Global opinions have increasingly considered the potential danger of war in the Taiwan Strait should China take military action to invade the island in pursuit of its plan for “full unification of the motherland.” These are legitimate concerns, as such danger increases with the growth of both China’s national power and Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s global ambitions. Military action should not, however, devalue Beijing’s military-backed, nonmilitary strategy to reclaim Taiwan.

What, in practice, is the specific purpose of Beijing’s nonmilitary strategy? How do nonmilitary and military means mutually support each other in China’s overall reunification strategy? As the Taiwan populace seemingly drifts further away in terms of a shared Chinese identity and rejects future unification, why does China still deem nonmilitary means optimal for dealing with Taiwan?

This paper addresses these questions by first discussing how China’s Taiwan strategy consists of both military and nonmilitary elements, highlighting how Xi has upgraded the latter by “putting the people at the center” of “peaceful reunification” while simultaneously preparing military action and how the nonmilitary strategy follows the spirit of the united front political strategy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). It then investigates one of China’s latest nonmilitary initiatives to deal with Taiwan, namely, the “cross-strait integrated development demonstration zone” in Fujian, and analyzes the strategic implications of those various measures for promoting “comprehensive integration.”¹ The third section explores how the CCP defines the situation in the Taiwan Strait as a continuation of civil war and, accordingly, employs both military and nonmilitary strategies for winning said war. By considering how the two strategies complement one another, it also explains why CCP leadership has strengthened nonmilitary means, such as integration, despite prior ineffectiveness. The paper concludes that nonmilitary measures will not ultimately lead to “peaceful reunification” but are instead intended to mask Beijing’s overall capabilities to deal with Taiwan.

In November 2021, Beijing announced “the Party’s overall strategy for solving the Taiwan issue in the new era” with a resolution adopted at the Sixth Plenum of the 19th Central Committee. The resolution highlighted Xi Jinping’s contributions to China’s strategy in response to changes in the Taiwan Strait: “Comrade Xi Jinping put forward a series of important concepts and major policy propositions on work on Taiwan and forms the Party’s overall strategy for solving the Taiwan issue in the new era.”² The Party-state then published a white paper on the Taiwan issue in August 2022 to elaborate on this “overall strategy.”³ A succinct and authoritative explanation came from Liu Jieyi, then director of the Taiwan Affairs Office, who summarized the strategy in ten points:⁴

1. Uphold the centralized and unified leadership of the Central Committee on the work on Taiwan.
2. Promote the reunification of the motherland as part of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.
3. Resolve the Taiwan issue on the basis of the development and progress of the motherland.
4. Adhere to the basic policies of “peaceful reunification” and “one country, two systems.”
5. Adhere to the “one China” principle and the “1992 Consensus.”
6. Promote the peaceful and integrated development of cross-strait relations.
7. Unite “Taiwanese compatriots” and win the hearts and minds of the Taiwanese people.
8. Smash the separatist plot of “Taiwan independence.”
9. Oppose interference from external forces.
10. Never commit to renouncing the use of force.

CCP-style rhetoric aside, the overall strategy contains fundamental elements of China’s plan to appropriate Taiwan. Four of them are worth mentioning. First, “peaceful reunification” is continuously emphasized as the “grand policy” for cross-strait relations. In Liu’s words, it is “the basic principle” and “the best way” to achieve cross-strait reunification and “the most beneficial to compatriots on both sides of the strait and the Chinese nation.” As always, however, the overall strategy never commits to renouncing the use of force in pursuing reunification. This is especially interesting when compared to the 2019 national defense white paper, the first such document issued under Xi, in which China made it clear that it will not hesitate to use force if Taiwan secedes. By swearing that “if someone wants to separate Taiwan from China, the Chinese military will resolutely defeat it at all costs and safeguard national unity,”⁵ the 2019 white paper clearly expressed the Xi regime’s increasing inclination to go to war over the island. The two white papers are consistent and complementary in outlining Beijing’s strategy toward Taiwan and include both military and nonmilitary elements.

Second, the “overall strategy” underlines the “spiritual unity of compatriots on both sides of the Taiwan Strait” and views “uniting Taiwan compatriots and winning the hearts and minds of Taiwanese people” as the “fundamental driving force for unification.” Its policy implications are rich and meaningful, and the tenet follows the ancient Chinese principle of subjugating an enemy’s heart as the best option in war. The CCP’s dialectic logic for using “compatriots” and “enemies” has political purpose. The united front political strategy is based on the divisions between “us,” “friends,” and “enemies,” which can be traced back even further to an article written by Mao Zedong in 1926.⁶ Likewise, the CCP now divides the Taiwan populace into three roles: “family members,” “friends,” and “enemies.” Ordinary Taiwanese citizens are viewed as “family members” of an imagined reunified China, Taiwan’s political elites who oppose Taiwanese independence are “friends,” and whoever supports independence are “enemies.”⁷ The “spiritual unity of compatriots,” therefore, intends to “win the hearts” of the first two groups, but since Taiwan as a whole is the target of reunification, such an effort also implies reducing the strength of enemies.

Third, the “practical approach for reunification” is to promote the “peaceful and integrated development of cross-strait relations.” It intends to “deepen cross-strait integrated development, take the lead in sharing development opportunities with Taiwan compatriots, provide equal treatment, expand and deepen cross-strait exchanges and cooperation, strengthen the Chinese national economy, jointly promote Chinese culture, and build a cross-strait community with a shared future.” This important paragraph indicates that the methods and tactics of China’s nonmilitary strategy are based on the economic and cultural connections between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. Some state-sponsored scholastic articles are blunter in disclosing this, as they suggest “interest exchange” (利益交换) and social policies that promote cooperation and enhance cross-strait intimacy to strengthen the momentum of peaceful reunification. This would effectively isolate the “Taiwanese independence forces” and increase economic and social integrations,⁸ thus “paving the way for future integration at the political level and eventual peaceful reunification.”⁹

Fourth, the nationalistic rejuvenation of China in terms of economic and material development provides the basic framework for reunification. The strategy’s actualization is based on the mainland’s development momentum, which is expected to involve the Taiwan population “joining hands” with the mainland populace “to realize the Chinese dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” A CCP outlet in Hong Kong echoed that the “Party’s overall strategy for resolving the Taiwan issue in the new era” is “people-centered” and “takes peaceful negotiation without giving up the use of force as a means, aims to end political opposition and achieve reunification, and takes national rejuvenation as its ultimate goal.”¹⁰ The February 22–23, 2024, Taiwan Working Conference in Beijing vowed to “resolutely implement the Party’s overall strategy for resolving the Taiwan issue in the new era.”¹¹

Xi’s strategy, therefore, upgrades both the military and nonmilitary means for China’s reunification with Taiwan. The former can be termed rezhan (hot war), and the latter tongzhan (united front). This is consistent with earlier CCP leadership strategies — Mao Zedong listed “united front” and “military struggle” as two of the CCP’s “three magic weapons” for defeating its enemies (the third is “party-building”).¹² In a Fujian provincial cadre’s elaboration, among the three magic weapons for achieving national rejuvenation, of which acquiring Taiwan is a critical step, party-building is the core element that enables the CCP‘s capable leadership of the “great cause”; the military is designed for hot wars, and the united front promotes soft power by targeting people’s hearts and minds.¹³ Therefore, the nonmilitary aspect is a significant and indispensable part of China’s overall strategy to deal with Taiwan and takes priority as long as the crisis does not call for military action. If China does take military action, nonmilitary strategies can still weaken Taiwan’s capacity to resist invasion, nurture a puppet regime, or consolidate control under Chinese occupation.

China’s nonmilitary strategy is centered on “integration” (融合), which implies the “merging of Taiwan into China” and covers domains ranging from economic to cultural, with “emotional integration” (情感融合) at its core. It is well known that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have for decades developed close economic connections and that the Taiwanese economy is highly dependent on China. A wide range of industries in Taiwan, from manufacturing to farming, have relied on China since the mid-2000s, with the mainland accounting for 40% of Taiwan’s total exports. By 2023, Taiwan’s exports to China still accounted for 35.25% of its total exports, dipping from 38.8% in 2022 to the lowest share in 21 years due to the mainland’s economic slowdown and robust artificial intelligence–related exports to the United States and Europe.¹⁴ Political tensions and former Taiwanese president Tsai Ing-wen’s Southbound Policy drove an economic wedge between Taipei and Beijing, as only 11.4% of Taiwan’s foreign investment went to mainland China in 2023, down from 83.8% in 2010.¹⁵ Still, the historical accumulation of investment is high: between 1991 and 2023, it totaled $206.37 billion, or 50.7% of Taiwan’s total foreign investment.¹⁶

Cross-strait economic interdependence (and its recent diminishment) has provided China’s leadership with both the basis for and a new incentive to aggressively promote economic and comprehensive integration with Taiwan, represented by the cross-strait integrated development demonstration zone in Fujian Province. Following a September 2023 document issued by the Taiwan Affairs Office of the national leadership,¹⁷ the CCP Fujian Provincial Committee called a plenary session in December to implement the project.¹⁸ Per the Fujian authorities, “integration” is the project’s keyword: the “creation of three demonstration models of social integration, economic integration, and emotional integration across the Taiwan Strait.” The project vows to involve the entire provincial territory for this comprehensive integration.

Accordingly, nearly fifty ministries of the central Party-state (led by the Taiwan Affairs Office and the National Development and Reform Commission) as well as local Fujian authorities have made a series of policies and measures to attract Taiwanese compatriots and companies to land in Fujian as their “first home” on the mainland.¹⁹ The measures cover wide-ranging economic and trade cooperation between Fujian and Taiwan, including legal, administrative, financial, and other services, such as transportation, job assistance, education, housing, healthcare, and social insurance, for Taiwanese people in Fujian. The tenet is clear, as one provincial leader put it: “to promote integration with communication, benefits, and affection.”²⁰ The leader emphasized the need to “give full play to the cultural influence of our ancestral land and fully promote grassroots exchanges between Fujian and Taiwan.” In his elaboration, comprehensive integration will make Taiwanese citizens identify as mainland residents.²¹

Fujian is said, at least by Fujianese authorities, to be the ancestral homeland of 80% of all Taiwanese people.²² The CCP sees this as a huge resource for “creating a model for emotional integration” by mobilizing various traditional Chinese connections between Fujian and Taiwan. Authorities make use of connections such as those between clansmen, fellow villagers, in-laws, and religious believers and sponsor kindred Fujianese and Taiwanese genealogies, recommending Taiwanese people trace their family roots to Fujian for paying homage to ancestors. Local CCP organizations are eager to promote shared cultural heritages — Southern Fujian, Mazu, Hakka, and Zhuzi — to create “an ancestral cultural brand system” (祖地文化品牌体系).²³ Fujian has recently proposed a series of projects using historical resources to highlight the Fujianese origins of Taiwanese people, which include a historical display traceability project and Taiwan-related cultural landmarks and venues such as the Austronesian Museum, the China Museum of Fujian-Taiwan Connections, and the Memory Hall of Moving to Taiwan.

For promoting “spiritual bonds” between Fujianese and Taiwanese peoples, the atheist CCP turns to religions, folk cultures, and folk customs. The CCP Fujian Provincial Committee, in a recent document, required cadres to “give full play to the role of Mazu and other folk beliefs as a spiritual bond.” Mazu (or Matsu) is a sea goddess in Chinese folk religion; her worship spread throughout China’s coastal regions and overseas Chinese communities, and she is especially popular in Taiwan, where her temple festival is a major event. With the demonstration zone project, Fujian authorities are determined to protect Mazu beliefs, customs, and cultural and historical sites by supporting Fujian-Taiwan joint applications to the United Nations’ Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity.²⁴

Modern technologies, globalization, and cultural industry are also mobilized to promote Fujian-Taiwan cultural and spiritual integration. Measures include: creating more cultural industry cooperation platforms and encouraging Taiwanese cultural businesses to invest in them, supporting overseas Chinese cultural centers to display Fujian-Taiwan cooperation projects to the outside world, allowing Taiwanese people to invest in and set up companies in Fujian to produce radio and television programs, building cross-strait film and television production bases, and gathering cultural and entertainment resources to create cross-strait pop culture centers.²⁵

Taiwanese youth are also a prominent target of emotional co-opting with cultural activities. Fujian provincial authorities emphasize welcoming “Taiwan youth to come to Fujian to pursue and realize their dreams” and propose a series of measures to “enhance their cultural and emotional identity” with the mainland. These measures include: expanding enrollment of Taiwanese students in mainland schools; promoting in-depth cooperation between Taiwanese enterprises and mainland universities; supporting primary and secondary school exchanges between Fujian and Taiwan; encouraging Taiwanese college students to participate in various activities taking place in Fujian; establishing cross-strait youth study bases, entrepreneurship and employment bases, and experiential exchange centers; and sponsoring a variety of cross-strait camps, such as those for tea culture, porcelain-firing techniques, Hakka construction techniques, art, reading, singing, sports, research sessions, and other such activities.²⁶ The local CCP propaganda department urges the “use of new media, popular culture, and the Internet to extensively carry out experiential, immersive, and interactive communication activities to continuously expand the common ‘circle of friends’ and ‘circle of careers’ shared by young people in Fujian and Taiwan.”²⁷

Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are also a significant avenue for promoting Fujian-Taiwan social and emotional bonds. Reportedly, there are already 154 social organizations in Fujian with “Strait” in their name that are devoted to exchanges between social organizations. Following the provincial CCP authorities’ requirement to guide cross-strait communication between social organizations,²⁸ the Chinese side vows to establish even more social organizations and to encourage “qualified” Taiwanese NGOs to set up offices in Fujian. This initiative especially targets Taiwan’s research institutions, think tanks, farmers’ grassroots and agricultural associations, and religious organizations. For the demonstration zone project, Fujian authorities offer Taiwanese compatriots the opportunity to join the mainland’s professional social organizations in the fields of economy, industry, science and technology, academic studies, culture, and art and promise to allow “qualified” Taiwanese scientific and technological personnel to serve as leaders in such organizations.²⁹ The central leadership enjoins “establishing and improving the incentive mechanism,” referring to the mobilization of financial resources for enterprises to promote such exchanges.³⁰

Fujian is, of course, not the only province wooing Taiwanese people. As the official document indicates, Fujian is exploring how to effectively “integrate” Taiwanese people due to its geographical and cultural proximities to the island. Other localities also promote such “integration,” as a July 2024 article in the Economist noted.³¹ Activities such as “united front summer camps,” sightseeing trips to the Great Wall in Beijing, and visiting pandas in Sichuan further reveal that “comprehensive integration” is much more than just “woo[ing] Taiwanese investors.”³² They are designed to, as Fujian provincial authorities have expressed, win the hearts and minds of the Taiwanese people.

How does China win the hearts and minds of the Taiwanese people? Because the CCP has never renounced the use of force against Taiwan, if Beijing truly wanted to do so without any political or military ambitions, an announcement of renouncement would surely be best. However, CCP leadership has routinely defined the current situation in the Taiwan Strait as a continuation of China’s civil war³³ and recently emphasized this phrasing, as reflected by China’s leading diplomats and official CCP propaganda.³⁴

Heart-winning measures in the context of war relate to one of the prevailing sentences in the ancient Chinese Art of War: “攻心为上, 攻城为下; 心战为上, 兵战为下” (Attacking the heart is better than attacking the city; psychological warfare is better than military warfare).³⁵ By this logic, the ultimate purpose of winning the Taiwanese people’s hearts is not for anything benign to the Taiwanese people, nor for making peace in the Taiwan Strait, but to take Taiwan via capturing the hearts of its people. All heart-winning measures, therefore, must be regarded as components of the CCP’s nonmilitary strategy to win the war.

Historically speaking, the CCP initiated and developed its united front strategy in cooperation with the Kuomintang (KMT), which lost the Chinese Civil War to the CCP in 1949 and is now a major political party in Taiwan and currently holding the relative majority in the Legislative Yuan, Taiwan’s supreme lawmaking body.³⁶ In the late 1970s, when the CCP turned to “reform and openness” to promote economic development, it made various efforts to attract overseas investment to China, particularly from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the Chinese diaspora, among whom the KMT has traditionally been influential.³⁷ Now there are reportedly two million Taiwanese people who work and live in China, primarily for economic opportunities.

China, for decades, cultivated cross-strait connections, be they economic, cultural, ethnic, or political, for achieving “national reunification” with Taiwan — or at least to prevent Taiwan from creeping toward “independence.” But this cultivation has seemingly been ineffective, as indicated by the growth of a Taiwanese identity on the island, the estrangement of the Taiwan populace vis-à-vis China, and the continued electoral victories of the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP).

This explains why the CCP has increasingly threatened military action. It also explains, by proxy, why the CCP has strengthened its nonmilitary strategy, as embedded in Fujian Province’s comprehensive integration program and elsewhere. To think that the ineffectiveness of the nonmilitary strategy leads to its renouncement fundamentally misreads Beijing’s logic for two reasons. First, the CCP’s military strategy toward Taiwan has always had tremendous difficulty in actualizing its purpose. It has never stopped or even reduced the growth of a Taiwanese identity among the island’s residents, and whenever Beijing militarily threatens Taiwan, it often aids the pro-independence DPP in winning elections, contrary to the CCP’s preferences. Even with such ineffectiveness, however, the CCP has not been forced to abandon its military plans. By the same logic, why would the ineffectiveness of its nonmilitary strategy cause Beijing’s dispensation of it? Second, it incorrectly assumes a converse relationship between China’s military and nonmilitary strategies as one wanes and another waxes. As stated earlier, they are complementary and reinforcing. Analytically, the nonmilitary strategy serves the military strategy and, ultimately, China’s reunification with Taiwan in three significant ways.

First, the nonmilitary strategy plays the identity politics for enlarging Taiwan residents’ internal divisions and confrontations between the CCP-defined “Taiwanese compatriots” and “separatists,” as evidenced in the policy measures proposed in Fujian. According to a CCP-sponsored website, this is a strategy to identify and isolate an enemy in a given time period and “defeat one by one” (各个击破).³⁸ Interestingly enough, Mao Zedong initially proposed “defeating one by one” as a military strategy,³⁹ which was then carried over as a guiding principle in the CCP’s united front strategy. A major difference is that military action identifies, isolates, and defeats an enemy according to geostrategic considerations, but, in political domains like dealing with Taiwan, the CCP creates political labels to do so.⁴⁰ In any case, this discloses how the CCP coordinates its military and nonmilitary strategies in the same spirit.

Second, identity-based confrontations between Taiwan residents inevitably erode democracy⁴¹ and in turn increase China’s economic attraction. This, accordingly, can significantly reduce the Taiwan populace’s political autonomy. So-called Asian values have for a long time advocated economic gains over democratic rights;⁴² some prominent elite figures in Taiwan have even echoed this: “democracy cannot be eaten as food” (民主不能当饭吃).⁴³ The Art of War often lists the economically coercing or buying an enemy country’s elite as a major and effective way of winning the “heart war” (心战), as it can significantly reduce an enemy’s willingness and capability to fight.⁴⁴ It appears that, through greater economic integration with Taiwan, the CCP is now expanding these tactics to target many non-elite Taiwanese people.

Third, nonmilitary measures promote pacificism among the Taiwan populace and broader international society, which can reduce the willingness and capability to fight off any military actions by China. Creating a world in which there is no anticipation of military action reduces a people’s willingness to take up arms to protect their fundamental rights and facilitates actions by dictatorships and authoritarian regimes. Thus, the threat of war is no less if nonmilitary measures are being practiced.

China’s “peaceful reunification” is often viewed as either rhetoric, propaganda, or a disguise to cover up a potential use of force against Taiwan. Aware of the disastrous consequences of a Chinese military campaign across the Taiwan Strait, Taiwan and other countries favor China’s employment of peaceful means. Vigilance is reserved almost exclusively for military ambitions. The above paper has highlighted the significance of China’s nonmilitary strategy with regards to Taiwan, analyzed the CCP’s recently upgraded policy measures to strengthen this strategy, shown how the nonmilitary strategy and military strategy are complementary, and argued that, in mutual support, both strategies serve Beijing’s ultimate goal to assume control of Taiwan against the will of the Taiwanese people.

It is obvious that Beijing’s nonmilitary and military strategies work in different but coordinated ways to oppose Taiwanese citizens’ readiness to oppose China: the military strategy conquers targets to coerce citizens, while the nonmilitary strategy attempts to reshape with soft power so that citizens do not oppose the CCP’s values, principles, and governance. Put simply, China does not practice its nonmilitary strategies of economic, social, and spiritual attraction to the detriment of its military strategy. The two reinforce each other.

Beijing’s military threat to the Taiwanese people forms the context in which its nonmilitary strategy unfolds. Within this context, any rhetoric about peace sounds benign and attractive, even if the rhetoric’s source is the military threat. It is thus more likely to lure those who are threatened militarily to accept nonmilitary measures and even incline them to believe that the military threat is disappearing if they engage in the integrations proposed by the nonmilitary strategy. In this sense, “peaceful” reunification becomes “peace-fooling.”

A solely military strategy to annex Taiwan, however, is at the moment impracticable. China’s nonmilitary strategy, therefore, becomes significant and high priority due to its feasibility in the present dynamics characterizing the Taiwan Strait. As long as the CCP does not commit to renouncing the use of force against Taiwan, its nonmilitary measures will never replace the possibility of military measures. In other words, the nonmilitary strategy is, by design, used in concert with its military strategy to achieve what neither can do separately.

The effectiveness of the nonmilitary strategy is, of course, limited, which is why Beijing has never forsworn its military strategy. But, in the past, present, and foreseeable future, the CCP has and would have tremendous difficulty in carrying out a military conquest of Taiwan — the impending threat of war has loomed over the Taiwan Strait for decades but has not manifested. On behalf of peaceful reunification, therefore, China’s nonmilitary strategy with Taiwan is often welcomed by international society and meets less resistance among the Taiwan populace. This increases its effectiveness, especially when the CCP combines both nonmilitary and military means as a coherent, comprehensive strategy to manage the Taiwan situation, to whatever end.

1. China’s nonmilitary strategy toward Taiwan may include many other aspects beyond the empirical content of this article, such as electoral interference, political infiltration, and cognitive warfare. There are some studies in the regards, as exemplified in Edward Barss, Chinese Election Interference in Taiwan (Oxfordshire: Routledge, 2022); and Brian C.H. Fong, Jieh-min Wu, and Andrew J. Nathan, eds., China’s Influence and Center-periphery Tug of War in Hong Kong, Taiwan and Indo-Pacific (Oxfordshire: Routledge, 2021).
2. State Council of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), “中共中央关于党的百年奋斗重大成就和历史经验的决议” [Resolution of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on the Major Achievements and Historical Experience of the Party’s Centenary Struggle], November 16, 2021, https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2021-11/16/content_5651269.htm.
3. Taiwan Affairs Office (PRC), 《台湾问题与新时代中国统一事业》 [The Taiwan Issue and China’s Unification in the New Era] (Beijing, August 2022), https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/zt_674979/dnzt_674981/qtzt/tww….
4. Liu Jieyi, “坚持贯彻新时代党解决台湾问题的总体方略” [Persist in Implementing the Party’s Overall Strategy for Resolving the Taiwan Issue in the New Era], Qiushi, December 1, 2022, http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2022-12/01/c_1129172940.htm. For a digest, see “十个坚持: 新时代党解决台湾问题总体方略的丰富内涵” [Ten Insistencies: The Rich Connotation of the Party’s Overall Strategy for Resolving the Taiwan Issue in the New Era], Qiushi, December 12, 2022, http://www.qstheory.cn/laigao/ycjx/2022-12/12/c_1129203348.htm.
5. State Council Information Office (PRC), 《新时代的中国国防》 [China’s National Defense in the New Era] (Beijing, July 2019), http://www.mod.gov.cn/gfbw/fgwx/bps/4846424.html.
6. Mao Zedong, “中国社会各阶级的分析” [Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society], in 《毛泽东选集》 [Selected Works of Mao Zedong] (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1967), 3–11.
7. Huang Jichao and Ye Xiaodi, “十九大以来大陆对台政策的运作逻辑探析,”《台湾研究集刊》[Journal of Taiwan Studies], no. 5 (2021).
8. The practical effectiveness, rather than Beijing’s policy goal in this regard, is another issue, which Part Three of this article will discuss.
9. Huang and Ye, “十九大以来大陆对台政策的运作逻辑探析.”
10. Zhu Suiyi, “‘新时代解决台湾问题总体方略’为两岸关系发展导航” [The “Overall Strategy for Resolving the Taiwan Issue in the New Era” Guides the Development of Cross-Strait Relations], Ta Kung Pao, November 2, 2022, https://www.takungpao.com/opinion/233116/2022/1102/782235.html.
11. “国台办: 坚决贯彻落实新时代党解决台湾问题的总体方略, 坚持一个中国原则和’九二共识’” [Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council: Resolutely Implement the Party’s Overall Strategy for Resolving the Taiwan Issue in the New Era and Adhere to the One-China Principle and the “1992 Consensus”], China Central Television, February 27, 2024, https://content-static.cctvnews.cctv.com/snow-book/index.html?item_id=8….
12. Mao Zedong in 1939 summarized them as “three magic weapons,” and the later CCP leaderships followed. For the CCP’s recent emphasis on them, especially United Front, see “习近平总书记反复强调要用好这个’重要法宝’” [General Secretary Xi Jinping Has Repeatedly Emphasized the Need to Make Good Use of This “Important Magic Weapon”], Quishi, July 29, 2022, http://www.qstheory.cn/zhuanqu/2022-07/29/c_1128874273.htm; and Zhu Jidong, “中国革命’三大法宝’的时代意义和当代价值” [The Contemporary Significance and Contemporary Value of the “Three Magic Weapons” of the Chinese Revolution], People’s Daily, June 15, 2021, http://www.rmlt.com.cn/2021/0615/616434.shtml.
13. Li Ren, “新时代’三大法宝’论——中华民族伟大复兴战略研究” [The Theory of “Three Magic Weapons” in the New Era—A Research on the Strategy of the Chinese Nation’s Great Rejuvenation], Fujian Provincial Federation of Social Sciences, July 14, 2022, https://www.fjskl.org.cn/contents/621/1002718.html.
14. Hideaki Ryugen, “Taiwan’s Export Reliance on Chinese Market Falls to 21-Year Low,” Nikkei Asia, January 10, 2021, https://asia.nikkei.com/Economy/Trade/Taiwan-s-export-reliance-on-Chine….
15. “As Taiwanese Businesses Leave China, Taiwan’s Foreign Investments in the Mainland Hit at an All-Time Low,” AsiaNews, February 22, 2024, https://www.asianews.it/news-en/As-Taiwanese-businesses-leave-China,-Ta…’s-foreign-investments-in-the-mainland-hit-at-an-all-time-low-60202.html.
16. “As Taiwanese Businesses Leave China, Taiwan’s Foreign Investments in the Mainland Hit at an All-Time Low.”
17. Taiwan Affairs Office (PRC), “中共中央国务院关于支持福建探索海峡两岸融合发展新路建设两岸融合发展示范区的意见” [The CCP Central Committee and the State Council’s Opinions on Supporting Fujian in Exploring New Paths for Cross-Strait Integrated Development and Building a Cross-Strait Integrated Development Demonstration Zone], September 12, 2023, http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/topone/202309/t20230912_12566987.htm.
18. Fujian Provincial Department of Civil Affairs, “事关建设两岸融合发展示范区, 福建召开重磅发布会” [Regarding the Construction of Cross-Strait Integrated Development Demonstration Zone, Fujian Held a Major Press Conference], December 29, 2023, https://fgw.fj.gov.cn/ztzl/fjys/fjys/202401/t20240104_6372806.htm.
19. “建设两岸融合发展示范区, 福建发布首批15条政策措施” [To Build a Cross-Strait Integrated Development Demonstration Zone, Fujian Releases the First Batch of 15 Policies and Measures], Xinhua, November 27, 2023, http://www.news.cn/tw/2023-11/27/c_1129995709.htm.
20. Fujian Provincial Department of Civil Affairs, “事关建设两岸融合发展示范区, 福建召开重磅发布会.”
21. Fujian Provincial Department of Civil Affairs, “事关建设两岸融合发展示范区, 福建召开重磅发布会.”
22. Fujian Provincial Department of Civil Affairs, “事关建设两岸融合发展示范区, 福建召开重磅发布会.”
23. For Mazu, see below a brief explanation; Zhuzi refers to Zhu Xi (朱熹), the preeminent Neo-Confucian (daoxue) master of the Southern Song (1126–1271), born in Fujian, who is generally ranked as second only to Confucius in the Chinese philosophical tradition. See Kirill Thompson, “Zhu Xi,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, August 31, 2020, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/zhu-xi.
24. Taiwan Affairs Office (PRC), “中共中央国务院关于支持福建探索海峡两岸融合发展新路建设两岸融合发展示范区的意见.”
25. Taiwan Affairs Office (PRC), “中共中央国务院关于支持福建探索海峡两岸融合发展新路建设两岸融合发展示范区的意见.”
26. Fujian Provincial Department of Civil Affairs, “事关建设两岸融合发展示范区, 福建召开重磅发布会.”
27. Fujian Provincial Department of Civil Affairs, “事关建设两岸融合发展示范区, 福建召开重磅发布会.”
28. Fujian Provincial Department of Civil Affairs, “事关建设两岸融合发展示范区, 福建召开重磅发布会.”
29. Fujian Provincial Department of Civil Affairs, “事关建设两岸融合发展示范区, 福建召开重磅发布会.”
30. Taiwan Affairs Office (PRC), “中共中央国务院关于支持福建探索海峡两岸融合发展新路建设两岸融合发展示范区的意见.”
31. “Songs, Pandas and Praise for Xi: How China Courts Young Taiwanese,” Economist, July 11, 2024, https://www.economist.com/china/2024/07/11/songs-pandas-and-praise-for-….
32. Ralph Jennings, “Mainland China Steps Up Efforts to Woo Taiwanese Investors despite Cross-Strait Tensions, but Why Aren’t More Listening?” South China Morning Post, March 10, 2024, https://www.scmp.com/economy/global-economy/article/3254673/mainland-ch….
33. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (PRC), 《一个中国的原则与台湾问题》 [The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Question] (Beijing, February 2000), https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/zt_674979/dnzt_674981/qtzt/tww…. The PRC’s Anti-Secession Law adopted in 2005 continued this assessment in the legal term. See also National People’s Congress (PRC), “反分裂国家法” [Anti-Secession Law], March 14, 2005, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ziliao_674904/zt_674979/dnzt_674981/qtzt/twwt/st….
34. See, for example, “中国驻法大使卢沙野: 中国内战尚未结束, 台湾政权是叛乱政权” [Chinese Ambassador to France Lu Shaye: China’s Civil War Is Not Over Yet, the Taiwan Regime Is a Rebel Regime], Lianhe Zaobao, June 28, 2024, https://www.zaobao.com.sg/realtime/china/story20240628-3989942; and Chaoyang Shaoxia, “到底什么是真正的台海现状?” [What Is the Real Status Quo in the Taiwan Strait?], China Youth Daily, June 12, 2023, http://m.cyol.com/gb/articles/2023-06/12/content_YOjNJ0Sm96.html.
35. Zhuge Liang, “南征教” [Southern Expedition Teachings] in《诸葛亮集》 [Zhuge Liang Collection] (Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 1960), 33.
36. For a CCP official account of its united front with the KMT in the revolution years, see Institute of Party History and Literature (PRC), 《中国共产党历史，1921–1949》 [History of the Chinese Communist Party, 1921–1949] (Beijing: CCP Party History Press, 2002), chap. 4, 13.
37. For post-Mao China’s early economic connections with Taiwan, see, for example, Barry Naughton, The China Circle: Economics and Technology in the PRC, Taiwan, and Hong Kong (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997); and Zhang Chuanguo, 《台商大陆投资问题研究》 [Research on Taiwanese Business Investment on the Mainland] (Beijing: Commercial Press, 2007).
38. Song Ming, “毛泽东统一战线思想中的战略智慧” [The Strategic Wisdom of Mao Zedong’s United Front Thought], People’s Forum Network, September 18, 2016, http://www.rmlt.com.cn/2016/0918/440289.shtml.
39. See a recent elaboration of this in Hu Yuhan and Wang Xiaojing, “毛泽东的战争‘游泳术’” [Mao’s War “Swimming”], People’s Daily, July 3, 2023, http://cpc.people.com.cn/n1/2023/0703/c443712-40026355.html.
40. “Labeling” is also a prevailing tactic in Mao’s class struggle to fight enemies. See Lynn T. White, Policies of Chaos: The Organizational Causes of Violence in China’s Cultural Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989).
41. Guoguang Wu, “Identity, Sovereignty, and Economic Penetration: Beijing’s Responses to Offshore Chinese Democracies,” Journal of Contemporary China 16, no. 51 (2007): 295–313.
42. For “Asian values” and relevant debates, see, for instance, Takashi Inoguchi et al., “‘Asian Values’ and Democracy in Asia,” United Nations University, March 28, 1997, http://archive.unu.edu/unupress/asian-values.html; Josiane Cauquelin, Paul Lim, and Birgit Mayer-König, eds., Asian Values: Encounter with Diversity (London: Routledge, 1998); and Leena Avonius and Damien Kingsbury, eds., Human Rights in Asia: A Reassessment of the Asian Values Debate (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).
43. See a report and comment in “94要客訴/郭曾說‘民主不能當飯吃!’王時齊: 中國關係能處理乾淨?” [94 Wants to Complain / Guo Once Said That “Democracy Cannot Be Eaten!” Wang Shiqi: Can China’s Relations Be Handled Cleanly?], Yahoo Taiwan, February 9, 2023, https://tw.news.yahoo.com/94要客訴-郭曾說-民主不能當飯吃-王時齊-中國關係能處理乾淨-092506177.html.
44. The “Six Strategies” is an example of elaborating on the Art of War. See, for instance, Kong Deqi,《六韬浅说》[A Brief Introduction to the Six Strategies] (Beijing: People’s Liberation Army Press, 1987).