On March 1, Iranians went to the polls to elect members for their parliament and the Assembly of Experts. The latter, a pivotal body tasked with selecting Iran’s next Supreme Leader after Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, added an extra layer of significance to the electoral process. Of the 290 parliamentary seats up for grabs, 245 were decided in this initial round, with the remaining seats slated for a runoff election in April/May. The parliamentary elections yielded a significant win for hard-line politicians, with around 200 of the elected candidates backed by hard-line factions. A similar dominance by conservatives was observed in the elections for the Assembly of Experts.

These recent elections marked the first major political event since the 2022 nationwide protests triggered by the death of Mahsa Amini. Notably, voter turnout stood at 41%, marking the lowest participation rate since Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution. This diminished engagement reflects a pervasive disillusionment with the political system, with many Iranians questioning the efficacy of electoral avenues for meaningful change. Furthermore, the disqualification of numerous moderates and reformists from candidacy muddies the legitimacy of the electoral process and outcomes, all while Iran grapples with the enduring challenges posed by sanctions and rising economic concerns.

In the aftermath of these election results and amid the burgeoning discourse surrounding succession, global attention naturally shifts to Iran's evolving relationships with key players on the international stage, notably the United States, China, and major South Asian nations.

With this backdrop in mind, this conversation-style piece brings together experts for a nuanced analysis of Iran's geopolitical engagements and the potential implications of its recent political transition on bilateral dynamics, regional stability, and broader global affairs.

U.S.-Iran Relations Amid Iran's Conservative Ascendancy 

By: Sanam Vakil, Director, Middle East and North Africa Program, Chatham House

The March 2024 elections are significant not because they will immediately affect political decision-making in the Islamic Republic of Iran but rather because they clearly cemented a conservative monopoly of power and a narrowing of the conservative base in Iran that could over time lead to further tensions with Washington.

U.S.-Iranian relations have been broken for more than four decades as the Islamic Republic has continuously sought to undermine the role and influence of the United States and its partners in the region. Tehran for its part has long seen Washington behind destabilization efforts if not regime change.

While the trigger in the rupture of ties was Iran’s 1979 seizure of the U.S. embassy in Tehran and detention of 52 American hostages for 444 days, since then, relations have remained strained over Iran’s decidedly anti-American posture, hostility toward Israel, support for the regionally based axis of resistance, and its ballistic missile and nuclear program. The latter was contained in the Iran nuclear agreement of 2015 after a decade of multilateral diplomacy. However, President Donald Trump’s 2018 withdrawal from that deal at the encouragement of Republican hawks, Israel, and Gulf Arab states that wanted to pressure Iran through sanctions into a stronger more inclusive deal, has heightened tensions further.  It has also seen Iran respond by accelerating its nuclear program to alarming new heights. Tehran has also developed closer ties with China and Russia and exported its drones and missiles—the former have been used in Moscow’s war in Ukraine. Tehran’s continued provision of lethal aid to Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis in Yemen, and groups in Syria and Iraq showcases Iran’s destabilizing capacity and its intention to maintain a resistance posture.   

As evidenced by the outcome of the recent elections, Iran’s domestic climate does not foreshadow moderation. Iranian politics, even among conservative blocs, are notoriously factional and competitive. To preordain the composition of parliament, Iran’s Guardian Council blocked the candidacy of reformist politicians. The results have in fact brought a new generation of hard-liner conservatives to parliamentary power who favor resistance and anti-American hostility.  Moreover, these conservatives are looking to unseat pragmatic conservatives who have in the past favored balance and international engagement.

In this critical election year and since the war in Gaza began, the Biden administration has tried to deter Iranian-backed groups around the region to prevent the war from spreading. At the same time, a temporary agreement aimed at constraining Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for some oil sales continues to hold.

Domestic U.S. pressure is mounting to address the cascade of Iran’s challenges. The outcome of the 2024 U.S. presidential election that might yield a Trump victory could set both countries on a path of more direct confrontation. A return to hawkish politics in both capitals could in turn trigger broader regional instability. The development of a bipartisan, transatlantic Iran strategy reliant on deterrence and diplomacy in advance of the election is urgently needed to help stave off another Middle East crisis.

Iran’s Growing Dependency on China  

By: Ghazal Vaisi, Iranian-born international affairs analyst focusing on China

Amid the geopolitical chessboard of the twenty-first century, Iran's pivot to the east, particularly toward China, emerges as a strategic maneuver with multifaceted implications.

Sino-Iranian cooperation safeguards China's energy security at a considerable discount, offers Iran’s ruling clergy a lifeline amid crippling sanctions, and challenges the traditional hegemony of the U.S.-led world order.

Iran's integration into China-led platforms such as BRICS (made up of Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) further solidifies its diplomatic orientation. This move not only stresses Iran's quest for economic and military cooperation but also poses a potential challenge to Western-dominated institutions including NATO.

However, despite the apparent symbiosis between Tehran and Beijing, disparities in their bilateral relations linger. According to China's Ministry of Commerce data, China has been Iran's largest trading partner for more than a decade. Despite U.S. sanctions, Iran exported around 90% of its crude oil to China in 2023. Meanwhile, Iran is only China's 38th largest trading partner with a trade volume of $32 billion. China has excluded Iran from major investment projects, only two years into the 25-year Iran-China deal. Iranian officials are further dissatisfied with the gap between China’s pledged investments and realized projects. China continually benefits from this relationship, saving billions of dollars annually by buying cheap Iranian oil without having to make good on investment promises to Iran.

Following Iran’s recent elections for parliament and the Assembly of Experts, it is anticipated that Tehran's foreign policy will undergo further radicalization. Iran’s Supreme Leader Khamenei holds ultimate power over both institutions, solidifying Iran’s foreign policy direction by hand-selecting officials. These selections often favor individuals with staunch anti-American, pro-Chinese strategic interests, while moderate voices are frequently excluded from electoral participation and policy shaping.

Beijing's diplomatic support of Iran in international forums such as the UN helps shield the Islamic Republic from accountability for its human rights abuses and suppression of dissent. As protests persist across various provinces and social groups in Iran, the Iranian regime is bolstering its surveillance capabilities with advanced technology supplied by China. This includes sophisticated tools for monitoring, identifying, and penalizing nonconforming citizens, notably driven by women rejecting the mandatory hijab. Chinese AI facial recognition cameras have also been deployed in public areas in Iran to enforce strict adherence to hijab laws.

Examining the intricate dynamics between China and Iran within the broader regional context reveals a complex relationship of interests and challenges. As Iran flexes its military muscle alongside China and Russia in joint naval drills, regional stability becomes a pressing concern. Two weeks after Iran’s elections, Iran, China, and Russia conducted a "Maritime Security Belt 2024" joint naval drill in the Gulf of Oman. The drill served as a bold assertion of Iran's defiance against Western influence in the region. Nevertheless, the Iran-backed Houthi attacks on commercial ships in nearby chokepoints undermine overall maritime security and pose an inherent risk to Tehran’s relationship with Beijing.

Despite Beijing issuing ultimatums to Tehran to contain the Houthis, the rebels persist in their attacks, posing a challenge to China's efforts to uphold stability in the region. Only days after the Houthis agreed to ensure safe passage for Chinese and Russian ships in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, the militant group launched multiple ballistic missiles at a Chinese owned and operated oil tanker.

China's status as the largest global exporter of goods renders it vulnerable to disruptions in maritime trade routes caused by Iran’s rogue militias. China has a vested interest in maintaining maritime and regional stability to safeguard its economic interests. Iran’s funding of regional proxy groups highlights the balancing act that China must navigate in its relationship with Iran. While Beijing seeks to leverage its partnership with Tehran for strategic gains, it must also face the repercussions of Iran's hard-line foreign policy that inherently threatens global trade and undermines regional security.

After the Elections: Iran – South Asia Relations Remain Constrained 

By: Arif Rafiq, President of Vizier Consulting, LLC, a political risk advisory company focused on the Middle East and South Asia

Iran’s geography positions it to be a gateway to Eurasia. Among the many Iran-centric connectivity vectors are those linking South Asia with Turkey, Europe, Central Asia, and Russia. Additionally, with its abundance of oil and natural gas, Iran can meet the demands of South Asian net energy importers: Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan.

But Iran’s geo-economic potential has been and will continue to be limited by its diplomatic isolation — and, more specifically, the international sanctions regime. This isolation from the West is likely to endure with the entrenchment of hard-liners in the Islamic Republic after the elections in March.

Iran under President Ebrahim Raisi has embarked on a pivot to the east. After the elections, that pivot will continue, mainly through building relations with China and Russia and maintaining détente with Gulf Arab states. But it is unlikely to yield meaningful change in Iran’s relations with South Asia for two reasons. First, South Asia’s two largest states — India and Pakistan — are gravitating in distinct ways toward the West. In India’s case, that includes U.S.-led mini-laterals involving Israel and the Gulf Arab states, such as the I2u2 partnership and the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor. Second, economic engagement with Iran will be constrained by Indian and Pakistani fears of U.S. secondary sanctions.

India-Iran economic relations have yet to recover from the externalities of the Trump administration’s maximum pressure campaign. India has moved away from imported Iranian oil. Iran has opted to develop the Farzad B gas field on its own, after the Indian consortium that made the discovery dragged its feet.

With the potential return of Donald Trump to office, India will continue to proceed with caution on Iran. India, however, is neither aligning with the West nor is it closing off the prospects for a renewal of relations with Iran. New Delhi is an expressly transactional geopolitical actor these days, mindful of the maneuvering space it has in this multipolar moment. It will continue to hedge. And so even as it pursues connectivity with Europe through Israel and Gulf Arab states, it will not abandon the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), which connects it to Russia via Iran and the Caucasus. The completion of the Rasht-Astara railway would advance the INSTC’s viability.

Pakistan, which relies on costly liquified natural gas to meet its domestic energy demand, has balked at building its end of a gas pipeline with Iran. The recent decision by Islamabad to begin construction of the Pakistani portion of the pipeline is largely aimed at avoiding financial penalties imposed by Iran for not fulfilling its obligations in the deal.

Like India, Pakistan sees little upside in deepening engagement with an isolated Iran. Pakistan’s leadership is intent on rebuilding ties with the United States and Gulf Arab states and potentially assimilating to some degree into a geo-economic and security architecture anchored by these powers.

In January 2024, relations between Iran and Pakistan were tested by the unprecedented exchange of cross-border strikes targeting Pakistan’s Baloch militants. While suspicions between their security establishments likely persist, the two countries will continue with modest levels of economic engagement, including the opening of trade posts along the border. Iranian President Raisi is expected to visit Islamabad later this year. While the two countries could conclude a free trade agreement during Raisi’s visit, Western sanctions on Iran limit a formal economic relationship. Much of the actual bilateral trade is being conducted through smuggling or third-party countries including the United Arab Emirates.

One element to watch out for is the Taliban factor. India has adopted a pragmatic stance toward the Taliban government in Afghanistan, diplomatically engaging it, as Iran, Pakistan, and China have. Given the downturn in relations between the Taliban and Pakistan and the former’s interest in using Iran’s Chabahar Port, there may be an opportunity for greater Indo-Iranian coordination on Afghanistan.

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