The following is an excerpt from an article by Neil Thomas, Fellow on Chinese Politics at the Asia Society Policy Institute's Center for China Analysis, originally published by the China Brief.

Executive Summary:

• The readout from the Central Foreign Affairs Work Conference (CFAWC) at the end of December indicated an emerging strategy of countering U.S. leadership by mobilizing the support of Global South countries while dividing the West on contentious global issues. 
• Recent changes in official discourse and new language that now forms part Xi’s messaging to visiting politicians makes clear Beijing’s enhanced conviction of the need to actively shape and influence world events.
• The CFAWC meeting signaled a turn away from the more abrasive forms of “wolf warrior” diplomacy. Xi’s desired shift in rhetoric does not mean that PRC diplomats will be less assertive in communicating their preferences overseas.

China hosted two international events in late March that seemed to send different messages to the world. Following the China Development Forum in Beijing, Chinese leader Xi Jinping (习近平) advised a group of U.S. executives that “promoting world economic recovery and resolving international and regional hotspot issues require China-US coordination and cooperation” (Xinhua, March 27). The next day, his number-three Zhao Leji (赵乐际) told the Boao Forum for Asia in Hainan that Asian countries themselves should “jointly maintain security” and form a “common regional market” (MOFA, March 28). Does Beijing want to work with Washington or without it?

Both speeches operate within the framework of a foreign policy strategy outlined by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) at a Central Foreign Affairs Work Conference (CFAWC) that Xi held in Beijing last year (Xinhua, December 28, 2023). These conferences convey to Party cadres and members the leadership’s authoritative assessments about the international achievements, external environment, and diplomatic priorities of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). This was Xi’s third CFAWC, after convenings in November 2014 and June 2018, and only the fifth such gathering in the post-Mao era, with Jiang Zemin (江泽民) and Hu Jintao (胡锦涛) respectively hosting analogous meetings in July 1991 and August 2006.

The recent CFAWC deserves more attention, given its likely significance in establishing the outlines of PRC foreign policy over the next few years (cf., GMF, February 6). Three themes stand out. First, the PRC’s rising diplomatic focus on leadership of the Global South; second, Beijing’s enhanced conviction about its need to shape world events; and third, Xi’s turn away from “wolf warrior” diplomacy. Understanding these themes helps to resolve the seeming contradiction between the speeches mentioned above.

Rising Focus on the Global South

The CFAWC provided what is perhaps the strongest articulation yet of the Party’s emerging strategy to counter U.S. leadership by mobilizing the support of Global South countries and by trying to divide the West on contentious global issues like climate change, free trade, and Palestine. Most revealingly, the readout said Beijing must “firmly occupy the international moral high ground and unite and win over the world majority.” Furthermore, the growing power of the PRC and other non-Western countries means that “China’s development faces new strategic opportunities” and its diplomacy “will enter a new stage in which it can be more effective” and “elevate China’s international influence to new heights.”

The readout clarifies the importance of Xi’s concept of a “community with a shared future for mankind (人类命运共同体)” (CSFM) in this vision.¹ The CSFM is the “core concept” of Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy and “a Chinese solution to what kind of world we should build and how we should build it.” Moreover, the concept is said to embody the worldview of Chinese communists, reflect the laws of development of human society, and respond to the universal aspirations of people from all countries. Xi sees his ideas as important and even necessary contributions to international order-building.

What would a CSFM look like? The objective is to create a world of “sustained peace,” “universal security,” “shared prosperity,” “openness and tolerance,” and “cleanliness and beauty.” What these boilerplate phrases signify in Party discourse is a world without U.S. military alliances, where the PRC can advance its territorial objectives and freely pursue its economic model at home and abroad, and where there is acceptance of authoritarian governments and the privileging of collective over individual rights. Put simply, a CSFM means building an international system that better reflects the Party’s interests, preferences, and values.

How will Beijing pursue a CSFM? The “path to realization” is through advancing more equitable global governance, the “universal guideline” is practicing shared human values, and the “fundamental support” is pushing for a new type of international relations. More concretely, “strategic leadership” comes from implementing Xi’s Global Development Initiative (GDI), Global Security Initiative (GSI), and Global Civilization Initiative (GCI). Furthermore, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a “practical platform.” Beijing does not want to conquer the world, but it does want to direct it away from thwarting the PRC and toward “collaborating on responding to challenges and realizing mutual prosperity.”

At the heart of all these policies is the Global South. Developing countries are the main audience for the Chinese pitch to reorient the international order away from the West. The GDI, GSI, and GCI should now be understood as outreach initiatives to slowly operationalize the PRC’s long-held desires to reform the international economic, military, and normative orders. The BRI, injected with new financing at the third Belt and Road Forum last October, has been revitalized as a tool of economic diplomacy (Xinhua, October 18, 2023). Beijing will likely keep boosting its investments in multilateral institutions — especially PRC-heavy groupings such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization — and seek to mobilize development-first coalitions more actively on global issues such as climate change, conflict zones, and free trade.

Notes

1. The previous formulation in English for “community with a shared future for mankind” was the “community of common destiny” (cf. China Brief, February 26, 2018).

Read the full article in the China Brief.