Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus was sworn in as chief adviser (Updeshta) of Bangladesh’s interim government on the evening of August 8, taking the oath of office at the presidential palace in Dhaka. Alongside Yunus, an advisory council consisting of representatives of civil society organizations, student leaders, freedom fighters, law professionals, medical and technical sector representatives, and business leaders also took their oaths. The 84-year-old Yunus, a renowned global figure and the founder of Grameen Bank – a microfinancing institution that provides loans to the poor – was unanimously approved by the army, political leaders, student representatives, civil society organizations, and advocacy groups to head the interim government.

His appointment came after weeks of student-led protests, civil unrest, attacks against Hindu minority groups, and clashes between civilians and police in which hundreds of people died. The violence ultimately led the army, headed by Chief of Army Staff General Waker-uz-Zaman, to take control of the country, forcing Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina to step down on August 5. Within 72 hours, Yunus had been appointed to stabilize the nation during a period of turmoil.

Soon after Zaman’s address to the nation in the presence of opposition leaders, civil society members, and representatives of the Anti-Discrimination Students Movement (ADSM) – a united front against Prime Minister Hasina and her party, the Awami League – Hasina made a panicked call to “come for the moment to India.” For the time being, she remains in India, reportedly in a safe house, but she is expected to eventually move to a third country. According to the Bangladeshi media, Hasina has sought asylum in the United Kingdom. These developments come against the backdrop of her victory in the January 2024 parliamentary elections, when she won a fourth consecutive term.

Having received a resounding electoral mandate in the 2024 parliamentary elections, what led to Hasina’s downfall?

Sheikh Hasina was sworn in as prime minister of Bangladesh for a fourth consecutive term in January 2024. Her electoral victory was marked by allegations of election-rigging, coercive use of force against the opposition, and global criticism of the degradation of democracy in Bangladesh during her three previous terms (2009–2024). Hasina and the Awami League had gradually lost their footing as a result of large-scale political malpractice. Therefore, her decline was not sudden, but rather the result of quiet opposition that had been building since 2018.

Although Hasina was able to use the state machinery to ensure her victory, the student protests that began in June marked a turn toward active resentment of the prime minister and her administration. The student protests initially focused on the country’s controversial quota system, which reserved 30% of government jobs for relatives and dependents of the freedom fighters (Mukti Joddhas) who took part in the 1971 Liberation War (Mukti Juddho). The protests eventually spread to educational institutions across Bangladesh, as students demanded the abolition of the quota system, which they viewed as discriminatory and contrary to equal opportunity rights.

The quota system, which has disproportionately benefited supporters of the ruling Awami League, was seen as a strategic tool that Hasina used to place trusted allies in key bureaucratic positions, thereby tightening her control over the country’s administration. This practice exacerbated the already-pressing issues of youth unemployment and limited career prospects in a country where civil service jobs are considered secure and stable careers. At a time when Bangladesh was striving for economic development, the quota system was perceived as limiting options for the youth population, fueling discontent and opposition.

The quota system was introduced in the aftermath of the 1971 war to reward the freedom fighters who had fought and sacrificed during the armed war against the Pakistan Army to liberate East Pakistan (present-day Bangladesh). Soon after Bangladesh achieved independence in December 1971, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman – founder of the Awami League, top leader of the freedom army (Mukti Bahini), popularly known as “Bangabandhu” (friend of Bangla), and revered as the “father of the nation” – introduced the quota system in 1972. He remained active in politics until his assassination in 1975.

Under the subsequent extremist Islamic and military regimes, the quota system was sidelined. However, Mujib’s daughter, Sheikh Hasina, actively sought to reinstate the quota system during her first term as prime minister from 1996 to 2001. The policy remained on the margins under the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) administration led by Prime Minister Begum Khaleda Zia (2001–2006) and the three interim governments that followed (2006–2008). Hasina made a comeback in 2009 and restored the 30% reservation for freedom fighters and their dependents until it was abolished in 2018 in response to student opposition. As Hasina sought a third term in December 2018, she abandoned the policy to prevent the opposition from taking advantage of the student protests and make it an election issue.

The protests over the quota system again halted the national capital of Dhaka after Hasina’s administration appealed to the Supreme Court of Bangladesh and resumed the policy in June 2024, five months after winning her fourth term. Students again took to the streets, and the situation soon turned hostile when the government proved unwilling to abandon the policy. Following violent protests that caused the deaths of more than 133 people, including students, civilians, and security officials, on July 21, the Supreme Court ruled to abolish the quota for all government sector jobs. While the court’s ruling was expected to restore peace, the situation did not abate, as many student leaders accused the administration of intimidation, police crackdowns, and attacks by groups linked to the Awami League.

The tensions were exacerbated by inflammatory remarks allegedly made by government officials, including Prime Minister Hasina, referring to the protesting students as razakars – a derogatory term for individuals who sided with the 1971 anti-liberation forces. The Awami League’s attempt to portray anti-quota forces as anti-national eventually became an anthem for the protesters.

Another reason for the ongoing protests even after the Supreme Court’s July 21 verdict was the country’s high unemployment rate, especially in the government sector. Citing an International Labour Organization (ILO) report, a preliminary United Nations analysis of labor conditions in Bangladesh reported 12.3% unemployment in the government sector in 2023 compared to 3.58% in the overall labor market. Meanwhile, the ILO acknowledged that the share of youth in the labor force had increased, making youth employment a high priority. While the quota system had little impact on youth labor outside the state sector, organized government opportunities were given primarily to Awami League supporters.

August 4 marked the “second coming” of the anti-Hasina protests.

The Supreme Court verdict was seen as a political defeat for the Awami League. In the days following the July 21 decision, the Bangladesh Chhatra League, an Awami League–affiliated student wing, clashed with protesters at Dhaka University. The situation quickly turned violent, with arson and killings taking place across Bangladesh. On August 5, the ADSM, a coalition of student representatives from different groups protesting the Hasina administration, organized the “Long March to Dhaka,” whose sole agenda was the resignation of the Hasina administration. In response, the government reportedly shut down the internet, imposed a curfew, and announced a three-day holiday.

Seeing no improvement in spite of preventive measures, the army briefed the prime minister on the deteriorating law and order situation across the country. Hasina seems to have ordered even stricter measures, but the army refused. Lacking support from the military, Hasina made a quick decision to resign on August 5. Reports suggest that she had already sensed disquiet within the army a day earlier, but, thinking that the army would take strong action against the protesters, she believed her power and position were assured. Following Hasina’s resignation, Army Chief General Zaman took responsibility for the country and promised to form an interim government. Fearing for her life, Hasina sought approval to go to India, a request that was quickly approved by Delhi.

Why was the 30% quota so crucial for the Hasina government that she imposed a curfew, shut down the internet, curtailed civil liberties, and sought to take military action against the protesters?

These actions were taken primarily to assert her political authority and ensure unconditional support from the Awami League even as her standing as a democratic leader waned. This reasoning, however, would seem to contradict the outcome of Bangladesh’s January 2024 parliamentary elections, which gave Hasina a fourth term in office.

This brings us to the second reason for Hasina’s downfall: perceived authoritarian rule. Hasina’s time in power was seen as somewhat autocratic, as the politics of favoritism seemed to thrive and democratic norms appeared to be compromised. Since 2018, Hasina has been criticized for failing to abide by democratic norms and for dismantling the political opposition by imprisoning opponents on charges of corruption, anti-national activities, and so on. Leading BNP opposition leaders were barred from contesting in the 2018 elections, including former Prime Minister Zia, who was then serving a 10-year prison sentence for corruption. Even as Hasina used the state machinery to counter the opposition, she could see that anti-incumbency sentiment was growing, and suppressing the opposition was a way to ensure her victory.

The Awami League–led Grand Alliance won 96% of the vote in the 2018 elections, giving Hasina a third term (2014-2018) as the opposition boycotted the polls. Leading human rights organizations, including Human Rights Watch, condemned the violence and repression of the opposition. In an alarming 37-page report titled “Creating Panic,” the organization cited political activists and their families who had been “falsely implicated” in cases of corruption and violence. A similar pattern was observed during the 2024 elections, when the opposition was in no position to contest.

Concerned about political freedom and human rights, the U.S. State Department, in a press statement on July 9, 2024, noted that “the United States supports the people of Bangladesh and their aspirations for democracy, freedom of peaceful assembly, and freedom of expression.” However, the statement went on: “The United States remains concerned by the arrests of thousands of political opposition members and by reports of irregularities on election day. The United States shares the view with other observers that these elections were not free or fair, and we regret that not all parties participated.” This was by far the strongest statement from the United States condemning Hasina’s disregard for democratic norms.

Hasina has been in office since 2009, and over the last 15 years of Awami League rule, she has been credited with raising Bangladesh’s economic profile, particularly by bolstering the ready-made garments industry, valued at US$47 billion in fiscal year 2022–2023. In 2023, Bangladesh’s GDP per capita reached its highest point in a decade at $2,529.5, surpassing India’s $2,484.8 and significantly outpacing Pakistan’s $1,407. While Bangladesh’s economic outlook has been praised globally, persistent violence and suppression of the opposition did not favor Hasina’s political legitimacy. She was accused of misusing her political power and government authority and disregarding the freedom of democratic institutions, such as the Election Commission and the judiciary.

The third reason for Hasina’s downfall is the romanticization of Bangladesh’s war of independence, even after 50 years. By keeping the memory of the 1971 war alive, Hasina reminded the nation of the great sacrifices made by her father, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Hasina identified herself with her father’s legacy. The 1971 Liberation War was the cornerstone of the Bangladeshi nation, and by romanticizing this history, she attempted to bolster her own and the party’s image. This romanticization closely mirrors the Communist regime in China, where almost all leaders in the past seven decades have romanticized Mao’s peasant revolution.

After Hasina’s resignation, the student protesters expressed their preference for Yunus to lead the interim government. They seem to have regarded him as a neutral candidate with significant experience in governance and economy, earning both respect and criticism across party lines. The army may have agreed to the 84-year-old Nobel laureate to lead the interim government to counter allegations of democratic backsliding coming from the West during Hasina’s tenure. However, some claim that Yunus was appointed at the behest of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency – a typical “foreign hand” accusation often used in South Asia.

In addition to Yunus, the interim government initially included 17 advisers and later it was expanded to 21, including a former governor of the Reserve Bank of Bangladesh, several legal experts, a retired army brigadier, a former foreign secretary, women’s and Indigenous rights activists, bankers, academics, a medical practitioner, an Islamic studies expert, and two student leaders from the ADSM. The government has attempted to project an image of gender inclusiveness, with 25% of members (four advisers) being women.

What is worrying is the resurgence of political vendettas against the Awami League by Islamic fundamentalists in politics and governance. For instance, the inclusion of advisers such as A. F. Hassan Ariff – who served as attorney general of Bangladesh (2001–2005) under the BNP-led government and as an adviser to the interim government from 2008 to 2009 – may push for the political prosecution of Awami League. The inclusion of A. F. M. Khalid Hossain – a professor of Islamic studies and Nayab-e-Amir (administrator) of the Hifazat-e-Islam (Protectorate of Islam or Hifazat), an organization known for advocating Islamic laws in governance and politics – may signal the return of Islamic fundamentalism in governance. He has been appointed as an adviser to the Ministry of Religious Affairs.

Hifazat was formed in 2010 to protest the proposed Women Development Policy advocating women’s rights and safety, which was introduced soon after Hasina entered office in 2009. In 2013, Hifazat was said to be involved in the killing of a young blogger for reportedly writing a blasphemous post on Islam. Hifazat’s list of demands included a stronger blasphemy law and 12 other demands, including cancellation of the Women Development Policy. Under Hasina’s administration, Hifazat’s activities were scrutinized by the security agencies. With Hifazat now in power, a greater push for Islamic laws in governance may be on the agenda.

Interestingly, Jamaat-e-Islami (hereafter Jamaat) – the oldest Islamist political party in Bangladesh, which advocates for the implementation of Islamic law in the country – reopened its office on August 6 after having been shut since 2011. Jamaat was founded in 1941 in British India and has faced legal restrictions in Bangladesh, including a ban on its participation in elections in 2013 and 2024. The party has been controversial because of its opposition to independence in 1971 and alleged involvement in war crimes during the Liberation War. In 2016, Jamaat’s head, Motiur Rahman Nizami, was hanged for war crimes committed during the 1971 Liberation War. With Jamaat’s return, fears of a resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism loom large – a trend that Hasina was able to manage to maintain the country’s secular image.

Ensuring law and order and a peaceful transition.

The army has been brought in to manage the law and order situation because the police, who should be responsible for internal security, have been attacked for their stringent actions against protesters. Protesters have reportedly set police stations on fire, and police personnel have been beaten to death. Following these attacks, police officers expressed concerns for their safety and refused to resume their duties at full capacity. As a result, the army was deployed across many districts in Bangladesh.

The United Nations’ Preliminary Analysis of Recent Protests and Unrest in Bangladesh cites more than 600 killings reported between July 16 and August 11, with 250 deaths on August 4 and 5 alone – the key days of the protests. At least 32 children were reported dead in this violent episode. Supporters of the Awami League were allegedly targeted and their houses set on fire in the aftermath of Hasina’s exit.

As of August 23, more than 50 legal cases have been filed against Hasina over the deaths of students, including 42 murder cases. Several corruption cases have been filed against the leaders of the Awami League, including key advisers to the Hasina government. Reports also suggest that Awami League supporters and officials in the Hasina government have gone underground, fearing retribution by opposition groups, mainly the BNP and Jamaat.

Of primary concern are attacks on members of the Hindu minority community, who have long been seen as supporters of the Awami League. The party has historically championed secularism and syncretism, reflecting its roots in the Bengali nationalist movement that prioritized cultural unity over religious divides. There have been reports of attacks on Hindu temples and other minority religious establishments across Bangladesh, prompting civilians to come out to protect these buildings.

As a result of the sentimental and religious attachment of India’s majority Hindu population, Delhi has repeatedly reminded the interim government of the importance of ensuring the safety of Hindus in Bangladesh. In his congratulatory tweet on the appointment of the new interim government, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi urged Bangladesh to “ensure the safety and protection of Hindus.”

In a letter to Yunus on August 16, UN General Secretary António Guterres congratulated the chief adviser on his new role and advocated for “bringing an end to the violence, ensuring accountability, restoring law and order and charting a course towards democratic elections” and recommended “an inclusive approach, including taking into account the voices of the youth and women.” In particular, Guterres urged the interim government to ensure the inclusion of “minority and Indigenous communities.” To further UN efforts to ensure human rights and to investigate the violence that occurred between July and August, a three-member UN team was sent to Dhaka on August 23.

Safeguarding the spirit of the student-led “second liberation” of Bangladesh.

Although the interim government has promised to create jobs, ensure merit-based equal opportunity in government jobs, and hold elections soon, the chances that groups and political parties that were dismantled under the Hasina administration will influence the government along different lines are higher. For instance, the BNP and Jamaat might want to continue the current setup until they revitalize their party organization, cadres, membership, and leadership.

With the BNP and Jamaat gaining political space, concerns about the sustainability of the country’s secular image are growing. These parties may seek to exploit the current political instability to push for policies that align with their ideological agendas, potentially undermining the nation’s secular foundation. This could involve attempts to influence education, law, and public discourse, steering the country away from secular principles. From 2006 to 2009, Jamaat was actively involved in violent activities, especially in 2008, when the International Crimes Tribunal – a domestic body formed to adjudicate crimes against humanity during the 1971 Liberation War – began holding trials of individuals and organizations who sided with Pakistan and unleashed violence against their own people. This history shows the possibility that Jamaat could exploit the current situation.

Ensuring institutional freedom and autonomy in governance.

There is no doubt that the Bangladesh Army’s top brass has been involved in determining the structure, members, and representation in the interim government. However, the army’s readiness to cede power and authority over institutions to the Yunus-led interim government will be crucial to ensure a peaceful transition to a democratically elected government. In light of Bangladesh’s history of military coups and hostility toward the elected government over the past 50 years, the possibility of the army taking full control of the country remains, especially if it is in the driver’s seat.

Despite Yunus’s differences with Prime Minister Hasina in the past decade and a half, he is still respected by some members of the Awami League. His fallout with Hasina began in 2007, when Yunus announced the formation of a third-front political party named Nagarik Shakti (People’s Power), to which Hasina objected. She successfully lobbied for him to drop the idea. Yunus may have had problems with Hasina, but he admired Bangabandhu and the freedom fighters of 1971. While Yunus will try to preserve the legacy of the Liberation War amid vandalism of historical monuments belonging to liberation history, including statues of Bangabandhu, striking a balance between anti-liberation forces, army diktats, and secular forces will be challenging.

Amid growing violence, the possibility of fresh elections is unlikely in the immediate future. Those in power now, including the army, may want to remain so for some time. But if elections are held soon, there is a greater possibility that the Awami League could be banned or dismantled, its members and supporters imprisoned, and party cadres increasingly attacked – just as the Awami League did to the opposition during its time in power. This scenario could lead to another wave of political violence in Bangladesh.

In addition, the parties that are now coming to power, especially the BNP and Jamaat, seem to be pushing to appoint their own people to institutions like the Election Commission and the judiciary to execute their agenda. For instance, on August 10, Chief Justice Obaidul Hassan, a Hasina loyalist, was forced to resign. While this may signal a revolution, the forced resignations raise a fundamental question: is the country repeating old patterns of appointing loyalists, just as they criticize Hasina for doing? And, will running a country by “mobocracy” or populism be suitable for ensuring institutional autonomy and maintaining a stable democracy? The answer is probably no.

Investigating the crimes.

Much violence and arson was committed by and against the protesters, including students, political parties (Awami League, Jamaat, BNP, etc.), civilians, extremist forces, the police, and the army. In line with existing local and international human rights mechanisms, including the UN conventions, investigating crimes in a timely, fair, and accountable manner will be critical to delivering justice to the victims. Bangladesh has a poor track record of managing political violence during elections, and especially ensuring that the violence is not repeated, making it difficult to safeguard its image in international forums.

Foreign policy will be a crucial for the interim government. The immediate challenge will be to ensure stable ties with neighboring India. From sharing “deep-rooted bonds of history, language, culture, a multitude of other commonalities” to India’s vital historical role in Bangladesh’s independence from Pakistan in 1971, the two countries have come a long way. Under Hasina’s leadership, the relationship between India and Bangladesh became stronger. However, when the military or the BNP and its allies were in power, suspicion arose in India and the country was accused of openly supporting Hasina and the Awami League. Today, this perception that Delhi’s influence is linked primarily to the Awami League may play a spoiler in normalizing bilateral ties.

In the immediate aftermath of August 5, Yunus conveyed his displeasure with India’s position on the protests and emphasized that it is an internal matter for Bangladesh. But India has been put on the spot by providing a safe haven to Hasina after her resignation. Political groups such as the BNP are asking India to return Hasina. In a press statement, a joint secretary general of the BNP added, “We want to maintain a good relationship with the people of India. Please arrest Sheikh Hasina and Sheikh Rehana, who fled the country, and send them back to Bangladesh. Sheikh Hasina has killed many people in Bangladesh.” The BNP cited the 2013 India-Bangladesh Extradition Extradition Treaty as requiring her return for cases filed against the former prime minister in Bangladesh, including murder cases, which qualify under Article 2(a) of the treaty.

However, Article 8 of the treaty provides immunity against extradition if a person “satisfies the Requested State that it would, having regard to all the circumstances, be unjust or oppressive to extradite him by reasons of…the accusation not having or been made in good faith in the interests of justice.” India is unlikely to extradite Hasina to Bangladesh, especially considering her long-standing close relationship with India, which was a significant ally during her time in power.

India must walk a tightrope to better its ties with Bangladesh’s new leaders. The interim government already has a strong anti-India voice in Hifazat-e-Islam, which is known to have supported the “India-out” campaign earlier this year. Even if Yunus makes a concerted effort to use his personal experience with India’s top leadership to improve bilateral ties, the chances of his advisers sabotaging the relationship are even greater, primarily because of Delhi’s alleged support for the Hasina regime.

According to Bangladesh watchers in India, Delhi has taken a massive risk by hosting Hasina, especially when the tides have turned against her in Bangladesh and the friendly Awami League is facing an existential crisis. In a suo motu statement on Bangladesh in the Indian parliament on August 6, Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar apprised legislators of the situation in Bangladesh.

India’s concerns center on the safety of minorities, particularly Hindus, who are reportedly being targeted by the BNP and Jamaat cadre. Support for Hindus in Bangladesh is a concern for India’s majority Hindu electorate and for the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party. However, Islamic fundamentalist forces in Bangladesh may continue to target Hindus to hurt India. They may view Hindus as symbolic of India's influence in the region due to the historical and cultural connections between the two nations. Also, India’s advocacy for the protection of minorities in Bangladesh has been perceived by these extremists as external meddling, further incentivizing them to retaliate by targeting Hindus as a means to challenge India directly.

India shares a long border with Bangladesh, which nonstate actors have historically used for “illicit drug trafficking, fake currency, human trafficking” and terror activities. A 2018 report by the International Crisis Group highlighted concerns about the activities of terror groups in Bangladesh during the BNP’s Zia-led coalition government (2001–2006). According to the report, these groups, which had links to several international terror organizations, reportedly used Bangladesh as a safe haven. They were allegedly involved in attacks against foreign nations and carried out attacks in India. The presence and activities of these groups raised significant security concerns for India. Hasina was undoubtedly a strong partner with Delhi in counterterrorism efforts, particularly against extremist Islamic groups.

Fearing that Islamic extremists might reemerge following Hasina’s exit, India has taken steps to heighten security along its border with Bangladesh. This includes alerting and possibly reinforcing border forces to prevent any spillover of extremist activities and ensure border security. Foreign Minister Jaishankar has alerted border forces “to be exceptionally alert in view of this complex situation.” But India could face the same situation it faced 50 years ago – the influx of millions of Bangladeshi Hindus fleeing to the bordering regions of West Bengal and Tripura, fearing prosecution. The arrival of significant numbers of refugees would create a significant challenge for India to manage.

Amid mounting concerns, Prime Minister Modi congratulated Yunus “on assuming his new responsibilities.” He added, “We hope for an early return to normalcy, ensuring the safety and protection of Hindus and all other minority communities … [and] India remains committed to working with Bangladesh to fulfill the shared aspirations of both our peoples for peace, security and development.” On August 16, Modi spoke to Yunus by telephone and reiterated his call for the safety of the “Hindus and all other minority communities” in Bangladesh.

The good news is that India accepts the new political situation in Bangladesh. Even if nothing but permanent interests dominate bilateral or multilateral engagements, India would not wish to lose a huge neighboring market. Bangladesh is India’s biggest trade partner in South Asia, while India is Bangladesh’s second-largest trading partner (second to China). But it will be crucial for India to ensure that its advocacy for minorities in Bangladesh is taken in good faith, considering the BNP and Jamaat may exploit this stance to fuel anti-India sentiment or to gain political leverage by portraying India as interfering in Bangladesh’s internal affairs.

India the largest destination for Bangladesh exports, amounting to $2 billion in fiscal year 2022–2023, while bilateral trade stood at $15.9 billion. Interestingly, India-Bangladesh trade ties, unlike those with other South Asian countries, are not one way, making dependence a factor in the relationship. Apart from trade, connectivity, investments, and energy are vital pillars of cooperation between the two countries. While the current situation in Bangladesh might impact trade through rising security protocols on the border and disruptions in production, it will be interesting to see how eager India is to continue the momentum, even as it hosts Hasina.

China has also responded to developments in Bangladesh. In a statement on August 6, the Chinese Foreign Ministry noted that “China is following closely the developments in Bangladesh. As a friendly neighbour and comprehensive strategic cooperative partner of Bangladesh, China sincerely hopes that social stability will be restored soon.” China is unlikely to express anything beyond these formal lines. Certainly, China saw Bangladesh draw closer to India under Hasina – but that does not mean Beijing’s relations with Dhaka did not grow during the same period. Hasina managed a balanced outlook in which trade and investments took primacy. Bangladesh was among the first countries in India’s neighborhood to join the Belt and Road Initiative in 2016.

Bangladesh’s trade trajectory with China has been transformed in the last decade. When Hasina entered office in 2009, bilateral trade accounted for $3.3 billion; by her third term in office, it reached more than $20 billion in 2022. Chinese investment in Bangladesh exceeds $38 billion. In recent years, defense cooperation has become a vital pillar of bilateral ties, with China becoming Bangladesh’s primary supplier of light weapons. It also assisted Bangladesh with $1.2 billion for the first submarine dry base in its Cox’s Bazar region. The transformation in the bilateral relationship is significant, considering that China opposed the creation of an independent Bangladesh and supported Pakistan in 1971.

For China, Bangladesh’s critical location in the Bay of Bengal is the primary factor in this transformation. As the great powers have fought Chinese expansionism in the Indo-Pacific region, Beijing has attempted to deepen ties with regional players that cannot afford to choose sides, whether with the West, China, India, or Japan. At the same time, as Bangladesh has sought investments across geographies and political systems, it has looked to deepen its ties with China despite mounting pressure from Delhi.

With its foreign policy based on “cooperation with all and malice to none,” Bangladesh has achieved a good balance with neighbors and partners. For example, in 2023, it drafted its own “Indo-Pacific Outlook” instead of joining the vision of the United States and its allies in the region. Bangladesh’s outlook focused exploring economic opportunities, safeguarding sea lanes of communication, and maintaining peace and stability in the region – but did not refer at all to China.

For many observers in India and the West, China may be the biggest beneficiary of Bangladesh’s current political challenges. Given China’s track record of leveraging political instability to its advantage, the situation could open the door for Beijing to assert its economic and strategic influence in the country and the region. Considering that the new regime in Bangladesh may have to take an anti-India stance because of Delhi’s long-standing support for Hasina and its resentment of Islamic fundamentalist parties, there is no better choice than China since it is the mightiest regional power and presents a plethora of economic opportunities.

China comes with little historical baggage, despite having supported Pakistan in the 1971 war, and it has no problem interacting across party lines, whether extremist Islamic or secular. This contrasts with India’s consistent choice to engage secular forces to support the Hindu minority in maintaining its cultural and religious identity in a diverse and pluralistic society.

However, China could also opt for a wait-and-see strategy while it ensures its investments in Bangladesh are safe. Currently, nearly 1,000 Chinese companies are involved in infrastructure projects in Bangladesh, including energy, roads, and bridges. Soon after Hasina’s resignation, the Global Times, a Chinese state media outlet, reported that “Chinese businesses have rolled out contingency measures, including asking employees not to go out unless necessary, stockpile daily necessities, and temporarily suspend projects, amid weeks of protests in Bangladesh."

Chinese investments in Bangladesh carry immediate risks, requiring swift guarantees from the interim government for their functioning and safety. Beijing’s political commitment to the new political regime may invite targeted attacks on Chinese investments from the ousted Awami League. China’s risk aversion suggests that it hopes political stability will prevail. Meanwhile, the Chinese envoy to Bangladesh met the BNP delegation on August 21, reiterating China’s support for Bangladesh. The envoy in his meeting with BNP stakeholders sought their commitment to the “one-China principle” and safeguarding China’s interests, including investments.

Following his meetings with the BNP delegation, Ambassador Yao Wen also met with the Yunus on August 25, conveying “No matter what changes have taken place in the domestic situation of Bangladesh, China's commitment to develop China-Bangladesh relations remains unchanged.” On September 2, Wen held talks with the Jamaat leaders at their office, which was reopened the very next day of Hasina’s exit. In his remarks to the media in the presence of Jamaat leaders, Yao told that “Jamaat-e-Islami is a disciplined party. The people of China want friendly relations with the people of Bangladesh. We will continue to work for the development, progress and prosperity of Bangladesh in the future.” The chronology of these meeting clearly exhibits Beijing’s strategy of engaging with potential actors who may make a comeback in the next government. These moves suggest that China is betting on the opposition’s return to power, especially since the Awami League has gone underground following Hasina’s exit.

Navigating diplomatic relations beyond India and China, the interim government in Bangladesh faces significant hurdles in engaging with the United States. Washington was a strong critic of Bangladesh’s political landscape under Hasina, pointing to anti-democratic tendencies, authoritarianism, and human rights concerns. If the interim government continues with the same tendencies—such as conducting unfair elections or allowing the military to play a significant role in civilian administration—it is likely that the U.S. will maintain its critical stance. The challenges in U.S.-Bangladesh relations, therefore, rise not just from specific leadership but from structural issues that undermine democratic governance and human rights, regardless of who is in power.

The U.S. position on democratic developments has been constant since the 2018 elections in Bangladesh. The U.S. State Department raised concerns about electoral irregularities that “prevented some people from voting, which undermined faith in the electoral process.” The United States took a similar position on the 2024 elections, “concerned by the arrests of thousands of political opposition members and by reports of irregularities on elections day… [and] these elections were not free or fair and we regret that not all parties participated.”

Despite recent criticisms of Bangladesh’s elections and democracy, the White House seems to have softened its approach to engaging with the country, as it remains a crucial partner in the Indo-Pacific. In a rare event, President Joe Biden penned a letter to Hasina on February 6 – just after she began her fourth term – conveying the “sincere” desire of his “administration to continue our work together on regional and global security, economic development, climate change and energy, global health, humanitarian support, especially for Rohingya refugees, and more.” Biden assured Hasina of the U.S. commitment to supporting “Bangladesh’s ambitious economic goals and partnering with Bangladesh on our shared vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific.”

Logically, the United States was right to reset the tone of the relationship and seek to engage rather than letting anti-American sentiment grow in Bangladesh. Following President Biden’s letter to Prime Minister Hasina, Donald Lu, assistant secretary of state for South and Central Asian Affairs, visited Dhaka in May 2024 on his tour of the subcontinent. Lu’s visit aligned with Biden’s letter, pointing out that the United States and Bangladesh share a vision of an “Indo-Pacific region that is free and open, connected, prosperous, secure and resilient” and rebuilding ties. However, Lu’s visit to Bangladesh was marred by controversies and criticized by Awami League leaders.

In a press briefing, the Awami League’s general secretary added, “We didn’t invite him[;] rather he has come to this country because of their different needs.” This statement may have been a reaction to Lu’s emphasis on Bangladesh’s human rights record. In a follow-up to Lu’s visit, the United States introduced a new visa policy for Bangladesh under Section 212(a)(3)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which restricts the “issuance of visas for any Bangladeshi individual, believed to be responsible for, or complicit in, undermining the democratic election process in Bangladesh.” Having criticized the Awami League in the past on such grounds, the new visa policy certainly marked a new low in bilateral ties.

Despite the negativity of these statements, the Hasina government made great strides with the United States in trade, investment, and security. The United States has been a major trade partner of Bangladesh, with trade accounting for $13,243 million in 2021–2022 and U.S. direct investment in Bangladesh estimated at $695 million in 2022. On the security cooperation front, since 2014, the United States has allocated $78.45 million in foreign military financing, with $54.8 million earmarked for bilateral programs and $23.6 million for the Bay of Bengal Initiative. The Bangladesh Navy has been a part of the U.S. Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training program since 2010; this weeklong program is aimed at enhancing “collaboration focused ion shared maritime security challenges in the region.”

Yunus has been dismissive of U.S. pressure. In an interview with local media in Bangladesh in June 2024, Yunus stated bluntly, “I don’t care what the West wants. What matters is whether we want democracy, human rights and freedom of the press. If they want what we want, it is a matter of happiness. If they don’t want it, we will continue to want it. Why let it be imposed on us like them?” He added, “It doesn’t matter when or what they said. Each country will formulate its foreign policy according to its own rules.”

Despite Yunus’s past remarks about the United States, he is favored by the Democratic Party, as reflected in a January 22 letter from 12 U.S. senators urging Hasina to “end the persistent harassment of Nobel Peace Prize laureate Professor Muhammad Yunus – and the pattern of abusing laws and the justice system to target critics of the government more broadly.” As a leader with a better global image, Yunus will face the significant task of resetting ties with the United States and addressing contentious human rights issues.

Meanwhile, the United States is alleged to have had a role in toppling Hasina’s government. An unconfirmed statement by Hasina has circulated in the Indian media claiming that the United States orchestrated her removal because she refused to surrender the sovereignty of Saint Martin Island, located in the northeastern Bay of Bengal. The tiny island has strategic importance because of its proximity to major shipping lanes and potential offshore resources, making it a point of interest for the United States’ regional security and economic influence. Had the United States made such a demand, it would have gone too far in pushing Dhaka.

Indeed, like every great power, the United States seeks to increase its outreach in the Indo-Pacific, but not when the cost is too high – such as toppling an elected government. Difference makes partnerships grow and improve, but baseless accusations are outlandish. The State Department has firmly refuted such claims, calling them “laughable … any implication that the United States was involved in Sheikh Hasina’s resignation is absolutely false. We have seen a lot of disinformation in recent weeks, and we remain incredibly committed to strengthening information integrity across the digital ecosystem, especially with our partners in South Asia.” Considering that the two countries have spent decades developing multisector cooperation, especially with respect to tackling terrorism, staging something of this sort would be a serious political blunder on the United States’ part.

Where does the Islamic world stand on the unfolding situation in Bangladesh – an Islamic nation?

Bangladesh has had a love-hate relationship with the Islamic world, especially the Awami League’s version of Islam, which is primarily secular and culturally rich. It is noteworthy that no country in the Islamic world, including Saudi Arabia – a vital member of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) – supported Pakistan during the 1971 Liberation War. There was a widespread belief among Islamic countries that the war was India’s strategy to split Pakistan in two and create the separate nation of Bangladesh.

Bangladesh became a member of the OIC in 1974, marking the beginning of a fresh partnership with the Islamic world. That relationship has evolved in trade, investment, and cultural and religious exchanges over the last five decades. Bangladesh also receives significant remittances from expatriate workers in the Middle East, which plays a crucial role in its economy. Bangladesh collaborates with other Islamic countries on a variety of issues, including trade, education, and humanitarian efforts, demonstrating a united front in addressing global challenges facing the Muslim world, including solidarity in supporting Palestine.

Despite this strong working relationship, no major statement has come from the countries of the Islamic world (as of August 10) except for Pakistan and Malaysia; Islamabad expressed hope for a “peaceful and swift return to normalcy,” while Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim welcomed the new government on behalf of Kuala Lumpur, with sly appreciation for the student-led movement against the Hasina government, adding “As a new dawn rises over Bangladesh, bringing forth a renewal driven by the vigour and vision of its youth…at this pivotal moment in history, I wish the people of Bangladesh every success and the brightest of futures.”

Meanwhile, at this pressing moment, the question is whether Hasina will find support or asylum in any Islamic country. Reports suggest that amid immigration-related chaos in the United Kingdom, the chances of her application getting attention in London may be slim. Therefore, she may think of several Islamic countries, such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which have historically provided refuge to exiled leaders because of their religious and political affiliations. However, where she eventually settles remains to be seen.

As the situation in Bangladesh remains volatile, Yunus will have a tough time navigating the multiple power centers with the army in the powerful position and Islamic parties attempting to amend the country’s laws and constitution, especially with respect to religious freedom and women. There will be attempts to hijack the national glory of the 1971 Liberation War. This has already started with the declaration that there would be no public holiday on August 15 – a day traditionally observed as National Mourning Day, introduced by the Hasina government in 1996 to mark the assassination of her father and his family members on August 15, 1975.

The influence of nonstate actors and the potential interference from countries like Pakistan, which may seek to exploit their Jamaat connections to revisit grievances from 1971, must also be addressed. Furthermore, there is a risk that Pakistan and China might use Bangladesh as a conduit to export instability to India, which would require a response from Delhi. The ongoing Rohingya crisis and instability in Myanmar add further complexity to the situation, requiring diplomatic and humanitarian strategies to manage the refugee situation and regional tensions.

It is essential that the interim government prevent a repeat of the past by ensuring that what Hasina did to the opposition is not replicated by the opposition – the BNP and Jamaat – against the Awami League. Failure to do so would only perpetuate the cycle of violence. Additionally, the administration must ensure that the movement initiated by students remains true to its roots and is not co-opted by other forces. Lastly, holding fresh elections will be vital to avoiding a constant tug-of-war among stakeholders.