By: Lizzi C. Lee and Neil Thomas

Communist leaders may not like electoral democracy but there are few events they will pay more attention to this year than the U.S. presidential election on November 5. General Secretary Xi Jinping says U.S.-China ties are “the most important bilateral relationship in the world,” and Chinese officials, scholars, and netizens are anxious to glean insights about Republican Party candidate and former President Donald Trump and Democratic Party candidate and current Vice President Kamala Harris.

For Beijing, the stakes are high. The presidencies of first Trump and now Joe Biden saw the United States adopt a posture of “strategic competition” toward China that has significantly impacted the ruling Chinese Communist Party’s external environment and domestic priorities. Trump imposed tariffs on most Chinese imports to the United States, which Biden ramped up in key industries including electric vehicles. Biden introduced extensive export controls aimed at curbing China’s chip industry, which could be expanded to other sectors. Trump and Biden have both elevated U.S. support for Taiwan; strengthened restrictions on inbound and outbound investment with China; and sanctioned hundreds of Chinese government agencies, state-owned enterprises, private firms, and individuals. Biden has further prioritized working with U.S. allies and partners on economic, political, and security policies to blunt China’s influence. Both countries seek “guardrails” against crisis and conflict, but bilateral diplomacy is increasingly fraught and multilateral cooperation on global challenges is increasingly difficult.

This essay analyzes the China policies of both candidates, focusing on the diplomatic and economic dimensions of U.S.-China relations, highlighting how a second Trump administration could deliver acute shocks but potential openings while Harris would likely bring continuity with Biden’s approach. It argues that Beijing has no clear preference between the two candidates. Therefore, neither election outcome would fundamentally change China’s international strategy, although the result would produce different tactical responses. It concludes with recommendations for how both Washington and Beijing can safeguard global stability while preserving national sovereignty regardless of who succeeds Biden.

Trump’s China Policy: Acute Threats but Unique Opportunities for Beijing?

When Donald Trump was in the White House, he dominated decision-making to an extent unusual even for a U.S. president. He led an administration that included cabinet members and senior officials with conflicting views on China policy who fought for his attention. He changed tack with Beijing several times during his four years in power, variously heeding and ignoring advice from different factions. Sometimes he made decisions in the middle of the night and first shared them on social media.

His campaign team emphasizes that no one else speaks for Trump, despite several Republican advisors offering their views about what foreign policy could look like in a second term. Should Trump win in November, his China policy will depend somewhat on the level of personal interest he takes in the country, and on whom he selects as his national security advisor and secretary of state, variables that Trump himself may not yet know. It makes sense, therefore, to base predictions of Trump’s policies on what he himself has said. And Trump’s most consistent positions for the past four decades have been support for tariffs, domestic manufacturing, and reducing the trade deficit. China, by far the world’s largest manufacturing country, has comprised the largest share of the U.S. goods trade deficit since 2000, with a bilateral deficit of $279.1 billion in 2023 (down from a record $418.2 billion in 2018).

Compared to Biden, Trump is more likely to lean on his executive authority to pursue tougher economic measures against China in a more sudden and unilateral fashion. In recent months he has promised to revoke China’s most-favored nation status — ending many of its current tariff exemptions — and introduce a blanket tariff of around 60% on Chinese imports. He has also suggested introducing much harsher restrictions on Chinese ownership of U.S. assets and U.S. investment into China; expanding U.S. export controls on China from Biden’s “small yard, high fence” to a “big yard, high fence” approach; and phasing out imports of Chinese electronics, steel, and pharmaceuticals entirely. Furthermore, an exception to the Trump campaign’s reticence about anointing surrogates has been directing some media inquiries to his former U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer, a champion of comprehensive “strategic decoupling” from China.

Trump may not fully implement all these ideas, but they give a flavor of his China policy priorities, which could cause significant economic pain in the country. A UBS study estimated that a 60% tariff on all Chinese exports to the Unites States would by itself shave 2.5% off China’s GDP growth rate the next year. The effect could be even worse if Trump also follows through on another promise to impose a “universal baseline tariff” of around 10% on imports from all countries. Still, the authors said Beijing could mitigate the impact by shifting exports and production to other countries, and through more aggressive fiscal stimulus, monetary policy, and exchange rate depreciation — potentially allowing Xi to avoid having to compromise with Trump.

While Trump’s views on tariffs are unlikely to change, he may seek to use his tough trade measures (or the threat thereof) as leverage with China. In his telling, tariffs are beneficial because they raise revenue, they make factories return home, and they are “good for negotiation” because foreign leaders during his first term “would do anything” to get them removed. Without the Covid-19 pandemic, which triggered a sharp deterioration in bilateral ties, Trump’s first term may have ended with more amicable relations with Beijing, following the signing of the U.S.-China Phase One trade deal in January 2020. On the campaign trail this year, Trump has said that relations with China can be “mutually beneficial” and has frequently praised the country, claiming that “I love China” and “I respect China,” and Xi, saying “I liked him a lot” and “he’s a strong guy.”

Trump, an incorrigible dealmaker, may see his tough economic proposals against China as the opening gambit of Phase Two negotiations, especially if Beijing decides to meet (or gesture towards meeting) some of his demands. His invitation to Chinese automakers to invest in American factories and his backflip on banning the Chinese-owned app TikTok, in which one of his campaign donors is a major investor, suggest that some of Trump’s stances on China can be flexible to serve his broader goals. Trump could also become more open to compromise with Beijing if his policies lead to a slump in the U.S. stock market, to which he is known to pay particular attention.

Trump may link China’s economic actions to diplomatic and security issues. In particular, he has been critical of Taiwan, which China claims as sovereign territory and with which it refuses to rule out using force to achieve unification. He has complained recently that “Taiwan took our chip business from us” and “We’re no different than an insurance company. Taiwan doesn’t give us anything. Taiwan is 9,500 miles away. It’s 68 miles away from China.” This attitude reflects Trump’s general belief that allies and partners are freeloading off the U.S. military and should pay more for their own defense. If Trump views Taiwan policy through a transactional lens, he could either use it as a stick, by increasing U.S. support to try and force Beijing to the bargaining table, or as a carrot, by agreeing to reduce U.S. support in exchange for economic concessions, or both. The chances of a grand bargain may be slim under a Trump presidency, but they would be virtually non-existent under Harris.

Harris’s China Policy: More of the Same for U.S.-China Relations?

The elevation of Kamala Harris to the top of the Democratic ticket has brought a flurry of scrutiny of her views on China. While her earlier career in law enforcement focused on domestic issues, she gained foreign policy experience in the Senate as a member of its Intelligence Committee and Homeland Security Committee. In her almost four years as vice president, she has since actively participated in almost every meeting of the National Security Council and discussion of the Presidential Daily Brief. She has made 17 foreign trips, including representing the United States at the ASEAN Summit in 2023 and at the Munich Security Conference in both 2022 and 2023.

Harris appears to broadly share the mainstream Democratic approach to China policy that Secretary of State Antony Blinken summarized in May 2022 as “Invest. Align. Compete” — that is, invest in domestic capabilities, align with allies and partners, and compete with Beijing for economic advantage and global leadership. Later statements from the White House, when Biden met Xi in Bali in November 2022, added that the administration believed this competition should play out in the context of “guardrails,” such as leader-level diplomacy; military-to-military dialogue; and limited cooperation on issues of mutual concern such as climate, trade, and counternarcotics.

Harris is likely to build on Biden’s China policy. In August she told the Democratic National Convention that as president she would ensure that “America, not China, wins the competition for the 21st century.” She has said the United States must pursue a “de-risking” of its economic relationship with China to guarantee that it is the “leader in terms of the rules of the road.” She has stood on a Philippines Coast Guard vessel and criticized Beijing’s “intimidation and coercion” in the South China Sea. She supported Biden’s policies to strengthen ties with Taiwan by saying the United States “will continue to support Taiwan self-defense” and meeting Taiwan’s now-president Lai Ching-te in Honduras. But she has expressed support for cooperating with China on global issues such as climate change and has told Xi that the two countries need “open lines of communication to responsibly manage the competition” between them. She has also embraced cooperation with allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific, as well as with NATO and Ukraine, emphasizing that “isolation is not insulation” from the world.

Of course, as vice president, Harris ultimately must implement Biden’s foreign policy, and reporting does suggest a few differences in foreign policy emphasis between the two. Harris apparently disagrees with Biden’s framing of international relations as a simple battle between democracy and autocracy, implying more willingness to strengthen ties with non-democracies that traditionally favor Beijing. But she also has a history of support for the cause of human rights in China, possibly beyond that which Biden was willing to offer. When running for president in 2019 she said, “China’s abysmal human rights record must feature prominently in our policy toward the country.” In the Senate she co-sponsored the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act in 2019 and the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act in 2020. Her views here may resonate with those of her running mate Tim Walz, who once lived in China and while in Congress met with both the Dalai Lama and Hong Kong democracy activist Joshua Wong. More focus on addressing human rights in China through U.S. actions could raise tensions and test the guardrails of bilateral relations.

Lose-Lose: Beijing Has No Clear Preference between Trump and Harris

Chinese interlocuters have summarized the mood in Beijing about the U.S. election with a line from the classic Qing dynasty novel Dream of the Red Chamber: “All crows under heaven are the same black.” In other words, neither Trump nor Harris is a good option, as both would pursue a hostile China strategy, even if their tactics could be quite different.

Beijing has scrupulously avoided expressing any views on the candidates but policymakers there are under no illusions about the dramatic shift in U.S. policy on China in recent years. None of them are expecting Washington to return to its past policy of prioritizing engagement with China anytime soon. They see both Trump’s “America First” mantra and the Biden-Harris administration’s “foreign policy for the middle class” as reflections of a shift in U.S. thinking from prioritizing absolute gains from economic globalization to prioritizing relative gains over China, even if that means disrupting international markets. They know that U.S. public opinion on China is at a near-record low.

Beijing’s judgment that outcompeting China is a bipartisan priority in Washington means that Chinese leaders have put forward a relatively clear set of foreign policies that are likely to persist regardless of who wins the U.S. election: 1) turbocharge technological innovation, advanced manufacturing, and scientific research to reduce U.S. leverage by building autonomous supply chains and dominating future industries; 2) shape a favorable external environment by elevating diplomacy with the Global South, gaining influence in global governance institutions, and maintaining stable ties with the West; and 3) advance China’s territorial claims and security ambitions through aggressive gray zone activities while being careful to avoid a major military confrontation with the United States.

Even if China’s long-term strategy will not fundamentally change, the candidates have important policy differences that will affect Beijing’s near-term approach to U.S.-China relations. A Harris administration would likely bring policy continuity with Biden, including a commitment to leader-level diplomacy and bilateral guardrails, which could be more advantageous to Xi in the short term, as he looks to steady the Chinese economy. But the progressive consolidation of a U.S.-led network of China-skeptic partners may be more systematically damaging to Beijing in the longer term, as it would likely mean that China faces more effective allied deterrence, export controls, and technology cooperation.

In contrast, the geo-economic policies of a second Trump administration are likely to quickly and significantly escalate U.S.-China tensions, worsening Beijing’s economic challenges and intensifying threat perceptions among Xi and his top advisors. A more unilateral Washington could also express support for Taiwan or other Chinese Communist Party concerns in ways that cause Beijing to see greater threats to its red lines. Such threats could lead to more combative conduct in regional hotspots and raise the risk of a military incident. However, Trump’s openness to unconventional diplomacy and strong belief in leader-to-leader negotiations could provide an opening to improve U.S.-China relations that is virtually inconceivable under Harris. Moreover, Trump could undermine international “anti-China” coalitions by alienating U.S. allies and partners through his implementation of universal tariffs, refusal to militarily support Ukraine, demands for greater allied burden-sharing, and opposition to multilateral action on major issues such as climate change. Some nationalist Chinese even say they prefer Trump, calling him Chuan Jianguo, or “Trump, builder of our country,” because they believe that he will weaken America’s domestic governance and global standing.

Policy Recommendations: Keeping the Peace in U.S.-China Relations

A fundamental view shared by Harris, Trump, and Xi is their desire to avoid a great power war between China and the United States. Regardless of who replaces Biden in the White House or whether they pursue policies that lower or raise the temperature of U.S.-China relations, the two sides should work to maintain the basic peace between them through the following three principles.

Prioritize leader-to-leader diplomacy. To avoid dangerous misunderstandings and miscalculations, it is essential for the top leaders of China and the United States to speak to each other. If bilateral visits prove politically difficult, these meetings can occur by video conference or preferably on the sidelines of international summits. Even if the leaders agree on nothing of substance, they should continue to meet. Direct talks allow for the communication of credible signals about red lines and avoid the risk that signals from one country are distorted by yes-people or vested interests in the government bureaucracy of the other. These meetings also serve as critical action-forcing events inside each government to consolidate positions and emphasize mutual priorities. And they establish contact points that can help manage international flashpoints. More information leads to better decisions and less risk of unintended consequences, such as security crises or even military conflict.

Enhance dialogues and exchanges. Leaders will usually only talk at most every few months, while events, policies, and priorities can change by the day; so, it is essential for China and the United States to maintain regular channels of communication to remain informed about developments in the other country. This should take the form of track-one, track-1.5, and track-two dialogues that involve politicians, officials, executives, and scholars, as well as people-to-people exchanges such as tourism, study abroad, and research fellowships. Naturally, these events should be undertaken with appropriate security precautions, and with full transparency about the affiliations of each side’s interlocutors. Whatever ideas Beijing and Washington have for U.S.-China relations, dialogue does not necessarily mean agreement; the more that each side knows about the other, the better they will be able to understand their motivations and work to avoid worst-case scenarios.

Cooperate on existential threats. Some global issues should transcend national boundaries because they threaten everyone. Low trust between Beijing and Washington has made such cooperation difficult in recent years, such as during the Covid-19 pandemic, and because climate action is not a Trump priority. However, new technologies may pose more immediate threats to humankind. Both Trump and Harris, as well as Chinese policymakers, have expressed concern at the potential existential risks posed by future developments in artificial intelligence, leading to the creation of high-level bipartisan track-two dialogues and the U.S.-China Intergovernmental Dialogue on Artificial Intelligence. These early steps could provide a foundation for building more sustainable habits of cooperation that add stability to what will be an ongoing strategic competition between China and the United States.

Neil Thomas is a Fellow on Chinese Politics at Asia Society Policy Institute’s Center for China Analysis

Lizzi C. Lee is a Fellow on Chinese Economy at the Asia Society Policy Institute’s Center for China Analysis.