From international security to climate change to human rights, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) never fails to draw the attention of the international community, in both positive and negative ways. This will certainly be the case when the world’s heads of state gather this month in New York for the 78th Session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA 78). What can we expect from China at this important world gathering? What will it tell us about Beijing’s priorities on the international stage for the coming year? And how will China’s priorities diverge from and converge with those of other major powers, especially the United States?

It is, of course, difficult to know specifics just yet. But we do know that China faces a growing number of problems that threaten its economic growth, national security, technological ambitions, and climate policy. As Chinese leaders head into UNGA 78, these developments will be foremost in their minds. They will undoubtedly shape Beijing’s approach to its UNGA 78 agenda while also setting the broader tone for its engagement with the international community in 2024. Examining China’s likely UNGA agenda can provide us with a useful window into its top foreign and domestic policy priorities.

Key to understanding China’s engagement at UNGA 78 is to first examine its challenges at home and abroad, as these will largely dictate what China is willing to commit to at the international level.

The past several years have been difficult for China. A global pandemic and its lingering aftermath, a sputtering economy, and ongoing geopolitical upheaval, including worsening relations with many key economic partners — especially in the West — are just a few of the many challenges confronting PRC leaders. 

The Chinese economy continues to weaken under deflationary pressures, with exports and imports contracting, new inbound investment dropping to levels not seen in decades, burgeoning local government debt, and an increasingly troubled real estate market. Persistently high rates of youth unemployment continue to cause concern: the June 2023 figure of 21.3% was the highest on record, but some experts predict that number could actually be closer to 46% when taking into consideration youth who are not enrolled in school or a training program. Meanwhile, China’s demographic decline is worsening: by 2035, an estimated 30% of the population will be over 60, and the fertility rate hit a record low of 1.09 in 2022.

Improved productivity through technological advances may be one way to address some of these economic challenges. But China’s ambitions in this regard have been stymied by its policies at home, which often impede innovation. At the same time, Washington and its allies have taken steps to restrict access to advanced technology, know-how, and investment — especially in relation to semiconductors, artificial intelligence, and other cutting-edge technologies — with the intention to hobble the PRC’s ambitions in these areas, particularly as they apply to military end uses. Beijing has struck back with actions that will likely intensify this high-tech rivalry and worsen political and trade relations between China and the world’s most advanced economies.

With these developments in mind, it is little wonder that China’s paramount leader Xi Jinping recently warned that “the national security issues China faces today are considerably more complex and much more difficult to be resolved” and that the country must be prepared for “high winds, choppy waters, and even dangerous storms.” Among these perceived adversities, relations across the Taiwan Strait will loom large for Beijing in the coming months: the self-governing island will hold a presidential election in January 2024 and, in spite (and indeed because) of China’s stepped-up military activities around Taiwan, Taiwanese citizens now oppose the idea of unifying with the mainland by a large majority.

Even in one area of potentially positive outcomes — its domestic climate agenda — Beijing faces difficulties. On the one hand, China officially maintains its commitment to peak carbon emissions by 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality by 2060. China plans for renewable energy sources to account for 33% of national power consumption by 2025. However, in a reminder of other domestic priorities, Xi asserted at a high-level domestic conference on environmental protection that “the path, method, pace, and intensity to achieve [carbon emissions cuts] should and must be determined by ourselves, and will never be influenced by others.” Despite international optimism about China’s commitment to the climate agenda, recent increases in coal use, the creation of new coal-fired plants, and growing imports of Russian coal have combined to raise new concern over its commitment to meeting its goals. International observers are hoping that China will not deviate from its domestic climate agenda even as energy insecurity concerns are propelling it to stockpile fossil fuel reserves.

Given the increasing challenges facing China at home and abroad, we can expect several key elements to characterize China’s UNGA 78 interventions and priorities. Overall, we should anticipate that China will push forcefully for the adoption of a more inclusive multilateral global agenda across many fronts — economic, technological, security, and climate. 

Such an agenda not only would be consistent with China’s long-standing strategic outlook and preferences, it also would receive renewed impetus owing to the challenges that China faces regarding its own economic growth, national security, technological ambitions, and climate policy. Recognizing these challenges and the likelihood of more “dangerous storms” ahead, Beijing will advocate a more stable, open, cooperative and equitable multipolar system in which it can play a greater role and reap greater benefits in a global order that is more conducive to its interests. Moreover, given its increasingly troubled relations with the West and its apparent decision to push back against what it sees as the ill effects of a world still dominated by the West and by the United States in particular, China will take advantage of its prominent role within the United Nations (UN) to strengthen its image and deepen its ties with the Global South.

With respect to economics and international development, China will emphasize its opposition to what it calls “block mentality,” trade wars, and strategic competition as examples that contradict international stability and development. China hopes to increase its leadership in the international community by advancing and strengthening efforts to build alternative coalitions, mostly bringing together the developing nations of the Global South. These efforts will include promoting China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Global Security Initiative (GSI), Global Civilization Initiative (GCI), and Global Development Initiative (GDI), while building up existing multilateral blocks like the BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. These initiatives are intended to offset the dominance of Western-led alliances and ease international pressure on China — including economic pressure. To reinforce its support for a multipolar world order, China will use UNGA 78 to restate its involvement with peace-brokering initiatives, including the recent Saudi-Iran deal that it helped bring to fruition and its 12-point peace plan for Russia’s war on Ukraine. China is likely to argue that these efforts demonstrate its positive leadership of and commitment to fostering international stability and peaceful development.

China will likely reinforce its appeal to multilateral approaches that benefit the Global South by centering the GDI in its UNGA 78 statements and priorities. The GDI primarily targets the Global South by selling itself as a multilateral program to promote development, alleviate poverty, and improve health in the developing world. As the Global South is the largest and fastest-growing part of the world, China understands that expansive investment in this area may reap new economic rewards, in addition to garnering it greater support at the international level from the countries it is aiding. By securing support among the 152 developing countries in the United Nations, Beijing aims to shape agendas, impact voting decisions, and amplify China’s voice across the UN system.

The GDI was most recently pushed forward by China at the BRICS Summit in Johannesburg, South Africa, in August. Xi attended both the BRICS-Africa Outreach and BRICS Plus Dialogue, where he promoted Chinese leadership on development and climate change, remarking that the “delivery of most Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) remains slow … the international community must pursue the larger interests of all countries, respond to people’s concerns, and restore development to the center of the international agenda.” Xi then stated that “China has set up a Global Development and South-South Cooperation Fund with a total funding of 4 billion U.S. dollars, and Chinese financial institutions will soon set up a special fund of 10 billion dollars dedicated to the implementation of the GDI.” This announcement reflected China’s desire to advance the GDI and highlighted that the GDI will also emphasize green development and “new-type” industrialization that aligns with the international climate agenda. We can expect that the PRC’s representatives at UNGA 78 — or Xi himself, if he attends — will reinforce Xi’s comments at the BRICS Summit. This is all the more true now that the initiative has demonstrated initial success — some 200 projects have now begun or been incorporated into the GDI, spanning Asia, Africa, the Pacific, and the Caribbean.   

Technological competition, export controls, and supply chain disruptions have caused persistent difficulties for China. Global supply chain disruptions were observed throughout the COVID-19 pandemic and continue as a result of the Russia-Ukraine war. For China, this has manifested in domestic energy insecurity. China’s reliance on Russian coal (as well as gas and other resources) placed it in a position of vulnerability after the war began, and despite China’s ability to capitalize on discounted Russian coal, the initial volatility in supply threatened to put the country in a precarious position. It served as a reminder to Chinese leadership of the country’s potential vulnerability, leading Beijing to prioritize resource security, even at the cost of other goals.

In addition, U.S.-China technological competition continues to intensify, with the United States adopting new export controls on advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment in August. These export controls have reduced China’s ability to purchase U.S. chips and the inputs needed to build out Chinese alternatives. Beijing responded to these controls by stating that “we won’t just swallow this.” It has blocked all corporate mergers involving a U.S. semiconductor company operating in Chinese markets and initiated a cybersecurity review of Micron, the leading U.S. producer of memory chips. China also recently announced a new export license system for gallium and germanium, two elements used to make computer chips, fiber optics, solar cells, and other tech devices. In short, it does not appear that the tension between the United States and China will halt any time soon — in fact, it is only likely to grow.

At UNGA 78, China is likely to call for more global economic openness, abandonment of unfair trade restrictions, and the need to establish more resilient global supply chains. This is in line with its rhetoric against great-power competition and block mentality. China will likely leverage the recent advancement and expansion of the BRICS achieved at the Johannesburg Summit as an example of the action it is taking to offset the current dominance of the U.S.-led Western block and portray this as the provision of pro-development global public good.

On issues of international security, we should expect China’s UNGA 78 interventions to emphasize the GSI. Announced by Xi at the Bo’ao Forum in April 2022, the GSI has gained momentum as a frequently cited concept in PRC diplomatic exchanges. A government white paper published in March 2023 laid out further description of the new undertaking. The GSI is officially described in the white paper as a “new approach to eliminating the root causes of international conflict,” identifying a number of priority areas in which the GSI will focus its work, including supporting climate change cooperation; promoting “sound interaction” among world powers; settling regional disputes; and supporting UN efforts in peacekeeping, counterterrorism, and combatting transnational crime. 

Advancement on the GSI will take place in conjunction with China’s desire to increase its peace-brokering role in the international community, particularly through the UN. The GSI is specifically intended to offer an alternative to U.S.- and other Western-led frameworks for global security. Given the high-level provenance of the GSI, its stated support for the UN, its multilateral nature and appeal in the Global South, and its role in distinguishing Beijing’s approach to international security, the GSI is likely to be a prominent part of China’s UN-related activities moving forward, at UNGA 78 and beyond.

Beijing will likely devote significant attention at UNGA 78 to the climate crisis and China’s response to it. China will reaffirm its commitments to achieving carbon peak by 2030 and carbon neutrality by 2060. China is expected to reiterate to the international audience the efforts it has taken since its initial submission of Nationally Determined Contributions in 2016. International forums like the UNGA give China a platform to speak about its domestic successes; for example, the country doubled its utility-scale solar and wind power capacity, a build-out that met the central government’s 1,200 gigawatt goal five years ahead of schedule. China relies on these types of achievements to bolster its positive image internationally and show progress on its commitments.

However, China will likely face scrutiny and, no doubt, some criticism at UNGA 78 for recent domestic climate-related policy choices. China will attempt to divert attention from its continued construction of new coal-fired power stations and increased reliance on coal broadly, instead focusing on other areas of climate progress that Beijing has prioritized. These include conserving biodiversity, meeting the global water and food crises, and increasing and preserving green spaces (such as reforestation). These are all transboundary issues that allow China to highlight the work it has done while calling upon greater international support. China’s international initiatives have shown that it has the potential to focus resources to help vulnerable and developing states. The same could be done in the climate space, where it has successfully increased its leadership in the years since President Donald Trump’s removal of the United States from the Paris Agreement in 2016 (before the United States rejoined under President Joe Biden in 2021).

One area that is still in the development stage for China is loss and damage financing. “Loss and damage” is a legal term that refers to economic and noneconomic losses linked to the impact of climate change, such as those attributable to extreme weather events or rising sea levels. At the 2022 UN Climate Change Conference or Conference of the Parties (COP27), a loss and damage fund was approved to be set up under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, and a transitional committee of 24 countries began work to determine how the fund will be operationalized, who will benefit, and who will pay. Details of the committee’s recommendations will be released this year at COP28. Right now, however, there is no particular international leader backing the fund. China supported the creation of the fund but did not accept an obligation to contribute financially to it, given its status as a developing country and protection under the “common but differentiated responsibility” principle. However, with China seeking to play a greater leadership role within the international community and the United States expressing a view to limit the fund, this may provide an opportunity for China to take the lead. If so, China may signal such an intention during UNGA 78.

The loss and damage fund seems to primarily target “least developed countries” (LDCs), which currently number 48. This group includes 33 countries in Africa, 14 in Asia, and one in Latin America. Thus, the fund provides an opportunity that would dovetail with China’s attempts to strengthen its role and influence in the Global South. Taking the lead on loss and damage financing is not a guaranteed course of action for China, but, given its commitment to supporting the Global South and other vulnerable states, including LDCs, it may seize this unique opportunity for leadership at the UN.

Separately, but in line with China’s other climate-related actions and its growing engagement with international organizations, Beijing is likely to focus more on global food security. At the BRICS Summit, Xi boasted that China had “launched a China-Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) South-South Cooperation Trust Fund, implemented the Food Production Enhancement Action, and provided food assistance to and shared agrotech with many countries.” Xi’s statement signals that food security will also feature in China’s UNGA 78 agenda as it emphasizes its leadership and impact in this area, which it could connect to its climate leadership and support for the Global South. It is likely that China will call on the international community to follow suit, touting the benefit of cooperation with existing multilateral organizations.

It is important to remember, however, that China typically eschews overpromising or overcommitting to the international community, and this will not change at UNGA 78. China tends to set achievable targets, avoiding embarrassing shortfalls and reinforcing its perceived legitimacy. As a result, some of China’s goals, especially with respect to climate, are often viewed, perhaps justifiably, as being too lax. On the one hand, this strategy allows China to add these goals to its list of achievements and bolster its image as a climate leader. On the other hand, it does not accelerate the global climate agenda in a truly ambitious way. Beijing’s twofold challenge of geopolitical instability and a domestic imperative to grow its cooling economy will likely dampen the ambition of any climate-related commitments that China makes this year.

China will be subject to significant attention at UNGA 78. China’s centrality to all issues of international concern endows it with significant responsibility and leadership potential. However, China’s significant domestic challenges will likely drive it to be careful to refrain from overcommitting or overpromising at the UNGA this year.

Therefore, we can expect China’s UNGA 78 agenda to focus narrowly on the importance of multilateralism, given the unique challenges the international community is facing, but its national-level promises are likely to remain limited. China will reinforce the successes it has achieved, its plans to continue those successes, and its commitment to strengthen and engage with the UN framework. We should not expect any new announcements to accelerate China’s climate agenda, change its stance on Taiwan, or otherwise comment on security issues or human rights.

China’s UNGA 78 agenda will remain focused on upholding international stability and development through the UN multilateral system. Beijing is likely to hammer home the message that amid increasing geopolitical instability, the international community must work together to overcome “block mentality” and disruptions to global supply chains, championing globalization and adherence to and advancement of the multilateral system established by the UN.

China will seek to link its current work and future plans to the importance of the UN as a way of illustrating how China is working within the UN agenda and highlighting its willingness to “play ball” as a responsible global governance actor. It will likely demonstrate this by underscoring the importance of achieving the Sustainable Development Goals, committing to the international climate agenda, working in cooperation with other multilateral organizations, and centering the Global South, vulnerable states, and LDCs in its work.

Key to substantiating this multilateral-focused agenda will be China’s efforts to portray itself as a broker of international peace and its work to take on more of a leadership role with the establishment and expansion of its key international initiatives: the GDI, GSI, GCI, BRI, and BRICS. We can expect China to use its official statements to reinforce the work it has done to accelerate these initiatives and the impact it has had through the delivery of associated projects.

While it is not likely China will overcommit by taking on any major new initiatives, it may back the importance of climate financing, especially as the transitional committee concludes its operationalization plans for loss and damage financing. It may even go a step further and commit to a financial contribution; however, because of China’s interest in retaining and emphasizing its developing country status, this remains relatively unlikely.

At its core, China’s UNGA 78 agenda will focus on preserving international stability and demonstrating responsible Chinese international leadership at a time when China faces significant domestic challenges — and therefore hopes for breathing space to solve these challenges. Now more than ever, we should expect Beijing to pursue a combination of carefully limited national commitments combined with an international posture that stresses multilateralism and a multipolar world.