By: Akshay Mathur and Helen Zhang

A new era of intergovernmental science and technology cooperation has emerged, driven by the United States and its Asian partners in the Indo-Pacific such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Australia, Singapore, and India. As science and technology take primacy in the modern economy, countries are introducing laws and policies to build new sovereign capabilities, protect sensitive innovations and industries, and govern cross-border cooperation.

This essay examines the key trends we have observed in the United States and select Asian countries in the Indo-Pacific, the nature of agreements being inked, and the likely direction of cooperation under the next U.S. administration.

Recent Technological Renaissance in the Indo-Pacific

While technology is not new to the region, there is a discernible shift in recent years toward building competence and capability in newer domains such as artificial intelligence, synthetic biology, quantum computing, clean technologies, space science, semiconductor manufacturing, and digital public infrastructure.

To meet their national objectives and to keep pace with scientific and technological innovation, Asian countries in the Indo-Pacific are upgrading their legislative agendas and policies. For Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Australia, Singapore, and India, the authors found more than 100 legislative measures and policies introduced for science and technology since 2020 by respective foreign, trade, home, and science and technology ministries, excluding defense.

For instance, South Korea’s Framework Act on Science and Technology, legislation introduced in 2001, which traces its roots back to legislation enacted in the 1960s, has been updated several times up to 2024. Australia published its National Quantum Strategy in 2023 to modernize its economy, “build sovereign capability,” and attract talent for the field. Singapore upgraded its National AI Strategy in 2023 to develop “greater capabilities” but also to address “greater concerns” about its dark uses. Japan’s “New Form of Capitalism” launched in January 2022 has focused on investing in science, technology, and innovation, particularly in “GX” (green transformation) and “DX” (digital transformation). India, alone, has launched national missions for quantum computing, green hydrogen, supercomputing, geospatial technology, artificial intelligence, interdisciplinary cyber-physical systems, deep ocean exploration, bioenergy, coal gasification, advanced manufacturing, and broadband technology.

A defining characteristic of these new domestic policies for science and technology is the focus on economic and national security. South Korea enacted the Special Act on the Fostering of National Strategic Technology in 2023 to protect sovereignty of technologies with implications for its diplomacy and security. Australia’s Critical Technologies Statement published in 2023 details how it is protecting and promoting innovations in quantum technologies, autonomous systems and robotics, artificial intelligence, and advanced manufacturing.

America’s Science and Tech Agreements with Asian powers in the Indo-Pacific

Simultaneously, and perhaps more significantly, building on the same security imperatives, Asian countries are upgrading their partnerships with key allies, within and outside Asia.

The United States now has a mix of bilateral (e.g., India-U.S. Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies, 2022), trilateral (e.g., U.S.-ROK-India Trilateral Technology Dialogue, 2024), and mini-lateral agreements (e.g., Quad Principles on Critical and Emerging Technology Standards) with Asian countries. The authors found over 20 agreements inked since 2021 between the United States and its key partners in Asia and the Indo-Pacific. Some of them are domain specific, such as the manufacturing-focused U.S.-India Semiconductor Supply Chain and Innovation Partnership (2023) and the U.S.-ROK Cooperation in Quantum Information Science and Technologies (2023). As per the Congressional Research Service, the United States has 60 science and technology agreements globally and more than 2,000 sub-agreements.

The United States has had a deep engagement with China, as well. The U.S.-China Science and Technology Agreement established in 1971 is still in force. It was initially established to counter the Soviet Union and has been renewed every five years, including in 2018 (with added provisions for intellectual property) and again in 2023 and 2024 for six-month intervals.

Meanwhile, the Trade Pillar of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (2022), one of the four workstreams along with Supply Chain, Clean Economy and Fair Economy, boasts of America’s partnership with 14 Asian countries and is developing “high-standard rules” for the digital economy, including on cross-border data flows and data localization. The Supply Chain Pillar is set to secure sectors “critical” for the economies, and the Clean Economy Pillar aims to decarbonize with sustainable technologies. At the inaugural IPEF Clean Economy Investor Forum in Singapore in June 2024, nearly 50 startups competed for $2 billion  for development and deployment of clean energy and climate friendly infrastructure and technologies in member countries.

Unsurprisingly, the Quad, in which the United States partners with India, Japan, and Australia, has an agenda that overlaps with that of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF). It includes critical and clean technologies but also adds space and cyber to its agenda. The push behind Open Radio Access Network by the Quad is of particular importance given that it is an effort to break the market oligopoly of 5G telecom vendors, driven primarily by fear that networks may become hostage to geopolitical rivals (e.g. China). At the September 2024 Quad Summit, the leaders pledged further support for the Asia Open RAN Academy (AORA) in the Philippines which already has an $8 million commitment from the United States and Japan. India banned Huawei and ZTE in 2021 and has already announced its homemade open radio access network (ORAN) network, Comet, in February 2024.

U.S. Tech Posture toward Asia and the Indo-Pacific

Over the past three administrations, American foreign policy has increasingly centered on Asia and the Indo-Pacific. Starting with President Obama’s “Pivot to Asia” and continuing under both the Trump and Biden administrations, the United States has moved rapidly to increase its focus on the region to counter a rising and more assertive People’s Republic of China (PRC).

The ongoing competition between the United States and China in Asia has taken on several dimensions. Most often discussed are the military dimensions, including concerns over Chinese naval activity in the South China Sea, fears of U.S.-China military conflict over Taiwan, and regional tensions between China and American allies including Japan. In addition, this competition has economic dimensions, as seen during the Trump administration’s trade war with China, and diplomatic dimensions, as both America and China compete for influence in international organizations and court strategically important nations in Southeast Asia.

Technology, in turn, has become one of the most important dimensions of modern U.S.-China competition. Leaders in both China and the United States believe emerging technologies — most notably artificial intelligence (AI), synthetic biology, quantum computing, and more — will shape the twenty-first century. In both sides’ view, AI and other technologies will enable the development of more powerful autonomous systems for use in war, lead to automated scientific research that will speed up innovation, and more.

American policy on technology in Asia has thus adopted a bifurcated approach. On one hand, it seeks to ensure the United States remains a preeminent leader in global innovation ahead of the PRC. In line with this strategy, the United States placed sweeping export controls on the supply of high-end AI chips to China, launched an international campaign to keep the Chinese telecommunications firm Huawei away from American and allied networks over espionage and security fears, as well as other measures.

On the other side, however, America has also attempted to bolster its technology cooperation with its Asian partners, particularly in the Indo-Pacific. For example, in April, the United States announced new agreements to cooperate with Japan on lunar exploration and fusion energy. The United States also launched a critical and emerging technologies dialogue with South Korea and helped upskill more than 50,000 people as part of an ongoing partnership with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). These efforts not only help advance American and allied innovation but also help build key regional ties that the United States hopes will help it check China’s growing influence.

American science and technology agreements with its Asian allies are, in turn, as diverse as the populations that inhabit the region. With nations that are longtime technological powerhouses, such as Japan and South Korea, these agreements include efforts to support joint scientific research and dialogues over technology usage. For nations with more nascent scientific infrastructure, American agreements include provisions to foster greater cooperation between research institutions, aid in training new scientists, and more. In this way, American agreements are tailored to meet the diverse needs of countries across Asia.

Key Tech Trends We Have Seen in the Biden Era

Beyond bilateral agreements, the Biden administration has also implemented several domestic, regional, and international policies with ramifications for Asia.

At home, the U.S. Congress passed the CHIPS and Science Act, which invested $280 billion to improve American semiconductor research and help onshore chip supply chains. Such measures are meant to reduce American dependence on Taiwan, the world’s leading producer of high-end chips, and help America keep pace with China’s growing investment in the sector. The Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), which created substantial incentives for investment in American green technology firms, is similarly designed to help America keep pace with China’s ever-expanding production of electric vehicles and other green technology products. Even the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law (BIL) was in part designed to improve American infrastructure to boost national competitiveness vis-à-vis China. Indeed, while these policies were not Asia-focused, they have significant consequences for the region.

A telling speech on America’s changing approach to technology security was given by the U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan in 2023. In his remarks, he explained how the United States is evolving from a narrow focus on trade policy to a broader focus on international economic policy that prioritizes domestic industry and economic security (a “new Washington Consensus”). Given the geopolitical and geoeconomic rivalry with China, a key objective of this shift in policy will be protecting “foundational technologies with a small yard and high fence.” He also emphasized that America’s focus on industrial policy aligns with a parallel objective of securing global supply chains by collaborating with Asian partners such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and India — in line with our observation that the United States is taking a bifurcated approach toward science and technology cooperation.

American efforts to shape global digital governance has value for Asia. The Biden administration crafted a 2023 executive order on AI governance, and its officials attended the first AI Safety Summit in the UK. As part of the follow-up to these efforts, at the 2024 AI Seoul Summit, the United States was one of several nations that agreed to help establish an international network of AI safety institutes designed to ensure the safe development of the technology. The United States and its G7 allies helped mobilize more than $200 million to enhance connectivity in under-resourced areas as part of a program called Digital Invest. In turn, Digital Invest programs have had a significant impact in Asia, for example, by expanding digital payment systems in Uzbekistan.

Many of these Asia-focused efforts come with substantial private sector engagement. The aforementioned Digital Invest program run by the United States and its allies helped launch a fund for technology entrepreneurship in South and Southeast Asia. Meanwhile, the Quad began its own Quad Investment Network (QUIN) to bring together executives from Quad nations to foster increased investment in technology development. Beyond investor-focused initiatives, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has also launched efforts such as the COMET project, partnering with Microsoft, Google, and others to provide new technologies to farmers in the Mekong Delta.

On the other hand, Asian countries have also influenced global policy on issues of technology governance new to the United States. During its G20 presidency in 2023, India introduced, negotiated, and developed consensus on a definition for Digital Public Infrastructure and supplemented it with guiding principles for its development and deployment. India also introduced the G20 Chief Science Advisors Roundtable and is currently the chair of the Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence.

What Will the Next Administration Do?

America’s broad focus on technology-based engagement in the Indo-Pacific may change based on the upcoming presidential election. The victory of either Vice President Kamala Harris or former President Donald Trump could have important implications for American technology engagement with Asia and the Indo-Pacific.

Under a Harris Administration

If Vice President Harris triumphs in November, she will likely continue much of the Biden administration’s technology policy. Insiders have already suggested that a Harris administration will likely maintain the Biden administration’s 2023 executive order on AI governance, which means it may commit to international efforts such as the proposed network of global AI safety institutes.

A President Harris is also likely to deepen engagement with America’s Asian allies on science and technology while promoting a robust effort to keep the United States ahead of the PRC.

There may still be some subtle shifts under a Harris administration, however. Hailing from California, Vice President Harris has longtime relationships with leading Silicon Valley figures, such as her well-known friendship with Laurene Powell Jobs. As a result, Vice President Harris may be more likely to work with Silicon Valley on technology issues, including in Asia. A Harris administration, for example, might include more partnerships between the United States and its top technology firms to train scientists and promote technology adoption across the Asia-Pacific, as it currently does with the aforementioned COMET project.

Vice President Harris may also partner with industry on issues of international AI governance, as she did on privacy policy while serving as California’s attorney general. Therefore, she represents continuity with the status quo, but with a greater focus on public-private partnerships.

Under a Trump Administration

Meanwhile, if former President Trump wins, we anticipate more significant changes. The former president has made it clear that he wants the United States to stay ahead of China on AI; therefore, a second Trump administration will likely renew and strengthen efforts including export controls on advanced chips. Trump allies have also been reportedly planning efforts to research and design new advanced AI systems for use by the U.S. military.

However, Trump has also stated his desire to limit AI regulation, such as by rolling back the Biden administration’s 2023 executive order on AI governance. This position may signal that the Trump administration may be less committed to efforts including building a network of global AI safety institutes. Therefore, global AI governance efforts may take a backseat in a second Trump administration.

Looking Ahead

Governments are building capacity to usher in this era of science and technology diplomacy. New roles are emerging. The authors found nearly 50 cyber-, science-, or technology-focused cabinet ministers, ambassadors, and senior officials in the United States, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Australia, Singapore, and India. The Biden administration appointed Nathan Fick as the inaugural ambassador at large for the Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy. Similarly, Japan has appointed an ambassador for science and technology cooperation, South Korea has an ambassador for science and technology, and Australia has an ambassador for cyber affairs and critical technology. India’s Ministry for External Affairs has a division for cyber diplomacy as well as one for “new, emerging, strategic technologies.”

If the Harris or Trump administration decides to deepen its science and technology cooperation with Asia and the Indo-Pacific, the United States will find the matching technical expertise, entrepreneurial ambition, and geopolitical impetus in its partners in the region.

Akshay Mathur is the Senior Director, Asia Society Policy Institute based in New Delhi responsible for the institute's policy mandate in India.

Helen Zhang is a non-resident fellow in the Sydney University's United States Studies Centre's Emerging Technology Program, and the co-founder of Intrigue Media.