Anticipation is growing for one of the most important events in Chinese politics this year. On June 27, General Secretary Xi Jinping chaired a meeting of the 24-man Politburo that announced the 20th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) will hold its Third Plenum in Beijing on July 15–18. A plenum is a plenary meeting of the committee’s 205 members and 171 non-voting alternate members.

The meeting is important because the Central Committee will issue an authoritative “decision” (jueding) that will guide policymaking for years to come. The document will center on “further comprehensively deepening reform and advancing Chinese-style modernization” amid concerns both at home and abroad about the Party’s ability to steward China’s economic, geopolitical, and social development.

However, expectations should be modest. Historically, third plenums are often overrated as catalysts for transformational change and instead introduce plans that expand on existing policy themes. Xi’s first third plenum in 2013 appeared unusually ambitious, raising hopes for economic and political liberalization, but its true significance was in enabling Xi’s centralization of power. The policy signals for this month’s plenum suggest a strong emphasis on Xi’s goals of achieving technological self-reliance, addressing financial risks, streamlining central-local relations, and improving social welfare. There are also hints that Beijing may try to ease conditions for private firms and foreign investors in high-tech sectors, as well as efforts to enhance internal Party governance. Additionally, several previously sacked officials are expected to lose their seats on the Central Committee.

This article analyzes the historical context, policy signals, personnel movements, and key documents related to the upcoming Third Plenum. Its structure is as follows:

• History: Third Plenums Are Overrated for Transformational Reforms
• Context: Xi’s First Third Plenum Was an Economic Feint for Political Ends
• Policy: What to Expect at this Third Plenum
  • Centrality of New Quality Productive Forces
  • Strategic Utilization of Market Forces and the Private Sector
  • Fiscal Reform and Managing Financial Risk
  • Promoting Social Welfare
  • Reassuring Foreign Business
  • Enhancing Policy Implementation and Cadre Management
• Personnel: Cleaning House in the Central Committee?
• Timeline: Key Documents

Many China watchers ascribe a mythological quality to third plenums. Hopes for the unveiling of momentous reforms at these events have been high since the Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee in December 1978. Party history venerates this meeting as the launch of former paramount leader Deng Xiaoping’s market-oriented “reform and opening” of China’s economy.

However, this legendary plenum mostly rubber-stamped policies approved by a Central Work Conference a month prior in November, when Deng cemented his political ascendancy over Hua Guofeng, the designated successor to Mao Zedong and the Party’s titular leader from 1976 to 1981. The plenum did not even mention “reform and opening,” an agenda that evolved over many years.

Few other third plenums compare (see Table 1). The 1984 gathering extended economic reforms from rural to urban areas. But, in 1988, the Party re-emphasized stability and soft-pedaled price and wage reforms due to rampant inflation. The first of the Jiang Zemin era, in 1993, consolidated Deng’s post-Tiananmen reform revival by implementing the decision taken at the 14th Party Congress the previous year to establish a “socialist market economy.” Hu Jintao began his tenure with a third plenum in 2003, where structural reforms were blocked by vested interests in the government and state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The 1998 and 2008 third plenums addressed rural development.

Xi did not hold a plenum focused on economic policy during the 19th Central Committee’s term from 2017 to 2022. The 19th Third Plenum in February 2018 covered topics usually associated with a second plenum: State Council leadership appointments and institutional reforms. It followed a special second plenum in January 2018 that discussed constitutional amendments, including the removal of term limits for Xi’s role as president of the People’s Republic of China. The 19th Fourth Plenum convened 20 months later, in October 2019, to address governance issues.

History suggests that analysts often overrate the importance of a third plenum. Only the 1978 edition was a truly pathbreaking moment, and that was for political rather than economic reasons. Subsequent third plenums introduced policies that helped to improve China’s economic governance, but they typically implemented reform directives that Party leaders had already outlined. All in all, Xi is unlikely to fundamentally change course at the 20th Third Plenum.

The most notable third plenum since 1978 was probably the first of Xi’s reign, the Third Plenum of the 18th Central Committee, held in November 2013. Xi later compared the two plenums, describing them both as “epoch-making“ events, with the former launching Deng’s era of reform and opening and the latter launching Xi’s “new era” of “comprehensively deepening reform.”

The 2013 plenum generated significant optimism about economic reform, especially after the factional conflicts, policy stasis, and rampant corruption of the Hu era. Many observers identified the highlight of the plenum’s “Decision on Several Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reform” as a pledge that markets would now play a “decisive” rather than just a “fundamental” role in resource allocation. The lengthy document promised liberalization in areas such as interest rates, property rights, financial markets, and foreign investment.

Xi’s record on implementing the 2013 plenum decision is mixed. Promises fulfilled include ending the one-child policy, reducing business red tape, enacting more market-based energy prices, strengthening competition policy, permitting private banks, making progress on interest rate liberalization, and institutionalizing environmental protection and climate action. Many proposals, however, were also abandoned or diluted, such as introducing a property tax, raising the retirement age, allowing a larger role for NGOs, and experimenting with compulsory financial disclosures for leading cadres. Most importantly, over the last eleven years, Xi has enhanced rather than diminished the role of the Party-state in China’s economy.

What the 2013 plenum decision effectively did was lay the groundwork for Xi’s political dominance. It established what is now the Central Comprehensively Deepening Reform Commission (CCDRC), the powerful body that coordinates Xi’s domestic policy agenda, and the Central National Security Commission, which helped him to control the security apparatus (and bring his current right-hand man, Cai Qi, to Beijing). It provided the justification a few months later for founding the Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission, which Xi used to both censor and weaponize the Internet, and the Central Leading Group for Military Reform, which coordinated his sweeping military reorganization in 2015. It also bolstered the authority of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), turbocharging Xi’s anti-corruption campaign by enabling the Party’s internal watchdog to embed inspection groups in Party-state agencies.

Xi also made a concerted effort to wrest control of economic policy from then premier Li Keqiang, a political rival with a more “Deng-like” approach to reform and opening. Xi himself led the decision’s drafting team, a role held by Li’s predecessor, Wen Jiabao, in 2003 and 2008. His drafting deputies were Liu Yunshan and Zhang Gaoli, but the de facto team leader was reportedly Xi’s economic czar, Liu He. Xi was also the first CCP general secretary to deliver an official “explanation” of a decision, which hinted at his more statist economic outlook. His most telling lines were: “We must still insist on giving full play to the superiority of our socialist system and to the active role of the Party and the Government. The market plays a decisive role in the allocation of resources, but by no means does it play a total role.”

In retrospect, Xi’s first third plenum can be seen as an economic feint to advance political objectives. It occurred in the early days of Xi’s leadership, when he was only the first among equals on the Politburo Standing Committee, and his colleagues and rivals still held some power and influence. But he played his hand well and used promises of economic reform to justify the creation of political institutions that ultimately helped him to dominate Zhongnanhai. Xi’s consolidation of power means the policies outlined at this year’s third plenum are far more likely to reflect Xi’s true economic priorities.

Policymaking at the 20th Third Plenum will follow more of a political logic than an economic logic. Xi says he adopted the phrase “comprehensively deepening reform” out of a desire “not to promote reform in one area … but to promote reform in all areas.” His reforms aim to “advance the modernization of China’s governance system and capacity” writ large, a theme articulated at the 2013 and 2019 plenums. His top goal for this plenum is not to revive growth but to continue his political project.

The plenum’s decision advance Xi’s established priorities. He says that “further comprehensively deepening reform” will support his signature strategy of “high-quality development,” which he introduced at the 19th Party Congress in 2017 and detailed at the 20th Party Congress in 2022. This refers to a shift in the focus of economic policy from rapid growth to quality growth and includes a “new development concept” that seeks more innovative, coordinated, green, open, and equitable growth, as well as a “new development paradigm” that promotes domestic markets, indigenous technology, and foreign dependencies on China. Chinese-style modernization is the Party-centric methodology that Xi introduced at the 20th Party Congress to achieve China’s “national rejuvenation” as a country that “leads the world in comprehensive national power and international influence.”

However, while Xi is unlikely to significantly change his priorities at the plenum, his political interests may be causing him to pay more attention to the economy. The rare admission in his New Year speech that “some enterprises had a tough time” and “some people had difficulty finding jobs and meeting basic needs” implies that he both knows about and wants to address the prevailing pessimism in Chinese society, at least to some extent. That speech came just a fortnight after Xi first mentioned the topic of “further comprehensively deepening reform and advancing Chinese-style modernization” at the Central Economic Work Conference in December 2023.

Economic growth is no longer Beijing’s singular priority, but Xi may recognize that national security and tech self-reliance must co-exist with a baseline level of growth that sustains consumption, investment, social stability, and his own political security. Senior economic official Han Wenxiu penned a plenum preview article that emphasized Xi’s pledge for China to become a “moderately developed country” by 2035, a benchmark usually associated with a per capita GDP of at least US$20,000. This target would require Beijing to achieve an average annual economic growth rate of almost five percent until 2035, which is wildly ambitious but shows that leaders still want to raise living standards.

Xi may be contemplating new ideas to help achieve this balance. In a December speech, he said that “reform and opening is an important magic weapon … and a key move in determining the success or failure of Chinese-style modernization.” While Xi is not a reformer in the “Western” sense, or even in the “Deng” sense, he does want to make the Party-state a more effective organization for building a powerful country with a resilient economy and a stable society. In other words, Xi only backs the aspects of “reform and opening” that overlap with his plans to reshape China's economy.

Xi will continue to prioritize Party control, financial de-risking, technological self-reliance, and investment-heavy industrial policy. But he could deliver “positive surprises” — in the words of a former senior official who CCA met in Beijing — to tackle issues such as weak productivity, geoeconomic restrictions, a struggling property sector, and the fiscal distress of local governments. Any such surprises, however, will be modest and will emphasize incremental improvements rather than sudden breakthroughs.

Science and technology (S&T) will be at the heart of the Third Plenum. On June 24, Xi told a National Science and Technology Conference (NSTC) that “Chinese-style modernization depends on S&T modernization as a support” and “high-quality development depends on S&T innovation to foster new momentum.” Xi sees the world experiencing “a new round of S&T revolution and industrial change” centered on “cross-cutting technologies,” such as artificial intelligence, quantum technology, and biotechnology. But he also believes that “high technology has become the frontline and main battleground of international competition,” and “some key core technologies are controlled by others,” so Beijing must enhance its innovation capabilities to “seize the high ground of S&T competition and future development.”

Xi wants to build China into a “science and technology great power” by 2035, with “world-leading S&T capabilities and innovation abilities” that achieve “a high level of self-reliance” and “a holistic leap in our economic power, defense power, and comprehensive national power.” He believes the Party must enhance its “policymaking command system” and “organizational implementation system” to “strengthen top-level design and overall planning” of S&T policies, markets, and industries. He highlighted “bottlenecks and constraints” in chips, software, seeds, advanced materials, machine tools, and scientific research instruments as top priorities for industrial self-reliance.

The elevated status of S&T is reflected in the “new quality productive forces” (NQPF) concept that Xi introduced in September 2023 and called an “inherent requirement” of high-quality development. In a speech to the Politburo on January 31, Xi defined NQPF as “those for which innovation plays a leading role” and that are “catalyzed by revolutionary breakthroughs in technology, innovative allocations of factors of production, and the deep transformation and upgrading of industry.” They are also “green productive forces” that necessitate “optimizing the economic policy toolbox to support green and low-carbon development,” including in innovation, industry, and finance. The “core measure” of NQPF is “a significant increase in total factor productivity,” which would address both China’s economic problem of slowing growth and its strategic problem of dependency on Western technology.

Therefore, this Third Plenum will prominently feature reforms focused on advancing S&T innovation and developing NQPF. These are likely to include significant resources for basic research and product development in “key common technologies, frontier-leading technologies, modern engineering technologies, and disruptive technologies.” Another major focus will be industrial policies that aim to “transform and upgrade traditional industries, cultivate and grow emerging industries, and plan and build future industries.” Policy advisors in Beijing suggested to CCA that other reforms will likely center on improving incentive structures to spur cutting-edge innovation in risk-averse S&T institutions, better reward individual contributions to innovation, attract international high-tech talent, and deter intellectual property violations.

Xi’s focus on high-end manufacturing continues to privilege supply-side growth, which contributes to subduing domestic consumption and creating excess capacity. Chinese policymakers recently told CCA that they see “no such thing as overcapacity” in green industries such as batteries, electric vehicles, and solar panels that are at the center of current U.S.-China trade wars. Exports are also driving growth in China, given weak consumer confidence and property sector troubles, further reducing incentives to reduce production. It is possible that Western tariffs rise to such a level that Beijing is willing to manage overcapacity, but the Third Plenum agenda will likely exacerbate trade tensions. After all, Beijing has non-market considerations, such as domestic employment and geoeconomic security, that contribute to overcapacity.

The most intriguing policy signals ahead of the plenum suggest the possibility of more pro-business policies that further Xi’s goals for science, technology, innovation, and industry. Xi used his NSTC speech to say for the first time that the Party should “give full play to the decisive role of the market in the allocation of S&T resources.” He also wants to “strengthen the status of enterprises as the main body of S&T innovation” and says that “further comprehensively deepening reform” involves “promoting the development and growth of private firms” and “eliminating obstacles restricting the fair participation of private firms in market competition.” His Politburo speech in January is worth quoting at length:

Developing new quality productive forces requires further comprehensively deepening reform and the formation of new types of relations of production that are compatible with them. New quality productive forces not only require unprecedented planning and guidance and scientific policy support from the government, but also constant innovation in market mechanisms and regulations and in microeconomic agents such as enterprises. They are formed by the joint cultivation and propulsion of the government’s “visible hand” and the market’s “invisible hand.” Therefore, we should deepen reform of the economic system and of the science and technology system, strive to remove chokepoints that restrict the development of new quality productive forces, establish a high-standard market system, and bring forth new ideas for modes of allocating factors of production, so that all kinds of advanced and high-quality factors of production can flow toward the development of new quality productive forces.

Of course, the 2013 plenum shows that actions speak louder than words, but Xi’s greater authority today means that his words are more likely to reflect policy directions. The quotes above suggest that he is not oblivious to the value of markets or private firms. On May 23, he listened to policy briefings from business executives and reform-minded economists in Jinan at an event the People’s Daily billed as “preparation” for the Third Plenum (see Table 2). Some encouragement for the private sector is expected, but only within the confines of the Party’s economic leadership and official guidance about Xi’s industrial priorities. The content of a forthcoming “Private Economy Promotion Law” will prove a revealing test for any promises made at the plenum.

Xi wants to harness rather than unleash markets and entrepreneurs at this Third Plenum. He aims to use state power and public finances to direct them toward developing strategic technologies and producing advanced manufactures. As he told sporting goods executive Ding Shizhong, “Running a business or pursuing a career is not just about making a few bucks. One’s duty is to dependably and completely focus on industry.” Xi is especially concerned about successful companies becoming financialized conglomerates that lose focus and stop innovating — the fate of many U.S. manufacturers, including automakers. He reminisced about the clothing companies he saw as a provincial leader in Fujian and Zhejiang, praising them as “focused, consistent, and strong in their main business.”

The plenum should also bring a degree of SOE reform. On June 11, Xi used a CCDRC meeting to signal reforms to the “modern enterprise system with Chinese characteristics” that aim to strengthen Party oversight of SOEs. These would improve “modern corporate governance” and “management of state capital” to boost revenues, profits, and dividends flowing into the central budget. Less clear is how any such reforms will apply to private firms already concerned about increasing Party involvement in their operations and markets. More intervention would further damage business confidence.

Xi wants markets, entrepreneurs, and companies of all types to operate more efficiently within the Party’s priority guidance and regulatory constraints. The Third Plenum will therefore see reforms to build a “unified national market” and enhance “coordinated regional development” by cutting local protectionism, integrating urban clusters, and reducing logistics costs. Since the Two Sessions in March, Xi has emphasized the need to “adapt to local conditions” in developing NQPF, with localities specializing in certain technologies to reduce the inefficiency of them all “rushing into action” and creating growth bubbles in priority industries. Beijing insiders recently suggested to CCA that the plenum could see a further marketization of factors of production, such as making it easier to trade data and transact rural land, and reforms to streamline public ownership into factor markets and out of product markets.

Fiscal reform to address financial risks should be another important theme of the Third Plenum. Reducing financial risks has been a pillar of Xi’s economic agenda since the 2015–2016 stock market meltdown, gaining an added dimension when the “three red lines” policy in 2020 began the painful unwinding of the real estate sector’s massive overleverage. The largest risk is fiscal distress among local governments, which provide most public services but collect less tax than the central government. Many are reeling from falling property prices and costly COVID-19 containment measures. Localities running out of money and drastically cutting services or hiking taxes could impact social and political stability.

Xi said in December 2023 that the Party should “plan a new round of reform of the fiscal and taxation system.” The Politburo meeting in April foreshadowed the implementation of a “local government debt risk resolution program” and the rapid establishment of a “new model of real estate development,” both of which could be expanded at the Third Plenum. More support for venture capital and long-term “patient capital” for high-tech industries is also probable, building on State Council measures.

Beijing will avoid juicing the economy with massive stimulus, but recent conversations with Chinese officials suggested that the central government may issue more debt instruments, such as ultra-long-term special treasury bonds, to raise funds to cushion the property sector and help local governments overcome revenue shortfalls for public services. Xi is also reportedly considering allowing local governments to retain more fiscal revenues, such as from consumption tax and value-added tax. The central government may also help relieve local government outlays on healthcare and introduce a national pension scheme. Major tax reforms such as higher consumption levies or the introduction of a property tax are possible yet would likely be slow-walked given the impact they could have on economic confidence.

Rising living standards help Xi maintain social stability and guarantee political security. At the Jinan symposium, he promised “to do more practical things that benefit people’s livelihood, warm people’s hearts, and follow people’s will.” He highlighted employment, education, healthcare, housing, and childcare as areas to “find reform momentum and breakthroughs” at the Third Plenum. One example will probably be policies to incentivize childbirth and reduce childrearing costs. Further loosening of the household registration system also seems likely, which would help boost consumption and growth by enabling more urban residents to access public services and encouraging further urbanization. Xi is stressing that Chinese people must feel a “sense of gain” (huo de gan) from their country’s development.

Xi has told French president Emmanuel Macron and U.S. business leaders that the Third Plenum will benefit multinational corporations and foreign investors. At the Jinan symposium, he told Xu Daquan, the China head of German engineering company Bosch, that “We are committed to creating a level playing field and will not squeeze companies out of the Chinese market just because they are foreign funded.” To the Politburo in January, he said that China “must expand high-level opening to the outside world to create a favorable international environment for the development of new quality productive forces.” Chinese interlocuters told CCA that the plenum will likely lead to a further reduction in the negative list for foreign investment and offer more incentives to do business in the country’s free-trade zones. Xi wants high-tech multinationals to help China develop through technology transfer, skills training, and competition for domestic firms, though his objective remains for China’s national champions to eventually overtake their foreign rivals.

Xi says reforms “should emphasize planning and, more importantly, implementation.” The decision published by the Third Plenum will detail the Party’s views on numerous policy areas, and possibly establish new institutions to coordinate policy making, but will provide few granular details about specific policy adjustments. A key test of the staying power of any Third Plenum reforms will therefore be whether they are codified in legislation and incorporated into the 15th Five-Year Plan for 2026-2030, which will be substantively drafted next year. Xi has also strongly criticized some leading cadres for impeding high-quality development with “old-fashioned” thinking, suggesting that more disciplinary crackdowns could accompany his Third Plenum agenda. These sticks will be accompanied by carrots, however, as Xi told his closest colleagues last December that they “must improve methods of appraising and evaluating political achievements to promote high-quality development.” The recently published “Planning Outline for the Establishment of National Party and Government Leadership Teams (2024–2028)” reflects a rising focus on competence as well as loyalty.

A possible factor in the delayed convening of this third plenum was lengthy disciplinary investigations into several Central Committee members. Beijing fired Qin Gang as foreign minister last July following claims of personal indiscretions with potential national security implications. That same month saw the removal of Rocket Force commander Li Yuchao and political commissar Xu Zhongbo, allegedly for corruption tied to nuclear procurement. Li Shangfu lost his job as defense minister last October and was formally expelled from the Party for taking and receiving bribes on June 27. The CCDI opened an investigation into Tang Renjian, the then minister of agriculture and rural affairs, in May.

The plenum is an opportunity for Xi to eject these officials from the Central Committee. Article 42 of the Party Charter says the Central Committee must confirm by a two-thirds majority any decision to discipline a full or alternate member that involves dismissal, probation, or expulsion. The Politburo can make such decisions, but in most cases, they must be retroactively endorsed by the Central Committee. The plenum will almost certainly expel Li Shangfu and could well remove the other four cadres, but the lack of official announcements about Qin, Xu, and Li Yuchao creates a sliver of uncertainty about their fates. It is possible, for example, that Qin is not expelled but put on probation, or that he is not mentioned because his investigation remains ongoing.

We already know who should replace these leaders as full members of the Central Committee. Article 22 of the Party Charter states that “Vacancies on the Central Committee shall be filled by alternate members in order of the number of votes they received.” Given that the first 159 cadres on the official slate of 171 alternates are listed by surname stroke order, we can surmise they were elected unanimously at the 20th Party Congress, but the people at the top of this list are still prioritized for vacancies. The first five alternates are: Ding Xiangqun, director of the Anhui Provincial CCP Organization Department; Ding Xingnong, deputy political commissar of the PLA Rocket Force; Yu Lijun, director of the Sichuan Provincial CCP Organization Department; Yu Jihong, president of Beijing Normal University; and Yu Huiwen, deputy minister of ecology and environment.

Another possible personnel move is the elevation of Li Shangfu’s replacement, Dong Jun, to the Party’s Central Military Commission (CMC). The new defense minister has not yet been appointed to fill the vacancy that Li’s dismissal created in the country’s top military organization. According to Article 14 of the Central Committee Work Regulations, a plenum is the only meeting that can add new CMC members. Doing so would restore normalcy to China’s military hierarchy, but Beijing has passed on opportunities to promote Dong to Li’s other former role as a state councilor, so Xi could be effectively demoting the defense minister to punish the military for corruption scandals.

Personnel movements have become increasingly unpredictable during the Xi era. The personnel changes discussed in this section follow a reasonable political logic but are subject to an opaque decision-making process that often produces surprises.

Precedent suggests that this plenum should have convened in late 2023, but it was delayed due to the abovementioned disciplinary investigations as well as uncertainty about how to respond to a weaker-than-expected post-COVID recovery. It is also rare for plenums to happen in the summer, with the last such instance occurring in July 1989. However, the Party Charter only mandates that a general secretary convene at least one plenum per year — a requirement that Xi has always fulfilled — and says nothing about its timing. Below is a list of the main watchpoints for after the plenum’s conclusion on July 18.

• Communiqué (gongbao) 
  • A relatively brief report of the plenum and its outcomes
  • Does not always accurately reflect the overall tenor of the decision
  • Published on the day or day after the plenum concludes
• Decision (jueding)
  • The full authoritative policy plan issued by the plenum
  • Look here for policy takeaways, specific targets, and implementation instructions
  • Published a few days after the plenum concludes
• Explanation (shuoming)
  • Xi’s authoritative reasoning about the content and context of the decision
  • Published on the same day as the decision
• Record of Creation (danshengji)
  • Long, basic, but still interesting account of the decision-drafting process
  • Published usually a day or two after the decision
• Side Notes (ceji)
  • Short but useful additional details about the plenum that often include comments made by Xi that are not reflected in more formal documents and readouts 
  • Published usually a day or two after the plenum concludes, if at all
• Post-Plenum Interpretations
  • Several Party departments will likely hold a joint press conference to provide additional context and more sector-specific interpretations related to the decision
  • Party publications will publish numerous articles that summarize, interpret, or elaborate on the decision, with the most authoritative usually being People’s Daily editorials and Q&A articles with senior cadres
  • Party committees in all institutions and across the country will begin an intensive study campaign to learn and implement the decision
• Later
  • The monthly Politburo meeting in late July will share the leadership’s analysis of the Chinese economy and give instructions for economic work in the second half of the year, likely offering some insight into the implementation of the Third Plenum decision.
  • Some weeks or months later, the top Party theoretical journal Seeking Truth may publish one or more internal speeches that Xi gave at the plenum
  • Since the 1990s, the Central Committee has held seven plenums during its five-year term, and the timing of this Third Plenum raises the possibility of a Fourth Plenum later this year, which would typically address topics related to Party governance

CCA members Lobsang Tsering, Haolan Wang, and Shengyu Wang contributed to this article.

French: https://legrandcontinent.eu/fr/2024/07/12/chine-le-rattrapage-de-xi-strategie-du-troisieme-plenum-en-10-points/. 

Spanish: https://legrandcontinent.eu/es/2024/07/15/china-el-reajuste-de-xi-la-estrategia-del-tercer-pleno-en-10-puntos/.