I like to compare the question of South Korea’s North Korea policy to how a family might deal with a relative who can’t get their life together.

Maybe someone you care about is stuck in a rut of sloth or selfishness or substance abuse or depression. Do you provide the wayward loved one with material support, maybe paying their rent or buying them food, with the hope that a boost will allow them to build the confidence needed to get back on their feet? Or do you pull away all assistance, hoping that only by hitting rock bottom will they accept the gravity of their situation and take a turn for the better?

In short, do they just need to feel like someone cares about them, or do they need a kick in the behind?

Since becoming a democracy in the late 1980s, South Korea has tried various approaches to dealing with its poor, nuclear-armed ethnic brethren in the North. Under liberal governments from 1998 to 2008, Seoul carried out what it called the Sunshine Policy, which mandated unconditional economic aid to North Korea and instituted projects of economic cooperation. The hope was that with shared interests, the two sides could build trust and work toward reunifying.

In 2008, the conservative government of President Lee Myung-bak changed course. Lee has a business background, and applied the cold thinking of cost-benefit analysis to North Korea policy: Pyongyang wasn’t about to change, he believed, so no point in wasting money or energy hoping for improved behavior.

President Park Geun-hye took office in early 2013 pledging to balance these two approaches in a policy she christened “trustpolitick.” She didn’t promise any bolds moves like the resumption of large-scale aid but left the door open to dialogue that could at least avoid military clashes.

Last week, in the wake of tests that confirmed North Korea’s refusal to give up its nuclear weapons and long range missile programs, Park made a firebreathing speech in Parliament in which she voiced a shift in her approach, and the public acceptance of some uncomfortable truths.

The key point was Park’s contention that Seoul can no longer wait with the expectation that North Korea will change on its own. She also said that Pyongyang’s insistence on developing nuclear weapons would lead to the regime’s collapse.

Her tone was noteworthy: Park didn’t sound rueful, like she was delivering bad news. She came across more as one with a determination not to repeat past mistakes.

The domestic discussion about North Korea policy is often colored with flimsy optimism, the hope that with a few meetings North Korea may come around and play nice. North Korea’s latest moves have apparently exhausted Park’s patience.

And she isn’t the only one. Let’s not forget that Park is a politician and that South Korea is a democracy. This shift in tone wouldn’t have occurred if it weren’t in tune with evolution in South Korean public opinion. Poll data indicate that a majority of South Koreans support Park’s recent decision to close the jointly run Kaesong Industrial Complex, the last vestige of the Sunshine Policy. Even more suggestive is a study by RealMeter that found that not a single age cohort believes aid to North Korea shouldn’t be cut off if the North doesn’t give up its nukes.

There is also noteworthy change in South Koreans’ perception of what it takes to be a citizen of their country. A 2014 study by the Asan Institute found that to more South Koreans, civic concerns such as abiding by laws are of greater importance, while Korean ethnicity matters less. The South Korean public is less tied to the concept of ethnic nationalism; there are fewer voices contending that North Korea should be forgiven and catered to because the two Koreas form one ethnic group.

The harder line on North Korea is particularly pronounced among young people, who don’t have memories of Korea as a unified country and who are trying to make their way in an unforgiving job market. To many of them, unification seems like a prohibitively costly undertaking.

Throughout her political career Park has shifted her policy stances with the spirit of the times. When she first sought the presidency in 2007, she cast herself as a Korean Margaret Thatcher, a champion of business and small government. When she ran in 2012, she skillfully incorporated into her platform public calls for increased social welfare and corporate regulation. In this most recent case, too, Park has melded her governance decision around public opinion.

Critics are already making fair criticisms of Seoul’s decision to take a newly hardened stance toward North Korea, arguing that such moves play into Pyongyang’s claims that the outside world wishes them ill, and only further isolate North Korea’s people from the outside world.

Whether or not you agree with Park in her turn, it is important to note that the shift in policy is only possible alongside public fatigue with the estranged relative.  

*Steven Borowiec is a correspondent for the Los Angeles Times.