On April 19, India commenced the six-week-long electoral process to elect its government for the next five years. The world’s most populous democracy (969 million eligible voters) will elect the 543 contested seats in the Lok Sabha, the lower house of Parliament, in seven phases and close polls on June 1. Following the 2019 election, the ruling Bhartiya Janta Party (BJP) had 303 seats in the lower house and is now aiming for 400 seats in the 2024 edition. The BJP-led coalition, the National Democratic Alliance, is taking on the opposition, the Indian National Congress (Congress)–led India National Development Inclusive Alliance, and any party or coalition gaining more than 272 seats will be invited to form the government.

With more than 2,000 political parties in the fray, including 6 national and 56 regional parties, the upcoming elections are an overwhelming and complicated political affair for both the voter base as well as international stakeholders vested in the election outcomes, particularly when it comes to unpacking the political manifestos. These manifestos are often seen as mere formalities that do not significantly influence voting priorities. However, they still play a role in shaping voter sentiments and garnering attention, particularly from major global actors. This is especially true regarding the foreign and national security policies that have been set out.

With this in mind, this paper analyzes the foreign policy stances of major parties, covering topics ranging from India’s global positioning to ongoing conflicts in West Asia, as outlined in their manifestos.

On the Regional Neighborhood

Political parties, both the ruling BJP and the opposition, have historically prioritized the South Asian regional neighborhood — Nepal, Bhutan, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Pakistan, and Afghanistan--in their election manifestos due to the significant impact that neighboring countries have on India’s national security, economic development, and regional stability. For instance, the state of Tamil Nadu shares a maritime border with Sri Lanka, and human rights issues of the latter’s minority Tamil community are often raised in election campaigns due to their direct relevance to the former’s ethnic Tamil population and historical ties with Sri Lanka. Therefore, parties remain mindful that India’s neighbors perceive a “big brotherly attitude,” and the campaigns reflect attempts to carefully manage those relations.

Consequently, parties have tried introducing timely policy initiatives to address such apprehensions. For instance, India followed the Gujral Doctrine, a set of principles designed to manage relations with neighbors that include provisions about respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, and most importantly, the element of non-reciprocity and giving more to neighbors in “good faith and trust”. Also, the Look East policy, aimed at reviving and deepening ties with Southeast Asian countries, was introduced in the 1990s and continues to be effective today in the form of its successor, the Act East policy. The BJP-led government also introduced the Neighbourhood First policy in 2014 to deepen ties with immediate neighbors.

In its current manifesto, the BJP promises to continue observing the Neighbourhood First policy by “being a trusted and responsible partner in the subcontinent, promoting regional cooperation and ensuring stability and prosperity.” While the BJP sees this as a successful diplomatic initiative, the Congress has repeatedly berated the BJP over growing anti-India sentiments in the neighborhood, beginning with the “India Out” campaigns in Nepal, Sri Lanka, and, recently, in Bangladesh. The Congress, leveraging these political movements, promises to restore a “special relationship” with Nepal and Bhutan, enhance economic and cultural relations with Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, and repair ties with the Maldives in its manifesto.

As India navigates its complex neighborhood, its relationship with Pakistan stands as a rare area of consensus among the two major coalitions, echoing historical realities. Rooted in the 1947 partition of the sub-continent, the India-Pakistan relationship carries the burden of unresolved issues, with Kashmir continuing to be a flashpoint. The BJP and the Congress both uphold a zero-tolerance policy on terrorism toward Pakistan and maintain a controlled stance in their manifestos. While the BJP makes a single reference to Pakistan, pledging to enhance infrastructure along the Indo-Pakistan border, the Congress stresses that any engagement with Pakistan hinges on its willingness to halt cross-border terrorism.

On Regional Cooperation

Amidst political contestations and trust deficits among India and its neighbors, regional cooperation has disappeared from India’s political agenda. In 2014, the BJP promised to revive the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and made efforts accordingly. Prime Minister Modi attended his first SAARC summit in Kathmandu in 2014, but no other summits followed. The SAARC was omitted from the BJP’s 2019 manifesto and remains absent in the 2024 version. Today, the SAARC stands as a largely inactive organization, displaying no signs of rejuvenation amidst the ongoing India-Pakistan political challenges. Also, despite the widespread belief that India could lead in revitalizing regional cooperation, Delhi prioritizes bilateral over multilateral engagements.

Congress and the Left have also refrained from addressing regional cooperation. Notably, during the Congress-led government from 2004 to 2014, five SAARC Summits were convened in 2005, 2007, 2008, 2010, and 2011, compared to just one in 2014 under the BJP-led government. It is intriguing to observe that SAARC played a crucial role in restoring Kathmandu-Delhi ties in 2005 amidst Nepal's Maoist insurgency, facilitating discussions between traditional rivals India and Pakistan on regional matters, if not bilateral issues. However, with a generational shift in South Asian geopolitics, new leaders from all major parties do not view SAARC as an effective mechanism or investment platform for regional energy.

On China

China has remained a central challenge in Modi’s foreign policy agenda. During his two terms in office, China has been a persistent threat, with incidents like the Dhoklam standoff in 2017, the PLA intrusion into Ladakh in 2020, and the violent conflict in Galwan Valley that resulted in the deaths of twenty Indian soldiers in 2020. Despite high-level visits and dialogues on both sides, India and China remain a loggerhead, and diplomatic channels have weakened. The deep-rooted border conflict highlights the relationship’s fragility and the challenges of achieving lasting stability and cooperation.

In his inaugural address at the launch of the Asia Society Policy Institute’s Delhi office, External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar stated that “the state of the border [with China] will determine the state of the relationship.” Linking the disputed border to the overall state of bilateral relations, Delhi hints at resolving territorial disputes to build trust and cooperation between the two countries. The BJP only makes a passing reference to China in the recent manifesto by adding that “we will accelerate the development of robust infrastructure along the Indo-China border.” The BJP seems to avoid talking about China directly, likely to steer clear of controversies, especially given the ongoing border conflict. To BJP, this strategy helps prevent giving the opposition additional reasons to criticize the government.

Meanwhile, the opposition has repeatedly criticized the BJP for not being more assertive in its China stance. In its manifesto, the Congress adds that “the Chinese intrusions in Ladakh and the Galwan clash in 2020 represented the biggest setbacks to Indian national security in decades” and accuses the Modi administration of giving “a clean chit to China that considerably weakened our negotiating position.” It further claims that “Chinese troops continue to occupy Indian territory and deny Indian forces access to 26 out of 65 patrolling points as well as build infrastructure near the disputed border.” The Congress promises to “restore the status quo ante on our borders with China and to ensure that areas, where both armies patrolled in the past, are again accessible to our soldiers” and “take necessary steps to adjust our policy towards China until this is achieved.” Similarly, the Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI-M) does not decry China’s border aggressions and calls for a “negotiated settlement of the border dispute with China and promotion of all-round relations.” Despite the differences, almost all major parties unanimously agree that relations with China are India’s biggest national security and foreign policy challenge.

On India-U.S. Relations

In the last decade, India’s ties with the United States have positively evolved. The BJP government deserves great credit for taking advantage of rising regional geopolitical tensions and India’s own industrialization to deepen its relationship with the U.S. The shift is commendable, considering the U.S. maintained a strict view of Narendra Modi, during his time as the chief minister of Gujarat, on the human rights front. A particularly salient turning point in the relationship occurred in 2023 when the United States invited Modi for an official state visit. Washington not only rolled out the red carpet, but the visit also resulted in a number of agreements to advance the technology, defense, economic, and people-to-people partnership between the two countries. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) and a shared vision of the Indo-Pacific are also key factors driving the relationship.

Significant strides have been made under the Modi regime to foster an advanced and comprehensive defense partnership between India and the United States through joint exercises, enhanced defense industrial cooperation, and the annual 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue. Yet, surprisingly, neither the BJP nor the Congress explicitly mention the United States in their 2024 manifestos. The BJP does, however, promise to “continue to collaborate with the countries of the Indo-Pacific region for the security and growth of all in the region”; the Congress makes no such allusion. Historically, the BJP and the Congress have preferred to avoid policy projections regarding the United States in order to stay consistent with the fundamentals of “strategic autonomy” and “non-alignment movement.” Despite real progress, there remain limits to the value of stronger U.S.-India relations within Delhi’s domestic politics.

For example, the CPI-M begins its manifesto’s foreign policy section by attacking the BJP government for abandoning “India’s independent foreign policy” and surrendering to “U.S. strategic, political and security designs and to strengthen U.S. imperialism’s designs for global hegemony.” It accuses that “U.S. imperialism continues to cement India as a subordinate ally in its strategic designs in the Indo-Pacific region.” Similarly, the CPI-M alleges that “India has become a strategic defence partner signing agreements of strategic military cooperation. The Quad has been converted into an active strategic and military alliance in the Indo-Pacific region.” The party still envisions the world through a Cold War prism and desires a continuation of the non-alignment policy; however, this stance is increasingly ineffective and outdated amidst a changed global power equilibrium.

On Projecting “Brand India”

The BJP’s election manifesto lauds substantial gains in India’s global soft power. From championing the United Nations’ declaration of June 21 as the International Day of Yoga to exporting Ayurveda to the world, the manifesto covers all recent major wins. Furthermore, it promises to return all artifacts illegally taken from India and encourages “the study of classical Indian languages in major educational institutions across the world”—goals that match those of the BJP’s own ideologically based colleges. The Congress and the CPI-M manifestos make no such pledges.

Additionally, India’s leadership and presence in global forums are also highlighted in the BJP’s manifesto. From orchestrating the success of the G20 summit and achieving a joint Delhi declaration in 2023 to seeking permanent membership in the UN Security Council, the BJP proudly applauds itself for the delivery of its diplomatic objectives and aspirations. While it remains uncertain whether these initiatives will directly translate into votes, their widespread publicity undeniably shines a spotlight on the party’s foreign policy initiatives. The CPI-M and the Congress skip this issue entirely, saying nothing about soft-power projection plans.

On the Israel-Hamas War

The BJP-led government’s policy to support Israel following the Hamas terrorist attacks in October 2023 and the division in sentiments over the ongoing Middle East conflict may impact India’s minority Muslim voter base. The BJP endorses Israel on the issue of counterterrorism, but the Congress cites it as a “marked departure” from India’s long-held advocacy for “a negotiated two-state solution”, which still remains unchanged. Though the CPI-M calls BJP’s inaction on calling for a ceasefire a “shameful” act, the BJP government continues to defend support for Israel under the principle of counter-terrorism. This divergence on the ongoing war highlights the political parties’ need to navigate domestic and international perceptions effectively through a delicate balance of both maintaining India’s strategic interests as well as its historical solidarity with the people of Palestine.

Conclusion

As the elections continue, the party manifestos reflect the possible paths ahead for India’s foreign policy. While domestic issues such as social security, healthcare, housing, electricity, and employment may take precedence in the electoral discourse, the outcome of the polls will undoubtedly influence India’s foreign relations trajectory and its role as a pivotal player in shaping regional and global dynamics. Also, the number of seats won by a coalition or party forming the next government would be crucial in determining their power to introduce new laws and policies concerning foreign policy matters. For instance, the BJP was able to abrogate Article 370 because of its majority in parliament, which had a direct implication on India’s ties with Pakistan. Meanwhile, the basic foreign policy structure, especially towards the U.S., Japan, and China, will remain the same irrespective of the outcomes of the elections, but a Congress-led government is likely to keep a low profile on supporting Israel.