On November 30, 2017 NK News published a round up of expert interviews on North Korea's quickly advancing nuclear and missile programs. Chad O'Carroll posed a series of questions to experts including Andrea Berger, Senior Research Associate and a Senior Program Manager at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies; Evans Revere, Senior Director with Albright Stonebridge Group; Joshua Pollack, Editor of The Nonproliferation Review; and Naoko Aoki, Graduate Fellow at the University of Maryland. The interview below with ASPI's Director for Political-Security Affairs Lindsey Ford is excerpted from the original article published by NK News.  

A major goal of United States foreign policy in 2017 has been to prevent North Korea completing the development of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). But despite President Donald Trump’s pledge in January that a North Korean “nuclear weapon capable of reaching parts of the U.S….won’t happen,” Kim Jong Un on Tuesday declared that the DPRK has now “finally realized the great historic cause of completing the state nuclear force, the cause of building a rocket power.”

Having tested its Hwasong-14 and Hwasong-15 ICBM designs a total of just three times, it's uncertain whether the missiles can be reliably fielded just yet without more testing, particularly of warhead re-entry capabilities. As a result, there may still be a small window of opportunity for the U.S. to stop the program before North Korea has battle-ready ICBMs capable of hitting cities throughout the homeland.

NK News spoke to five North Korea watchers in the U.S. and Europe to better understand how things will change for Washington in the event North Korea deploys its new ICBM capability, what risk now surround U.S. military options, and what will happen if a lull in missile testing emerges.

Q. North Korea says it has “finally realized the great historic cause of completing the state nuclear force” – something Trump proclaimed wouldn’t happen under his watch. What changes now from a U.S. policy perspective?

Lindsey Ford (LF): There’s unfortunately a difference between what ought to change and what will change in U.S. policy. If it wasn’t already clear, this test ought to be a wake-up call that we’re going to have to find a way to live with a nuclear North Korea for at least the foreseeable future.

U.S. policy is continuing to operate on the outdated assumption that there’s still a window of time within which North Korea can be coerced into de-nuclearization. The statement North Korea issued yesterday makes pretty clear that time has past and their goal is now to force the international community to acknowledge them as a responsible nuclear power.

Kim Jong Un’s not going to get the formal recognition he’s seeking, but we’re not going to get the denuclearization we’re seeking either. So the United States needs to make some uncomfortable re-assessments and find a way to manage this problem over the long-term without going to war over it. Unfortunately, what we’re likely to see is simply more of the same: increased sanctions, more inflammatory rhetoric and military posturing, further calls for denuclearization. None of this will move us closer to dealing with the fact that our strategy is based on outdated assumptions.

Q. What are the risks of U.S. military action to “force” North Korea to change course given this development?

LF: The risks of a preventive strike on North Korea are staggering.

The idea of a limited strike requires believing that you have a credible reason to think you can control the escalation cycle, limiting the potential costs and risk of a wider conflict. We have no such assurances in this case. North Korea understands full well that they would be over-matched and eventually defeated in a full-on conflict with the United States. As a result, they have a tremendous incentive to escalate quickly and decisively in response to a U.S. strike, in an attempt to dissuade the United States from expanding the conflict further.

The potential loss of life should North Korea attack Tokyo or Seoul with a nuclear weapon could easily exceed one million casualties. In the event of a broader conflict, recent assessments estimate that at least 300,000 people could die within just the first few days alone. We underestimate the risks of escalation at our own peril.

Q: Some have said that once North Korea reaches its ICBM goal, the country will become open to dialogue with the U.S. What could be a realistic focus of discussions, assuming the U.S. side would be interested, given the current circumstances?

LF: The surprisingly measured tone of North Korea’s recent statement and the emphasis it placed on being a responsible nuclear power certainly raise the prospect that North Korea may be angling for renewed negotiations.

The real question will be whether the United States and North Korea can agree to come to the table without either nation getting the assurances they are seeking on the nuclear question (i.e. – an agreement to discuss denuclearization vs. an acceptance of North Korea’s nuclear weapons status).

If we re-start negotiations, the immediate focus could be as simple as talking about talking. Can we have a conversation to better understand each other’s interests and intentions and see whether there is any opening or step-by-step path we can begin to construct toward a more meaningful negotiation?

Q: In the event this marks the end of major missile testing from the North, how do you expect the international community will respond long term? Sanctions fatigue? More pressure?

LF: For the moment, there’s a fairly high degree of international consensus on punishing North Korea for its actions.

If, and as, time elapses without further North Korean provocations, this consensus is likely to fray. U.S. allies are more likely to stay on side with the U.S. approach, but other countries with less vested interests in resolving the North Korean crisis will feel fewer and fewer incentives to keep this issue at the top of their priority list.

Without ongoing and concerted diplomatic efforts to keep other countries focused on the importance of resolving this issue, it’s going to be hard for the United States to hold together the strong international coalition it will need.

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