How will a second Trump presidency impact U.S.–Southeast Asia relations, and what are the implications for regional stability and economic growth? This paper analyzes views of Donald Trump’s second term in the region and the Trump's administration most likely approach to Southeast Asia. In particular, it assesses regional perceptions of risks in the security and economic domains and discusses how China may seek to capitalize on those perceptions.

Key Points

• Along with the rest of the world, Southeast Asian nations are grappling with how to understand the dramatic changes to geopolitical priorities signaled by the early stages of the second Trump administration, in which the U.S. is “no longer prepared to underwrite the global order,” as one regional leader recently put it.
• Many in the region anticipate reduced U.S. multilateral engagement under President Donald Trump, with his administration viewing the region primarily through the lens of U.S.-China competition. The U.S. is expected to focus on bilateral relationships with strategically significant partners like the Philippines and Vietnam, weakening engagement with regional institutions like ASEAN.
• Trump's confrontational stance toward China, which includes new and steeper tariffs and expanded technology restrictions, will complicate Southeast Asian nations' traditional balancing act between Beijing and Washington. Regional fears focus on greater geopolitical competition leading to wider regional instability, notably through increased military tensions over Taiwan and the South China Sea.
• Economic disruption poses a major risk for trade-dependent Southeast Asian economies, stemming from Trump's use of tariff barriers against countries with trade surpluses, as well as a broader policy of decoupling from China.
• China is well positioned to exploit reduced U.S. engagement by deepening both bilateral relationships and multilateral initiatives in Southeast Asia, particularly through investment deals, expanded BRICS cooperation, and attempts to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade bloc. Trump's early decision to shut down the U.S. Agency for International Development creates additional opportunities for Chinese influence.
• Southeast Asia's economic growth potential and strategic importance to U.S.-China competition make continued engagement crucial for American interests. While high-level diplomatic participation may decrease, maintaining strong security partnerships and encouraging U.S. private sector investments will be important components of any strategy for preserving U.S. influence in the broader Indo-Pacific region.
   

Observers of ties between the United States and Southeast Asia witnessed a unique sight in November 2017: President Donald Trump attending an Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit. At the multilateral meeting held in the Philippines, Trump said that the United States remained “committed to ASEAN’s central role as a regional forum” and noted that engagement with the region “advances the security and prosperity of the American people.” In Southeast Asian diplomatic circles, where physical presence at forums carries symbolic weight, attendance is monitored and interpreted as an indicator of commitment. It was noticed, therefore, that Trump failed to show up for any further ASEAN gatherings, nor did he attend the East Asia Summit, which brings together 18 nations from the wider region, including China and India. In 2019, Trump even sent National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien to the ASEAN summit – the first time that any country sent an official below the rank of foreign minister. Trump was, of course, far from unique in his diplomatic absences. President Joe Biden was a serial non-attendee, too, including a no-show at the ASEAN leaders' meeting held in Laos in October 2024. Thus, regional leaders will have especially low expectations for greater engagement from Trump’s team as he returns to office a second time.

During Trump’s 2024 campaign, political elites across Asia maintained a measured outlook on a potential second term, particularly compared with their counterparts in Europe, who were sounding alarm bells. Even as they anticipated limited diplomatic and economic engagement, many in Asia saw things to like in Trump’s policies. This relative equanimity stemmed partly from their experience of Trump's first term, when many in Southeast Asia found him to be a transactional and unconventional leader, but ultimately a manageable one. However, the chaotic radicalism of the first few weeks of Trump’s second term has dented that insouciance. Unexpected moves to shutter the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) will have a direct negative impact on many emerging economies in Southeast Asia. Trump’s threats to hit Canada and Mexico with heavy tariffs, and his moves to introduce tariffs on China, have exacerbated existing worries about U.S. anti-trade policies and sparked concerns that Southeast Asian nations are next in line. Renewed U.S. domestic political turmoil in the wake of Trump’s early policies is alarming regional leaders. Speaking at the Munich Security Conference in February, Singapore’s Defense Minister Ng Eng Hen pointedly accused the U.S of behaving like “a landlord seeking rent,” in effect abandoning its more traditional role as a force for freedom in the region.

Beneath those worries, however, lie two deeper ongoing concerns about the United States’ role in the region as a potential geopolitical and economic disruptor. The primary anxiety focuses on a more confrontational U.S. approach to China. Amplified great-power tensions risk destabilizing a carefully managed diplomatic equilibrium in which Southeast Asian nations have tried to maintain productive relationships with both Washington and Beijing. A more assertive U.S. posture would make this traditional balancing act more complicated. A second concern relates to economic and trade policies. Trump's emphasis on tariffs and reshoring supply chains poses challenges for trade-dependent Southeast Asian economies, many of which rely on global supply chains for future growth. Nations running a trade surplus with the United States – specifically Vietnam, Thailand, and Malaysia – also risk being hit with tariffs. These anxieties are compounded by the absence of a constructive U.S. economic agenda to foster regional trade and growth, a vacuum that China is eager to fill.

These regional anxieties appear well founded in light of the disruptive policies of Trump’s first term and the likely policy directions of his new administration. Trump’s team views relations with Southeast Asia largely as a subset of its approach to great-power competition with China. This is likely to mean reduced engagement with regional multilateral institutions like ASEAN in favor of direct bilateral relationships with strategically significant partners, such as the Philippines, Vietnam, and Singapore. Meanwhile, Trump's economic policies will only heighten anxieties about trade and development. To the extent that the United States does engage economically with Southeast Asia, Washington will increase pressure to choose a side in the broader geopolitical contest, using economic measures like tariffs and access to advanced technologies as leverage. Lee Hsien Loong, Singapore’s former Prime Minister, put these changes in stark terms in a speech in early February, reflecting on the early weeks of Trump’s second term. “The U.S. is no longer prepared to underwrite the global order. This makes the international environment far less orderly and predictable,” Lee said. “Singapore, like all other countries, must adapt to this new reality, even as we seek to maintain our strong ties and friendship with the U.S.”

U.S. policymakers would be short-sighted to abandon engagement with Southeast Asia given its growing economic importance and position as a central front in the geopolitical balance of Asia. Viewed in raw geopolitical terms, without meaningful U.S. engagement, countries like Malaysia and Cambodia risk drifting further into China's orbit. In the absence of U.S.-led economic initiatives, ASEAN nations will continue to increase engagement with Chinese-led bodies, notably BRICS. In short, the region's expanding economies and geographic position should remain a priority as the new administration seeks to maintain U.S. influence in the wider Indo-Pacific.

Southeast Asian nations see both opportunities and risks in Trump’s return to power. Trump’s style of government is unorthodox, but some of his policies could create economic opportunities in Southeast Asia. For example, as U.S. companies continue to develop "China Plus One" diversification strategies, the relocation of supply chains could benefit countries like Vietnam and Malaysia. Furthermore, a new administration offers the chance to renew relationships or restart dialogues. Many Southeast Asian leaders will welcome a U.S. president who cares little for traditional American concerns like safeguarding human rights or promoting democracy. Others in the region remain sanguine about Trump’s first term. “The Trump administration wasn’t all bad,” former Singapore diplomat Bilahari Kausikan remarked just before the 2024 presidential election. “The world did not end. And some of the things Trump did to restore the credibility of American hard power were certainly in our interest.” 

The prospect of Trump's return to power heightened specific anxieties about geopolitical and economic instabilities. On the former, Trump’s team looks set to push increased military spending to bolster deterrence and a policy of robust diplomatic pressure to counter China. Doing so is necessary, his supporters argue, to push back against Beijing’s attempts to alter elements of the existing regional order – an order that has done much to facilitate Southeast Asia’s economic rise over recent decades – even if this comes at a cost of increased tensions. Risk-averse Southeast Asian nations will be wary of this approach, viewing any new diplomatic or military strains between the two superpowers as cause for alarm with potentially negative implications.

Regional capitals were relieved by the recent period of relative calm in U.S.-China relations during the later stages of Biden’s term, which was characterized by more frequent high-level diplomatic encounters and reopened channels of communication. During a second Trump administration, we are likely to see a return to tense bilateral relations. Trump’s focus on China’s economic policies and his use of tariffs will be major contributors to that tension. Many observers fear a repeat of the confrontational dynamics that followed then–House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan in 2022, which prompted Beijing to undertake large-scale military exercises and led to an extended period of tension. Michael Waltz, Trump’s incoming national security advisor, wrote in November 2024 that the United States should “increase defense spending and revitalize the defense-industrial base to make sure its armed forces are clearly capable of denying a Chinese attack on Taiwan.” Any movement in this direction by the Trump administration will come at a time of already heightened Chinese military activity—2024 saw a marked increase in Chinese military and gray-zone action close to Taiwan, including one of its largest ever military exercises conducted in December 2024.

The most obvious potential flashpoint remains the Taiwan Strait, where Trump's approach is ambiguous at best. Most of his national security appointments have hawkish views on China; however, his advisors also include those with warmer ties to Beijing, most obviously billionaire tycoon Elon Musk, who has a range of China-connected business interests. During his first term, Trump was a popular figure in Taiwan, credited with improving bilateral ties. But he has also praised Chinese President Xi Jinping and made mixed statements on Taiwan’s future, criticizing Taiwan over its semiconductor industry and its limited defense investments. Taiwan “stole our chip business ... and they want protection,” Trump said in an interview on the Joe Rogan podcast during the presidential campaign in October 2024. In his first few weeks in power, Trump said that he planned to introduce tariffs on semiconductor imports “in the very near future,” a move that would target Taiwan in particular.

Beyond the Taiwan Strait, ASEAN member states will also be anxious about a possible escalation of tensions in the South China Sea. This concern is particularly acute given ongoing hostilities between the Philippines and China over what Beijing claims is an illegally grounded warship at Second Thomas Shoal. Fellow ASEAN countries have been notably cautious in expressing support for the Philippines in this dispute, generally counseling de-escalation for fear of offending Beijing. It remains uncertain how Trump would react to further Chinese provocation against the Philippines, despite Manila’s position as a U.S. treaty ally. Trump has often expressed doubts about the wisdom of the United States supporting its allies. In his victory speech on November 6, 2024, Trump specifically noted that he planned to "stop wars,” rather than start them, raising doubts about his willingness to threaten military force to support allies such as the Philippines.

A rising risk of economic disruption is the second major concern of Southeast Asian nations following Trump’s return, beginning with his approach to China. Biden's team aimed for a policy of "de-risking" from Beijing in specific areas, notably by limiting access to advanced technology. Biden’s national security advisor, Jake Sullivan, spoke of a "small yard, high fence" strategy narrowly focused on export controls and investment restrictions on a limited set of critical technologies essential for national security. This approach aimed to balance the protection of sensitive technological advantages with the need to maintain beneficial economic engagement with China in other areas. Many of Trump's advisors favor a wider economic separation and broader restrictions on high-tech trade with China. His nominee for U.S. Trade Representative, Jamieson Greer, has advocated for full "strategic decoupling," in which the United States would separate itself from China in a much wider range of economic areas.

This approach to China would have negative economic consequences for Southeast Asian nations, for which China is a critical trading partner. During his 2024 campaign, Trump suggested imposing universal tariffs of 10% on all nations, but up to 60% on Chinese goods. His early decision to target China with only 10% tariffs will come as a relief, although it will have a direct impact on trading nations in the region. Chinese retaliation through reciprocal tariffs or technology restrictions will create additional challenges for regional trade and development, as demonstrated in December 2024 by China's retaliatory ban on critical mineral exports for semiconductor manufacturing in response to U.S. technology restrictions. Chinese companies are also likely to redirect imports affected by U.S. tariffs to other markets, producing a wave of cheap imports that will undermine domestic Southeast Asian producers. China is also likely to relocate operations to Southeast Asia to circumvent U.S. tariffs, potentially drawing unwanted U.S. scrutiny over "rebadging" practices. Countries like Malaysia have already taken steps to discourage such tactics to avoid becoming a focus of U.S. enforcement efforts.

Beyond China, Trump has threatened specific actions against other countries. These actions could include new tariffs against Southeast Asian nations that have trade surpluses with the United States, such as Vietnam. Such measures, coupled with Trump’s general distrust of international trade institutions, would likely dent global trade more broadly, posing obvious challenges for Southeast Asian economies that are trade dependent and deeply integrated with global supply chains. “Trade is three times our GDP,” Singapore’s Lawrence Wong noted in November just after Trump’s election. “We are an open economy. We are a trading economy. We would be concerned in a world where there are more and more frictions to trade overall.”

U.S. technology policy presents another significant economic challenge. Trump is likely to introduce new restrictions limiting Chinese access to a range of technologies, from semiconductors to biotechnology. Artificial intelligence (AI) is likely to be a particular focus, following the recent publication of the "AI diffusion" framework, which creates a new three-tier system of export controls with varying levels of access to AI technology. The system features a top tier of 18 closely allied nations with unrestricted access, a bottom tier of around two dozen nations with no access, and larger middle tier of around 150 nations with controlled or limited access through licensing programs. The system aims to prevent U.S. companies from transferring AI products to countries that might, in turn, transfer them to China. These measures create complications for countries such as Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam, all of which are situated in the middle tier and would prefer to benefit from both U.S. and Chinese AI developments.

Southeast Asian leaders consistently caution against viewing their region primarily as an arena for U.S.-China rivalry. Indonesia's outgoing president, Joko Widodo, voiced this concern in November 2024, warning that "ASEAN should not let the current geopolitical dynamic turn into a new Cold War." Most signals nonetheless suggest that Trump’s team indeed views U.S. engagement with ASEAN primarily through the lens of strategic competition with Beijing. This approach will overshadow other more prominent aspects of U.S.-Southeast Asian relations under previous U.S. administrations, from economic cooperation and climate change initiatives to regional security challenges such as the crisis in Myanmar.

This shift should concern Trump’s team, as it flows directly from choices made over recent decades. President Barack Obama’s administration invested time and attention in Southeast Asia, viewing it as an arena where U.S. influence could expand at China's expense and democratic transitions could flourish, as exemplified by Myanmar. This approach was progressively downplayed during Trump's first term and under the Biden administration. The United States became increasingly realistic about Southeast Asian nations' reluctance to abandon their traditional balancing act between Washington and Beijing. In response, U.S. diplomatic efforts shifted toward Indo-Pacific partners that demonstrated a greater willingness to actively counter China.

Trump’s team is likely to continue this approach, bypassing regional bodies like ASEAN and focusing on bilateral ties in areas where geopolitical or investment dividends are greatest. Those hoping for renewed economic engagement may to be disappointed, as Trump’s team is likely to unravel the limited attempts made by the Biden administration to promote economic engagement. Trump previously pledged that Biden’s Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) would be “dead on day one” of his new administration. Launched in 2022, the IPEF—which includes Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, and Singapore among its 14 members—aims to deepen U.S. economic ties in the region in areas such as digital trade and supply chains.

Among Southeast Asian nations, the Philippines is one potential beneficiary of Trump's approach. As a long-standing U.S. treaty ally with strategic proximity to Taiwan, it remains critical to U.S. efforts to balance China militarily. Manila's assertive stance toward Chinese maritime claims in the South China Sea aligns well with Washington's objectives. Recent moves to enhance military cooperation are likely to continue, following the enlargement of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement signed in 2023, which expands U.S. access to Philippine military bases. Military-linked investments will also be an important factor in the alliance during the second Trump administration, including, most notably, the 2023 deal by private equity investor Cerberus Capital Management to buy a commercial shipyard at Subic Bay, a major former US naval base, for $300 million. In December 2024, Trump nominated billionaire and Cerberus founder Stephen Feinberg to serve as deputy secretary of defense. Economic ties may be deepened through a bilateral free trade agreement if Trump decides to revive discussions that began during his 2017 visit to Manila.

Beyond the Philippines, Vietnam is another potential focus for the Trump administration. Hanoi faces the prospect of U.S. tariffs, given its rising trade surplus with the United States. Trump also brought a trade investigation against Vietnam during his first term. But Vietnam has also shown some willingness to challenge Chinese assertions in the South China Sea and has steadily expanded cooperation with the United States, including a comprehensive strategic partnership signed in 2023, the highest level of diplomatic agreement that Vietnam offers. Singapore's role as a strategic logistics hub for the U.S. military, alongside its position as a center for financial and investment flows, will ensure that it continues to play a role as an important U.S. partner. Indonesia hopes that its new president, Prabowo Subianto, will strike a positive relationship with Trump, as both have reputations as no-nonsense, populist strongmen.

Overall, Trump is likely to seek a clear quid pro quo for any diplomatic engagement, with a particular preference for investment deals for American companies or foreign direct investment in the United States. This approach to prioritizing investments was evident early in Trump’s transition, when both SoftBank CEO Masayoshi Son of Japan and DAMAC Properties Chair Hussain Sajwani of the United Arab Emirates visited him at Mar-a-Lago to pledge major investment deals in the United States. Southeast Asian countries may seek to adopt their own transactional approaches. For example, Malaysia could leverage its growing role in global semiconductor supply chains, while Indonesia is emerging as a key global player because of its resources of nickel and other minerals used for green technologies.

In recent years, commentators have identified a shift in regional sentiment away from the United States and toward China. This was captured in an April 2024 survey of elite opinion produced by the Singapore-based ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute. For the first time since the survey’s inception in 2020, political and business leaders said they would prefer to align their countries with China over the United States if forced to choose. Of course, a single question in one survey cannot reflect the complexity of a region like Southeast Asia. The survey’s results partly reflect regional reactions to U.S. support for Israel’s operations in Gaza, given that the survey’s shifts were pronounced in Muslim-majority ASEAN nations like Malaysia and Indonesia. However, the shift also likely reflects China's long-term strategy of regional engagement, as well as changing patterns of economic interdependence in which ASEAN has surpassed the European Union to become China's largest trading partner. A spate of recent international commentary reflects this view. "America Is Losing Southeast Asia,” one essay in Foreign Affairs put it last year.

The Trump administration’s approach to Southeast Asia will create opportunities for China to exploit, even as Beijing struggles to manage its own complex and changing relationship with Washington. Beijing has consistently portrayed the United States as a destabilizing force in the region and will continue to do so under Trump 2.0. Trump’s early decision to shut down USAID, for instance, plays perfectly into China’s narrative portraying the United States as a force for destabilization and China as a force for regional and global stability. The decision is likely to have wide-ranging implications in the region, leading to hospital closures in Thailand across the border from Myanmar and affecting areas such as climate financing and habitat preservation. Beijing will also emphasize what it characterizes as a provocative U.S. policy toward Taiwan, a message that will resonate with Southeast Asian nations concerned about regional stability.

At the bilateral level, Beijing will see an opportunity to move forward with its strategy of deepening relationships throughout Southeast Asia, focusing on economic engagement and investment projects, including in disputed areas of the South China Sea. In November 2024, Beijing announced a USD 10 billion economic investment deal with Indonesia that will include joint development projects in disputed maritime areas. This drew scrutiny from Western observers, who pointed to China’s habit of using bilateral investment deals win concessions in territorial disputes. This strategy of deepening bilateral engagement is likely to focus on countries like Cambodia and Malaysia, whose leaders have demonstrated openness to Chinese investment and have, from Western perspectives, moved increasingly into China's sphere of influence in recent years. Malaysia’s role as ASEAN chair during 2025 will be a particular focus. Anwar Ibrahim, Malaysia’s prime minister, noted in a January 2025 interview that a lack recent U.S. engagement had created opportunities for China. The United States “does not engage the region as actively as it did in the past,” he said. “China … takes a more positive attitude.”

Beyond bilateral engagement, China will seek to expand its multilateral engagement in Southeast Asia, both through its role as an ASEAN partner and through the expanded BRICS grouping. Indonesia formally joined BRICS in early 2025, while Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam are formally classified as “partner” countries. Greater engagement between Southeast Asian countries and BRICS could be viewed as a hedge against the uncertainties of a second Trump administration. This stronger alignment is likely to create new tensions with the United States. Trump threatened 100% tariffs on BRICS members in response to discussions about developing a BRICS international payment and settlement system, which could, in theory, become an alternative currency and challenge the dominance of the U.S. dollar. Despite these pressures, many Southeast Asian nations view BRICS as a valuable counterweight to traditional Western-led forums like the G7 and G20, potentially leading more ASEAN members to seek membership in future.

China is also likely to continue to pursue membership in the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), a trade agreement that the United States abandoned during Trump's first presidency. Since submitting its application in 2021, China has created divisions among the agreement's 11 members, which include Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam in Southeast Asia. Although China’s eventual accession requires unanimous approval from existing members, a likely period of U.S. disengagement on trade policy in the region will provide an opportunity for Beijing to press forward with CPTPP membership.

China’s ambition to expand its influence in Southeast Asia should give pause to Trump's advisors as they formulate their approach to the region. Southeast Asian nations remain steadfast in their strategy of striking a balance between the United States and China. Yet they continue to value U.S. engagement, both as a geopolitical counterweight to China and as a potential investment partner. Singapore's Bilahari Kausikan characterized the region's complex approach to the great powers in a recent speech: “To Southeast Asia, dealing with great-power competition is a normal state of affairs; and hedging, balancing, and band-wagoning are not alternative strategies.”

Southeast Asian nations will continue to display a complex set of interests and risk perceptions as they respond to Trump in his second term. Many countries have drawn closer to China economically and diplomatically over recent years, but few in the region welcome a future dominated by Chinese power and the absence of U.S. influence. Any signs that Trump might make conciliatory moves toward Beijing are likely to be welcomed in the name of regional stability. But signs that Trump is willing to go further, seeking to strike deals that involve Taiwan and affect the broader regional security balance, would cause alarm. No country wants to choose between the United States and China. Yet it appears increasingly likely that a second Trump term will force precisely that kind of uncomfortable choice, challenging the region's traditional preference for balanced engagement with the two major powers. The combination of increased geopolitical tensions and economic decoupling threatens to create a more polarized environment, making it difficult for Southeast Asian nations to maintain their preferred position of strategic autonomy.

For the United States, Southeast Asia retains considerable geopolitical and economic potential. Growth levels in ASEAN nations are projected to be among the world’s highest over the next decade, led by nations like the Philippines, Indonesia, and Vietnam. As U.S. companies seek to diversify their supply chains away from China, Southeast Asia should remain an attractive investment destination. Concerns about the United States’ declining influence relative to China risk becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy in the absence of meaningful engagement. Few will expect President Trump to turn up at many regional summits. But maintaining a strong U.S. presence in Southeast Asia should remain an important focus for the Trump administration as it seeks to contain China's growing influence and secure U.S. economic advantage in the wider Indo-Pacific region.