On U.S.-China Relations & Security
What's at Stake for Asia in the 2024 U.S. Election

By: Lyle Morris and Wu Xinbo
In the run-up to the November 2024 U.S. presidential election, national security issues are playing a key role in the campaigns of the two candidates — Democrat Kamala Harris and Republican Donald Trump. In particular, since China has been identified as the United States biggest “strategic competitor” during both the Trump and Biden administrations, a key question is how will the trajectory of U.S.-China relations will be affected under a Harris or a Trump presidency?
This article explores how both candidates will approach China if elected president. In particular, both authors will present U.S. and Chinese perspectives of how both candidates will influence bilateral relations, with a particular focus on national security. The central question to be considered is this: Will there be any discernible changes to U.S. policy towards China under a Harris or a Trump presidency? If so, what changes might be expected?
Both authors agree that there will be few differences at the macro level in the China strategies of Harris and Trump: “strategic competition” has become deeply ingrained as the guiding principle within the U.S. national strategy towards China. Furthermore, national security has seeped into U.S. trade and investment policy toward China in recent years, to include greater U.S. export controls on high-technology commodities. Thus, it is likely that both candidates will continue policies that nest national security considerations within an overall economic approach toward China.
However, we may expect tactical differences in both candidates’ policies regarding trade and U.S. approaches to alliances. Harris will likely continue policies under a Biden administration that prioritize the central role that U.S. alliances in Asia and Europe play in the world. While Trump will likely inject uncertainty into the role of alliances within strategic competition with China. He will also likely adopt a much more aggressive stance on trade, to possibly include heavy tariffs on China, that may destabilize an already unstable bilateral relationship.
The View from Washington
If Vice President Harris wins in November, there will likely be significant continuity between her China policy and that of President Joe Biden, which has emphasized investing in domestic capabilities, aligning with allies and partners, and competing with Beijing for economic advantage and global leadership. During the U.S. presidential debate on September 10, 2024, Harris said the United States must “beat China in the competition for the twenty-first century.” This echoed her August 2024, speech at the Democratic National Convention, for example, saying she would ensure that “America — not China — wins the competition for the 21st century” in fields such as space and artificial intelligence, and that the United States “does not abdicate its international leadership.”
If Trump returns to the White House, trade will continue to form the centerpiece of his policy toward China. This includes his promise to impose higher tariffs of up to 60% on Chinese imports. He has also suggested that he will heavily restrict Chinese ownership of U.S. assets and U.S. investment into China; expand export controls on China from Biden’s “small yard, high fence” to a “big yard, high fence” approach; and phase out imports from China of electronics, steel, and pharmaceuticals. His more unilateral approach brings more downside risk for U.S.-China stability but also slightly more upside potential, as he views tough policies as negotiating tools for potential deals with China.
Trump will also likely continue his prior approach to U.S. alliances, casting doubt on their utility and calling for allies to “pay their share” of mutual defense commitments. As recently as February 2024, Trump threatened not to honor NATO treaty commitments involving hostilities with Russia, for example. His support for U.S. alliances in Asia is also tenuous. During his tenure as president, Trump is perhaps best remembered as scraping the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal, oscillating between confrontation and appeasement with North Korea, and injecting bilateral tension with Japan over trade and burden-sharing arrangements.
While Trump has a four-year track record of China policies to draw from, Harris’s China policy remains less clear. As vice president, Harris has largely amplified Biden’s policies on China, which include being outspoken on China’s “unfair” trade practices, concerns over Beijing’s military modernization, and China’s human rights record.
On human rights, Harris regularly worked on legislation as a senator promoting human rights in Hong Kong. Trump signed into law a bipartisan bill she introduced with Sen. Marco Rubio (R-FL.) promoting human rights in Hong Kong and sanctioning Hong Kong officials implicated in “undermining fundamental freedoms and autonomy” in the territory. Harris’s co-sponsorship of the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act helped make it law in 2020 and empowered the U.S. government to impose sanctions against “foreign individuals and entities responsible for human rights abuses” in Xinjiang.
On the geographic flashpoints, such as Taiwan and the South China Sea, Harris has signaled continuity with the Biden administration. Speaking aboard the USS Howard at the Yokosuka Naval Base in Japan in September 2022, for example, Harris offered some of her most pointed remarks about China’s military activities in the Indo-Pacific and near Taiwan, accusing China of “undermining key elements of the international rules-based order” and calling Beijing’s behavior in the East China Sea, South China Sea and Taiwan Strait “disturbing.” She also echoed President Biden’s comments on Taiwan, saying the United States will “continue to oppose any unilateral change to the status quo. And we will continue to support Taiwan’s self-defense, consistent with our long-standing policy.”
Notably, Harris became the highest-ranking United States official ever to visit the western island of Palawan, the closest Philippine landmass to the disputed Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, in November 2023. Harris said “as an ally, the United States stands with the Philippines in the face of intimidation and coercion in the South China Sea.” She also reaffirmed the “unwavering” commitment of the United States to defend the Philippines if its vessels or aircraft were attacked in the South China Sea.
While Harris has not visited China or Taiwan as either senator or vice president, she has spoken with both Chinese leader Xi Jinping and Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te. Harris met briefly with Xi on the margins of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leaders Retreat in 2022 where she urged him to “maintain open lines of communication to responsibly manage the competition between our countries.” Harris also met Lai at the inauguration of Honduras’s President Xiomara Castro in that same year prior to Lai’s successful bid for Taiwan’s presidency in January 2023.
Harris’s selection of Tim Walz as a running mate, however, may increase the chances of a new direction for the U.S.-China relationship. Walz has spent significant time in China, including teaching English during the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident, giving him a unique perspective on China and its world view. While the role of the vice president in foreign policy varies from administration to administration, Walz’s deep China background may influence a Harris administration in new and important ways.
Finally, trade is likely to be one of the most critical issues in U.S.-China policy, with significant variation between a Harris and a Trump administration. While both sides of the political aisle agree on the importance of reducing the trade deficit with China and decreasing reliance on Chinese imports, the methods adopted by Trump and Biden have varied significantly, possibly suggesting different approaches in a Harris versus a Trump presidency.
President Trump initiated a trade war with China in 2018, imposing tariffs of up to 25% on a range of Chinese goods under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. President Biden has not only maintained these tariffs but also increased or introduced new duties on strategically important goods.
Trump’s agenda adopts a considerably broader, blanket approach to trade barriers compared to the more targeted strategy employed by the Biden administration. The central aim of his trade strategy is to bring back manufacturing jobs to the United States that have been lost to overseas competitors — particularly China. In his 2024 campaign materials, for example, Trump has proposed universal baseline tariffs on most imported foreign goods, as well as a mechanism to gradually increase tariffs on countries, such as China, that have been deemed to devalue their currency or engage in other unfair trading practices. Thus, universal baseline taxes under a Trump administration would be a major hit to Chinese exporters — particularly those selling consumer goods — as the United States is one of the largest export markets for China. It would also considerably increase costs for U.S. consumers and businesses.
While Harris has yet to release a specific policy platform for her campaign, statements made in public appearances suggest she largely holds the same positions as the Biden administration on trade with China, which include targeted “de-risking” and tariffs against Chinese goods, while leaving room for a slightly more open trade posture with China. During an interview with CBS last year, Harris said, “It’s not about pulling out, but it is about ensuring that we are protecting American interests, and that we are a leader in terms of the rules of the road, as opposed to following others’ rules.”
It also notable that as a senator, Harris criticized Trump’s trade approach to Beijing, telling then-Vice President Mike Pence during the vice presidential debate in 2020 that Trump “lost that trade war” and that his tariffs hurt the U.S. economy without rebalancing the U.S.-China relationship.
The View from Beijing
From the Chinese perspective, the 2024 U.S. presidential election is unlikely to bring about major changes to U.S.-China relations: Trump and Biden have largely set the trajectories for the U.S.-China policy during their presidencies from 2017 to 2024.
The Republicans and Democrats have reached a general consensus over the designation of China as America’s primary challenge or threat and the pursuit of a China policy featuring competition and containment. However, Trump and Biden do differ in some specific approaches to China, which may suggest differences in a Trump or a Harris administration in 2025. Differences in diplomacy, economic engagements, people-to-people exchanges, how competition should be managed and conflicts should be avoided, and whether cooperation with China in certain areas is still necessary all constitute possible areas of divergence between the two candidates. In this sense, the election result in November 2024 will determine how the legacy from the previous two administrations will evolve over the next four years.
Should Trump be reelected, his China policy will give priority to economic issues, as was the case during his first tenure. Trump and his advisors including Robert Lighthizer have proposed imposing new tariffs on all the imports from China, revoking China’s Permanent Normal Trading Relations (PNTR) status, restricting two-way investments between two countries, and intensifying the control of technology flows to China. While national security will inevitably drive a harsher trade and “de-risking” policy under a Trump administration, his national security team may also push China hard on traditional security issues. However, given Trump’s personality, he may opt to make a deal with China on certain security issues for the sake of his economic agenda.
On the political side, the picture is less clear. Although Trump himself may not be interested in provoking an ideological or geopolitical conflict with China, hawks in his national security team may seek to push China on Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong, Taiwan and South China Sea. Furthermore, the Trump administration will generally view ties with China as a liability and take an indifferent attitude toward engagement and cooperation with China, either bilaterally or multilaterally.
So what are the implications for bilateral relations under a Trump presidency? First, China-U.S. economic ties will suffer more devastatingly than it did during the first Trump administration, with “decoupling” taking place at a faster pace and at a larger scale. This suggest the single most important pillar underpinning the bilateral relationship will be shattered.
Second, at a time when Beijing is highly vigilant over Taiwanese leader Lai Ching-te’s pro-independence stance, if Washington pushes the Taiwan issue and further undermines the United States’ “One China” policy, a serious crisis and even confrontation across the Taiwan Strait is likely to occur. Beijing will be watching for signs that the next administration understands the seriousness of the Taiwan issue and can manage its ties with Taipei to avoid a conflict.”
Third, dialogue and communication between the two governments at the national and sub-national level will shrink to a minimum, and cultural and people-to-people ties between two sides will diminish.
And finally, Sino-U.S. coordination and cooperation in global governance, from maintaining the stability of international financial system to curbing the effect of climate change, will evaporate. Overall, under a Trump presidency, Sino-U.S. relations will witness intense frictions, serious crises and even military conflicts.
China policy under Kamala Harris is harder to predict. Given her lack of experience on foreign policy issues, she may be more inward-looking and more concerned with domestic social-economic issues. However, as a senator from California — a state with significant trade with China — she may be more aware of the importance of economic relations with China than Trump or Biden. She may also feel less pressure to demonstrate toughness toward China than Biden did, when the latter entered office in the wake of the Trump presidency’s hawkish policies towards Beijing. In this sense, her approach to China could be more pragmatic and less national security or ideologically driven than Biden.
Having said that, U.S. China policy under a Harris administration will generally see more continuity than change from the current trajectory. Economically, Washington will, in the name of competition, work to strangle China’s technological advancement and restrict two-way investments in emerging technologies. Harris may remove some of the Trump-era tariffs on Chinse products, which have failed to weaken China’s competitiveness while unnecessarily burdening U.S. consumers. However, the general trajectory of trade barriers and restrictions on U.S. exports to China will likely continue.
Politically, Harris will likely promote the narrative of “democracy versus autocracy,” to include criticizing China from time to time on Xinjiang and Tibet, which was featured in the National Security and National Defense strategies under both the Trump and Biden administrations
Diplomatically, a Harris administration will likely join hands with allies and partners to pursue geopolitical competition with China in the Indo-Pacific and beyond, and possibly devote more resources to competing with China in the Global South. While Trump may pay lip service to such priorities, his policies may be harder to pin down, as he has spoken little about the importance of the Global South on the campaign trail.
On the security front, the Harris administration will continue to support Taiwan and ratchet up military deterrence against Beijing in the Western Pacific, to include pressuring China in the South China Sea. However, Harris may try to avoid major crises or conflicts with China, viewing engagement and cooperation in some areas with China as both necessary and valuable.
Given the above, if Harris wins, what will U.S.-China relations look like over the next four years? They will remain strained in economic, diplomatic, and security fields, with constant tensions and frictions becoming the “new normal.” Some of these frictions may even boil over into crisis. On the other hand, some of these negative trends may be offset by sustained or increased engagements and cooperation, which will help build mutual trust and enhance stability in bilateral ties. The hope is that the next four years will see some progress in arresting the major power rivalry between China and the United States. For instance, Beijing and Washington may develop a better understanding of the boundaries of competition, the premise of cooperation, and the effective means to manage differences. To be sure, U.S.-China ties will still be challenged during a Harris presidency but could be more stable than during the Trump and Biden years.
Finally, external events may inject opportunities into U.S.-China relations. In the past, major events generated positive momentum in bilateral ties. In the future, a serious U.S. economic crisis may compel Washington to seek Beijing’s assistance, as it did during the 2008 financial crisis. Or a major international conflict may force the United States to cooperate with China, either bilaterally or multilaterally. No one knows for sure if any of these scenarios will arise at all, but in a highly uncertain world, all sorts of possibilities exist.
Conclusion
Policymakers in Beijing and Washington are under no illusions that a dramatic shift in U.S. policy on China will take place, regardless of which candidate wins. This conclusion highlights a widespread consensus in China and the United States that neither Harris nor Trump will deviate from the current U.S. strategy of strategic competition with China, even if their tactics may diverge. Both sides also agree that a new normal of competition and tension in the national security domain will be the defining feature of either candidate’s administration, with little expectation of a return to past U.S. policies prioritizing engagement with China. However, both authors agree that a Harris administration may leave open space for discrete areas of cooperation between Beijing and Washington, which may soften some of the sharper dimensions of competition. While Trump’s harsher trade policy towards China, coupled with uncertainty over the value of U.S. alliances in Asia and Europe, may inject greater instability into the U.S.-China relationship.
Lyle J. Morris is Senior Fellow for Foreign Policy and National Security at Asia Society Policy Institute’s Center for China Analysis.
Wu Xinbo is Professor and Dean, Institute of International Studies, and Director at the Center for American Studies, Fudan University.