The following is excerpted from an op-ed in World Politics Review.

Five years after Chinese President Xi Jinping introduced the Belt and Road Initiative to the world, the ambitious multitrillion-dollar infrastructure scheme is experiencing major growing pains. Months of harsh media scrutiny, criticism from the United States and Europe, some surprising grumbling domestically, and backtracking from key partner countries have put a dent in what had been promoted as a seamless chain of China-funded transportation and development projects spreading out across the Asian continent. Xi’s signature foreign policy initiative now faces skepticism in the country that has been its most enthusiastic cheerleader and most willing testing ground: Pakistan.

On Sept. 9, immediately following a visit to Islamabad by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, the Financial Times broke a story that cast doubt on the state of China and Pakistan’s ties and further hurt the Belt and Road’s brand. The government of new Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan, the paper reported, planned to “review or renegotiate agreements reached under China’s Belt and Road Initiative” because they were considered unfair and financially onerous. 

The projects potentially under review are all part of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, or CPEC, a $60 billion collection of energy and infrastructure projects, which is the flagship venture of the Belt and Road Initiative so far. Khan has already formed a committee to evaluate CPEC. One of its members, Commerce Minister Abdul Razak Dawood, suggested that Pakistan might choose to put CPEC on hold or stretch its implementation over a longer period of time. Finance Minister Asad Umar confirmed that a review process was in place, implying that the government could indeed consider a modification to CPEC, which includes a huge deep-water port project in southern Pakistan, $30 billion in new power plants, and a network of new highways and railways.

The response to the FT story was dramatic. Pakistan’s Commerce Ministry issued an unconvincing denial, saying words had been taken out of context and that the article’s headline—“Pakistan rethinks its role in Xi’s Belt and Road plan”—was misleading. China issued a stronger statement, saying there was “firm consensus between China and Pakistan that CPEC is a mutually beneficial project and both governments will carry it forward according to the needs of Pakistan.” Pakistani officials issued a few more clarifying statements, and Pakistan’s army chief even took what appeared to be a last-minute trip to Beijing to meet with Xi and make a show of their shared commitment to CPEC.

But the damage had been done. Few analysts seriously expect that Pakistan will pull out of CPEC or significantly delay its implementation. Yet the story crystallized some fundamental problems with the Belt and Road Initiative as a whole.

Beijing’s signature foreign policy initiative now faces skepticism in the country that has been its most enthusiastic cheerleader and most willing testing ground.

Since China unveiled the world’s most expensive series of infrastructure projects, Pakistan has widely been seen as its most important partner and proponent. Many Pakistani politicians championed CPEC because they viewed it as a boon for their country’s ailing economy. CPEC was a success story that buttressed China’s narrative that rather than a global power play, the Belt and Road was a benign initiative that would bolster economic development in partner countries and unleash shared prosperity. The flurry of debate in Pakistan in recent weeks has undermined that rosy depiction.

Read the full article.