China’s politicians are lifelong learners. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) calls itself a “learning party” (xuexi dang) because its members participate in regular study sessions. These are designed to enhance organizational discipline and to instill practical knowledge. Even the Party’s top leaders, the 24 members of the Politburo, dedicate a half-day almost every month to the “collective study” (jiti xuexi) of a topic chosen by General Secretary Xi Jinping.

This practice is unusual compared to most Western governments. It is rare that a U.S. president would convene their cabinet for lectures on employment policy, political theory, or World Trade Organization reform — all recent topics of Politburo study sessions. So why do Party leaders spend so much of their limited time doing collective study? What do they study? Who briefs from? How can we use this information to better understand Beijing?

This paper first explains the nature and importance of Politburo study sessions. It then uses a unique dataset to analyze changes in topics and briefers over time before presenting case studies of how sessions focused on technology and foreign affairs relate to policymaking. The conclusion summarizes our findings about the value and limits of using these sessions to decode Chinese politics. 

The Politburo began holding collective study sessions in their current form in December 2002, just a few weeks after Hu Jintao became general secretary. Hu sought to enhance the Party’s governance capacity by creating a culture of learning that would build consensus and knowledge around policies favored by himself and other members of the elite Politburo Standing Committee (PSC). These sessions happen after the Politburo’s regular meetings, which are usually held toward the end of every month.

Politburo study sessions help the general secretary to “convey preferences and priorities to lower-level officials and the general Chinese public” on a given topic. For example, the readout of a session on blockchain technology in 2019 instructed cadres to follow trends in blockchain development, improve their ability to utilize technology, and make China a great power in cyberspace. Sessions are meant to improve practical outcomes as well as indoctrinate cadres in Party ideology.

Collective Study Has a Rich Political Heritage

Chinese historians trace the Party’s first systematic learning campaign back to a resolution passed in 1938 at the Sixth Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee at the Yan’an revolutionary base. Led by Mao Zedong, leaders held study sessions to deepen their followers’ understanding of Party dogma. Four years later, this custom was further embedded when Mao founded a General Study Committee to “unify thinking” around his leadership and enforce political conformity during the brutal Yan’an Rectification Movement. Party luminaries like Zhou Enlai and Liu Shaoqi led study sessions.

Collective study continued after the Party established the People’s Republic of China in 1949. In November 1958, for example, Mao sent a letter to local Party Committees titled “Suggestions on Reading Books,” which instructed them to study Soviet leader Joseph Stalin’s Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR and excerpts of other Marxist works. During the Cultural Revolution, the Party introduced Mao Zedong Thought Study Classes and May Seventh Cadre Schools to “re-educate” officials and citizens alike. The purpose of collective study was ideological control.

Mao’s death in 1976 and the advent of economic reform saw intra-Party learning evolve into a “method of initiating regime adaptation.” Paramount leader Deng Xiaoping declared that “the whole Party must conduct another study” of new economic policies and political methods. The forerunner of today’s Politburo study sessions was a series of lectures on the legal system held at the Zhongnanhai leadership compound in Beijing in the 1980s. A 1993 regulation mandated “central group study” (zhongxin zu xuexi) for leading cadres to absorb the third volume of Deng’s selected writings. Collective study now encompassed both ideological control and practical knowledge.

Hu convened the first Politburo study session on December 26, 2002 (Mao’s birthday). Beijing claims this was a move to create a “learning party” and “solve problems” that was inspired by American systems scientist Peter Senge’s 1990 book The Fifth Discipline, which argued that companies must become objective “learning organizations” to remain successful. However, in practice, these study sessions more closely resembled Mao’s subjective efforts to “unify thought” around his own views, with the added benefit of mobilizing leading cadres to adopt new approaches to development.

Since Xi succeeded Hu in 2012, collective study has continued to grow in scope and politicization. He has launched six Party-wide ideological education campaigns, including an extensive campaign in 2019 that told cadres to “never forget our original aspiration.” Study sessions have also spread from the Politburo to other organs of government. Since April 2023, Premier Li Qiang has convened the State Council every two months for “themed study” (zhuanti xuexi) on topics such as competition policy, digital technology, and building a world-class business environment. No explanation was offered for the move, but it shows greater Party-state cohesion, a hallmark of Xi’s governance.

What Happens at Politburo Study Sessions?

Politburo study sessions are held in a medium-sized conference room in the Hall of Embracing Benevolence (Huairen Tang) at Zhongnanhai. Xi sits at the far end of an oval ring table in the middle of the room, with the other six PSC members sitting in rank order along both sides and the speaker seated at the near end facing Xi. Other Politburo members sit in two rows on each side of the central table. Xi is responsible for making this layout more hierarchical, as during Hu’s decade as leader and his first five-year term the whole Politburo would sit around one large circular table.

Almost all study sessions follow a similar format. They last for approximately two hours, with the first eighty minutes allotted to a lecture by one or more speakers, followed by thirty minutes of discussion with Politburo members, and ending with ten minutes of concluding remarks by the general secretary. Hu would consistently invite two experts to each give a forty-minute talk, while Xi usually summons only one speaker or sometimes his fellow Politburo members to deliver presentations (see below).

Topics vary widely and have included history, ideology, philosophy, economics, security, foreign policy, environmental policy, social policy, and Party affairs. Information on how topics are chosen is scarce, but the general secretary has the final say, the CCP Policy Research Office (CPRO) is thought to play a leading role, and the CCP General Office (CGO) is consulted. It may also be possible for other Politburo members and central agencies to suggest topics. Once decided, the CGO typically invites relevant Party-state departments to help the CPRO decide on speakers (who the CGO must approve) and then coordinates the content and preparations for the session. The CGO is led by Xi’s top aide, Cai Qi, while the CPRO is led by Jiang Jinquan, a protégé of Xi’s chief ideologue, Wang Huning. It can therefore be surmised that Cai and Wang are both well-placed to suggest topics and speakers to Xi.

Each session involves extensive planning to ensure that the Politburo gets a polished product. According to Zhan Guo, who briefed on historical materialism in December 2013, preparing for his session took over three months and involved five stages: consultations with the CGO and the CPRO to determine a lecture outline for the requested topic; his drafting of the lecture; review and revision of the draft by a “lesson preparation team” comprising other experts and officials from relevant agencies; multiple trial lectures for this team to suggest improvements in content, expression, and timing; and a trial lecture for CPRO cadres. The lecture is finalized in advance, and each Politburo member has the text in front of them during the briefing. Any policy recommendations are thoroughly vetted.

The most important part of a study session is the concluding remarks by the general secretary, which summarize his key takeaways for the Party. Afterwards, the Central Secretariat, a small group of senior leaders who handle the day-to-day business of the Politburo, decides how to condense these remarks into a readout. Party committees in central agencies and local governments then hold their own study sessions based on materials from the Politburo session, and speakers will sometimes run workshops for lower-level groups. In 2010, Hu created a Coordination Group for the Organizational Work of Establishing a Learning Party, which now appears to be inactive.

The Center for China Analysis compiled a unique database of all Politburo study sessions from December 2002 to June 2024, which includes information on their topics, speakers, and formats. This resource shows how open-source data on Chinese politics can shed light on changing policy priorities and processes that affect firms, investors, and policymakers around the world.

Under Xi, the Politburo Has Studied National Security More than Economic Development

Figure 1 shows that, compared to Hu, Xi has made the Politburo spend more time studying Party affairs and national security and less time studying economic policy and social policy. He has also overseen upticks in their study of technology and foreign affairs and a slight decline in sessions about state governance, while the focus on history and the environment remained consistent.¹

Under Hu’s leadership, a plurality of Politburo study sessions addressed the economy, with state governance, Party affairs, and social policy the next most common topics. He dedicated several sessions to studying how to improve China’s economic policymaking, national development planning, and financial systems. These included two separate sessions after the Great Recession in 2007–09 that analyzed how China should navigate and capitalize on the changing international economy. Sessions on state governance examined how to improve the rule of law, regulatory structures, and government accountability, although this agenda lost some steam in Hu’s second term.

During the Xi era, a plurality of Politburo study sessions focused on Party affairs, followed by national security, economic development, state governance, and technology. In line with Xi’s greater focus on internal discipline and ideological purity, his leadership has seen far more sessions devoted to anti-corruption, propaganda, and Marxist ideology. Hu’s sessions on Party affairs, by contrast, tended to look at reform-oriented subjects such as intra-Party democracy and grassroots governance. National security became more prominent as Xi sought to reinforce Party control by studying perceived threats from civil society, foreign governments, pandemic pathogens, and the financial sector.

The data also shows some continuity between the Hu and Xi eras. Xi’s focus on economic topics has fallen in each successive term, though they remain a middling priority. Xi has also assigned fewer sessions to state governance than Hu, but his second term saw a small climb centered around boosting administrative capacity and improving institutional structures for implementing Party decisions.

Under Xi, the Speakers Briefing the Politburo Have Become More Red and Less Expert

The type of speakers briefing the Politburo has changed along with the topics being studied (see Figure 2). Most briefers during the Hu era were professors at universities, specialists at institutions affiliated with the State Council, or researchers at national academies like the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). Briefers invited by Xi are proportionately more likely to be affiliated with central Party agencies and military research institutes, while the number from universities, academies, and the State Council has noticeably declined. Xi has also experimented with inviting briefers from state-owned enterprises, government-affiliated nonprofits, provincial leaders, and the National People’s Congress.

Hu and Xi have also favored speakers from different institutions. Since 2002, the most popular source of Politburo briefers has been CASS, whose experts have appeared at least 38 times. Its influence has waned, however, as 28 of those briefings happened during the Hu era. The Chinese Academy of Sciences is far less prominent, with Hu inviting three of its experts and Xi none. Xi has only twice requested scholars from the Central Party School, despite leading it from 2007 to 2013, while Hu invited them no fewer than eleven times. The dominant military research institutes are the PLA Academy of Military Sciences (13 briefings) and the PLA National Defense University (4 briefings).

Xi has invited more representatives from central Party agencies to brief the Politburo, relatively speaking. He has summoned officials from the Organization Department five times, from the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection three times, and from the Propaganda Department two times. Hu invited speakers from what is now the Institute of Party History and Literature to brief the Politburo eight times, from which Xi has never invited anyone, despite his interest in history.

Since 2002, the most common affiliations of briefers from State Council agencies are the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC, 15 briefings), the State Council Development Research Center (DRC, 13), the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs (six), and the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security (five). The NDRC’s lead is largely attributable to its Academy of Macroeconomic Research, whose experts have briefed eleven times. However, the NDRC has become less prominent under Xi’s leadership, only briefing four times since he took office and not since 2017. The DRC’s access to the Politburo has evaporated; Xi has never invited its experts to brief.

There is a clear hierarchy of higher-education institutions. Almost half of the 63 briefings by professors have involved academics from Tsinghua University (twelve briefings), Renmin University of China (eleven), and Peking University (eight). The overrepresentation of elite universities in Beijing is no doubt due in part to the concentration of top experts at such institutions and the easier logistics of preparing sessions with Beijing-based scholars, but their dominance remains disproportionate. Indeed, Xi shows a clear preference for scholars from Tsinghua, his alma mater, which employed seven of the 22 professors who have briefed the Politburo during his tenure. Meanwhile, he has invited only three Peking University professors and none from Renmin University.

Under Xi, the Speakers Briefing the Politburo Have Become Older and Less Diverse

In the Xi era, Politburo briefers are on average more male, more Han, and more elderly (see Figure 3). During the ten years of Hu’s leadership, nine women briefed the Politburo (5.81% of all speaker slots), compared to just five in the twelve years since Xi came to power (4.17%). Hu’s comrades heard from seven members of ethnic minorities (4.52%), while Xi’s have only heard from one (0.83%). The median age of Hu’s briefers was 52 years old, but this has jumped to 60 years old under Xi. Xi’s belief in traditional gender roles, Han-centric ethnic nationalism, and conservative values appears to shape his choice of briefers, likely reinforcing his ideological priorities in top-level policy discussions.

Under Xi, Fewer Experts Are Briefing the Politburo

Xi has changed the structure of Politburo study sessions (see Figure 4). From 2002 to 2012, they followed an identical format, with all but one session consisting of two speakers, the exception being when a Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention official was added to a session on technology policy in April 2003 to brief on the SARS outbreak. Under Xi, there has been a mix of formats, with most sessions involving just one speaker, a handful featuring two speakers, a few including three or more speakers, and some “group study” sessions without external speakers. The latter category includes three excursions in Beijing: to the Zhongguancun technology district in September 2013, to the People’s Daily News Agency in January 2019, and to Peking University and a former residence of Mao in June 2021. The new norm of single-speaker study sessions may allow Xi to engage more deeply with favored scholars and for the CGO and the CPRO to more easily manage intra-Party discussions. Xi also held more study sessions in his first two terms than Hu did, by a margin of 84 to 77. Whatever the reason, this change means that the Politburo is engaging with fewer external experts, with the number falling significantly from 146 between 2002 and 2012 to 103 between 2012 and 2022.

Repeat Briefers Reflect the Policy Preferences of the Party Leader

More than twenty people have briefed the Politburo more than once, but only four have briefed three times (see Table 1). The only expert to brief three times during the Xi era is Bu Xianqun, director of the CASS Department of Ancient History and a historian of the Qin and Han dynasties. Bu lectured in 2013, 2014, and 2018 on historical lessons for improving anti-corruption work, national governance, and cadre incentives, respectively. Hu’s favorite speakers were the reform-leaning economists Cai Fang, then director of the CASS Population and Labor Economics Research Institute, and Wang Yiming, then a senior official in the NDRC Academy of Macroeconomic Research, who both briefed three times between 2002 and 2012 but have not briefed since. The only three-time briefer invited under both Hu and Xi is Xue Lan, a U.S.-educated scholar of public administration, technology policy, and crisis management who serves as the dean of Schwarzman College at Tsinghua University. Xue briefed the Politburo on scientific and technological development in 2003, on cultivating strategic emerging industries in 2011, and on modernizing emergency management systems in 2019.

Most briefers subsequently enjoy a boost to their public profile, while some also experience significant career advancement, possibly due to the impression they made on China’s top leaders. Wan Gang, who briefed on China’s science and technology strategy in December 2004 when he was president of Tongji University, subsequently served as minister of science and technology from 2007 to 2018 and as a deputy national-level Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference vice chairman from 2008 to 2023. Three briefers in the Hu era who made especially large jumps from technical research institutes to ministerial-level positions are Cao Shumin, a telecommunications engineer who now leads the National Radio and Television Administration; Feng Fei, an industrial economist who is now Party secretary of Hainan Province; and Luo Wen, an information technologist who now heads the State Administration for Market Regulation. Their briefings likely helped to confirm their status as technocrats with policy skills who could succeed as political leaders.

The new normal of fewer and older briefers has contributed to fewer rising stars emerging from their ranks during the Xi era, with some notable exceptions. Jiang Hui was Party secretary of the CASS Institute of Information Studies when he briefed on the contemporary significance of Marxism in September 2017, shortly before the 19th Party Congress. He was promoted to a deputy ministerial-level post on the CASS leadership team in 2018, earned a rare lateral promotion to local officialdom when he was appointed propaganda chief of Chongqing in 2022, and became an alternate member of the Central Committee that same year. Yuan Peng briefed on strengthening national security systems in December 2020, when he was president of the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, and just over two years later was promoted (under the pseudonym Yuan Yikun) to serve as a deputy minister of state security. Xi likely selected Jiang and Yuan because their ideas already aligned with his own political priorities, but he also seems to have then rewarded them for providing especially useful briefings.

Beyond macro changes in policy focus, analyzing Politburo study sessions can also shed light on how the Party’s thinking is evolving in particular domains. This section analyzes what these sessions say about Chinese policymaking during the Xi era in two areas of interest to China watchers: technology policy and foreign affairs. The case studies suggest that these sessions highlight Xi’s priorities within a crowded policy universe but usually correlate more with policy refinements than major policy shifts.

Technology Policy

Technology became a frequent topic for Politburo study sessions during Xi’s second term, in line with his growing emphasis on economic self-reliance and building secure supply chains that reduce Western chokeholds. The four tech-themed sessions of the Hu era mostly focused on general topics such as “trends in scientific and technological development,” “China’s science and technology development strategy,” and “strategic emerging industries.” Under Xi, by contrast, they are usually deep dives on specific technologies, reflecting China’s growing innovation capabilities and industrial competitiveness in cutting-edge fields. The speakers are almost always leading academic experts, suggesting Xi’s recognition of the need for technical expertise in these subjects.

Xi has chaired nine technology-themed sessions: innovation-driven development (Wan Gang, Ministry of Science and Technology, September 2013); information technology (Wei Shaojun, Tsinghua University, October 2016); big data (Mei Hong, Beijing Institute of Technology, December 2017); artificial intelligence (Gao Wen, Peking University, October 2018); blockchain (Chen Chun, Zhejiang University, October 2019); quantum (Xue Qikun, Tsinghua University, October 2020); digital economy (Lü Jian, Nanjing University, October 2021); basic research (Gong Qihuang, Peking University, February 2023); and new quality productive forces (Politburo members, January 2024).

Xi generally uses these sessions to socialize his policy preferences related to emerging technologies and mobilize Party leaders to adapt accordingly. Typically, Beijing had already issued directives regarding these technologies, but in the months or years following a session, it published more authoritative and detailed policy documents. For example, the October 2016 session on advancing indigenous innovation in information technology and building China into a cyber power came after Xi had introduced the Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission, World Internet Conference, Made in China 2025 strategy, and Internet-Plus Action Plan. Two months later, though, came the rollout of a National Information Technology Plan that incorporated many themes of the session. Likewise, before the Politburo studied big data, artificial intelligence (AI), blockchain, and quantum, the State Council had already issued policies promoting greater investment, stronger regulation, and deeper self-reliance in these technologies. But the study sessions often fed into deeper initiatives like the first dedicated Five-Year Plan for Developing the Big Data Industry, Guiding Opinions on Accelerating the Application of Blockchain Technology, the tech-heavy 14th Five-Year Plan, and a raft of AI-specific regulations.

Xi often selected briefers whose recent work echoed his views. Wei Shaojun, who briefed on information technology in 2016, had long advocated for more top-level support to advance indigenous innovation. Just a few months before Gong Qihuang briefed the Politburo on upgrading basic research to advance tech self-reliance in February 2023, he published an article emphasizing the need to adapt educational institutions to the demands of national strategies. In an adjacent policy area, a high-profile speech by Liu Jizhen in September 2023, which questioned the focus on wind and solar power in energy storage solutions, preceded his briefing the Politburo on new energy technology in February 2024.

Technologists who brief the Politburo tend to become quasi-official spokespersons for their fields. Having heard Xi’s views directly, they serve as credible evangelists for his policies with both expert and public audiences, through academic conferences, media interviews, and policy commentaries. Mei Hong, the software engineer who briefed on big data, started giving speeches to officials and writing for state publications, injecting a strong national development focus into his work. Gao Wen leveraged his briefing on AI into positions on several government advisory committees and began to publish articles praising Xi’s science and technology policies. Netizens responded warmly to Chen Chun, an affable professor of computer science at Zhejiang University, who became a cheerleader for Beijing’s steering of blockchain technology away from cryptocurrency applications.

Foreign Policy

Foreign affairs has become a more common subject of Politburo study sessions after Xi abandoned the diplomatic caution of his predecessors’ “hide and bide” approach in favor of “striving for achievement” in international affairs. Hu’s four sessions in this area focused either on economic globalization or on hosting major global events, namely the Beijing 2008 Summer Olympics and Expo 2010 Shanghai China. Under Xi, these sessions have emphasized different ways that China is seeking to play a greater role in global governance. The sessions are led by ministers, officials, and professors, reflecting the diverse government interests that have a stake in China’s international relations.

Xi has chaired eight Politburo study sessions about foreign policy: peaceful development (Yang Jiechi, Wang Jiarui, and Chen Deming, State Council, January 2013); cultural soft power (Shen Zhuanghai, Wuhan University, and Huang Zhixian, Propaganda Department, December 2013); global governance (Qin Yaqing, China Foreign Affairs University, October 2015); the Belt and Road Initiative (Li Guoqiang, CASS, April 2016); the G20 and global governance transformations (Gao Fei, China Foreign Affairs University, September 2016); international communication (Zhang Weiwei, Fudan University, May 2021); World Trade Organization reform (Gu Xueming, Ministry of Commerce, September 2023); and foreign-related legal affairs (Huang Huikang, Wuhan University, November 2023).

Xi’s first foreign-related study session, just two months into his tenure, set the tone for his leadership as he brought in three government ministers to help outline his view that China’s development required it to more actively shape the international order. But since then, these sessions have generally not introduced new concepts and rather focused on consolidating emerging directions in Xi’s foreign policy with the Party leadership. For example, Xi had already launched the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and the Community of Common Destiny by the time the Politburo studied global governance and the BRI later in his first term.

The type of experts invited to brief the Politburo on foreign policy reflects the more political and less technical nature of these study sessions. The choice of Qin Yaqing, a constructivist scholar who advocates the deeper integration of Chinese culture and philosophy into international relations, to brief on global governance suggests an emphasis on legitimizing Xi’s project rather than practical proposals. Li Guoqiang, who briefed on the BRI, is a historian whose work focuses on justifying China’s territorial claims. Gu Xueming, a researcher affiliated with the Ministry of Commerce, does not specialize in World Trade Organization reform, the topic that he briefed on, so his selection seemed simply to communicate Xi’s commitment to international trade. Even the sessions with scholars whose work more closely followed the topic at hand — such as Shen Zhuanghai on soft power, Gao Fei on the G20 and global governance, and Huang Huikang on international law — appeared to mostly reinforce existing policies.

Perhaps the most notable foreign-related study session, which attracted media attention in the West, was the one on international communication in May 2021. It came at the height of “wolf-warrior diplomacy,” when Chinese diplomats embraced inflammatory language and aggressive threats against Western countries, alienating their politicians and publics alike. The briefer was Zhang Weiwei, a nationalist pundit-turned-professor at Fudan University, who had described wolf-warrior diplomacy as “telling big truths” and “a very good thing.” But, contrary to Zhang’s sentiments, the readout said that Xi wanted to build a more “trustworthy, lovable, and respectable” image of China, the first sign of Xi’s eventual retreat from the wolf-warrior approach. This disconnect underlines how briefers are less important than leaders when it comes to the content of Politburo study sessions. And the significance of this session marks it as an exception that proves the rule that major policy shifts are rare.

This paper has shown both the possibilities and limitations of using Politburo study sessions to decode Chinese politics. The topics reflect the priorities of the top leader and often signal that further guidelines related to these areas are in the pipeline. But these sessions seldom signal a major policy shift, tending instead to help the top leader to confirm, disseminate, and socialize their views on an established but progressing policy process. The speakers reveal the types of experts and institutions that the Party Center consults with on different issues. But the extensive vetting of briefers and their lectures means they function more as credentialed political messengers rather than independent policy advisors, although there is more leeway for substantive input on technical policy questions.

Our unique database of Politburo study sessions shows the increasing priority of internal Party affairs and national security in Xi’s approach to governance. Speakers have also increasingly been drawn from Party institutions, reinforcing Xi’s more inward-looking approach to politics and the centralization of power in the Party Center over the State Council. This echo chamber is intensified by inviting fewer and less diverse experts to interact with the Party’s top leaders. These developments are contributing factors to the uncertainty and volatility of policymaking in Beijing today, as well as to decision-making that is stickier and less responsive to changing dynamics and emerging problems in Chinese society.

The case studies show how the monthly Politburo study sessions often play an important role not in introducing new ideas to Chinese policymakers but in highlighting Xi’s priorities within the existing policy mix. These sessions are a powerful tool for Xi to highlight a particular issue to ensure that his colleagues understand its importance and to signal his thinking on the issue so that they can incorporate his views into their work. Readouts from these sessions can serve as leading indicators of further high-level policy documents and sometimes of moderate policy changes.

But collective study is more important in some policy domains than others. Technology policy relies more on input from scientific experts than foreign policy, and so sessions focused on technology seem to have more impact on policymaking than sessions on foreign policy topics. The latter usually function more to socialize Xi’s policies with the political elite, whose high-level roles in the Party, state, military, and local governments all involve significant interaction with the outside world.

Experts who lecture to a study session get a rare opportunity to interact with the Politburo, and while their appearances are thoroughly rehearsed, they gain insight into the thoughts and questions on the minds of the country’s top leaders. Many emerge as more prominent and credible voices on the direction of policymaking in their areas of expertise, especially in technocratic domains such as technology. Briefers on foreign policy tend to flesh out existing initiatives. They may not directly influence policy decisions, but their work likely already reflects Xi’s views on an issue.

Differences between Politburo study sessions in the Hu and Xi eras also illuminate the importance of leadership in Beijing. The general secretary sets the agenda for these sessions, which are a half-step removed from the actual policymaking, meaning they are relatively reliable indicators of the leader’s personal preoccupations. The implication is that Xi himself is an important factor in Chinese politics and that the Party’s policy priorities, political processes, and sources of expertise could be quite different under another leader.

Future research on Politburo study sessions could focus on deeper case studies of specific policy areas and on comparing the speed, intensity, and focus of policies enacted regarding a certain topic both before and after a study session to better gauge the impact of different sessions.

1. The Center for China Analysis classified the topics of Politburo study sessions into nine categories: Economy (incl. Demographics, Finance, and Rural Development); Environment (incl. Energy Policy); Governance (incl. Administrative Reforms, the Constitution, and Legal Reforms); History (incl. Archaeology); Foreign Affairs (incl. Trade); National Security (incl. Military Affairs); Party Affairs (incl. Corruption, Ideology, Propaganda, and Theory); Technology (incl. Human Capital Policies and Science); and Social & Cultural Policy (incl. Aged Care, Ethnic Minorities, Health, Education, and Welfare). This approach was inspired by Brian Hart, although we chose a different set of topics and coded the data independently.

The authors would like to thank Jing Qian for his invaluable input to conceptualizing this paper and Jennifer Choo, Wenxuan Ma, Ian Lane Smith, Inger Marie Rossing, Lobsang Tsering, Gavin Xu, and Guoguang Wu for their assistance in putting this paper together.