyo. During King Salman‘s visit, the Saudi-Japan Vision 2030 initiative was launched. This was developed along the framework of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s signature Saudi Vision 2030 initiative, which was launched the previous year. Saudi Vision 2030 aims to facilitate Saudi Arabia’s economic transition to a post-oil era through the diversification of its economy, including the promotion of knowledge-intensive industries. Saudi Arabia has identified Japan as a key player in helping enable that transformation.

However, the Saudi-Japan relationship has not been without turbulence. Bilateral ties have strengthened at a time when Riyadh’s policies have generated significant turmoil in the region and beyond. In June 2017, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Yemen, Egypt, the Maldives, and Bahrain cut diplomatic ties with and imposed a blockade on Qatar, a state with which Japan enjoyed strong ties. The following year, in October 2018, Saudi Arabia was implicated in the murder of Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. Khashoghi’s murder generated a flurry of negative publicity for Saudi Arabia and led to many Western investors publicly shunning high-profile Saudi events, such as Davos in the Desert. Khashoggi’s murder also had ripple effects in Tokyo. It posed a dilemma for SoftBank, which relied heavily on investment from Saudi and UAE sovereign investment funds for its Vision Fund. While SoftBank’s chief operating officer pulled out of Davos in the Desert, SoftBank was represented at the event by other senior executives. And reportedly, Softbank’s CEO, Masayoshi Son, also traveled to Riyadh to meet separately with Mohammed bin Salman. Despite the turbulence of 2017–2018, by the time Japan hosted the 2019 G20 Summit in Osaka, it appeared that Japan-Saudi relations remained firmly intact.

A Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with the UAE

In terms of regional diplomacy, Japan’s relationship with the United Arab Emirates is perhaps its most important. In 2018, Prime Minister Abe and Sheik Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan recognized the importance of the partnership between the two countries in announcing the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Initiative (CSPI), which established a framework for deepening cooperation across 12 issue areas that spanned regional and international security to renewable energy and women’s empowerment. The CSPI is important because it establishes a framework for deepening strategic cooperation between the UAE and Japan. In the Middle East, Japan has a similarly broad framework for deepening bilateral relations only with Saudi Arabia within the scope of the aforementioned Saudi-Japan Vision 2030 initiative. With the UAE, there is a strong defense component to bilateral relations, and the CSPI contains specific commitments for defense and security cooperation. This includes the holding of security dialogues and cooperation in defense technology equipment and the facilitation of bilateral exchanges.

Prior to the deployment of Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Forces (MSDF) to the Gulf of Oman in 2020, Prime Minister Abe visited Abu Dhabi. In fact, Abe has visited the UAE three times: twice since he became prime minister for the second time in December 2012 and once during his brief premiership in 2007. In May 2013, Abe held meetings with Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan and Vice President and the ruler of Dubai Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum; they jointly announced a statement on the strengthening of the comprehensive partnership between Japan and the UAE toward stability and prosperity that ultimately would bring about the CSPI.

Growing Trade and Warming Relations with Israel

Historically, Japan had maintained its distance from Israel due to Japan’s dependency on Gulf oil and Israel’s rivalry with those nations. However, as ties between Israel and the Gulf have improved, Tokyo has also deepened its bilateral ties with Israel. Since 2014, there has been an uptick in trade and investment between the two countries following Japan’s e-commerce company Rakuten’s $900 million acquisition of Viber, which, while based in Cyprus, was founded in and also maintained its reasearch and development (R&D) in Israel. Japan’s companies have found Israeli tech firms especially attractive, as was illustrated by Sony’s $212 million acquisition of the Israeli-based Altair Semiconductor. Trade is on the rise – the value of trade between Israel and Japan rose by 20% to $3.5 billion between 2017 and 2018. A number of leading Japanese firms, such as Fujitsu, have also entered the Israeli market, and a number of leading Japanese firms have invested in Israeli-based R&D centers.

Japan’s growing trade ties to Israel have the support of Prime Minister Abe, who visited Israel in 2015 and 2018. Abe’s 2015 visit marked the first visit to Israel by a Japanese prime minister in about a decade, and Abe’s second visit in 2018 highlighted just how much relations had warmed between the two countries. In 2017, Japan concluded an investment agreement with Israel to facilitate a deepening of trade relations. Notably, Japan is an increasingly attractive trade partner for Israel at a time when activist boycott movements have mobilized in Europe and the United States.

Japan’s 2019 Defense White Paper affirmed that the U.S.-Japan alliance continues to be the cornerstone of Japan’s national security. The three pillars of Japan’s defense identified in the report are Japan’s own defense architecture, the Japan-U.S. alliance, and international security cooperation. It is the latter two pillars that have led to Japan’s increasing involvement in security and military presence and cooperation in the Middle East. 

In 2010, it appeared that Japan was coming into closer alignment with the United States in the Middle East and that the following decade would see Japan further relax its constitutional restrictions on the use of force to participate alongside the United States in shouldering the burden for regional security. With Japan having deployed the SDF to assist in refueling operations for the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan, and also more controversially to provide reconstruction assistance in Iraq, Japan seemed to be aligning with U.S. security interests in the region. However, Japan’s Prime Minister Abe, who returned to office a second time in December 2012, recalibrated Japan’s embrace of Washington’s priorities in the region. There was a growing recognition in Tokyo that aligning too closely with Washington’s diplomatic and security initiatives in the Middle East undermined Tokyo’s efforts to build relations on its own terms with regional capitals. However, Japan remains sensitive to Washington’s preferences. This tension between maintaining cordial ties with Tehran and supporting U.S.-led security missions was most recently illustrated by Japan’s SDF mission to the Gulf of Oman in early 2020. Japan did send forces to the region as President Trump urged; however, it did not formally join the U.S.-led multinational mission. Japan’s defense minister cited Tokyo’s desire to maintain friendly relations with Iran as the reason Japan chose to dispatch its own mission rather than join the U.S.-led coalition.

Japan’s relative lack of hard power levers limits the scope for security cooperation. This is not to say Japan lacks significant military capabilities, but rather that Japan cannot deploy these capabilities in a manner similar to that of China or South Korea. Nevertheless, Japan has set a record for defense spending over the previous eight years, with Japan’s latest defense budget totaling $48.56 billion.

Japan does maintain a permanent security presence in the region. It has deployed various air and naval assets in Djibouti since 2011 and coordinates with capitals in the Middle East on SDF deployments. At the same time, Japan’s leaders must keep a close eye on the fact that SDF deployments to the region are unpopular at home. To convince a reluctant domestic audience to support Japan’s continued engagement with the region, Japanese leaders routinely emphasize national self-interest as the reason the SDF is deployed on far-flung missions. For example, Japanese leaders have stressed that they must deploy the SDF in the Middle East for the sake of energy security. Policymakers in Tokyo have tried to communicate to a skeptical public that given East Asia’s energy dependence on the Middle East more broadly, any disruption to shipping lanes would have severe consequences for East Asian regional security as well.  

Japan’s Growing Security Interests in the Region

Japan is increasingly aware of the need to secure relationships in a pivotal region where U.S. commitment is wavering and Japan’s neighbors, South Korea and China, are increasingly active. Thus far, Japan has not sought out establishing any additional bases in the region beyond that in Djibouti. Japan has also not deployed any SDF units to conduct security training activities in the region analogous to South Korea’s Ahk Unit’s training mission in the UAE. In the coming decade, Japan’s comparative lack of security engagement is likely to come under significant pressure as China expands its footprint in the region. Japan will likely attempt to strengthen security ties with the Middle East in two spheres, arms trade and space cooperation. 

The Middle East is starting to emerge as a potential arms partner for Japan. In April 2014, Japan lifted its decades-old ban on weapons exports. Although Japan is a latecomer to the arms trade and has yet to score any major arms deals, potential clients in the Middle East have expressed interest. Kawasaki Heavy Industries showed off its C-2 military transport aircraft at the 2017 Dubai Airshow, marking the first time Japan sought to secure foreign buyers for its military aircraft. Also in 2017, the UAE expressed interest in purchasing the C-2; however, the UAE’s involvement in the Saudi-led war in Yemen has raised questions in Tokyo as to whether such a deal would run afoul of Japan’s arms export legislation, which prohibits Japan from exporting arms to countries engaged in armed conflict.  

In April 2020, Japan’s Diet adopted a law establishing the Space Domain Mission Unit within the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF). This new space unit is expected to become fully operational by 2023, and it signals Japan’s increased reliance on space systems. Japan’s space launch services are provided by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, using the H-IIA and H-IIB launch vehicles. Japan’s growing space capabilities may add a new dimension to military and security relations with the Middle East. In October 2018, a UAE earth observation satellite, KhalifaSat, was launched into outer space aboard an H-IIA rocket from the Tanegashima Space Centre in Japan.

Japan’s growing security role will certainty create complications for Japanese leaders at home. Japan’s deployment of SDF to the Middle East remains unpopular domestically. When Japan deployed its most recent mission to the Gulf of Oman in January 2020, polls showed that almost 60% of the public opposed this mission. As a result, Tokyo has sought to stress that such deployments are in Japan’s self-interest as 90% of Japan’s crude oil imports pass through the region. Whether or not the government’s messaging has been impactful will become clear if and when Japan finds itself confronted with or embroiled in a new crisis in the volatile region.

When Kono outlined his four principles for Japan’s policies toward the Middle East, it was clear that the focus was on building people-to-people ties. Unlike some of its Asian counterparts, Japan cannot draw upon large diaspora communities in the Middle East to build people-to-people ties. The largest Japanese community in the Middle East can be found in the UAE, where, as of 2017, more than 4,000 Japanese citizens are residents. Meanwhile, according to recent data, Israel hosts just over 1,000 Japanese residents, while Saudi Arabia is home to only 947 Japanese citizens. Given the relatively small size of Japanese communities in the region, Japan cultivates people-to-people ties through both official and semi-official channels. Japan relies heavily on contributions by JICA experts dispatched to the region and student exchanges with the Middle East to lay a foundation for strong and enduring ties.

At present, Japan’s strongest relationships in the Middle East are with the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. Japan also enjoys warming relations with Israel and prioritizes maintaining good relations with Iran. Tokyo has also sought to diversify its regional trade relationship beyond oil. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have welcomed this push as it closely aligns with both countries’ strategic priorities to harness technology in their transitions to post-oil economies. Tokyo’s focus on diversification has also brought Japan’s business community into a closer relationship with Israel, where a significant amount of R&D takes place.

Despite Japan’s reluctance to deploy hard power, it has cultivated strong relationships with the Middle East by emphasizing its role as a neutral honest broker for the region. Japan’s Defense Minister and former Foreign Minister Taro Kono expressed a desire to leverage these relationships so that Japan can take on a larger political role in the region, such as acting as a regional conflict mediator. This would be consistent with Tokyo’s larger grand strategy to strengthen a rules-based global order to constrain a rising China in a world where U.S. power and influence are growing more uncertain.

Prime Minister Abe has calibrated Japan’s foreign policy in the Middle East to distinguish Japan from China as a trusted partner for the region. This is also consistent with how Japan has approached its partnership with the European Union. Today, Japan’s interests in the Middle East go beyond a narrow mercantilist emphasis on securing oil deals. Tokyo recognizes that the maintenance of Japan’s energy security requires Japan to play a larger political role in the region as a mediator. While Japan will likely never be able to draw upon hard power levers in its own diplomacy toward the region, its soft power and diplomatic influence have established it as a credible partner for many capitals in the Middle East.

Japan continues to recognize its alliance with the United States as the cornerstone of its national security strategy and views the rise of China’s and North Korea’s ballistic missile and nuclear programs as its most pressing challenge. As such, Tokyo will remain sensitive to Washington’s preferences in the Middle East. However, the challenge for Tokyo will be how to balance the needs of Washington while maintaining Japan’s own web of relationships in the region. This challenge is also an opportunity for Tokyo. Japan’s close relationships built up over decades in both Washington and Middle East capitals could be leveraged in the future to allow Japan to take on a greater role in the Middle East and the world.

Christopher Lamont is Associate Professor and Assistant Dean of International Relations at Tokyo International University. Previously he held a tenured position at the University of Groningen in the Netherlands. In addition to his many scholarly publications, his writing has also appeared in Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, and the Washington Post's Monkey Cage.