This is an excerpt from an article by ASPI Program Officer John Van Oudenaren that was originally published by The Diplomat. 

The long-awaited summit between U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, previously scheduled for June 12 in Singapore, is now off. Earlier this week, Trump hinted at his reasoning for nixing the summit. He observed that following Kim’s second visit to China and meeting with President Xi Jinping earlier this month, “there was a somewhat different attitude [from Kim] after that meeting.” Trump added, “I can’t say that I’m happy about it.”

Before accepting the insinuation that China played summit spoiler, it is worth considering whether the unconventional way that the Trump administration pursued diplomatic engagement with North Korea is partially to blame.

From the outset, the Trump administration’s decision to hold a presidential summit with Kim was aberrational and unconventional. As New York Times White House correspondent Mark Landler recounted at a recent Washington, D.C., event, Trump’s determination to meet with Kim was made in a matter of hours on the evening of March 8, during a meeting with South Korean national security adviser Chung Eui-yong. The South Korean delegation was at the White House to relay an invitation from Kim requesting a meeting with Trump. Trump’s immediate acceptance, which overturned decades of precedence in sitting U.S. leaders refusing to meet with their North Korean counterparts, stunned the South Korean official. After a brief call to obtain President Moon Jae-in’s permission to move forward, Chung was trotted out to brief the White House Press Corps. While this made for great theater, it took both Japan, the United States’ most important ally in Asia, and China, North Korea’s primary backer, by complete surprise.

Read the full article.