February 29, 2024

Where is China heading? This perennial question of executives, investors, and policymakers has taken on new urgency as markets slide, growth slows, international tensions rise, and politics remains in command. That is the context for this year’s Two Sessions, one of the most important watchpoints for analyzing Beijing’s policy outlook.

The Two Sessions are the concurrent annual meetings of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), which begins on March 4, and the National People’s Congress (NPC), which opens on March 5. The meetings are likely to conclude around March 11.

The CPPCC is a United Front organization that mobilizes social groups to support and advise the Party-state. The NPC is China’s unicameral legislature and notionally the supreme organ of state power. Both bodies are under the control of the Communist Party of China (CPC), but they serve distinct and important political functions.

China watchers will be paying special attention to this Two Sessions because General Secretary Xi Jinping has yet to call a Third Plenum of the Party’s Central Committee, which traditionally approves economic reforms, and Premier Li Qiang will deliver his first government work report. This article analyzes four categories of watchpoints:

1. Policy: What could be in the Government Work Report?

• Economic Strategy
• Growth Target
• Deficit Target
• Technology and Industrial Policy
• Foreign Policy
• Taiwan and Hong Kong
• Other Policy Watchpoints

2. Politics: What will Xi do?

• Xi's Remarks
• NPC Vote Tallies
• Premier's Press Conference
• Coverage of Leaders and Delegates

3. Personnel: Beijing to restore normalcy to foreign and defense ministries?

• New Foreign Minister?
• Further Promotions for New Defense Minister?
• New State Councilors?
• Other Personnel Changes?

4. Timeline: Key Events

Premier Li Qiang will deliver his first government work report (GWR) on behalf of the State Council at the NPC’s opening session on March 5. His reading of this document is the set piece of the Two Sessions and one of its most important watchpoints. The GWR reviews the past year’s work, outlines the overall requirements and policy orientation of development in the coming year, and lists specific tasks the government will pursue.

The GWR features several specific policy-related watchpoints:

The economy is the central focus of the GWR, but Li Qiang is unlikely to deliver any big surprises. At a February 19 meeting he said the State Council must “follow the instructions” given by the Party last December at its annual Central Economic Work Conference (CEWC). The CEWC indicated a tactical shift toward growth this year but affirmed Xi’s underlying strategy of “high-quality development” as “the hard truth of the new era.”

The good news is that Li is likely to signal at least moderate fiscal stimulus this year. The CEWC readout said Party will maintain its “active fiscal policy” as well as “moderately strengthening fiscal policy,” “making effective use of fiscal policy space,” and putting greater emphasis on countercyclical adjustments. Despite a recent cut to mortgage rates, the U.S.-China interest rate differential and fears of capital flight mean monetary easing will be less preferred, with the CEWC pledging to maintain its “prudent monetary policy.” A directive to “build the new first and discard the old later” also implied Beijing’s resolve to favor planned and incremental reforms over the type of negative policy shocks that derailed markets in 2021. The readout of a Politburo meeting on February 29 that was dedicated to discussing the GWR also pledged to "create a stable, transparent, and predictable policy environment," while mostly repeating language from the CEWC readout.

Li will likely bring sunny messages for private enterprises and the business community to try and drive recovery in consumption, investment, and the stock market. He told a State Council plenary meeting on February 19 that Beijing should “use pragmatic and powerful actions to boost the confidence of the whole society” and a State Council executive meeting on February 23 that stabilizing foreign investment is an “important momentum point” for economic policy. Beijing is also accelerating the passage of a law to promote private sector development.

However, the evidence thus far suggests that policy modifications will primarily involve fine-tuning existing economic policy mechanisms, rather than deploying pathbreaking new approaches. Xi himself appears to believe that current issues are the short-term pain required for the long-term gain of a more secure and self-reliant economy. Even though there remain big questions about whether Xi can maintain China's growth rate without structural reforms that boost consumption, improve local finances, and allow a greater role for market forces.

The CEWC readout’s emphasis on high-quality development suggests no overhaul of Xi’s state-led approach. This concept is Xi’s existing economic blueprint, introduced at the 19th Party Congress in 2017, embedded in the 14th Five-Year Plan in 2021, and elaborated at the 20th Party Congress in 2022. It entails a “new development concept” that balances the pursuit of short-term growth with long-term agendas to make growth more innovative, coordinated, green, open, and equitable. This couples with a “new development paradigm” focused on domestic demand, indigenous technology, and reducing foreign dependencies.

Li is unlikely to reveal a definitive refocus on economic growth relative to national security, the confusing dual priorities of Xi’s third term. Recent statements, such as Xi’s comments on the annual reports of Party-state institutions, have made positive noises about the importance of economic work. But on February 27 the NPC Standing Committee (NPCSC) revised the Law on Guarding State Secrets to further strengthen the security state by introducing “work secrets” as a new category of restricted information that could affect firms that deal with China. Only a strong and clear signal would revive confidence in the Chinese business environment.

Li may also announce new approaches to Beijing’s longtime struggle to boost the share of consumption relative to investment in the economy. A meeting of the influential Central Financial and Economic Affairs Commission on February 23 focused on the potential for the renewal of industrial equipment, replacement of consumer goods, and reduction of logistics costs to stimulate consumption. This idea is likely to manifest in central funding for vouchers that encourage households to upgrade their cars, electronics, and appliances. This approach enables Beijing to boost consumption this year in a way that is state-led and helps create markets for advanced manufacturing and green industries central to Xi’s agenda.

But Xi opposes direct consumer stimulus for ideological reasons, even though it would be more effective at juicing growth. As would be strengthening the social safety net and abolishing restrictions on internal migration and land use, but Xi still seems unwilling or unconcerned to pursue such deeply redistributive structural reforms. The upshot is that a significant rebalancing toward consumption and a sustained economic revival is not yet in the cards.

Fundamentally, Beijing is expected to use the Two Sessions to announce tactical measures aimed at boosting short-term confidence in China's economy but without changing Xi's underlying strategy of investment-heavy state-guided development. Major shifts in economic policy are more conceivable at a Third Plenum chaired by Xi than in a Two Sessions speech by Li. Still, the degree to which the next plenum, which must be held later this year, will even address economic policy probably depends on how negative China’s growth outlook becomes.

Headlines about the GWR will focus on Li Qiang’s announcement of the GDP growth target for 2024. This figure provides an important signal to officials about how much to prioritize growth relative to other policy goals. Last year outgoing premier Li Keqiang set a goal of “around 5%,” which was seen as relatively modest, given that COVID-19 lockdowns cratered growth in 2022. Beijing says that the economy grew 5.2% in 2023, but most external analysts are skeptical of this claim, with estimates of China’s true growth going as low as 1.5%.

Li will likely reveal a growth target of around 5%. Most provincial-level governments, which convene local “Two Sessions” in January and February, have proclaimed similar growth targets, with an average weighted target of 5.4% (down slightly from 5.6% in 2023). The central government usually sets a slightly lower target because it plays more of a role in balancing economic growth with other policy priorities. This year, only Beijing, Liaoning, Tianjin, and Zhejiang increased their targets, better reflecting the central government's focus of pursuing quality over quantity in development.

Compared with last year, a growth target of around 5% is still relatively ambitious, especially considering China's tepid post-COVID recovery, property sector challenges, recurrent deflation, and dampened business and consumer confidence. This mark would signal a tactical focus on resuscitating confidence and spending. A lower target of around 4.5% would suggest a greater focus on regulatory agendas and could unsettle businesses and markets, while a higher target of around 5.5% would boost stimulus expectations.

The chances of “bazooka-style” or “flood-like” stimulus are low. Xi is set on reorienting the economy away from a growth model driven by risky debt and rooted in the property market, and the country is far from the type of collapse that could overwhelm the Party's sophisticated internal security apparatus. In a speech at Davos on January 16, Li hinted against “powerful stimulus” like that during the Global Financial Crisis or the 2015-2016 financial meltdown.

Stimulus is coming, but it will probably be moderate relative to China’s economic slowdown. Last year, Li Keqiang announced a mark of 3% of GDP, which has traditionally been considered an upper limit, but the NPCSC revised it to 3.8% in October by issuing RMB 1 trillion of special treasury bonds to support flagging growth through disaster relief. Li Qiang is expected to announce a deficit-to-GDP ratio for 2024 of 3% or slightly higher.

But a 5% GDP growth target this year will require more fiscal or monetary stimulus than the same target last year. Minister of Finance Lan Fo’an has already said that fiscal spending will increase this year, and there will also be carry-over of last year’s bond issuances. Beijing may provide additional fiscal support later this year through around RMB 1 trillion of special treasury bonds and RMB 4 trillion of special purpose bonds for local infrastructure investment.

The ongoing structural downturn in the property sector, driven by diminishing demand, will continue troubling the real estate market and the financial health of local governments. In response, Beijing is expected to increasingly rely on state-owned enterprises to absorb the debts and finalize the incomplete projects of beleaguered property developers. Moreover, the construction of more affordable housing is anticipated to become an even higher priority. Another watchpoint for greater liquidity in the property sector will be whether Li Qiang omits the phrase “houses are for living in, not for speculation.”

Xi’s centralization of power means that structural reforms to boost the fiscal capacity of local governments are unlikely, even though this is the most effective way to reduce their reliance on real estate revenues and address their dire financial situations. Instead, Beijing will likely focus on solutions for existing local debt, such as phasing out of COVID-era tax reduction policies, further centralizing pension systems to the provincial level, allowing more bonds to be issued for debt restructuring of local government financing vehicles, and possibly introducing a capital grants system for poorer provinces. However, these positive measures will likely come with increased central scrutiny of local officials in underperforming provinces, leading to anti-corruption purges and uneven policy implementation in the provinces.

The GWR will likely echo Xi’s strategy to favor Party-guided tech-manufacturing industrial policy over market-oriented reforms in responding to China’s economic challenges. On January 31, Xi chaired a Politburo study session focused on “accelerating the development” of “new productive forces,” a concept that he introduced on an inspection tour to Heilongjiang in September. Xi said that developing new productive forces is “an intrinsic requirement and an important focus of promoting high-quality development,” his signature economic approach, signaling that they could figure prominently in future policymaking. The experts selected to share their views on the draft GWR with Li at a meeting on January 23 were predominately technologists, including Robin Li, CEO of Baidu; Yan Jianwen, chairman of a smart manufacturing firm; and Wang Chunfa, an authority on innovation policy.

According to Xi, new productive forces are those in which “innovation plays a leading role,” and his “core measure” of success is “a significant increase in total factor productivity.” China’s productivity growth and productivity relative to the United States have declined considerably in recent years, as the state advances and the private sector retreats. If innovation can turn this around, it would help Beijing address economic challenges such as debt, demography, and Western restrictions on trade and investment. Massive investments in developing more advanced technology will help boost total factor productivity by increasing the value-added of capital and labor. But they are unlikely to resolve structural challenges, restore confidence, and revive growth close to what would be possible with a more market-oriented approach.

Slowing headline growth and Xi’s desire to guide markets, money, and innovation make political signals crucial for businesses and investors. Xi told the powerful Comprehensively Deepening Reforms Commission on February 19 that the Party must focus on “what innovation should do, who should organize innovation, and how to support, incentivize, and safeguard innovation.” His recent speeches suggest investing in new productive forces means more policy support for upgrading old industries and building new industries including advanced manufacturing, agricultural technology, artificial intelligence, biotechnology, commercial aviation, digital economy, drones, green technology, life sciences, quantum computing, and venture capital. Li flagged the digital economy, green industries, healthcare, and eldercare as especially welcome areas for foreign investment in a meeting with Japanese economists on January 25.

Li is unlikely to announce any major changes to China’s foreign policy, which is decided primarily by Xi-dominated Party institutions. His GWR will likely echo themes of December’s Central Foreign Affairs Work Conference. The readout of this highly authoritative meeting provided the strongest articulation yet of China’s emerging diplomatic strategy to push back against U.S. leadership by aligning with the Global South on contentious issues such as climate change, free trade, and Palestine. This position reflects Beijing’s growing sense that it can benefit from increasing Western divisions over the Russia-Ukraine war and the Israel-Gaza conflict, and from the possibility of another Donald Trump presidency in the United States.

On March 7, the foreign minister — whoever it may be at the time — should hold an annual press conference on China’s foreign policy priorities for 2024. Last year’s conference — coming just weeks after the “balloon incident” that derailed U.S.-China relations — saw Qin Gang slam U.S. President Joe Biden’s call for “building guardrails” to manage bilateral diplomacy. Now, following the fragile stabilization achieved at the Woodside Summit last November, any comments on “guardrails” could reflect Xi’s current disposition toward bilateral working groups and crisis control mechanisms, and thus their prospects for success. He will likely prioritize stability this year to improve business sentiment ahead of the U.S. election, with Li Qiang meeting the president of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce on February 28 and Vice President Han Zheng reportedly set to be the guest of honor at an AmCham China dinner.

Li is also expected to repeat boilerplate lines about defense policy, such as achieving certain modernization goals by the centenary of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in 2027, one step in a larger transformation that includes benchmarks in 2035 and 2049. Budget reports will also reveal Beijing’s planned spending on national defense, which is likely to keep increasing. Last year, the announced military budget was RMB 1.55 trillion, up 7.2% from the RMB 1.45 trillion figure for 2022. However, these growth numbers must be interpreted with some caution, especially when compared with GDP data, as they represent nominal rather than real increases.

Beijing’s stances on Taiwan and Hong Kong attract significant attention, but meaningful policy changes are unlikely. The GWR always includes a few lines on these topics, but analysts should be cautious about diagnosing major policy shifts, as this are more likely to come from Xi. In 2020, for example, Li Keqiang omitted the word “peaceful” when referring to Beijing’s desire to “reunify” with Taiwan — a departure from standard expression, which some media outlets interpreted as a signal of impending aggression. That part of the report, however, had been abbreviated to accommodate discussion of COVID-19, and other officials soon reaffirmed Beijing’s preference for “peaceful reunification.”

The most interesting watchpoint this year is whether the GWR and CPPCC will vow to “fight” rather than just “oppose” or “curb” Taiwan independence. Wang Huning used this language for the first time at an annual Taiwan Work Conference on February 23, although lower-level officials have employed the phrase in recent years. Fighting would hint at stronger efforts to deploy military intimidation and economic sanctions to deter Taiwan’s incoming president Lai Ching-te pursuing greater autonomy from the mainland.

The GWR features a section on social welfare, which is becoming increasingly important for political legitimacy as growth slows and the potential for social instability rises, as highlighted in Asia Society’s report on China 2024: What to Watch. The GWR, like last year, is likely to target about 12 million new urban jobs and an urban unemployment rate of no more than 5.5%, with added emphasis on youth unemployment and unemployment insurance for migrant workers. The government is also expected to respond to the socio-economic challenges of an ageing population by boosting support for both childcare and eldercare services.

The GWR also includes a section on environmental and climate policy, but weighty new announcements are unlikely. There may be greater emphasis on green technologies like solar, batteries, and electric vehicles — the “New Three” industries that could become major growth drivers. However, while clean energy capacity is expanding at pace, China is significantly off track in delivering on its 2025 targets for reducing energy intensity and carbon intensity. It will be important to watch whether Li’s speech suggests that Beijing is still committed to doing what it takes to achieve these goals given a more challenging economic trajectory.

The NPC will also hear annual reports from the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) on economic and social development and the Ministry of Finance (MOF) on central and local budgets, as well as work reports from the NPC Standing Committee (NPCSC), Supreme People’s Court (SPC), and Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP). It will also hold final deliberations on the first-ever revision to the State Council Organic Law adopted in 1980, which will tweak body’s organization in ways that could enhance the NPC’s oversight and power.

The NPCSC work report will provide clues about which items in its five-year legislative plan will feature in the annual legislative plan it will publish in April. Pending legislation related to economic policy and business operations that the NPCSC could prioritize this year include a Consumption Tax Law, Financial Stability Law, Public Interest Litigation Law, Tariff Law, and Value-Added Tax Law, as well as revisions to the Accountancy Law, Anti-Unfair Competition Law, Customs Law, Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, Foreign Trade Law, and Insurance Law.

The Two Sessions are a rare political event in China where Xi is not front and center. The limelight belongs nominally to Premier Li Qiang, NPC Chairman Zhao Leji, and CPPCC Chairman Wang Huning. These lieutenants will adorn the front page of the Party’s mouthpiece, People’s Daily, but the paper will still track Xi’s every move, offering behind-the-scenes reports that often include more revealing quotes than the main readouts of his activities.

Xi’s most important contributions at the Two Sessions are the remarks that he delivers to NPC provincial delegations and CPPCC sectoral groups. In 2023, he spoke to NPC delegates from Jiangsu; a joint meeting of two CPPCC groups, the China National Democratic Construction Association (CNDCA) and the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce (ACFIC); and NPC delegates from the PLA and the People’s Armed Police. Xi always addresses this military contingent, but he usually visits different provinces and sectors from year to year.

Such remarks often reflect or foreshadow key themes of national politics. Last year, for example, Xi told the Jiangsu delegates that “the key to whether we can comprehensively build ourselves into a socialist modern power as scheduled is technological self-reliance and self-improvement.” A side story revealed that he said, “At no time should we walk the road of urgency to deliver results, draining the pond to catch the fish, and caring only about GDP.” At the CNDCA-ACFIC meeting, Xi claimed that “Western countries, led by the United States, have implemented comprehensive containment, encirclement, and suppression against China.”

These comments presaged domestic policies that prioritized security relative to growth and foreign policies that emphasized ties with Russia and the Global South. However, the settings and messages of Xi’s activities are harder to predict than those of the government work report. One watchpoint is whether Xi visits the NPC delegation from Hunan, where the local Party secretary recently launched a “great discussion campaign to emancipate the mind,” which generated huge but probably unjustified hype about an economic policy overhaul.

Xi’s hold on the Party will also be closely watched. The NPC has approved everything submitted to it for a vote, but approval margins are not unanimous, as supposedly anonymous voting emboldens some delegates to express dissatisfaction with certain policies or officials by voting “no” or “abstain.” In March 2013, for example, after air pollution hit record levels in Beijing, only 67% of delegates approved the name list for the new NPC environment committee.

The NPC’s average annual “yes” vote on the GWR, the NDRC development report, the MOF budget report, and the NPC, SPC, and SPP work reports has increased from a low of 85.3% in 2013, right before Xi became president, to a two-decade high of 98.6% in 2023. That more delegates either choose or feel compelled to approve Beijing’s every move demonstrates Xi’s stronger grip on power compared to his predecessors. Votes will likely be near unanimous again this year, but economic malaise raises the possibility of protest votes that could chip away at Xi’s façade of invincibility — another delicate point to watch.

At the end of the Two Sessions, Li Qiang is expected to hold his second annual premier’s press conference, continuing a tradition begun by Li Peng in 1991 and formalized by Zhu Rongji in 1998. He will spend about two hours reading prepared replies to carefully screened questions from journalists. However, his answers may provide further detail about policies in the government work report, and there is a small chance that his comments shed light on economic debates within the leadership.

Last year Li Qiang elaborated on Beijing’s view that it can manage the social fallout of slowing growth as it pursues other policy priorities, saying that “most people do not focus on how much GDP grows every day, they care more about housing, employment, income, education, medical care, the environment, and other concrete things around them.” In a more subversive tone, Li Keqiang famously used his press conference in 2020, the final year of Xi’s war on poverty, to say that 600 million Chinese still earned only about RMB 1,000 per month (US$140). Wen Jiabao’s last press conference in 2012 saw him argue for deeper “political structural reform.”

Other political watchpoints center around the profile accorded to top Xi lieutenants. Will Xi’s chief-of-staff, Cai Qi, be prominent in official coverage, contrary to previous conventions? If so, this would confirm his rising favor as Xi’s informal “deputy general secretary.” Will Li Qiang get a more prominent People’s Daily spread than Li Keqiang did? If so, this would suggest that he enjoys more political trust and a wider policymaking remit than his predecessor. Will the same happen for Zhao Leji or Wang Huning?

Lower down the political hierarchy, following the delegates and proposals spotlighted by the Party media is a good indication of which issues the Party wants the public to notice, both to build legitimacy and highlight priority areas for future policymaking. Some bills submitted by delegates can even influence the direction and pace of the NPC’s legislative agenda. In recent years popular topics for such proposals include enhancing environmental protections, making it more affordable to raise a family, and creating more jobs for university graduates. These priorities show the continued albeit limited interplay between state and society in China, with the state still monitoring and responding to key sources of societal discontent.

Last year began with Xi completing the political triumph he achieved at the 20th Party Congress in October 2022 by securing the selection of a slate of loyalists for top positions in the NPC, CPPCC, and State Council before and during the Two Sessions in March 2023.

But some of those picks soon proved unwise. Qin Gang was removed as foreign minister in July, and resigned from his position as an NPC delegate on February 27, allegedly due to personal indiscretions when he was ambassador to the United States. Li Shangfu was removed as defense minister in October amid reports that he was under investigation for corruption. Both were removed from their concurrent role as state councilor, a higher-ranking post that placed them among China’s top few-dozen leaders.

Beijing is expected to use this Two Sessions to complete the transition to their successors. Approving personnel decisions at the annual session of the 2,977-person NPC, rather than at a bimonthly meeting of the 175-member NPC Standing Committee (NPCSC), which holds similar personnel powers, provides an added veneer of legitimacy to these unexpected turnovers.

Liu Jianchao is the frontrunner to become China’s new foreign minister. Liu is currently the ministerial-level director of the Party’s International Department, which handles party-to-party rather than state-to-state relations. He is a veteran diplomat who served as assistant foreign minister, head of Xi's overseas anti-corruption efforts, discipline chief of Xi's power base in Zhejiang Province, and deputy director of the Party’s Central Foreign Affairs Office (CFAO) under Xi. Other contenders include Ma Zhaoxu, the executive deputy foreign minister, who recently acted as China’s representative at a G20 foreign ministers’ meeting, and Liu Haixing, a former diplomat who serves as executive deputy director of the Central National Security Commission.

Liu is the only active ministerial-level diplomat on the Central Committee, and his busy schedule of high-profile diplomatic trips suggests he is being tested for promotion. In January he led an unusually diverse delegation of diplomatic, economic, and provincial officials to visit the United States, where he met with Secretary of State Antony Blinken and a host of officials, executives, and scholars. Liu is a talented diplomat and a sophisticated English speaker, skilled at defending China’s bottom lines without alienating interlocutors. He could help Xi stabilize relations with the West and repair some of the damage caused by aggressive “wolf warrior” diplomacy.

But it is possible that Liu will be passed over. Wang Yi, China’s top diplomat, who sits on the Party’s elite 24-person Politburo as CFAO director, replaced Qin as foreign minister last July, returning to a role he held from March 2013 to December 2022. Wang is widely seen as a caretaker, given that he has another higher-level job, but he now dominates the diplomatic policy space below Xi, leading some in Beijing to speculate that he could keep the role.

If Liu becomes foreign minister, the question is whether he will also become a state councilor. If so, he would be Wang’s presumptive heir as top diplomat after the 21st Party Congress in 2027 and would have a weightier voice in decision-making. If not, he would remain well below Wang in the pecking order and could turn to more belligerent policies to try and impress Xi.

Dong Jun replaced Li Shangfu as defense minister in December. The NPC will likely promote him to state councilor and the state Central Military Commission (CMC), a counterpart of the Party’s identical but more authoritative body of the same name. Dong is a Central Committee member, but he would have to wait for the Third Plenum before he could join the Party CMC.

Dong had served as commander of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy since August 2021. He is the first naval officer to serve as defense minister, one of several firsts for the navy under Xi’s tenure and another sign of Beijing's rising focus on sea power. Dong also has command experience in hotspot areas such as the East China Sea and South China Sea, reflecting the importance to Xi of advancing Beijing’s maritime claims in these areas.

Dong is China’s top military diplomat, and Liu would be China’s main interlocuter with foreign governments. Vesting them with the same roles and powers as their predecessors would help Beijing improve its international outreach at a time of significant economic uncertainty and geopolitical conflict. If neither Dong nor Liu becomes a state councilor, this could suggest a higher degree of mistrust and paralysis at the center of Xi’s leadership and a poorer outlook for China’s attempts to both manage tensions with the West and lead the Global South.

There is a rumor circulating that Wang Qingxian, Governor of Anhui, will replace Sun Yeli as Director of the State Council Information Office, the Party’s top external propaganda agency. Wang is a veteran journalist who worked with several Xi associates in Shanxi and Shandong. His rise, following Xi’s calls to improve economic propaganda, would add weight to the view that Xi sees China’s market woes as primarily a narrative problem. Meng Fanli, Party secretary of Shenzhen City, might succeed Wang in Anhui.

Another rumor holds that the Ministry of Ecology and Environment (MEE) leadership could be refreshed for the first time since April 2020. This idea is more speculative, as both Party Secretary Sun Jinlong and Minister Huang Runqiu are well below the ministerial retirement age of 65. However, Sun was linked to the now-decimated Communist Youth League faction and Huang is not a Communist Party member, so Xi may want to replace them with closer political allies. Another possibility is the replacement of Minister of Transport Li Xiaopeng — the son of former Premier Li Peng — who will turn 65 in June and has held the role since 2016.

The CPPCC and NPC will not publish full agendas until the day before their opening sessions, but a review of past schedules sheds light on the likely order of business. Their sessions have begun on March 4 and March 5, respectively, for many years, and an annual notice published by the Beijing Municipal Public Security Bureau on managing low-altitude aircraft during the Two Sessions hints that this year’s proceedings will conclude on March 11. Much of the time is taken up by CPPCC members and NPC delegates deliberating the drafts of various reports, although meaningful revisions are seldom made before they are adopted. This is the likely schedule:

• March 4:
  • CPPCC opening session.
  • Wang Huning delivers the CPPCC Standing Committee work report.
  • A CPPCC vice chairman delivers a report on work related to CPPCC proposals.
  • NPC publishes full agenda for its 2024 meeting.
• March 5:
  • NPC opening session.
  • Li Qiang delivers the government work report to the NPC.
  • NPC delegates review the NDRC development report and MOF budget report.
• March 6:
  • Xi Jinping begins speaking to various NPC delegations and CPPCC groups.
• March 7:
  • The foreign minister holds an annual press conference on “China’s foreign policy and foreign relations.”
• March 7 or March 8:
  • Zhao Leji delivers the NPCSC work report to the NPC.
  • Zhang Jun delivers the SPC work report to the NPC.
  • Ying Yong delivers the SPP work report to the NPC.
  • MOF and NDRC leaders may hold press conferences.
• March 8-10 (approximate):
  • NPC delegates vote to appoint new ministers and state councilors (possible).
  • CPPCC closing session.
  • CPPCC delegates vote on resolutions to adopt the Standing Committee report and reports on work proposals.
• March 11:
  • NPC closing session.
  • NPC delegates vote on resolutions to adopt the GWR and reports of the NDRC, MOF, NPCSC, SPC, and SPP.
  • Li Qiang conducts the premier’s press conference, after all meetings conclude. <

CCA members Taylah Bland, Andrew Chubb, G.A. Donovan, Jie Gao, Bates Gill, Bert Hofman, Lizzi C. Lee, Li Shuo, Kate Logan, Lyle Morris, Haolan Wang, Shengyu Wang, Guoguang Wu, Gavin Xu, Hongjia Yang, and Yifan Zhang contributed to this article.