New Article | What Happened at China's Two Sessions in 2024?

March 14, 2024 — Asia Society Policy Institute’s Center for China Analysis (CCA) has published a paper on the key outcomes of the Two Sessions, including insights from Asia Society experts Neil Thomas (Xi Jinping’s Activities),Christopher K. Johnson (Elite Politics), Guonan Ma (Economic and Financial Policy), Lizzi C. Lee (Technology Policy), Li Shuo (Climate and Environmental Policy), Lyle Morris (Foreign Policy and National Security), and Rorry Daniels (Taiwan Policy). This report follows a preview article written by Neil Thomas, CCA Fellow on Chinese Politics, and Jing Qian, CCA Co-Founder and Managing Director, on February 29.

Christopher K. Johnson, CCA Senior Fellow on Chinese Politics, believes that the Two Sessions only “underscored what we already knew: Xi Jinping is China’s undisputed ruler, period.” This was evidenced by what he called the most notable moments of the meeting: “Outsiders characterized the cancelation of the premier’s traditional closing press conference and changes to the State Council’s Organic Law as fundamental departures in transparency and governance, respectively.”

When it came to economic and financial policy, Guonan Ma, CCA Senior Fellow on Chinese Economy, says that the main takeaway from this year’s Government Work Report (GWR), unveiled at the Two Sessions, is that the GDP growth target of “around 5%” remained unchanged from last year’s report. However, he notes that this year’s market environment might be less favorable to growth and, as a result, it may be harder to deliver on the growth target this year.

Lizzi C. Lee, CCA Affiliated Researcher on Chinese Economy, says that at heart of Two Sessions technology policy, there is a dual objective: to increase internal growth engines while countering external challenges, like sanctions and export controls. However, she believes that this strategy may overlook a need for structural reform to unlock domestic consumption. “Absent a sold framework to invigorate internal demand, China may inadvertently intensify global trade imbalances, producing more than its domestic market can absorb. This situation has implications for China's economic equilibrium, but it could also incite protectionist responses globally, as trading partners become wary of Chinese exports undermining local industries and employment,” writes Lee.

“The only notable environmental goal the GWR provided was the energy intensity reduction target of 2.5%,” says Li Shuo, Director of Asia Society Policy Institute’s China Climate Hub. “China is off track to deliver the 13.5 percent energy intensity reduction set out in the 14th Five-Year Plan (2021–2025). Getting back on track would require a far greater effort than the proposed target of 2.5 percent.” In Xi’s remarks, he appeared defensive about China’s slow progress on environmental goals, notes Neil Thomas.

Lyle Morris, CCA Senior Fellow on Foreign Policy and National Security, found that the GWR adhered to Xi’s signature foreign policy goals, including an emphasis on China’s commitment to an “inclusive, multi-polar" world order free from “hegemony.” With regards to military strategy, “Xi has clearly identified technology as the key to successful military reform. But with the U.S. sanctions limiting transfers of high-technology to China in recent years, Xi’s call to ‘adapt’ a new scientific revolution in military affairs may also suggest urgency within China to offset trade and technological barriers imposed by the United States,” writes Morris.

According to Rorry Daniels, ASPI Managing Director and CCA Senior Fellow, the GWR section on Taiwan stuck to standard policies, stressing traditional Taiwan policy such as adherence to the 1992 consensus of one China with different interpretations. “The GWR mentioned ‘peaceful development’ as a policy pathway but not ‘peaceful reunification,’ instead using the phrase ‘China’s reunification.’ This distinction may highlight – as a political signal – Beijing’s concern that use of force to achieve reunification could be triggered by so-called independence activists in Taiwan but does not, in and of itself, constitute an intent to unify by force,” writes Daniels.

Neil Thomas noted that Xi Jinping’s statements on Taiwan were consistent with a relatively muted posture toward cross-Strait tensions: “Xi told the RCCK, a satellite party, to promote ‘peaceful unification’ with Taiwan through exchanges, cooperation, and development – relatively soft language hinting that Xi may not want to escalate cross-Strait tensions this year unless he feels provoked.”

Read the full report here. For more reactions, watch the recording of a CCA event on March 6 on “What does the Two Sessions Mean for the Economy, Politics, and Foreign Policy?"