Cadres born in the 1980s are rising within China’s party-state system, and their frontrunners will take up mid-level leadership positions in the power hierarchy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). These young leaders grew up during China’s economic boom, and many of them have elite educational backgrounds and professional training in STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics), distinguishing them from their older comrades. How have they risen under Xi Jinping’s leadership, and how will their ascendance shape China’s politics and governance in the future? What common traits do the frontrunners have that make them leading candidates to rule China in the decades ahead? And what political and institutional elements accelerated their promotion?

To answer these questions, this essay examines the CCP cadres who were born in the 1980s and serve at the sub-provincial city and sub-ministerial bureau and department levels (tingju ji), hereafter referred to as bureau-level cadres.¹ It first sketches a general picture of the younger generation of CCP elites and summarizes some prominent features they share. It then examines graduates of Tsinghua University in particular — Xi Jinping’s alma mater — who are significantly overrepresented in this cohort of rising stars. The final section explores the specific organizational measures promoted under Xi to cultivate and train university graduates for CCP careers.

A growing technocratic and elitist trend is evident in the rise of a younger generation of CCP elites represented by the prevalence of Tsinghua graduates taking the lead in career advancement within the party-state hierarchy. This trend appears to strengthen Xi Jinping’s control of CCP elites and benefit China’s governance, though it contradicts Xi’s emphasis on the CCP’s traditional political criteria and populist values. To overcome this dilemma, Xi’s leadership has prioritized loyalty to the CCP in the recruitment and promotion of young cadres and has developed organizational measures to enhance their grassroots experience.

By the end of 2024, there were at least 75 full-bureau-level cadres born in the 1980s, ranging from 38 to 44 years old (see appended Table 1). The data in Table 1 does not include personnel data for mid-level cadres within national party-state organs, the military, state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and CCP-sponsored non-state organizations, primarily due to the inaccessibility of such information. The data also does not include deputy-bureau-level cadres, who are discussed in this essay. Nonetheless, Table 1 captures the majority of this rising cohort within the CCP and reveals some interesting trends.

First, educational elitism is evident. Among the 75 cadres listed on Table 1, 63 hold an advanced degree (84%), including 35 with a PhD (46.7%). Except for two who earned master’s degrees from a Party school, they all obtained degrees from formal universities, and nearly 80% received them from prestigious universities.² This contrasts with older generations of CCP elites in power since the 1990s, whose educational backgrounds were more often symbolic than substantive, as many gained advanced degrees from part-time nonresidential programs with relaxed standards for officials. Further, 5 of the 75 cadres received overseas degrees — four from the United States and one from Australia.

Second, a technocratic trend is also apparent. Of the 60 cadres for whom information is available, 29 were trained as engineers and scientists. The actual percentage may be higher, as some majored in STEM during their undergraduate studies but later obtained non-STEM degrees, often via part-time study. This is why many have been appointed to supervise science, technology, research, and state-owned industrial enterprises, including those in military industries. In particular, at least nine cadres (12%) have educational or professional backgrounds in the military-industry sector. This data aligns with Xi’s emphasis on developing independent capabilities in science and technological innovation.

Third, all but one are CCP members (98.7%) who joined the Party at an early age. Of the 42 for whom this information is available, all did so in their 20s, with the majority (34 of 42, 81%) doing so in their early 20s and 10 before the age of 20 (six became Party members at 18, mostly as high school students). The only non-CCP member, Wang Yanyi, belongs to a satellite party, the China Zhi Gong Party.³

Fourth, the promotion of younger cadres accelerated following the 20th Party Congress in October 2022. This is indicated by the fact that 47 cadres (62.7%) were promoted to the full-bureau level after the congress, with 31 (66% of the 47) promoted in 2024. In contrast, from December 2015 to October 2022, just 28 cadres were promoted to this level. The faster pace of promotions will likely continue, as the same trend also appears at the deputy level and below.

Like the older generations of leaders, this young group is overwhelmingly male-dominated and of Han ethnicity. There are only nine women (12%, compared to 49% of the general population) and four from non-Han ethnicities (5%, compared to 9% of the general population).

The data for deputy-level cadres, although incomplete, shows that 242 were born in the 1980s, mostly in the first half of the decade, with 19 born after 1985. Of these, 211 (87.6%) have advanced degrees, including 73 PhDs (30.3%) and 138 master’s degrees (57.3%). However, in marked contrast to bureau-level cadres, most of those with master’s degrees earned them in non-STEM fields (68) rather than STEM subjects (31). Overseas returnees were a small percentage of this cohort (2.9%, or 7 of 242). There are 46 women (19.7%), 25 from non-Han ethnicities (10.7%), and 16 non-CCP members (6.6%).

Tsinghua University alumni make up a significant percentage of these young cadres. Located in Beijing, Tsinghua is among the most prestigious universities in China and is known as a leading STEM center. It is also Xi Jinping’s alma mater: he was a student there from 1975 to 1979, when he earned a bachelor’s degree in chemical engineering, and he returned as a part-time doctor of law student in Marxist theory and ideological and political education from 1998 to 2002.⁴ As of 2023, 30.2% of the full-bureau-level young cadres were Tsinghua alumni, although this proportion has since declined to 22.7%. These numbers have several meaningful implications for understanding CCP elite politics under Xi.

First, the Party under Xi favors recent Tsinghua graduates with rapid promotions to cultivate officials who are not only highly talented but also well-connected to Xi’s political networks. This becomes even clearer when comparing the percentage of Tsinghua University alumni to the percentage of Peking University alumni (10.7%). Peking University, just down the road from Tsinghua, is another of China’s most prestigious universities, but it has a stronger focus on the humanities and social sciences. Alumni from both universities are prominent among the young deputy-bureau-level cadres, but the number of Tsinghua alumni (15) far surpasses the number of Peking University alumni (6). In addition, in the youngest cohort born between 1985 and 1989 who have reached the deputy-bureau rank, Tsinghua alumni account for more than half (10 of 19, or 52.6%), and there are no Peking University alumni. These figures suggest that Tsinghua alumni will remain a powerful force within Chinese officialdom for decades to come.

Second, the recent decline in the percentage of Tsinghua alumni might be due to the large-scale promotion of those who were born in the 1980s to mid-level positions. Considering that there are 2,820 universities in China⁵ and that mid-level cadre promotions generally take place locally, the increasing percentage of local university alumni is not surprising. Data supports this speculation: among the 75 cadres in Table 1, no university contributes more than one graduate, except Tsinghua (17), Peking (8), and Hunan University (2). Politically, this implies that competition for promotion among the younger generations of elites increasingly involves a variety of institutions and interpersonal networks, thus reducing the dominance that Tsinghua alumni once enjoyed.

Third, this does not contradict the rise of Tsinghua alumni in the new generation of CCP elites. Since many Tsinghua alumni have already been promoted ahead of their peers from other institutions, it implies that they have a competitive advantage for future promotions. If true, Tsinghua alumni will maintain a large presence in the provincial-level leadership positions in the years ahead.

The younger cadres may generally be regarded as Xi’s “new army,” among which his “Tsinghua new army” takes the lead. Tsinghua alumni have long been prominent among post-Tiananmen CCP elites, especially during the Hu Jintao era (2002–12). Xi’s Tsinghua new army, however, is unrelated to Hu’s “Tsinghua clique” or the Tsinghua subgroups led by Zhu Rongji and Wu Bangguo within Jiang Zemin’s “Shanghai gang.” As a Tsinghua alumnus, Xi’s educational experience was fundamentally different from that of Hu, Zhu, or Wu — Xi, for instance, was a “worker-peasant-soldier student” during the Cultural Revolution.

Among Xi’s classmates at Tsinghua, Chen Xi has played a significant role in promoting and cementing Xi’s Tsinghua new army. Chen, who was Xi’s roommate at Tsinghua in the mid-1970s, eventually became Tsinghua’s Party secretary before joining Xi’s national leadership, where he was in charge of organizational affairs. At 69, Chen did not retain his Politburo membership at the 20th Party Congress but remains president of the Central Party School, the most significant institution for training high- and upper-middle-ranking cadres.⁶ Li Ganjie, Chen’s successor in the Central Organization Department, is the youngest member of the current Politburo and also a Tsinghua alumnus, receiving a bachelor’s degree in 1986 and a master’s degree in 1989, both in nuclear engineering.⁷ Chen has for a decade played a godfather-like role for the Tsinghua new army, now with Li serving as his lieutenant.⁸

In a political career, alumni connections can be a powerful resource, especially for graduates in science and technology fields. For example, in a project in Xi’an, Shaanxi Province, Zhao Xiao, Tsinghua PhD and local government leader,⁹ combined “local industry and Tsinghua’s high-quality resources in innovation and entrepreneurship for empowering the urban economy.”¹⁰ Zhao emphasized the concept of an “alumni economy in the new era”¹¹ for the benefit of local governance and economic development in the area he served. An ethnic Manchu, he was the first non-Han cadre to attain a position at the full sub-provincial level, and this was followed by an appointment as a municipal deputy Party secretary, a move that usually prepares one for further promotion.¹²

Both Lian Xin in Tianjin Municipality and Yao Ning in Xinjiang Autonomous Region also benefitted from their Tsinghua connections. According to Lian, her student and professional experience in scientific research at Tsinghua was “extremely suitable” preparation for her position as a local cadre in charge of science and technology affairs, and she facilitated cooperation between Tsinghua and the district government. Within nine years, Lian became deputy district mayor of Tianjin at the age of 37.¹³ Yao Ning, Party secretary of Kashgar in southern Xinjiang, is the same age as Lian and serves at the same level. Yao also “used various interpersonal resources,” likely including his Tsinghua network, to secure approval in his jurisdiction for a high-tech industrial park project and a company that was listed on the National Equities Exchange and Quotations board.¹⁴ Many of the rising stars among young Tsinghua alumni were student leaders and Chinese Communist Youth League cadres when they were at the university, and this has helped cement their ties with the school and other alumni involved in politics.

The CCP has developed a series of organizational measures to recruit university graduates as young cadres and train them for future careers within the Party. Programs include “Student Village Officials” (daxuesheng cunguan),¹⁵ “Three Supports and One Help” (sanzhi yifu),¹⁶ “Selected Graduates” (xuandiaosheng), and “Dunmiao” (“the hardening of seedlings”). While the first two are designed to send university graduates to villages as non-elite youth, the Selected Graduates and Dunmiao programs groom future ruling elites. Many of the mid-level young cadres discussed above participated in the latter two programs.

In February 2008, Xi Jinping, who then oversaw the Central Secretariat, emphasized at the National Organizational Work Conference that the Party must “vigorously cultivate and select outstanding young cadres, adhere to and improve the selected students arrangement, and carefully select outstanding college students to train in difficult positions and complex environments at the grassroots level.”¹⁷ The Central Committee’s report to the 18th National Party Congress in 2012, when Xi assumed office as CCP general secretary, stated that it was necessary to “increase efforts in cultivating and selecting outstanding young cadres” and called on “the entire Party to pay attention to, care for, and love the youth.” In May 2018, the Central Organization Department issued a document emphasizing the need to “further strengthen and improve” the Selected Graduates program and sponsored a national meeting on the matter.¹⁸

Recent graduates with bachelor’s or advanced degrees who excel in both political qualities and academic performance are selected for the Selected Graduates program by provincial Party organizations. They are then assigned jobs at the lower levels of the party-state system to train as reserve candidates for future leadership roles.¹⁹ According to policies and regulations issued by the Central Organization Department, the graduates must come from full-time, regular universities, which excludes non-state-sponsored and non-regular study programs. They must also be CCP members (including preparatory members) with “a certain status” and, preferably, recipients of awards from a university or higher-level authority. Political qualities are important, and those selected must “love the Chinese Communist Party, love the people, have the basic qualities to engage in party-state agency work, and have the potential for Party and government leadership.”²⁰

Prestigious universities, particularly Tsinghua, are among those from which students are selected for the program. Though the percentage who are Tsinghua alumni is unavailable, various sources report that the program is “hot” for Tsinghua graduates.²¹ Over time, the Selected Graduates program has become a “brand” signifying outstanding Party personnel. Increasingly welcomed by party-state organizations and employers at all levels, they are gradually becoming the backbone of the cadre team. In 2017, 75% of Peking University graduates employed by party-state agencies were selected graduates, and this number rose to 89% in 2019. For Tsinghua University, the percentage reached 98.9% in 2019 — on average more than 9 out of every 10 Tsinghua graduates who entered the party-state system did so through the program.²² According to the graduate employment quality report from the two universities, about 40% of graduates entered party-state institutions in 2019.²³ Further, a 2023 research article on cadre promotion, based on data from 293 prefecture-level cities, found that academic qualifications play a significant role in party-state career advancement. The effect of “elite universities” has become increasingly prominent and positively impacts the promotion of cadres on the administrative ladder.

The Dunmiao program gives young elitist cadres grassroots governance experience at the county level and below, especially as Party secretaries or governors.²⁴ The term’s etymology originates from a traditional crop cultivation technique that involves inhibiting the growth of seedlings’ stems and leaves while promoting the development of their roots. This makes plants more robust during the early stages of growth and increases yields. For young cadres, the scheme aims to increase their grassroots experience, moderate their expectations for rapid promotion, and smooth conflicts with local cadres over career competition. Different localities and party-state branches started the program at varying times, but all cite Xi Jinping’s early experience as a county-level Party secretary and his emphasis on cadres’ “growth.”²⁵

In practice, selected-student career frontrunners are concurrently appointed to lower-level leadership positions. Among those in Table 1, at least 52 (69.3%) have experience as a county Party secretary, county governor, or their equivalent in urban areas and enterprises. Among deputy-bureau-level cadres, the proportion is 49.4% — still large considering many cadres work in professional sectors. For those born in the late 1980s or 1990s who are now reaching county-level leadership positions, participation in the Dunmiao program is almost a necessity.²⁶

There is a saying within the CCP referring to generational change in its ranks: “The waves behind the Yangtze River push the waves ahead.” The time has come for those born in the 1980s to rise to mid-level positions, a trend that has accelerated during Xi Jinping’s third term. This essay has sketched out the educational backgrounds and political experiences of some of these young Party elites, providing a picture of who will be governing China in 10–20 years.

A major finding is the prominence of Tsinghua alumni among the rising stars in Chinese politics: Xi Jinping’s Tsinghua new army. The political implications could be profound. First, it shows that CCP cadres are becoming increasingly technocratic and elitist, which may improve the regime’s governance capabilities but also narrow its social base and grassroots connections. Second, the CCP is aware of this and has taken systematic measures to deal with it. The contradiction between increasing elitism and Xi’s emphasis on populist values and grassroots connections is obvious. Third, it shows the importance of interpersonal networks, patron-client relationships, and personal dependence on the leader in the CCP’s recruitment, management, and appointment of leading cadres. This will inevitably intensify factional competition within the regime.

This generational rejuvenation of elites will certainly expand in the years to come. In the next nationwide reshuffling of provincial leadership in 2026–27, the frontrunners of these mid-level cadres will rise to provincial and ministerial leadership positions. It would be unsurprising if many of them have a Tsinghua background.

1. The Chinese party-state hierarchy consists of five levels: national, provincial and ministerial, city-prefecture-bureau, county-district-section, and grassroots. Within each level are two cadre ranks: full and deputy. The middle level (i.e., city-prefecture-bureau), which this article focuses on, includes leaders of sub-provincial cities, districts within province-level municipalities (such as Beijing and Shanghai), sub-provincial and sub-ministerial bureaus (si [司] or ju [局]), and equivalent roles in non-administrative sectors, including state-owned enterprises, universities, research institutions, and CCP-sponsored social organizations. Note that CCP cadres’ official positions may be inconsistent with their official ranks.
2. The Chinese government has a list of prestigious “double first-class” universities. See the list at “‘双一流’建设高校名单” [List of “Double First-Class” Construction Universities], Ministry of Education of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), December 6, 2017, http://www.moe.gov.cn/s78/A22/A22_ztzl/ztzl_tjsylpt/sylpt_jsgx/201712/t….
3. In addition to the CCP, China recognizes eight other political parties (i.e., satellite parties), though each of their party charters explicitly stipulate that they “are under the leadership of the CCP” and, in practice, the United Front Work Department supervises them. They are small in comparison with the CCP — less than half a million members each in contrast to the CCP’s more than 90 million.
4. See Xi’s bio at “习近平同志简历” [Biography of Comrade Xi Jinping], CCP News Network, http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64192/105996/6463136.html.
5. “全国有多少所大学?” [How Many Universities Are There in the Country?], College Students’ Essential Website, June 19, 2024, https://www.dxsbb.com/news/38640.html.
6. See Chen’s bio at “陈希同志简历” [Biography of Comrade Chen Xi], CCP News Network，http://cpc.people.com.cn/n1/2017/1025/c414940-29608823.html.
7. See Li’s bio at “李干杰同志简历” [Biography of Comrade Li Ganjie], Xinhua, http://www.news.cn/politics/leaders/2023-04/27/c_1129280437.htm.
8. Other leading political figures with a Tsinghua background include Chen Jining, Politburo member and Shanghai party secretary, and Hu Heping, former Shaanxi provincial party secretary and current number two in the Central Propaganda Department. In this essay, the “Tsinghua new army” refers to mid-level cadres born in the 1980s. Those of Chen and Hu’s generation were born in the 1950s and 1960s and have already held national and provincial leadership positions.
9. “三创寄语｜鼓励与期望(一)” [Message from the Three Entrepreneurs｜Encouragement and Expectations (1)], Tsinghua Alumni Association, September 7, 2020, https://www.tsinghua.org.cn/info/1012/32454.htm.
10. “西咸AI精英赛暨清华校友走进西咸新区活动举办” [Xixian AI Elite Competition and Tsinghua Alumni Visit Xixian New District Event Held], Tsinghua Alumni Association, July 23, 2019, https://www.tsinghua.org.cn/info/1016/14471.htm.
11. “首个‘硬科技校友经济基地’在陕西省西咸新区沣西新城揭牌” [The First “Hard Science and Technology Alumni Economic Base” Was Unveiled in Fengxi New Town, Xixian New District, Shaanxi Province], Sohu, July 13, 2018, https://www.sohu.com/a/241002327_100000377. Zhao frequently organized activities around alumni. See, for example, “西咸新区产业链创新链融合提升活动暨第五届清华校友三创大赛决赛成功举办” [Xixian New District Industrial Chain Innovation Chain Integration Promotion Activity and the Fifth Tsinghua Alumni Innovation Competition Finals Were Successfully Held], Sohu, August 8, 2020, https://www.sohu.com/a/412119889_120575444; and Tian Jirong, “陕西省-清华大学省校合作座谈会举行” [Shaanxi Province-Tsinghua University Cooperation Seminar Held], Tsinghua University, December 9, 2023, https://www.tsinghua.edu.cn/info/1178/108567.htm.
12. “44岁正厅级赵孝，履新职” [44-Year-Old Zhao Xiao, a Senior Official at the Department Level, Takes Up a New Post], 163, February 24, 2024, https://www.163.com/dy/article/IRNJIBGV0530M570.html.
13. “‘85后’清华女博士拟任直辖市厅官，今年已有多名清华毕业干部履新” [A Female Tsinghua PhD Born After 1985 Is Expected to Be Appointed as a Municipal Department Official, This Year, Many Tsinghua Graduates Have Taken Up New Posts], Shangguan News, April 12, 2023, https://news.qq.com/rain/a/20230412A06PX200.
14. “这名收到清华祝贺的全国优秀县委书记，夫妻一同扎根边疆” [The National Outstanding County Party Secretary, Who Received the Congratulations of Tsinghua University, Took Root in the Frontier Together as a Husband and Wife], Tsinghua Alumni Association, July 2, 2021, https://www.tsinghua.org.cn/info/1953/34336.htm.
15. The program trains “a large number of key talents for the construction of a new socialist countryside, reserve talents for party and government cadres, and outstanding talents of all walks of life.” It was initiated in the Hu Jintao era and has continued under Xi Jinping with some adjustments. See “大学生村官” [College Student Village Officer], Baidu, https://baike.baidu.com/item/大学生村官/73510.
16. This was a CCP policy initiated by the Hu Jintao administration in 2006 to send university graduates to rural areas to support agriculture, education, and medical services to help alleviate poverty. See “什么是‘三支一扶’计划?” [What Is the “Three Branches and One Support” Plan?], Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security (PRC), November 2012, https://www.gov.cn/banshi/2012-11/30/content_2279057.htm. The program continues the Maoist measure of sending urban youth to the countryside to both reduce urban employment pressures and increase young students’ political training. It has had little to do with elite politics since 2011, when the regime opened a narrow door for such personnel to apply for the Selected Students program.
17. “选调生” [Selected Students], Baidu, https://baike.baidu.com/item/选调生/234978.
18. “选调生.”
19. “选调生.”
20. “选调生.”
21. Li Sihui, “名校毕业生‘选调热’折射就业新态势” [The “Selection and Adjustment Fever” of Graduates from Prestigious Schools Reflects the New Trend of Employment], Guangming Daily, March 21, 2022, available at http://theory.people.com.cn/n1/2022/0321/c40531-32379540.html; and “中国最卷的公务员考试，挤满清北毕业生” [China’s Most Competitive Civil Service Exam Is Filled with Graduates from Peking University and Tsinghua University], Paper, December 12, 2021, https://m.thepaper.cn/newsdetail_forward_15809625.
22. “中国最卷的公务员考试，挤满清北毕业生.”
23. “中国最卷的公务员考试，挤满清北毕业生.”
24. Jiang Ziwen, “人事时间｜河南为什么要搞干部‘墩苗育苗’” [Personnel Time｜Why Henan Wants to Carry Out Cadre “Seedling Cultivation”], Paper, November 22, 2023, https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_25384291; and Yue Huairang, “河南平顶山两名“墩苗”干部履新，均为‘80后’正县级干部” [Two “Dunmiao” Cadres Took Up New Posts in Pingdingshan, Henan Province, Both of Whom Were Born in the 1980s and Are County-Level Cadres], Paper, November 21, 2023, https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_25372895.
25. See, for example, “河南省 ‘蹲苗育苗’计划” [Henan Province’s “Seedling Cultivation” Plan], Beichen Selection, October 12, 2021, https://lx.edulxw.cn/news/index/detail.html?id=34548; and “总台召开第三批‘蹲苗’工作启动座谈会” [The Central Radio and Television Station Held a Symposium to Launch the Third Batch of “Squatting Seedlings” Work], CCTV, January 2, 2024, https://www.cctv.com/2024/01/02/ARTIGaAaiH1NTCx2SuypsUg7240102.shtml. For a related article frequently quoted by Xi in his speeches, see Liu Bangcheng, “优化‘墩苗’实践的理论要义与现实进路” [Theoretical Essentials and Practical Approaches to Optimizing the Practice of “Dunmiao”], National Governance Weekly, March 31, 2022, http://www.rmlt.com.cn/2022/0331/643575.shtml.
26. See, for example, Zhong Yuhao, “人事时间｜清北毕业生在县城” [Personnel Time | Graduates from Peking University and Tsinghua University in the County], Paper, November 15, 2023, https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_25306342; Yue Huairang, “福建为什么引进’90后’科技副县长” [Why Fujian Introduced a Post-90s Deputy County Magistrate for Science and Technology], Paper, October 30, 2023, https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_25114468; “90后宋云天拟任新乡市副县级领导，曾任清华大学学生会主席” [Song Yuntian, Born in the 1990s and Former Chairman of the Tsinghua University Student Union, Is Expected to Be a Deputy County-Level Leader in Xinxiang City], Paper, November 11, 2023, https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_25265293; and “90后干部、清华博士宋云天已任河南新乡县领导” [Song Yuntian, a Post-90s Cadre and a PhD from Tsinghua University, Has Been Appointed as the Leader of Xinxiang County, Henan Province], Paper, November 27, 2023, https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_25442435.