This year, 2024, is consequential for international politics, with more than 40 countries around the world holding national elections, including Russia, Taiwan, the United States, Mexico, India, Indonesia, and South Africa, among others. First in line were the presidential and legislative elections in Taiwan, held on January 13, with enormous geopolitical implications for several actors in the region, as well as for the world.

The outcome of the elections will impact cross–Strait dynamics and U.S.-China relations, as well as third countries’ foreign policies and China-related strategies in the months and years to come.

General expectations in the run-up to the elections had consistently maintained that if the China-friendly party were to win, cross-Strait tensions — currently at an all-time high — would quickly diminish and the future would bring Taiwan toward closer (economic) ties with China; on the other hand, were the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) to win a third straight presidential term and solidify its position, this outcome would lead the island further away from China, with potential for the emergence of a direct confrontation. More difficult to pinpoint was what would happen in case of victory by a third candidate, Ko Wen-je of the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), who as a wild card had little prospects of winning the presidency on his own.

While none of the extreme scenarios described above will materialize any time soon, variations among the different camps are worth analyzing. With these differences in mind, this paper will unfold in four parts.

First, it will briefly deal with the electoral results and the winning party, including the Legislative Yuan vote. This section will also analyze the role of the TPP and how the party could sway the balance of power in the parliament.

Second, it will discuss how a different result of Taiwan’s presidential elections (a Kuomintang (KMT) presidential victory) might have had a different impact on cross-Strait relations and regional dynamics, as well as highlight continuity in policies and positions across the political spectrum.

Third, it will examine how China has attempted to influence the elections before the vote and the actions it is likely to take toward Taiwan in the future.

Finally, the paper will analyze some of the likely trajectories for relations between the United States, Taiwan, and China, particularly considering the upcoming U.S. national elections in November 2024, before reaching some conclusions.

The DPP administration, despite having disappointed a big part of the electorate, has nevertheless managed to remain popular and win the election for a third term, even though by a small margin; such levels of continued support are remarkable, considering that the party has been in power for the past eight years, and many voters have expressed a sentiment of wariness and fatigue toward the DPP and its failure in solving Taiwan’s most pressing issues.¹

William Lai and the DPP won the presidency with 40% of the votes, while the opposition vote was split between the KMT (33.4%) and the TPP (26.4%) (see Figure 1).² The presidential vote was closely contested, with the KMT gaining more than 3.9 million votes, and the TPP about 3.1 million. The failed joint electoral ticket between the KMT and the TPP back in November contributed to Lai’s victory with more than 5 million votes.

The DPP victory suggests a certain degree of continuity in the posture the country will maintain toward the outside world. In international affairs, it is likely that Lai will increase ties with democratic countries and follow outgoing President Tsai Ing-wen’s low-key approach to cross-Strait policies. Since being chosen as the presidential candidate, William Lai has renewed his efforts to reassure the United States that he would not propose any pro-independence policy to ensure good relations with Western powers and has distanced himself from past statements, when he defined himself as a “pragmatic worker for Taiwanese independence.”³ At the same time, Lai has committed to upholding four pledges that Tsai defined in 2021 — namely, defending Taiwan’s freedom and democracy, safeguarding the island’s sovereignty, resisting pressure from Beijing, and making sure that the Taiwanese people will be able to choose the island’s future.

In terms of economic policies, it is reasonable to expect that the party will continue to try to reduce its trade dependence on China and renew its efforts to establish even firmer relations with important partners including Australia, Europe, and Japan to strengthen its economic security by diversifying trade.

On the domestic front, Lai will carry on with the policies partially implemented or discussed by the Tsai administration, such as raising wages, realizing further education subsidies for high school and college students,⁴ renewing the party’s efforts to build a system of social housing, as well as increasing taxes on owners of multiple properties⁵ and offering subsidies to renters.

On defense issues, Lai will continue to strengthen the military while resisting any kind of negotiation with Beijing.

To summarize, a DPP victory means that Lai will increase efforts to liaise with like-minded countries and signifies continuity in policies, possibly also when it comes to keeping current personnel in place.

While cross-Strait relations have been portrayed as the most important topic in these elections, domestic issues such as housing prices and stagnating wages have played a crucial role, especially concerning the vote for the legislature.

This has particularly affected the ruling DPP, given the growing dissatisfaction with its economic policies during its eight years in power. In the past, voters have often used local and municipal elections to express how they felt about these issues; in the 2024 presidential elections, the disappointment has led to the DPP’s loss of its majority in the parliament: an outcome that could limit the government’s ability to implement certain policies.

For the first time since 2004, no party won a majority in Taiwan's Legislative Yuan: the Democratic Progressive Party won 51 seats, the Kuomintang 52, and the Taiwan People's Party 8 (Figure 2). Of the DPP's 51 seats, 36 were from single-member districts, 2 were from Indigenous constituencies, and 13 were elected as at-large legislators based on the political party vote. The KMT also won 36 single-member district constituencies, 3 Indigenous seats, and 13 at-large seats.

Despite the KMT’s gain of 15 seats and the DPP’s loss of 11, there is disappointment in the KMT camp, which was hoping to win an outright majority in the Legislative Yuan. Compared to the 2020 election, the DPP dropped from 62 seats to 51 seats, while the KMT went from 37 to 52.⁶

Now that the TPP managed to obtain three at-large seats, rising from five to eight, it will probably not strictly align itself to either the KMT or the DPP but will side with either party depending on the issues at stake, wielding its advantage to affect the balance of legislative power.

A divided legislature presents the ruling administration with problems when passing new laws or budgets and could lead to a paralysis in governing the country. In fact, even with a parliamentary majority, ruling parties can face obstacles in passing key legislation.  Once the new administration comes into office later this year, Taiwan’s legislature is expected to begin debates on labor insurance reform and on issues raised during the electoral campaign, ranging from housing policy to education subsidies. To bring about significant transformation and to pass laws, Taiwan’s president and the executive branch of the government will need the cooperation of the legislature. The passing of any new decree will thus be significantly hindered by the fact that the ruling party does not hold a legislative majority.

Finally, a hung parliament could affect national security issues. The parliament scrutinizes proposed laws and government budgetary bills such as military spending. On the latter issue, for instance, although all three parties agree on the need to continue to spend to upgrade the island’s defense, opinions differ when it comes to which purchases (e.g., which weapons) must be made and which amounts should be spent. A divided legislature will render any decision and related approvals more complicated and could potentially hamper Taiwan’s relationship with the United States, which would see Taiwan challenged by a paralysis of its legislative process and a slow but steady weakening of its military modernization plans, largely supported by the United States.⁷ Decisions on defense budgets and arms procurement could become gridlocked, especially if the TPP decides to side with the KMT on these choices.

Since foreign policy is in the hands of the president, Lai is expected to continue the current approach to China, while relations between China and the United States will become even more important as the United States heads closer to its own important election in November 2024.

Regardless of the DPP winning the presidency, it is not likely that the elections in Taiwan will profoundly modify the evolution of cross-Strait and regional tensions in the long run, as these are mostly influenced by other structural issues that will be discussed at the end of this section. The situation in the Taiwan Strait will continue to remain tense, notwithstanding the election outcome. However, a KMT victory would have impacted cross-Strait relations and regional stability differently, especially in the short run.

In the immediate aftermath of the elections, a win for the KMT might have dispelled tensions temporarily with Beijing, and it is likely that the party would have reopened various communication channels with China. 

In fact, the KMT has consistently stressed the necessity to restart a dialogue with the People's Republic of China (PRC), primarily based on the 1992 Consensus, and has also highlighted that the KMT is the only party able to talk to China and keep conflict at bay.

While the KMT may have opened new avenues for communication with Beijing, in line with its political manifesto, such dialogues could have turned out to be a double-edged sword — maintaining the status quo while signaling to Beijing that China’s ambitions for “peaceful reunification” would not be achieved any time soon would have proved a difficult balancing act.

Regarding cross-Strait relations, the KMT would have been careful not to initiate any dealing that brought Taiwan on a path of closer political cooperation with China, as this would incur the risk of upsetting the electorate. Beijing may have been led into believing that after an initial phase of reestablishing dialogue, the KMT would be ready to start political talks and deliver some concrete results for China, which would not have been feasible. Therefore, in the long run, a KMT presidency might have turned out to be even more problematic than a DPP victory.

The narrow DPP victory with 40% of the votes may allow Beijing to save face by continuing the narrative that the DPP is a splittist party, opposed to reunification, and things would have turned out differently had the KMT won the presidency, keeping this option open for the future.⁸ Likewise, the fact that the parliament is split may play into Beijing’s hands. With a divided Taiwanese government, the PRC will carry out both overt and covert operations to destabilize the country and at the same time damage the credibility of the DPP and of Taiwanese democracy by portraying it as a failing system.

The reality, though, is that support for reunification is fading even among hardline blue voters,⁹ given Beijing’s aggressive behavior of the past few years and younger generations’ being more averse to the idea of reunification with China than their parents or grandparents (tianrandu 天然獨).¹⁰ The KMT itself has toned down its position to appeal to larger swaths of the electorate; it has become more common to hear comments by prominent KMT personalities, such as KMT International Relations Director Alexander Huang, that emphasize the need to deter China: “We are under a great military threat [from China]: Our position is deterrence without provocation: assurance without appeasement.”¹¹

While the KMT has adopted a softer approach toward reunification, the underlying goal of all the main parties at the moment remains the maintenance of the status quo, consistent with the preference of more than 80% of the population.¹²

Regarding foreign policies, had the KMT won the elections, it would have been more difficult to navigate in a situation where Taiwan is dependent on the United States for its security and on China for economic prosperity. For starters, in an election year, the United States would have been averse to any sort of dialogue between China and Taiwan gaining ground, even regarding economic agreements.¹³ So any approach that would have restarted communications with China might have infringed on Taiwan’s relations with the United States.

In security matters, the risk for Europe, had the KMT won the presidency and had tensions across the Taiwan Strait decreased, could have produced a diminished effort to work together with regional allies and partners to sustain Taiwan’s de facto independence, set aside by the lack of urgency in protecting the island, as tensions would have been perceived as lower. Thus, a KMT win would have brought about an interval phase, during which main players including the United States and Europe would have been cautiously waiting to discern the new direction of cross-Strait dynamics.

Finally, it is worth noting that in the long term, structural factors including the China-U.S. competition will likely play a much bigger role than this particular election in shaping regional dynamics and in driving tensions up or down across the Strait.¹⁴  Likewise, how China’s economic situation evolves will have a huge impact on the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) willingness to open yet another front in the form of a massive military confrontation, which, if it failed, could bring about the end of the CCP’s rule.¹⁵

Regardless of the outcome of the elections, tensions will continue to run high, and this will lead to more scrutiny by other countries in the region alarmed by China's aggressive actions against Taiwan and conscious of the fact that stakes are now higher because of China’s increased military capabilities. This has already led to deepening relations among the United States, its allies, and its security partners.¹⁶

Either a DPP or a KMT victory would have eventually resulted in a continuation of each party’s existing policies, especially when it comes to international and cross-Strait relations. In fact, all mainstream parties in Taiwan have limited maneuvering space when it comes to their China policies; as mentioned, this is more influenced and determined by exogenous structural factors such as the U.S.-China competition and by the need for all mainstream political forces in Taiwan to keep good ties with the United States. Since Xi Jinping has increased China’s military capabilities and stepped up military intimidation of Taiwan, all major parties have been forced to reshape their policies and stances toward Beijing, as well as their economic and defense strategies.

The common thread among major political parties in Taiwan is that they all reject being ruled by the PRC. However, they differ in their ideological standpoints concerning the future of the nation, and these in turn have the potential to raise or diffuse tensions across the Taiwan Strait. All the presidential candidates maintained that their parties are best suited to ensure peace and stability across the Strait, through either better ties with China or closer relations with the United States.

The parties’ different positions, however, all bear some risks. The DPP’s approach of strengthening Taiwan’s democratic structures and enhancing ties with fellow democracies and with the United States could increase the likelihood of conflict, while the KMT’s pro-China stance would endanger Taiwan’s sovereignty and de facto independence.

In the past 10 years, Taiwan's China policy has increasingly converged toward the middle of the political spectrum, while more radical pro-unification or pro-independence positions have been diluted to attract the mainstream electorate. The main pillars of this toned-down China policy, common to all parties, albeit with some differences, are the upholding of ROC (Republic of China) sovereignty (including by the DPP and Lai) and the rejection of Beijing’s “one country, two systems” formula (including by the KMT).

Accordingly, all major parties will continue to focus on the importance of maintaining the status quo, that is, Taiwan’s de facto independence: the DPP through closer ties with the United States and greater distance from China, the KMT through closer economic ties to mainland China and resumption of dialogue.

The TPP and Ko Wen-je have stated that in foreign policy, a TPP administration would follow Tsai Ing-wen’s previous approach but would also seek to tone down tensions with China while keeping good relations with the United States. Ko has described the relationship with the mainland as requiring risk management, along with deterrence and a will to communicate. Deterrence and communication are important aspects of his envisioned strategy where he emphasizes the need to increase the cost of war for China while keeping communication channels open.¹⁷ While the specifics of such an approach have not been spelled out, the TPP will be an important force to be reckoned with in the Legislative Yuan.

Finally, both opposition candidates, Hou You-yi and Ko Wen-je, focused their campaign strategies on accusing William Lai of being unnecessarily provocative toward China and thereby risking war; at the same time, they carefully avoided any statement that could make them appear as too friendly toward Beijing¹⁸ All three presidential candidates emphasized the need to strengthen Taiwan’s self-defense capacity to deter China. Even for the KMT, which propagates closer relations with the mainland, national defense is part of its “3-D strategy”: dialogue, de-escalation, and deterrence.¹⁹

William Lai will have strong reasons to avoid frustrating Beijing unnecessarily while honoring the Taiwanese electorate’s very clear preference for maintaining the island’s de facto independence. Striking this increasingly difficult balance will not be easy. The next president will have to navigate escalating U.S.-China tensions, keeping a progressively more hostile China at bay, and deflecting punitive economic and political measures coming from Beijing. For these reasons, the risk of an escalatory cycle in the region remains considerably high as long as Xi Jinping continues to emphasize the importance of achieving national reunification in the near future.²⁰

In the past, the PRC government has repeatedly expressed its preference for the KMT and has tried to influence Taiwanese voters to choose the China-friendly party while trying to undermine the KMT’s opponents.  Early in the electoral campaign, China targeted one would-be presidential candidate in particular, Foxconn founder Terry Gou, by launching a tax evasion investigation into his company. In Beijing’s view, Gou’s candidacy would split the blue vote; he eventually dropped out of the race at the end of November.²¹

Six months before, in April 2023, China announced an investigation into alleged trade barriers erected by Taiwan. While it initially scheduled the release of the investigation’s findings for October 12, China postponed their issuance until January 12, 2024, one day prior to the election, a decision clearly aimed at conveying the potential painful countermeasures that should be expected in case of a third term for the DPP.²²

Beijing has also used similar narratives as the KMT in promoting the “war versus peace” account in nationalistic media outlets including the Global Times, backing up such efforts with more visible and direct reminders of the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA’s) military might.²³ In the past year, China’s warplanes and ships have increased their intrusions into Taiwanese waters and airspace.²⁴ Also in the Global Times, the CPP has repeatedly stated that a DPP victory would increase instability and worsen security in the Taiwan Strait, repeatedly referring to DPP politicians as “splittists” and “separatists.”²⁵

China has employed various tools to influence the outcome of the elections. Having learned from past mistakes, however, it has refrained from highly provocative shows of forces, such as military exercises — in the immediate run-up to the election — aware that they could generate a backlash, potentially swaying the Taiwanese to vote anew for the DPP. Therefore, it switched to using covert methods, such as misinformation/disinformation campaigns, which increased exponentially and were more difficult to pinpoint and detect. Such hybrid warfare methods aimed at infiltrating Taiwan’s free society through both traditional and social media and at further creating divisions and polarization.

As a case in point, one article published in the China Daily discussed how Taiwan is a pawn in the great power competition between the United States and China and concluded that the Taiwanese should not trust the United States to come to their aid: “What [the United States] wants to do is to use Taiwan to control the mainland” (以台制华).²⁶ There is also evidence of mounting influence operations and other forms of cognitive warfare by Beijing to sow doubt and distrust in the minds of the Taiwanese regarding the U.S. commitment toward the island’s defense, especially after the Russian invasion of Ukraine.²⁷ More recently, the CCP specifically targeted the elections in its disinformation campaigns and especially in attacking DPP politicians. For instance, it spread rumors that Hsiao Bi-khim is a U.S. citizen and therefore not eligible to run for the vice-presidency. Deepfake videos of DPP candidates and fake news about their eligibility are among the most common forms of disinformation exposed by fact-checkers.²⁸

In the months following the elections, we are likely to see China working to further aggravate Taiwan’s internal political divisions. A hung parliament will help China’s cause, as it allows Beijing to push the narrative that democracy is a failing system and the party in power is unable to rule. We can also expect China to increase its rhetoric on the risk of war to add more psychological pressure on the Taiwanese, especially around May, when the new administration assumes office.

Before the elections, Beijing employed influence and disinformation tools hoping to shape the dynamics in favor of China’s preferred candidate. In the days and weeks following the elections, the CCP will probably feel compelled to lash out and show its anger at Lai’s victory, but tensions will eventually simmer down as it is not in China’s interest to raise the stakes too high in 2024.

Nevertheless, the DPP win for a third consecutive presidential term is problematic for Beijing on many fronts. First and foremost, this victory consolidates the trend of voting for the party that wants more distance from China. So far, Taiwan has experienced three electoral turnovers between different parties starting in 2000.²⁹ Since that time, no party has ever governed for more than eight years until now. Second, percentages of younger generations who identify as “Taiwanese” and, therefore, sympathize with the view of distancing Taiwan from China are bound to increase even further.³⁰ So to the extent that the DPP is partly an extension of a younger voter base with fewer ties and less attraction to the PRC, the DPP victory will prove challenging for Beijing.

In the long term, we can expect China to continue to use a mix of military and economic coercion measures directed at Taiwan. Military maneuvers and exercises by China in the waters surrounding Taiwan serve a robust psychological purpose aimed at instilling fear and gradually extending China’s influence over the island. However, economic coercion measures implemented thus far, such as those against the agricultural and fisheries industries, have been mostly symbolic and have not posed a significant risk to the economy (the agricultural sector accounts for less than 2% of Taiwan’s gross domestic product).³¹ The only way to cause real damage to Taiwan would be to target the high-tech sector. But China has so far refrained from doing so, as such action would negatively affect its own struggling economy.³²

Given its domestic economic difficulties, it is likely that the CCP will want to wait for the results of the U.S. presidential election in November before launching any new strategies toward Taiwan. It is improbable, therefore, that we will see any fundamental shift of tactics in 2024, but we can expect that Beijing will continue to maintain the current level of pressure while avoiding any further escalation. The show of military might in the weeks after the election, just like that after former Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, is possible but will eventually be dialed down once the news of the DPP victory diminishes in importance and media visibility.

However, Beijing’s ultimate goal of national reunification will not fade: Xi has made it very clear that he will not renounce the use of force to ensure that the two sides are reunited.³³ Beijing’s view of the current external environment puts a premium on the national security threats facing China. This has led to a further hardening of China’s position toward Taiwan, and the long game of unification has become more urgent and much more ideological. Because of this hardened posture, criticism of China and skepticism toward closer ties with the mainland within Taiwan are bound to grow.

Concretely, for the next four years of the DPP presidency, it is likely that Beijing will continue to try to isolate Taiwan diplomatically by poaching its allies — with the recent change of Nauru's diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing a day after the election as a major case in point — excluding Taiwan from international organizations,³⁴ insisting that corporations or countries follow a China-friendly terminology in relation to Taiwan, and continuing to warn third countries not to improve their relations (in any form) with the island. We can also expect further military maneuvers, continuous nonrecognition of the median line of the Taiwan Strait, and more shrill tones instilling fears of imminent Chinese military aggression. However, it will be especially important to watch China’s coercive economic measures against Taiwan, as they will be far more revealing of Beijing’s real intentions toward the island. Any step that puts more emphasis on economic coercion measures and especially on the high-tech sector would signify that China is ready to change its previous approach regarding Taiwan, even if this proves to be damaging to China’s own economic interests. In turn, such a change in strategies could mean that China sees the resolution of the “Taiwan Problem” as urgent and not to be deferred.

Nevertheless, it is more likely that Beijing will continue to drive up its grey zone tactics to put further pressure on the Taiwanese government and its population, while probably refraining from responding in any way that would seriously sway economic ties between the two sides of the Strait. Any move to limit Taiwanese investments in China would further encumber China’s own export sector and hamper the already unstable Chinese economy.³⁵

Given the upcoming U.S. election in November, any change of policy by the United States vis-à-vis Taiwan or China is extremely unlikely at this moment. Regarding Taiwan, the Biden administration will continue to support arms sales to the island, increase economic ties with Taiwan while trying to provide credible reassurance and deterrence toward China signaling that it does not support independence for Taiwan.³⁶

Concerning China, preoccupied with its own election cycle and warily watching the two major conflicts in Europe and in the Middle East, the current U.S. administration will renew its efforts to tone down tensions across the Strait. An important step in this direction was the agreement reached in San Francisco in November 2023 to reopen military-to-military communication channels between Washington and Beijing.³⁷ Despite this, the potential for escalation or further worsening of the relations remains high. In early January 2024, for instance, China sanctioned five U.S. defense firms for selling arms to Taiwan.³⁸ Continuing U.S. sales of defensive arms to Taiwan will remain a flashpoint between the two great powers in the months and years to come.

The reelection of Donald Trump in November could play into China’s hands. A more inward-looking administration would allow China to cement its grip on the developing world. While Trump launched several initiatives to counter Beijing’s growing might, such as launching a trade war and slapping tariffs on Chinese imports, Biden has adopted a more comprehensive effort to counter China with his long-term and expanding sanctions toward the PRC.³⁹ By rekindling ties with Europe and other allies and by establishing new security agreements in the Indo-Pacific, Biden has created greater difficulties for China’s economy and geopolitical ambitions.

An increasing degree of transatlantic unity toward China would probably diminish under Trump, whose administration could also mean reduced support for Ukraine. This would have an impact on Taiwan by signaling that the U.S. commitment to use its resources to combat unchecked aggression is wavering, lessons the Chinese leadership would no doubt appreciate.⁴⁰ Such considerations will become more prominent as Congress and the White House debate long-term funding for Ukraine and how to deal with China and Taiwan in the future.

The 2024 Taiwanese elections took place against the backdrop of intensifying China-U.S. competition and a highly volatile international situation. With major wars raging in Gaza and Ukraine, both of which involve the United States as a third-party protagonist, Taiwan’s election further adds to the complex international environment facing Taiwan, the PRC, and the United States.

Concerning the future, despite different viewpoints, all three presidential candidates in the race expressed support for preserving the status quo, in line with widespread public sentiment. As such, the current evolution of cross-Strait relations and regional tensions are unlikely to change fundamentally as a result of this election. It is far more likely that larger factors of U.S.-China competition and China’s own domestic situation and its military capabilities will play a more decisive role in determining whether Beijing is confident enough to take direct military action to unify Taiwan with the mainland.

In the near term, before Lai’s inauguration in May 2024, China will likely increase its rhetoric and military intimidation. After a powerful but short display of military might, we should expect a continuation and possible expansion of previous strategies used by Beijing. This includes but may not be limited to additional economic coercion measures on agricultural products, further pressure on the ROC’s diplomatic partners (as well as nonofficial ones) to switch recognition, pressure on corporations to conform to a China-friendly nomenclature of the island, and an intensification of grey zone activities and disinformation to further polarize Taiwanese society.

At the international level, Taiwan will continue to face a difficult geopolitical situation in which maintaining strategic autonomy will be a challenge, given intensifying China-U.S. competition. The island’s role as a geopolitical hotspot and main semiconductor manufacturer, however, will continue to increase its importance and ensure that third parties, especially the United States and Western countries, remain invested in safeguarding cross-Strait stability.

Within Taiwan, these various pressures will continue to strengthen and meld the two key strands of nationalism and identity on the island: being the “Republic of China” and being “Taiwanese,” increasingly distinct and separate from the mainland.⁴¹ That is the reality with which Beijing will ultimately need to reckon.

1. Ho Ai Li. “DPP’s Lai Ching-te widens lead in polls two weeks before Taiwan presidential election.” The Straits Times, December 28, 2023. https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/dpp-s-lai-ching-te-widens-l…
2. Joyu Wang. “Taiwan voters defy Beijing in electing new president.” The Wall Street Journal, January 13, 2024. https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/taiwan-presidential-elections-2024-baa62…
3. Brian Hioe. “DPP emphasizes continuity for 2024 elections at Party Congress on Sunday.” New Bloom Magazine, July 18, 2023. https://newbloommag.net/2023/07/18/dpp-party-congress-2023/
4. Brian Hioe. “Ahead of elections, DPP announces education subsidies to court youth vote.” New Bloom Magazine, June 30, 2023. https://newbloommag.net/2023/06/30/dpp-education-subsidies/
5. Focus Taiwan. CNA English News. “Cabinet proposes higher hoarding tax as Lai talks housing policy.” July 7, 2023. https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202307070014
6. Focus Taiwan. CNA English News. “ELECTION 2024/No party gets majority in legislature; KMT wins most seats.” January 13, 2024. https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202401130014
7. Davina Tham. “Taiwan Votes 2024: A hung parliament could emerge for the first time since 2008. Here's why it matters.” Channels News Asia (CAN). January 3, 2024. https://www.channelnewsasia.com/asia/taiwan-elections-hung-parliament-l…
8. A few hours after it became official that William Lai had won the elections, China dismissed the outcome and stated that the ruling DPP does not represent mainstream public opinion. See Clement Tan. “‘Taiwan is China’s Taiwan’: Beijing says Taiwan’s ruling party is not representative of popular opinion.” CNBC, January 13, 2024. https://www.cnbc.com/2024/01/13/china-reacts-to-pivotal-taiwan-presiden…
9. Blue voters are those associated with the goal of achieving unification with the mainland; recently, however, the pan-blue coalition (consisting of the KMT and all those parties that share ideological orientations and positions with it) has toned-down its approach and moved toward a more restrained position, supporting the status quo while rejecting immediate unification with mainland China.
10. This term indicates young but also first-time voters, also known as “natural independentists” (天然獨) who were born in the 1980s and 1990s, grew up when Taiwan was democratizing, and have a strong Taiwanese identity as this process has now become fully fledged.
11. As quoted in Anne McElvoy. “The first nail-biter election of 2024: Taiwan.” Politico, December 23, 2023. https://www.politico.eu/article/tawain-election-2024-taipei-south-china…
12. CNA English News. “Over 83 percent of Taiwanese people want to keep status quo: poll.” https://focustaiwan.tw/cross-strait/201811020027
13. Helena Legard and Abigaël Vasselier. “Navigating Taiwan relations in 2024: Practical considerations for European policy makers.” Merics, December 21, 2023. https://merics.org/en/report/navigating-taiwan-relations-2024-practical…
14. Legard and Vasselier. “Navigating Taiwan relations in 2024”; Simona A. Grano and David W. F. Huang. China-U.S. Competition: Impact on Small and Middle Powers’ Strategic Choices. Palgrave Macmillan, 2023.
15. Cai Xia. “The weakness of Xi Jinping: How hubris and paranoia threaten China’s future.” Foreign Affairs, September 2022. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/xi-jinping-china-weakness-hubris-p…
16. Veerle Nouwens. “U.S. allies in the Indo-Pacific align on China.” IISS, 2023. https://www.iiss.org/en/online-analysis/online-analysis/2023/05/us-alli…
17. Christopher Bodeen. “Taiwan’s presidential candidate Ko Wen-je seeks a middle ground with China, attracting young voters.” Associated Press, January 4, 2024. https://apnews.com/article/taiwan-elections-taiwan-peoples-party-ko-can…
18. Claudia Wessling. “Taiwan’s election and cross-strait relations—three candidates, one goal: Maintaining the status quo.” Merics, December 12, 2023. https://merics.org/en/comment/taiwans-election-and-cross-strait-relatio…
19. Hou You-yi. “Taiwan’s path between extremes: The Kuomintang presidential candidate lays out a plan to avert war with China.” Foreign Affairs, September 18, 2023. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/taiwan/taiwans-path-between-extremes
20. Simona A. Grano. “‘Letters to Taiwanese compatriots’: The PRC’s unification ideology and Taiwanese response in cross-strait communication.” International Journal of Taiwan Studies, December 6, 2023. https://brill.com/view/journals/ijts/aop/article-10.1163-24688800-20231…
21. Jennifer Creery and Betty Hou. “Taiwan opposition alliance collapses, Terry Gou quits race.” Bloomberg, November 24, 2023. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-11-24/taiwan-s-hou-ko-pick…
22. Filip Leskovsky. “Taiwan rejects China’s trade barrier findings, calls it political interference.” Radio Taiwan International, December 15, 2023. https://en.rti.org.tw/news/view/id/2010431
23. The Global Times, the English-language mouthpiece of the Chinese Communist Party, portrays the elections as a choice between “peace or war,” in Wang Qi. “DPP collusion with external forces will push Taiwan into abyss of disaster, mainland official says at flagship cross-Straits seminar,” Global Times, August 17, 2023. https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202308/1296487.shtml
24. Invasions of the median line in the Taiwan Strait are rather new tools employed by China, which until Tsai Ing-wen became president in 2016 were almost nonexistent.
25. Yang, Sheng. “Candidates begin registering for Taiwan regional leader election.” Global Times, November 20, 2023. https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202311/1302178.shtml  
26. China Daily Editorial. “Relying on U.S. for 'Taiwan independence' is just wishful thinking by Lai and his ilk.” August 16, 2023. https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202308/16/WS64dcb247a31035260b81c857.ht…
27. Helen Davidson. “Cognitive warfare and weather balloons: China accused of using ‘all means’ to influence Taiwan vote.” The Guardian, January 9, 2024. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/09/taiwan-presidential-elect…
28. AFP Hong Kong. “Posts falsely claim Taiwan election candidate ineligible to run as 'she holds U.S. citizenship.'” December 12, 2023. https://factcheck.afp.com/doc.afp.com.34749EQ
29. The Taiwanese have been able to directly elect their president since 1996; the first party turnover took place in 2000, with the DPP winning for the first time.
30. Today, almost two-thirds of the population on Taiwan identify as Taiwanese, and less than one-third as both Taiwanese and Chinese. See Election Studies Center, National Chengchi University, “Taiwanese/Chinese Identity (1992/06~2023/06).” https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/PageDoc/Detail?fid=7800&id=6961
31. Max Zenglein. “Increasing economic pressure on Taiwan is risky business for China.” Merics, December 13, 2023. https://merics.org/en/comment/increasing-economic-pressure-taiwan-risky…; Min-Hua Chiang. “China can’t afford to ban Taiwan’s semiconductors.” East Asia Forum, December 3, 2022. https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2022/12/03/china-cant-afford-to-ban-taiwa….
32. “Taiwan’s economy is highly dependent on export of semiconductors. In 2020, 40 per cent of Taiwan’s total exports were semiconductor chips, with China and Hong Kong being two of their biggest importers,” as quoted from Min-Hua Chiang. “China can’t afford to ban Taiwan’s semiconductors.”
33. Yvette Tan. “Taiwan and China will 'surely be reunified' says Xi in New Year's Eve address.” BBC News, December 31, 2023. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-67855477
34. Simona A. Grano. “Increased engagement with Taiwan needs less rhetoric and more (quiet) action.” 9Dashline, December 20, 2023. https://www.9dashline.com/article/increased-engagement-with-taiwan-need…  
35. “Crucially, most Taiwanese exports to China are not destined for the latter’s home market; they are intermediate products for Chinese finished goods mainly destined for export,” quoted from Max Zenglein. “Increasing economic pressure on Taiwan is risky business for China.” Merics, December 13, 2023. 
36. Bonnie S. Glaser, Jessica Chen Weiss, and Thomas J. Christensen. “Taiwan and the true sources of deterrence: Why America must reassure, not just threaten, China.” Foreign Affairs, November 30, 2023. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/taiwan/taiwan-china-true-sources-deterre…
37. Brigitte Blöchlinger. “Begrüssenswerte Entwicklung.” UZH Magazine, November 23, 2023. https://www.news.uzh.ch/de/articles/news/2023/simona-grano-biden-xi.html
38. Jane Zhang and Yi Wei Wong. “China sanctions five U.S. defense firms on Taiwan arms sales.” Bloomberg, January 7, 2024. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-01-07/china-sanctions-five…
39. Dion Rabouin. “Trump's trade war on China was a failure in every possible way.” Axios, February 1, 2021. https://www.axios.com/2021/02/01/trump-trade-war-china-failure
40. Michael Poznansky. “The Ukraine-Taiwan tradeoff.” Foreign Affairs, January 5, 2024. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/ukraine-taiwan-tradeoff
41. Katherin Hille. “Becoming Taiwan: In China’s shadow, an island asserts its identity.” Financial Times, January 5, 2024. https://www.ft.com/content/6e9a0243-87f2-445e-b563-e8f67082b3da