On South Asia in the Indo-Pacific
What's at Stake for Asia in the 2024 U.S. Election

By: Farwa Aamer and Vivek Mishra
In the dynamic landscape of geopolitical shifts, U.S. policy toward South Asia has consistently been a critical area of focus. As the region continues to evolve amid changing political, economic, and security imperatives, the outcomes of the upcoming elections in the United States necessitate a reassessment of strategic priorities and approaches. This article delves into the interplay of continuity and change in the U.S. policy toward South Asia, analyzing the implications of the possible electoral shifts and how the United States can navigate its interests and partnerships in this pivotal region post-election.
From Stability to Strategic Partnerships: The United States in South Asia
For decades, the region's strategic significance to the United States has centered on the long-running conflict in Afghanistan, which has shaped much of U.S. diplomatic, military, and economic strategies. Stability in Afghanistan as a precondition for broader regional security has been a U.S. foreign policy constant.
With the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, however, Washington's engagement with South Asia has significantly evolved. It is now more focused on countering Chinese regional influence than navigating the traditional mistrust between India and Pakistan. While these two countries remain central to the U.S. strategy, there is a growing recognition of the strategic importance and economic potential of other South Asian nations. This shift is partly driven by the U.S. desire to counter China's expanding influence in the region, particularly following the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) launch in 2013.
Bangladesh, for instance, has emerged as an important player for the United States due to its strategic location, economic promise, and potential to serve as a meaningful partner in the larger Indo-Pacific vision. The United States has also focused on Sri Lanka, supporting post-conflict reconciliation, democratic governance, and economic development to strengthen its sovereignty and reduce its dependency on Chinese investments.
Nepal, positioned at a geopolitical crossroads, has attempted to balance its relations with China and the United States. The latter has been actively engaging with Nepal to promote democratic institutions, infrastructure, and sustainable development, aiming to offer alternatives to Chinese investments. The Millennium Challenge Corporation’s (MCC) Nepal Compact, signed in 2017, exemplifies this effort.
Under the administrations of former President Donald Trump and the current President Joe Biden (under the Biden-Harris administration), the U.S. policy toward South Asia has seen both continuities and shifts.
Under Trump, the regional policy maintained a degree of continuity with previous administrations while introducing specific strategic initiatives. The South Asia Strategy, unveiled in 2017, emphasized a conditions-based approach to the war in Afghanistan, increased pressure on Pakistan to bolster counterterrorism efforts, and established India as a key component in any regional strategy. Trump’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision was another significant development, formally integrating South Asia with the broader Asia-Pacific strategy and defining new means of U.S. policy engagement in the region in light of China's growing presence in the area.
When Biden assumed office in 2021, with Kamala Harris as his vice president, the administration adapted to new challenges and opportunities. The U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, overseen by Biden, was politically contentious and strategically monumental. This major shift in U.S. regional interests necessitated a reevaluation of the U.S. strategy in the region.
As the U.S. elections draw near, strategic competition with China remains a central focus for the Biden-Harris administration — a trend that is likely to persist post-election, no matter the outcome. India’s relevance as a natural partner and counterweight to China in the South Asia region has only increased and paved the way for a multifaceted U.S.-India partnership. It is notable that Vice President Kamala Harris, the Democratic nominee for the upcoming presidential election, is the first U.S. presidential candidate of Indian and South Asian heritage, although that might not be a key political factor for her administration.
Beyond India, the United States stands to benefit from an increased engagement with the region overall, with a comprehensive South Asia outlook going forward to ensure regional stability.
A Closer Look at U.S. Relations with India and Pakistan
The U.S.-India dynamic has been notably consistent amid the major political transitions in the United States over the past two decades. The relationship between India and the United States has grown both from a bilateral perspective with strong defense and trade ties as well as from definable shared interests in the Indo-Pacific.
The two countries have consistently found areas of alignment. Since Prime Minister Narendra Modi first took office in 2014, India and the United States have signed three foundational agreements: the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA), the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA), and the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geospatial Intelligence (BECA), creating closer military and strategic cooperation. During the Trump administration, U.S.-India ties experienced notable highs and some challenges. The two leaders, then-President Trump and Prime Minister Modi, enjoyed a good personal relationship, which helped elevate bilateral engagements. However, the relationship was not without its challenges. Both leaders' nationalist positions sometimes led to divergent views, exemplified by Trump's "America First" policy and Modi's "Make in India" initiative. Trump’s attempts to achieve tariff parity created tensions, particularly around trade issues.
Under the Biden-Harris administration, the U.S.-India relationship received further emphasis: 2023 was a particularly significant year in the relationship with Modi’s historic state visit to Washington, which included an address to a joint session of the U.S. Congress and a series of consequential agreements ranging from high-level defense co-production to new avenues for technological partnership. During the visit, Harris acknowledged the impact that Indian Americans have had in the United States. She reiterated the importance of cooperation between the two countries on climate, space, and public health, among other areas. India and the United States have also found themselves working together more closely within the Quad — a group of four countries: the United States, Australia, India, and Japan — as well as other mini-laterals such as the I2U2 group formed by India, Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States. Tense China-India relations, particularly the unresolved border issues along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), have provided an additional plank for closer U.S.-India cooperation as well as having motivated India to play a more prominent role in South Asia, positioning itself as an alternative to China for other countries in the region and the larger Global South.
The U.S.-Pakistan relationship has experienced significant fluctuations in recent years. Historically, Pakistan has been a major non-NATO ally of the United States, playing a crucial role in regional dynamics, particularly in the war on terror and the Afghanistan peace process. However, mutual mistrust has often strained this dynamic. Following the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan, Pakistan has sought to reset its ties with the United States, aiming for new avenues for bilateral cooperation and engagement.
Under the Trump administration, U.S.-Pakistan relations faced considerable challenges but also moments of recalibration. Initially, the administration expressed frustration over Pakistan's perceived lack of cooperation in counterterrorism efforts. However, recognizing Pakistan's unique influence over the Taliban, the United States reengaged Islamabad to facilitate a diplomatic resolution in Afghanistan. Signs of improved relations emerged during then-prime minister Imran Khan’s visit to the United States in 2019; he was positively received by President Trump. Trump’s offer to mediate the Kashmir conflict, although contentious for India, and his call for stronger trade ties with Pakistan reflected a more engaged and multifaceted approach toward Islamabad.
In contrast, the Biden-Harris administration has shown less eagerness to deepen engagement with Pakistan, particularly after the U.S. troop withdrawal from Afghanistan. The administration's focus on bolstering ties with India and the lack of a comprehensive South Asia strategy has further marginalized Pakistan’s role in U.S. foreign policy. Pakistan’s close relationship with China has also been an element of dissension. However, on Kashmir, Harris, during her time as a senator in 2019, conveyed that “there is a need to intervene if the situation demands,” showing a more vocal stance than Biden. However, whether this will once again emerge as an important focus area for her remains to be seen.
Potential Shifts and the Future of U.S.–South Asia Relations
Like the rest of the world, South Asia is grappling with the multifaceted possibilities that could arise from the November presidential elections in the United States. These apprehensions stem from the vastly different policy implications of the incoming administration in Washington. The possibilities of both continuity and change are driving speculation, with concerns about the latter weighted more heavily.
If the Republican Party secures victory and Donald Trump returns to the presidency, his primary goal could be a substantial reorientation of America's domestic and foreign policies. Domestically, the Trump administration could intensify its inward-looking approach, while externally, it could renegotiate its engagements with other nations based on what the country has to offer to the United States.
Four key trends are expected to dominate Trump’s approach, significantly impacting South Asian countries: heightened trade tariffs, reduced military involvement abroad to cut U.S. costs, increased pressure on allies to contribute more, and a potential reevaluation of relationships with key global players. This would necessitate recalibrations in foreign policy strategies across South Asia.
The trade war during the first Trump administration reverberated strongly in South Asia. If Trump reinstates or escalates trade tariffs, South Asian economies that rely on exports to the United States, including India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan, could be heavily impacted. These countries could face higher costs for their goods, leading to economic adjustments, and potential trade disputes with the United States. Therefore, future trade relations with these countries might pivot around Trump's broader objectives to maintain U.S. engagement in the region.
Trump has previously advocated for reducing U.S. military involvement overseas to cut costs. This could lead to decreased military aid and support for South Asian nations, requiring them to reassess their security strategies and defense expenditures. The U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy will be strongly tethered to India’s indispensability in the region, although managing expectations under Trump could be a challenge for New Delhi. Some of the demands under a potential second Trump term could range from enhancing capacity for greater regional support to other partner countries (burden sharing) to developing a clearer China policy, one that aligns with his own stance toward China, competitive or otherwise.
However, the second Trump administration may also see an increased military spending in Asia, especially with reference to the Taiwan contingency and Washington’s China strategy as envisaged in the Taiwan Policy Act of 2022. While the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan aligned with Trump’s grand strategy of reducing U.S. financial and strategic commitments abroad, the evolving politics in the Middle East could also see the Trump administration’s diplomatic involvement in the region, even if cautiously. Given South Asia’s close geographical proximity to the Middle East, particularly that of Iran, any policy shifts impacting the wider regional security dynamics could have ramifications for South Asia as well.
Within South Asia, the Trump administration’s approach toward specific countries may largely remain the same as in his last term. Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka may receive more attention from an Indo-Pacific strategy perspective from Washington, underscoring the China angle. The Trump administration could discourage significant strategic partnerships between China and South Asian countries but is unlikely to enter into new military or strategic cooperation agreements that would require additional U.S. funding. Pakistan stands out in the region due to its strong bilateral ties with China. While little change is expected regarding Pakistan, there are new opportunities for Pakistan to explore a reset it has long sought, although careful strategic planning will be crucial to identifying areas of mutual interest given Trump's pragmatic approach to politics and Pakistan’s own challenges.
In sum, the Indo-Pacific strategy under a second Trump administration is likely to continue as in the first but with altered characteristics. A lot will depend on his China policy and appetite to work with allies and partners on security, economic, and other domains.
If Kamala Harris becomes president, there will likely be continuity of the Indo-Pacific strategy as under President Biden. This administration has spent valuable time in building a lot partnership-focused approaches whether in shape of maintaining the momentum of the Quad or working with other countries through minilaterals — something the Indo-Pacific partners value. India will consequently continue to play an increasingly significant role in this approach.
With Bangladesh the latest country experiencing turmoil, South Asia is undergoing a change in regional dynamics and great power relations, with the United States closely observing the developments. A post–Sheikh Hasina Bangladesh could highlight the undercurrent of dissonance between the interests of India and the United States in the area. The nature of Washington’s approach may depend heavily on whether a Democratic or Republican administration is in power.Under a Democratic leadership, as exemplified by the Biden-Harris administration, there has been a proactive effort to engage with Bangladesh's interim government and supporting it to chart a more democratic future for the country. However, Washington’s approach and interests may not always align seamlessly with India's, which prioritizes regional stability and security, and is currently navigating its own relationship with the new stakeholders in Bangladesh post-Hasina. In contrast, a Republican-led government, particularly one akin to the Trump administration, would likely take a more cautious approach toward Bangladesh, placing less emphasis on the promotion of democracy and more on safeguarding U.S. strategic interests.
Moreover, as U.S.-China competition intensifies, particularly in the tech sector, India is likely to become more involved in the broader regional dynamics of great power rivalry in South Asia. The Biden-Harris administration’s decision to restrict high-end tech exports to China, combined with rising wage rates in China, has coincided with India's growth as a manufacturing hub. This has attracted more tech and manufacturing companies to move from China and around the world to India. These developments may trigger a broader structural shift in the geoeconomic competition between China and a coalition of democratic countries led by the United States.
The ongoing wars in Europe and the Middle East have diverted some of the Biden administration's attention from the Indo-Pacific. However, measures such as the CHIPS and Science Act, continued tariffs on China, and intensified tech competition with Beijing indicate a sustained focus on countering China’s influence. Biden’s policies have established a framework that future administrations may find difficult to reverse, something Harris will also follow, ensuring that South Asia remains central to U.S. strategy in balancing China’s regional influence.
Regardless of who wins the upcoming presidential election, most of these channels of strategic engagement between India and the United States are likely to continue. However, in a Trump scenario, pressures for India related to tariff and burden-sharing could grow. In the debate between Trump and Biden on June 27 this year, Trump justified his decision to pull out from the Paris Accord in 2017 because “India, China and Russia weren’t paying.” India may have relief from back-channel pressure on its relationship with Russia, given Trump’s own seemingly pro-Russia stance, his promises to not provide military aid to Ukraine, and above all his promise to end the Russia-Ukraine conflict in a day. Yet, the Biden-Harris administration has shown remarkable accommodation and understanding vis-à-vis India’s continued relationship with Russia since the Russia-Ukraine war began. The Biden-Harris administration’s occasional critical push against India, such as that on religious freedom enunciated recently, is likely to weaken under a Trump administration.
Pakistan has chosen to remain neutral on the Ukraine conflict, exemplified by its recent decision to skip the Ukraine Peace Summit in Switzerland in June 2024. A Trump administration that is less confrontational toward Russia could provide Pakistan with greater flexibility to strengthen its ties with Russia without fear of significant backlash. However, the complexity of Pakistan's foreign policy is heightened by its strategic partnership with China. Navigating its relationships with all of these major powers presents a challenge for Pakistan, as Islamabad must balance its interests carefully to avoid alienating key partners.
In the coming four years, both the United States and South Asia must focus on key policy measures to effectively manage regional stability and growth. India may have to take proactive steps toward burden sharing to engage the United States, particularly if faced with another Trump presidency. For its part, the United States needs to deepen its understanding that stability in South Asia is critical to the broader Indo-Pacific region and acknowledge the global repercussions of conflicts in the area. Enhanced U.S. engagement as a development, economic, strategic, and security partner would benefit all. Moreover, with recent developments in Bangladesh, the United States should focus on supporting the country's stability during this transitional period, ensuring economic and other forms of aid are provided to help rebuild the nation and, by extension, contribute to regional stability. Any administration in Washington must recognize that a one-size-fits-all South Asia strategy is challenging to implement. The region's complexity, marked by fractured political landscapes, diverse economies, and often conflicting interests, necessitates a more nuanced and tailored approach.
Farwa Aamer is the Director of South Asia Initiatives at the Asia Society Policy Institute.
Vivek Mishra is a Fellow of the Americas at the Observer Research Foundation (ORF).