After winning Taiwan’s presidential election with 40% of the vote in January,¹ Lai Ching-te faced his first major test on May 20, 2024: his inaugural address. The speech incited a strong military reaction from the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Meanwhile, the largest civil protests since the Sunflower Student Movement² have gripped the island in reaction to a bill passed by opposition parties — a bill that some fear could expand the legislature’s power and undermine the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) presidency. For a number of reasons, Lai’s address, the protests, and his cross-Strait policies are crucial to understanding the continuing evolution of cross-Strait relations as well as the PRC-U.S.-Taiwan triangle. First and foremost, cross-Strait relations are at an all-time low; second, the U.S. presidential election in November could shift U.S. policy toward Taiwan; and third, Lai will govern with a divided Legislative Yuan, presenting challenges to his domestic agenda.

This paper will first deal with President Lai’s address and how it framed cross-strait issues, Taiwan’s relationship with the PRC, and other important topics. It will then cover China’s response and likely posture in the upcoming months. The paper then analyzes the current civil protests in Taiwan and how a divided legislature will impact politics over the next four years. The penultimate section looks at the expected differences between a Biden presidency and a Trump presidency for Beijing, Taipei, and the world. A conclusion sums up the paper’s key points.

Lai’s speech has been closely monitored and analyzed by scholars, pundits, and major global stakeholders (i.e., the United States and China), especially concerning his position on cross-Strait relations. Studying the speech reveals Lai’s vision and a possible direction for cross-Strait ties over the next four years, setting the tone for either rapprochement or more tensions. Of special significance are the language and framing Lai used to define Taiwan and its unique relationship with mainland China.

Throughout the speech, Lai talked about the importance of keeping peace in the Taiwan Strait through a continuation of the current status quo, which mean no unification with mainland China and no formal independence. By referencing the need for stability across the Taiwan Strait, Lai sent a message that signals continuity with the former administration. The speech, however, was clear and much less restrained than that of his predecessor, Tsai Ing-Wen, whose rhetorical flair in public speeches opted for cautious and strategically dull wording. In fact, Lai placed greater emphasis on the differences between Taiwan and the PRC, starting with the political ones: he repeated the word “democracy” (minzhu, 民主) 31 times and used the word “sovereign” (guojia zhuquan, 國家主權) in regards to the Republic of China (ROC).

The democratic system and values that Taiwan shares with like-minded countries were utilized throughout as a means to frame Taiwan’s preservation as crucial for the wellbeing of the international system: “the future of Taiwan is as important to the world as it is to Taiwan’s people.” In so doing, Lai underscored the island’s strategic importance, including as a global player in the semiconductor sector and in maintaining stable and open supply chains:³

As we look toward our future, we know that semiconductors will be indispensable. And the AI wave has already swept in. Taiwan has already mastered advanced semiconductor manufacturing, and we stand at the center of the AI revolution. We are a key player in supply chains for global democracies. For these reasons, Taiwan has an influence on global economic development, as well as humanity’s well-being and prosperity.

Throughout the speech, the “Republic of China” (zhonghua minguo, 中華民國) nomenclature was used twelve times, parlance intended as an olive branch to link the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. Nevertheless, Lai quickly revealed his fundamental viewpoint: that no matter what one calls “Taiwan,”⁴ no decision will ever be made without the will of its sovereign population. Therefore, despite the ROC reference, Lai clearly identified with Taiwan, its democratic system, its transparent institutions, and its open society. Furthermore, he left no doubt that he considers Taiwan a sovereign nation, not subordinate to and on equal footing with China.⁵ At the end of the speech, Lai framed Taiwan as the “motherland,” an ideology-laden term that Xi Jinping and other Chinese leaders have often used to connote the mainland, “the ancestral motherland” (zuguo dalu, 祖國大陸) of Chinese people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait:⁶ “I want to ask each fellow citizen to praise our mother Taiwan, the land that nurtures and supports us all, and to work together to protect her, honor her, let the world embrace her, and allow her the international respect she deserves as a great nation.”⁷

Lai’s drawing on the ROC terminology while at the same time calling for the Taiwanese people to identify with Taiwan embodies the conflicting positions and complexity of how Taiwanese people relate to China and a Chinese identity. He must balance representing the wishes of an entire population, including the more hardline and independence-leaning faction within the DPP, while at the same time keeping China at bay. From Beijing’s perspective, the speech, and specifically the references to Taiwan as the motherland, are a clear attempt to “desinicize” (去中) Taiwan and pursue a kind of Taiwanese independence in disguise. In reality, Lai, like all elected politicians in democratic systems, must please his electorate. Thus, domestic concerns play an important role in how he chose to frame cross-Strait issues — to appease the mainstream voter and especially younger voters, who overwhelmingly identify solely as Taiwanese.⁸

Lai’s first reference to the PRC framed its aggressive actions toward Taiwan as a threat to the world: “the greatest strategic challenges to global peace and stability.” He corroborated this with the U.S. Congress’s 2024 Indo-Pacific Security Supplemental Appropriations Act,⁹ which is designed to ensure peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait by deterring the PRC from using force to resolve the Taiwan issue. In so doing, he clearly established the PRC as Taiwan’s greatest existential threat and the United States as Taiwan’s most important security guarantor. He also called on Beijing to “face the reality of the Republic of China’s existence, respect the choices of the people of Taiwan, and, in good faith, choose dialogue over confrontation, exchange over containment, and, under the principles of parity and dignity, engage in cooperation with the legal government chosen by Taiwan’s people.”¹⁰ This was an attempt on Lai’s part to co-opt the PRC into a peaceful coexistence that would benefit not only stability in the Indo-Pacific but also the world.

A significant portion of Lai’s inaugural address was devoted to important domestic social issues and the internal divisions plaguing the Legislative Yuan that could prove detrimental to his administration over the next four years. Lai acknowledged challenges such as housing prices, the wealth divide, and the increasing cost of living:

Childcare, long-term care, and social housing services will continue to be expanded. Prices of commodities and housing, as well as the wealth gap, will be addressed. The safety and security of our food, our roads, our schools, and our social safety net will all be enhanced. And our reform efforts in education, the judicial system, and transitional justice will continue.¹¹

When addressing the main elements of his future economic policy, he emphasized the need for a model based on innovation. He pledged that his administration would concentrate on developing the artificial intelligence, military, surveillance technology, semiconductor, and communications industries. All are naturally important for the future of Taiwan’s economy but are also crucial to better protecting the island from potential aggression.

Regarding the divided legislature, one passage is of particular interest: “The majority should respect the minority, while the minority accepts the rule of the majority.”¹² This referenced the chaos that arose in the Legislative Yuan on May 17, when a scuffle between legislators arose over a vote on a reform to enhance the oversight powers of the legislative branch, glimpsing the divisive climate that could characterize the next four years of Taiwanese politics. The proposal originated from the two opposition parties, the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), which together hold a majority. An openly hostile opposition in the legislature threatens to make Lai’s tenure difficult to manage.

Following the January 2024 election, China’s response took a subdued form in the shape of strong verbal condemnation and the poaching of an ROC ally, Nauru. The inauguration gave China a second opportunity to react to Lai and his presidency. On May 21, Beijing defined Lai’s inauguration speech as a “confession of Taiwan independence” and warned that it would soon take countermeasures.¹³ Two days later, on May 23, it organized a large-scale military exercise near the island called “Joint Sword - 2024A”¹⁴ — the choice of the letter “A” has led some to believe that there will be more such exercises in the months to come, raising the specter of increased threat.¹⁵ The military operations lasted for two days and were conducted in five different areas around the main island as well as in four smaller zones surrounding Taiwan’s outer islands (Kinmen, Wuqiu, Matsu, and Dongyin).

Even though common understanding suggests that China’s response to the election itself in January was muted, in reality, it merely changed tactics and renewed efforts to further isolate Taiwan in a less obvious manner. As mentioned, shortly after the election, Beijing poached a diplomatic ally of Taiwan, Nauru, leaving Taipei with only twelve nations that recognize it.¹⁶ Throughout February–April,¹⁷ the China Coast Guard (CCG) regularly patrolled around Jinmen and Matsu, two outer islands under ROC jurisdiction but geographically much closer to mainland China. Beijing has also opened new air routes close to the islands, provoking criticism from Taiwan¹⁸ and other nearby countries like Japan. These gray-zone activities gradually blur accepted conventions by unilaterally and progressively changing the status quo to a new normal, where previous conventions on Taiwan's operating space are no longer presupposed.¹⁹ Beijing's main goal was to ratchet up pressure on Lai pre-inauguration but also normalize military activity around and within Jinmen’s waters. On April 29, Beijing announced it had “normalized” the CCG patrols.²⁰

In terms of cross-Strait exchanges, China will continue to refuse any engagement or dialogue with the DPP as long as it carries an independent plank in its party platform. Beijing may hope that, in the months and years to come, it will be able to split Taiwan’s democracy by taking advantage of the hung legislature and employ a divide-and-conquer strategy. The Chinese Communist Party's willingness to emphasize its connections with the KMT (or the TPP) while continuing to marginalize the DPP is part of this strategy. China will likely continue to trumpet that the DPP is electorally weakened and does not represent the majority of the electorate.²¹ Given the recent brawl in the Legislative Yuan, further political polarization in Taiwan could play right into the PRC’s hands.

On May 28, Taiwan’s opposition-controlled legislature managed to pass a controversial reform bill after days of harsh debate, with mass protests by citizens on the streets.²² The bill, passed after a third reading with a 58–45 vote, was driven through by the two opposition parties, the KMT and the TPP, which together hold a majority of the seats. While the DPP has already announced that the vote is unconstitutional and has decided to send the bill back to the Legislative Yuan for review,²³ citizens have already taken to the streets to protest the opposition and the passing of the act. Thousands of people, many of them young voters, have continued to gather in Taipei to protest since a week before the inaugural speech. The protesters accuse the opposition of not having substantively discussed or reviewed the bill before pushing it through.²⁴

This episode indicates that Lai could face a difficult first term on the domestic front due to the divided legislature, where the two opposition parties, if and when they decide to join forces, hold a majority of the votes. Taiwan could see increasing conflict between the executive and legislative branches in the years to come. It remains to be seen what effect civil society’s protests will have or how the situation with China will evolve from here until the November U.S. presidential election. While there are substantial differences between a Biden presidency and a Trump presidency, there are also similarities between the hypothetical administrations regarding the U.S. position toward China and Taiwan.

In China, there are diverse opinions among scholars and experts regarding the differences between a Biden or Trump presidency and what each would mean for U.S.-China relations. Despite initial hopes that he would be friendlier to China than Trump, Biden has retained many of his predecessor’s positions, and a bipartisan consensus has emerged in Washington that the United States must remain tough on China. Still, differences are evident.

A main difference between the two is that Biden has rebuilt a transatlantic alliance with Europe and co-opted countries in the Indo-Pacific into joining various alliances: technologically oriented, like the Chip 4 Alliance, and security-focused, like the Quad and AUKUS.²⁵ Biden has also openly committed to defending Taiwan in the event of Chinese aggression, not least by signing into law a foreign aid package in April 2024 that included $8 billion in Indo-Pacific defense support. Taiwan received $1.9 billion in military assistance from the package in the form of new weapons systems and training for recruits.²⁶

A Trump victory makes predictions more difficult, both for China and for the world. On the Chinese side, there is hope that a Trump presidency would allow the alliance with Europe to stagnate and that the United States would stop providing aid to Ukraine, thereby reinforcing one of China’s key strategic allies, Russia. In general, China hopes that a Trump-led America will become more isolationist and inward-looking, granting it more space to play a greater role in the Global South. An “America first” posture would be disadvantageous not only for Ukraine but also for other small states that are vulnerable to autocratic invasions, because Washington would signal that it would not defend any states not critical to U.S. security. China and the rest of the world have only one certainty when it comes to a Trump presidency: that it will be four years of unpredictability.

Come what may, regarding Taiwan, there is bipartisan consensus within the United States that the island is a key strategic asset and partner and that it should be protected from a Chinese invasion. 

Lai Ching-te took office on May 20, 2024, at a time when Taiwan is confronted with extraordinary challenges to protect its political and economic future. While Beijing’s attempts to undermine Taipei’s democracy continue to grow, China’s threats are increasingly considered a challenge to the entire Indo-Pacific region and the world at large, prompting a variety of stakeholders to call for peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.²⁷

How China chooses to conduct its Taiwan-related policies in the months to come will depend on how the Lai presidency develops and administers the country with a divided legislature. China will likely be less prone to increasing tensions if Lai has domestic troubles and, in fact, could use the polarization of Taiwanese society to its advantage. It could, for example, try to further divide and destabilize Taiwanese society and spread a narrative that democracy is a failing system without the need to resort to more aggressive actions. Geopolitics is another factor that will shape how China chooses to behave toward Taiwan. The relationship between Beijing and Washington will play a huge role, with a greater likelihood of tension if the United States and Europe continue to improve their own relations with Taiwan.

In the years to come, China’s continued use of gray-zone tactics is probable,²⁸ further diminishing Taiwan’s sovereignty and international space in every possible manner.²⁹ Beijing will strive to implement a mix of economic and military coercion toward the island and its allies, and it will adapt its strategies according to how the United States modifies its own Taiwan policy following the U.S. presidential election in November.

I would like to thank the following people at the Center for China Analysis for their support: Lyle Morris, for his enthusiasm and unwavering help with the paper; Ian Smith, for his editing guidance; Rorry Daniels for polishing the final draft; and the anonymous reviewers, for their keen eyes and suggestions that made the paper a much better read. Needless to say, I look forward to working with all of you on many more projects with CCA!

1. Simona A. Grano, “The Geopolitical Implications of the Taiwanese Elections for China, the United States, and the World,” Asia Society Policy Institute, Center for China Analysis, January 12, 2024, https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/geopolitical-implications-taiw….
2. The Sunflower Student Movement was a 24-day occupation (March 18–April 10, 2014) of Taiwan’s legislature to protest the ruling Kuomintang’s attempt to pass the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement, for which protesters maintained a “clause-by-clause” review was needed. The treaty, signed between China and Taiwan in June 2013, was a follow-up agreement to the controversial Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement signed in 2010.
3. Simona A. Grano, “Taiwan’s Growing Importance for Europe,” in Why Taiwan Matters to Europe, ed. Niklas Swanström, Agust Börjesson, and Yi-Chieh Chen (Stockholm: Institute for Security and Development Policy, 2024).
4. “Some call this land the Republic of China, some call it the Republic of China Taiwan, and some Taiwan; but whichever of these names we ourselves or our international friends choose to call our nation, we will resonate and shine all the same.” Lai Ching-te, “Inaugural Address of ROC 16th-Term President Lai Ching-te,” Office of the President of the Republic of China (ROC), May 20, 2024, https://english.president.gov.tw/News/6726.
5. His precise words were, “The Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China are not subordinate to each other.” Lai, “Inaugural Address of ROC 16th-Term President Lai Ching-te.” It is important to note that all Taiwanese presidents before Lai have framed cross-strait issues in similar manners. Even Ma Ying-jeou referred to Taiwan as an “independent country with full sovereignty.” See Ma Ying-jeou, “Taiwan President Ma: ‘We Are an Independent Country,’” YouTube, April 29, 2010, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ok8yImBU02A.
6. Simona A. Grano, “‘Letters to Taiwanese Compatriots’: The PRC’s Unification Ideology and Taiwanese Response in Cross-Strait Communication,” International Journal of Taiwan Studies 7, no. 1 (2024): 37–64.
7. Lai, “Inaugural Address of ROC 16th-Term President Lai Ching-te.”
8. In 2023, 61.7% of the population identified as “Taiwanese.” “Taiwanese / Chinese Identity (1992/06 ~ 2023/12),” Election Study Center, National Chengchi University, February 22, 2024, https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/PageDoc/Detail?fid=7800&id=6961.
9. See “H.R. 8036 - Indo-Pacific Security Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2024,” 118th Congress (2023–2024), April 23, 2024, https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/8036.
10. Lai, “Inaugural Address of ROC 16th-Term President Lai Ching-te.”
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid. 
13. Xinlu Liang, “Furious Mainland China Slams Taiwanese Leader’s ‘Blatant’ Call for Independence,” South China Morning Post, May 21, 2024, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3263464/furious-mainla….
14. Kelly Ng and Rupert Wingfield-Hayes, “China Holds Military Drills around Taiwan as ‘Strong Punishment,’” BBC, May 23, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cqvv29gpqn1o.
15. “China’s Large-Scale Military Drills around Taiwan Could Become Regular, Warn U.S. Experts,” Economic Times (India), May 26, 2024, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/chinas-large-scale-mi….
16. Thomas Shattuck, “What Does Nauru’s Switch to Beijing Mean for William Lai’s Taiwan?” Global Taiwan Brief 9, no. 2 (2024), https://globaltaiwan.org/2024/01/what-does-naurus-switch-to-beijing-mea….
17. Brian Hioe, “China-Taiwan Boat Collision near Kinmen Continues to Reverberate in Taiwanese Politics,” Diplomat, March 2, 2024, https://thediplomat.com/2024/03/china-taiwan-boat-collision-near-kinmen….
18. Ben Blanchard and Ryan Woo, “Taiwan Says New Chinese Air Routes Threaten Taiwanese Islands’ Flight Safety,” Reuters, April 19, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-opens-new-air-routes-n….
19. Isaac Kardon and Jennifer Kavanagh, “How China Will Squeeze, Not Seize, Taiwan,” Foreign Affairs, May 21, 2024, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/how-china-will-squeeze-not-seize-t….
20. Keoni Everington, “China ‘Normalizes’ Coast Guard Patrols around Taiwan’s Kinmen,” Taiwan News, May 3, 2024, https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/news/5678866; and “Mainland Law-Enforcement Patrols near Kinmen Legitimate: Spokesperson,” Xinhua, May 15, 2024, https://english.news.cn/20240515/d5d8722640ff46fb8f89004c3fa60545/c.html.
21. “国务院台办发言人评论台湾地区选举结果” [Spokesman for the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council Comments on Taiwan’s Election Results], Xinhua, January 13, 2024, http://www.news.cn/tw/20240113/de4b608e529742d6bb428d5993c66c41/c.html.
22. The bill is meant to expand the legislature’s power to question politicians, officials, military personnel, and citizens. The KMT and TPP maintain that the DPP itself tried to pass similar bills in the past, while the DPP accuses the opposition of wanting to use the reforms to undermine Lai’s presidency.
23. Thomson Chau, “Taiwan's Lai Sends Legislative Power Bill Back to Defiant Opposition,” Nikkei Asia, June 11, 2024, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Taiwan-s-Lai-sends-legislative-power-b….
24. Helen Davidson, “Taiwan Passes Controversial Reform Bill after Violence and Protests,” Guardian, May 29, 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/may/28/taiwan-passes-con….
25. James Crabtree, “Why Asia Should Sound the Trump Alarm,” Foreign Policy, March 20, 2024, https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/03/20/asia-trump-us-election-china-geopo….
26. Phelim Kine, “Blinken’s Bad Cop Duty in Beijing,” Politico, China Watcher, April 25, 2024. https://www.politico.eu/newsletter/china-watcher/blinkens-bad-cop-duty-….
27. Philippe Le Corre, “The ‘Rebirth’ of Europe-Taiwan Relations: Explaining Europe’s New Balance between Beijing and Taipei,” Asia Society Policy Institute, Center for China Analysis, January 10, 2024, https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/rebirth-europe-taiwan-relation…. Philippe argues that the European Union is starting to focus more on Taiwan than it did in the past. See also “MOFA Welcomes European Parliament Resolutions Expressing Concern over China’s Escalation of Taiwan Strait Tensions and Supporting Deeper Comprehensive Partnership with Taiwan,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs (ROC), Press Release, February 29, 2024, https://en.mofa.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=1328&s=116665.
28. Kevin Rudd, “‘Short of War,’ China’s Gray Zone Strategy on Taiwan Is Gathering in Intensity,” Washington Post, June 6, 2024, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2024/06/06/kevin-rudd-china-tai….
29. Jude Blanchett and Bonnie Glaser, “Taiwan’s Most Pressing Challenge Is Strangulation, Not Invasion,” War on the Rocks, November 9, 2023, https://warontherocks.com/2023/11/taiwans-most-pressing-challenge-is-st….