China has shaped the U.S.-India relationship for decades.¹ Today, another significant triangle is emerging: the China-EU-India relationship. Indian and European leaders are strengthening ties. Both view China as a formidable economic and security rival while regarding the United States as a key security partner (and, for Europe, a long-standing ally).

What is the current state of EU-China and EU-India relations? As India’s influence and economic appeal grow, could it become a viable alternative to China for European business leaders and policymakers? How is Brussels incorporating India into its strategies to address a potential crisis in Asia or the broader Indo-Pacific?

Twenty-five years ago, the European Union viewed China as a top priority for business, cultural exchanges, and diplomacy. Following the introduction of Beijing’s open-door policy in 1978 and with strong encouragement from Chinese authorities, European companies flocked to China. Initially, many Europeans used Hong Kong as an intermediary for business, but by the mid-1990s, Guangdong Province and Shanghai became key gateways to the Chinese market, particularly for Germany and France.² Trade and investment surged, especially after China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, which was widely supported by European political and business elites. Today, China remains the EU’s largest trading partner, with substantial European investments across the mainland.

In contrast, India was long viewed as a potential partner, but only a few EU member states took steps to forge a strategic partnership with New Delhi. European investments in India were — and still are — limited, with many corporations citing challenges such as inadequate infrastructure, market access barriers, and bureaucratic red tape, which make it difficult to operate in most Indian states. However, the mood has begun to shift. On the EU side, the European Commission’s 2019 China strategy characterized Beijing as “a partner, a competitor, and a systemic rival.” The COVID-19 pandemic, which disrupted direct links between Europe and China from 2020 to 2022, caused significant strain. This was followed by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, an event many on the continent perceive as having Beijing’s tacit support.

Additional factors, including an increasingly authoritarian regime at home and a more assertive China abroad, have contributed to European perceptions,³ as explained at length by the Center for China Analysis’s latest Global Public Opinion on China project.⁴ This, in turn, has affected the EU-China relationship, which has been gradually downgraded from the “honeymoon” period of 1995–2015.

On the other hand, the strengthening EU-India relationship is a relatively recent development, driven by several factors that have emerged in the wake of the pandemic. These include the rise of the ambitious Bharatiya Janata Party under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who first took office in 2014 and is now serving his third term, as well as a broader diversity of partnerships between the EU and India. Other factors influencing EU-India relations include the growing assertiveness of the People’s Republic of China and the United States’ shift away from multilateralism during President Donald Trump’s first term (2017–2021). Since January 2025, the increasing probability of a break in the transatlantic alliance under the new Trump administration is leading the EU to look for new partners, including in the Indo-Pacific region. In addition, India’s robust GDP growth — 6.6% in 2025 and a projected 6.7% in 2026 — has attracted European businesses.⁵

In a global environment defined by multipolarity, could the previously low-profile EU-India relationship evolve into a closer partnership? With EU-China relations facing significant challenges, might India emerge as a viable alternative Asian partner for Europe? The current EU-India relationship is described as “strategic.” In reality, it is partial and uneven, and there are major differences in the nature of relations between India and individual EU member states. Meanwhile, how does Beijing view its competitor in the Global South as it seeks to win over Europe’s support?

This paper explores the dynamics of the interaction among these three powers in the rapidly changing geopolitical context. It examines India’s political and economic challenges in the context of the EU-China relationship, how the EU-India relationship is evolving, and whether an EU-India partnership could take center stage if tensions with China escalate. European countries have kept strong ties with the Global South, and some see a strong India as a potential bridge for fostering cooperation in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Africa.

Starting in the late 1980s, China’s open-door policy was pivotal in shaping how European political and business elites viewed the country and fostering long-term collaboration, particularly in business. Over time, European companies began using Chinese factories as subcontractors, while others seized the opportunity to tap into the potential of a rapidly growing market of 1.4 billion consumers. This enthusiasm led to a surge in trade and investment as well as approximately 60 annual bilateral dialogues coordinated by the European Commission, addressing a broad range of issues from technology and business to climate change, culture, and even human rights.

After China joined the WTO, it became the EU’s second-largest goods trading partner. Bilateral trade in goods reached $503.6 billion in 2014 and $635.1 billion by 2024.⁶ While European companies had invested heavily in China since the 1990s, Chinese firms began investing more in Europe around the 2008 financial crisis, with investments peaking at $37.7 billion in 2016.⁷ Several major Chinese takeovers of European companies in robotics, biotech, and agriculture, together with investments in European port, airport, and energy infrastructures, led to rising concerns in several European capitals,⁸ which, in 2017, led Brussels to insist that the EU start building new defense mechanisms.⁹ In January 2024, a new regulation was introduced to revise the EU’s foreign direct investment screening mechanisms to make them more effective.¹⁰

By 2019, the European Union had notably toughened its stance on China, advocating for a more “balanced” relationship that would include improved market access for European companies and a level playing field. However, the pandemic led to further confusion between the two sides. Europeans grew increasingly concerned about Chinese dominance of supply chains and its near-monopolies in critical sectors such as solar panels. Given the challenges European companies faced in accessing the Chinese market, Brussels introduced additional restrictions in 2019, despite efforts to finalize a comprehensive agreement on investment in late 2020.¹¹ However, within two months, the agreement stalled due to a series of sanctions, first imposed by the EU over human rights issues, which prompted a strong retaliatory response from China.

Then came the Russia-Ukraine war. Since the Russian invasion in 2022, virtual summits between President Xi Jinping and European leaders have produced progressively fewer results, as EU leaders hoped Beijing would exert a more positive influence on Moscow. These efforts proved unsuccessful, however. Josep Borrell, the former EU high representative for external relations, described the virtual summit held in spring 2022 as a “dialogue of the deaf.”¹² Russia and China continued to strengthen their partnership through presidential visits and booming trade and investment ties. China also played a core role in reconstituting Russia’s defense industrial base through dual-use exports.

Pressured by European national leaders, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen delivered an ambitious speech in March 2023 outlining a strategy to de-risk from China.¹³ Three months later, this strategy was comprehensively defined in the EU’s Communication on a European Economic Security Strategy. The strategy sought to strengthen¹⁴ the EU’s policy tools, including measures to screen foreign direct investment and counter state subsidies and other unfair trade practices.¹⁵ In January 2024, the European Commission proposed five other initiatives,¹⁶ including stricter export controls, further research on potential dual-use technologies, and assessments of risks from outbound investments. According to the commission, China’s “special status” now required “a flexible and pragmatic whole-of-EU approach” that would not only defend principled interests and values but also achieve concrete results in areas such as trade and investment, climate change, biodiversity, and pandemic response.¹⁷ In other words, the EU considers China both a trading partner and a systemic rival.

Although Beijing has attempted to improve relations since the end of the pandemic, Brussels has several entrenched concerns. It says Beijing has become “less open to the world and more repressive at home” while taking “a more assertive posture abroad, resorting to economic coercion, boycotts of European goods, and export controls on critical raw materials.” On the economic front, Europeans have increasingly described the Chinese market as “less accessible.” At the same time, the EU’s growing dependence on China — particularly for digitalization and decarbonization — has made the relationship more asymmetric, diminishing the benefits that China once provided to European economies.¹⁸ China’s economy has become increasingly closed off to European companies due to nationalistic industrial policies characterized by state subsidies, bureaucratic red tape, Chinese Communist Party interference, and a strong push to develop domestic corporate champions.

Overall, the Chinese market has become less appealing to European businesses. Since 2021, consumption has fallen and GDP growth has slowed. EU investment in China hit a record low in 2023, when Chinese FDI in Europe was the lowest in a decade,¹⁹ although it picked up in 2024, likely driven by the worsening conditions facing Chinese investors in the United States.²⁰ Unlike many of their American counterparts who moved production to other Asian countries, German multinationals (e.g., BASF, BMW, and Volkswagen) have continued to invest in China.

Beijing has expressed a willingness to engage with Europe, though it has disregarded some European concerns. “We must join hands and work together to build a safer world!” Foreign Minister Wang Yi argued in February 2025 at the annual Munich Security Conference.²¹ This was greeted with skepticism in Europe. Throughout 2023 and 2024, European leaders like French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz made annual visits to Beijing, yet each time they returned with little assurance about China’s economic openness or its willingness to engage on global issues aside from climate change and biodiversity. Furthermore, in the past three years, China’s support for Russia in its war against Ukraine has become more obvious with substantial exports of dual-use technology,²² despite its official stance of neutrality.

In 2024, President Xi Jinping visited three European countries: France, to celebrate 60 years of Sino-French diplomatic relations, as well as Hungary and Serbia, two prime recipients of Chinese investment and aid over the last decade.²³ Both Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić have consistently expressed their approval of Chinese policies under Xi, participated in Belt and Road Initiative summits in Beijing, and promoted the Sinopharm vaccine through the pandemic.²⁴

The recent appointment of the former Chinese ambassador to France, Lu Shaye, as a special envoy tasked with “conducting consultations and exchanges with European countries” did little to encourage the EU. Lu, known for his abrasive style, spent five years as envoy to France, often clashing with his hosts. By the time he left Paris in mid-2024, he had been summoned seven times by the French foreign ministry over a series of high-profile rows and, according to people familiar with his case, had lost access to all of France’s high government organs.²⁵ Appointing someone with such a background — long regarded as a “wolf warrior diplomat” — may signal how Beijing views its relationship with Brussels.

Since 2019, the Sino-European relationship has encountered rising economic and strategic challenges, paving the way for a new player — India. Amid ongoing crises between China and the EU, India has asserted itself more prominently on the global stage. Economic ties between India and Europe are growing, including in defense procurement, with both sides increasingly interested in strengthening their partnership.

The EU’s relationships with India and China must be considered within the broader global geopolitical context, especially in light of Sino-Indian relations and these two powers’ interactions with the United States.

In June 2020, Sino-Indian relations took a significant hit after a border clash in Galwan Valley, in the Himalayan region of Ladakh. The confrontation, which resulted in at least 24 casualties, led to a four-year freeze in the bilateral relationship, when no meetings took place between Narendra Modi and Xi Jinping. Another skirmish occurred in Arunachal Pradesh in late 2022, exacerbating tensions, which have continued to simmer. Recent satellite images revealed the construction of a new Chinese settlement near Pangong Tso, the strategic lake at the heart of the standoff and a persistent flashpoint. The settlement, featuring over 100 buildings across 17 hectares, is located just 24 miles from the Line of Actual Control.²⁶ Experts suggest it could serve military and logistics purposes.

Eventually, for both New Delhi and Beijing, the costs of an antagonistic relationship became too high, and there were significant political and economic pressures to improve relations. Beijing recognized the growing importance of India as a potential market, especially amid U.S.-imposed restrictions and its own domestic economic challenges. India is heavily reliant on Chinese imports — its electronics sector and pharmaceutical industry depend on Chinese inputs — and its trade deficit with China surged to $85.1 billion in fiscal year 2024.²⁷ This interdependence, combined with the potential for increased bilateral trade and investment, spurred India’s business community to urge the government to resume engagement with Beijing.

High-level diplomatic exchanges slowly resumed after a Modi-Xi meeting at the BRICS summit in Kazan in late 2024, followed by a meeting between Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Sun Weidong and Indian Foreign Secretary Shri Vikram Misri in Beijing to promote the “implementation of consensus” reached in Kazan. They agreed on several cooperation agreements, including supporting China’s chairmanship of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and commemorating the 75th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations.

In recent years, Beijing has observed the growing closeness between New Delhi and Washington through initiatives such as the Quad and various bilateral engagements. Modi’s state visits to Washington in June 2023 and February 2025 were carefully watched, highlighting the significance that China places on the shifting dynamics among India, the United States, and the EU. During the early 2025 visit, indications emerged that U.S.-India relations would continue to thrive under the new Trump administration. Both Republicans and Democrats in Congress share similar concerns about China’s growing regional influence, creating a strong foundation for U.S.-India collaboration.

Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has been a major point of contention. India has never condemned the war, while the Biden administration and the EU strongly supported Ukraine. But President Donald Trump is pushing for a peaceful resolution to the conflict, potentially bringing India and the EU closer together as both seek a diplomatic solution. However, much will hinge on Russian President Vladimir Putin’s intentions and the ability of other global powers to influence the course of events.

Following the meeting between the Indian and Chinese foreign ministers in late January 2025, Beijing expressed a clear desire to build a long-term relationship with India: “China and India should focus on a strategic and long-term perspective to promote stable and healthy bilateral relations.”²⁸ Despite the competition India presents, especially with its growing ties to the United States, China now seems eager to enhance the bilateral relationship. This shift is likely motivated by a desire to prevent an even closer partnership between New Delhi and Washington, which could alter regional dynamics. In Washington’s eyes, India represents the interests of emerging economies with which it wants to engage and can serve as a counterweight to China.²⁹ While tensions persist over common border disputes and other geopolitical issues, China’s emphasis on improving relations with India underscores its broader strategic efforts to manage its influence in the region and counter strengthening U.S.-India ties.

In an increasingly tense global environment, the Sino-European economic relationship has become more complex. It is now largely driven by China’s tighter state control of the economy and use of leverage.³⁰ While Brussels has pushed back, politics and trade are now deeply intertwined when it comes to relations with Beijing.

Many countries depend on Chinese supply chains, and Beijing has used economic coercion on multiple occasions. For example, in 2020–21, China applied trade pressure after Lithuania strengthened its ties with Taiwan. Similarly, in response to the EU imposing countervailing duties on Chinese electric vehicles (EVs) in 2024, China initiated its own investigations into subsidies and dumping.³¹

Meanwhile, EU-India bilateral relations have gained momentum in recent years. Diplomatic ties were first established in 1962, followed by a cooperation agreement in 1994 and the inaugural EU-India Leaders’ Meeting in 2021. A Trade and Technology Council (TTC) launched in 2023, mirroring the one established between the EU and the United States. Brussels has shown increasing interest in engaging with New Delhi, which, in turn, has strengthened its diplomatic efforts with Europe, particularly in technology, trade and investment, migration and mobility, and security.³²

In a speech following her appointment to a second five-year term, President von der Leyen emphasized that the EU should establish “a new strategic agenda” for India and “upgrade its strategic partnership with the largest country and democracy in the world.”³³ On February 27–28, 2025, she visited New Delhi with 22 European commissioners — the first time a non-European country had received such a delegation. During an EU-India seminar in New Delhi, External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar insisted that a stronger relationship can be an “important stabilizing factor” in a world that promises to be “so volatile and uncertain.”³⁴ He added, without specifying anyone, that in Asia, “international law has been disregarded with significant consequences.”

For the EU, the devastating three-year Russia-Ukraine war remains a significant source of tension with China and, to a lesser extent, India. To Europeans, the frequent meetings between Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin, joint military exercises, and growing trade all signal that China has increasingly aligned itself with Russia since 2022. Europeans view China and Russia as pursuing a shared objective: reshaping the international system, especially in critical regions such as the Arctic and parts of the Global South. Public opinion surveys consistently show growing defiance toward Beijing, which is perceived as backing Moscow, despite China’s efforts to portray itself as neutral in the rivalry between Russia and the West. A 2023 survey showed that 70% of Europeans recognize China and Russia as close partners.³⁵ This contradicts the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s stance of non-alignment.³⁶ Moreover, Beijing’s refusal to participate in a Ukraine peace meeting organized by the Swiss government in June 2024 was met with considerable frustration in Europe.

European public opinion seems less aware of India’s “neutral” stance in the Ukrainian conflict. India has remained largely silent on the issue, abstaining from UN Security Council resolutions and consistently calling for both sides to “engage with each other to find a solution.” Prime Minister Modi visited Ukraine in August 2024, but there were no concrete outcomes. Last year, External Affairs Minister Jaishankar stated that “the needle is moving towards the reality of negotiation”; however, New Delhi is reluctant to be seen as a “mediator” in the conflict given its long-standing relationship with Moscow. Russia remains one of India’s key trading partners, with bilateral trade largely centered around crude oil imports and defense equipment — its exports to Russia totaled just $4.26 billion, whereas imports reached $61.43 billion in 2023–24.³⁷

Some analysts believe that India could be benefiting from the war, and the current crisis is “an opportunity to play the market for best prices and simultaneously accelerate the shift away from fossil fuels.”³⁸ India has the potential to become the cheapest producer of green hydrogen, and it is rapidly expanding its solar manufacturing capacity. Diplomatically, India also wields significant bargaining power, as evidenced by a steady stream of state visits from European leaders and well-attended international conferences, such as the annual Raisina Dialogue in New Delhi, whose 2024 edition attracted ten European ministers.³⁹

As the world’s two largest democracies, the European Union and India share a commitment to a rules-based global order, effective multilateralism, sustainable development, and a certain degree of strategic autonomy.

In 2004, the EU designated India as a strategic partner, but EU-India relations remained limited until around a decade ago. While countries such as France, the United Kingdom, and Germany engaged with India, economic interactions were sporadic. It took a few more years before the EU External Action Service began to engage with India in a strategic way. France had long supplied India with military systems, such as Scorpène-class submarines and Dassault Rafale jetfighters, helping to foster a close relationship between defense industries and ministries. As a sign of growing ties with both France and the broader EU, Prime Minister Modi was a guest of honor at France’s Bastille Day in 2023, while President Emmanuel Macron attended Republic Day in New Delhi the following year. Modi also co-chaired the Paris AI Action Summit alongside Macron on February 10–11, 2025, where Chinese Vice Premier Zhang Guoqing expressed China’s willingness to collaborate with other nations to protect security and share advancements in artificial intelligence.

Over the past decade, New Delhi’s relationship with the European Union has accelerated. During the recent visit by the College of EU Commissioners, both parties agreed to a more strategic EU-India partnership. The EU is already India’s largest trading partner,⁴⁰ with $133.7 billion worth of trade in goods in 2023, 12.2% of India’s total trade. This surpasses both the United States (10.8%) and China (10.5%). The EU is likewise the second-largest destination for Indian exports, accounting for 17.5% of the total, just behind the United States (17.6%), while China ranks fourth (3.7%). India’s exports of goods to the EU include ready-made garments, pharmaceuticals, steel, petroleum products, and electrical machinery. Although trade in goods between the EU and India has surged by almost 90% over the past decade, India is still only the EU’s ninth-largest trading partner, accounting for just 2.2% of the EU’s total trade in goods in 2023, far behind the United States (16.7%) and China (14.6%).

On the other hand, the services trade between the EU and India reached $54.8 billion in 2023, up from $32.8 billion in 2020. Indian visitors have become increasingly visible and sought after in top European tourist destinations like Paris, Rome, and Madrid. EU services trade with India is dominated by transport, telecommunications, information technology, business services, and travel. Together, these sectors account for more than 80% of EU services exports to India and more than 90% of EU services imports from India.

The EU is a leading foreign investor in India. Its share of foreign investment stock in India stood at $116.8 billion in 2022, up from $88.7 billion in 2019. However, this is still significantly lower than the EU’s foreign investment stock in China ($266.9 billion) or Brazil ($316.3 billion).

Based on European Commission data, some 6,000 European companies have a presence in India, providing 1.7 million jobs and 5 million more indirectly.⁴¹ Other estimates are more modest. The newly formed Federation of European Business⁴² (FEBI) positions itself as a unified, independent, and influential voice for European businesses in India, aiming to bring together companies and national bilateral chambers to strengthen collective EU policy advocacy. In its 2025 Business Sentiment Survey, FEBI underlined the need “to address key areas requiring bilateral cooperation. Strengthening investment protection, intellectual property rights, trade facilitation, and public procurement will create a more stable, transparent, and competitive business environment.”⁴³ However, the federation’s membership stands at just 120 companies. Members are generally large firms, and the federation remains considerably smaller than the long-established EU Chamber of Commerce in China,⁴⁴ which has over 1,700 registered members.

Germany alone boasts around 5,000 companies in China, compared to just 2,000 in India. Furthermore, European businesses in India are still in the process of fully embracing the EU identity in addition to their national brands — whether French, German, or Italian. Business sectors with a growing presence in India include defense, aviation, energy, and luxury brands targeting major urban centers. In recent years, there has been increasing interest in India for manufacturing and sourcing in areas such as toys, footwear, pharmaceuticals, and especially IT. European companies have sought opportunities across the investment and trade sectors in India, and many are drawn to its driven, young workforce. Additionally, the Indian government has actively promoted its Make in India initiative, attracting strong interest in Europe, especially from Germany and France, two countries listed as key investors alongside the United States, Japan, and the United Arab Emirates.⁴⁵

During the EU-India Leaders’ Meetings in 2021, 2023, and 2025, both sides committed to increasing cooperation in research and innovation on the green transition, digital agenda, and global health challenges.⁴⁶ At the first TTC meeting in Brussels on May 16, 2023, they agreed to start working on the following:

1. Wastewater management, including plastic litter and waste to hydrogen;
2. Recycling batteries for EVs;
3. Interoperability of charging infrastructure for EVs; and
4. Standards (both cross-cutting and thematic).⁴⁷

Exchanges between experts in these areas have already occurred, laying the groundwork for future actions. In January 2024, Indian experts participated in a training and mutual learning session on EV interoperability and electromagnetic compatibility at the Joint Research Centre E-Mobility Lab in Ispra, Italy. Additionally, a joint hybrid workshop on EV charging technologies (e.g., standardization and testing) was held at the Automotive Research Association of India in Pune, India. This event aimed to enhance EU-India dialogue and encourage industry involvement in standardization processes for charging infrastructure in India. Both sides also organized a “matchmaking event” to connect and support Indian and EU startups focused on battery recycling technology for EVs. Furthermore, experts collaboratively discussed tools for assessing and monitoring marine plastic litter.

The next step in EU-India relations may prove trickier. During their recent dialogue, President von der Leyen and Prime Minister Modi stated their ambition to conclude a free trade agreement (FTA) by the end of 2025 — “the largest deal of this kind anywhere in the world.”⁴⁸ The two sides are set for a tenth round of talks in March in Brussels, but the EU appears divided, particularly on agricultural and environmental issues.⁴⁹ The talks have been ongoing for fifteen years, and a successful FTA would undoubtedly boost trade and investment, but both sides appeared reluctant to open their markets in a meaningful way. For instance, India is opposed to making the EU’s Deforestation Regulation and Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism part of trade commitments.⁵⁰ “No one can replace China,” acknowledged a senior Indian diplomat, “but India’s 7% growth rate and growing consumer middle class [are] attractive to European brands.”⁵¹ Luxury goods are of growing interest to Indian consumers, with a remarkable 32.8% growth in sales in 2022, outpacing major markets like the United States, Switzerland, Japan, and China.⁵²

When Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar claimed that India is “non-West rather than anti-West,” it highlighted a distinct contrast to China’s frequent rhetoric that “the East is rising and the West is declining.”⁵³ This message has raised concerns in Europe, as it hints at a different vision for global power dynamics. India has avoided condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine — remaining notably more cautious than China. Both New Delhi and Beijing have refrained from directly denouncing Russia’s actions, but their approaches toward European countries differ significantly.

At BRICS meetings, India positions itself as a counterweight to the Sino-Russian alliance, working to prevent the Global South from moving away from the post-WWII international order. New Delhi has emphasized that it does not want to create an anti-Western coalition. Despite maintaining strong ties with the United States, particularly under President Donald Trump, India faces potential challenges, such as tariffs and a lack of engagement with the West. This has led the Modi government to strengthen its relationship with Europe, not just in trade but also in areas such as green technologies, security, and multilateral cooperation. To differentiate itself from China, India could consider focusing on other areas in its trade discussions with the EU, such as technology, research, higher education, economic security, and competitiveness. Moreover, the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor could incentivize and accelerate trade between Europe and India.⁵⁴

China, on the other hand, views its relationship with Europe as vital, especially as it prepares for the upcoming EU-China summit later this year, which will mark 50 years of diplomatic ties. Chinese analysts argue that strengthening EU-China relations is crucial for global growth, with cooperation needed to counter tariff hikes launched by the current U.S. administration. Some even highlight the “structural complementarity” between the EU and China, with Europe excelling in high-end manufacturing, green technology, and services, while China leads in digital infrastructure, smart manufacturing, and vast market applications.⁵⁵ Beijing’s stated willingness to collaborate at the Paris AI Action Summit was revealing; however, as China becomes an increasingly difficult market for Europeans, it is not clear that EU stakeholders share the same optimism.

This raises the question. Can India offer Europe solutions that China cannot? While India faces challenges, such as a smaller diplomatic service and complex relations with several South Asian neighbors, its ability to balance realism, interests, and values could provide an alternative to China. When President von der Leyen visited New Delhi in February 2025, she stressed that EU-India interests “align like never before.” “This world is fraught with danger. But I believe this modern version of great-power competition is an opportunity for Europe and India to reimagine their partnership,” she added.⁵⁶ While China is often perceived by many Europeans as a dominant force, India could offer a more balanced partnership that better aligns with European interests and values in the evolving global landscape.

Despite challenges, the EU-India relationship will remain pivotal. As the global order continues to shift, the EU will increasingly rely on India to counterbalance China’s rise and address the changing dynamics in the Indo-Pacific region. The growing significance of India in Europe’s geopolitical and economic strategy makes the EU-India partnership an intriguing but complex opportunity for both sides in the years ahead.

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22. Alicia García-Herrero, “The European Union Must Prepare for a Much More Difficult Relationship with China,” Bruegel, September 30, 2024, https://www.bruegel.org/newsletter/european-union-must-prepare-much-mor….
23. “Bilan de la visite européenne de Xi Jinping” [Review of Xi Jinping’s European Visit], Le Grand Continent, May 10, 2024, https://legrandcontinent.eu/fr/2024/05/10/bilan-de-la-visite-europeenne….
24. “Hungary’s PM Viktor Orbán Vaccinated Against COVID with Chinese Sinopharm Vaccine,” Euronews, February 28, 2021, https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2021/02/28/hungary-s-pm-viktor-orban….
25. Finbarr Bermingham, “EU Signals Pragmatic Tone as It Walks ‘Fine Line’ Between China and the U.S.,” South China Morning Post, February 8, 2025, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3297897/eu-signals-pragmatic-tone-it-walks-fine-line-between-china-and-us.
26. “After Bridge, a New Chinese Settlement Near Pangong Lake: What We Know So Far,” Firstpost, October 15, 2024, https://www.firstpost.com/explainers/after-bridge-a-new-chinese-settlement-near-pangong-lake-what-we-know-so-far-13825608.html.
27. Jhanavi Pathal, “India’s Growing Trade Imbalance with China: Can Budget 2025 Provide a Solution?” Economic Times, January 15, 2025, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/foreign-trade/indias-growing-trade-imbalance-with-china-can-budget-2025-provide-a-solution/articleshow/117223746.cms.
28. “中印應聚焦發展 共謀合作” [China and India Should Focus on Development and Seek Cooperation], Wen Wei Po, January 22, 2025, https://www.wenweipo.com/a/202501/22/AP67900382e4b0052dc15c4ab7.html.
29. Rorry Daniels, “When PM Modi Meets President Trump: The Key Will Lie in Layering India’s Preferences onto the White House’s Plans,” Indian Express, February 12, 2025, https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/pm-modi-us-president-….
30. García-Herrero, “The European Union Must Prepare for a Much More Difficult Relationship with China.”
31. Hugo Struna and Sofia Sanchez Manzanaro, “China Targets EU Cheese and Milk in Anti-Subsidy Investigation,” Euractiv, August 21, 2024, https://www.euractiv.com/section/agriculture-food/news/china-targets-eu….
32. Garima Mohan, “Can the EU Elevate Its Partnership with India?” German Marshall Fund, November 27, 2024, https://www.gmfus.org/news/can-eu-elevate-its-partnership-india.
33. Seb Starcevic, “Von der Leyen Announces Visit to India,” Politico, January 21, 2025, https://www.politico.eu/article/ursula-von-der-leyen-visit-india.
34. “Jaishankar Bats for India-EU FTA, Says Ties More Important than Ever,” Indian Express, February 5, 2025, https://indianexpress.com/article/india/jaishankar-bats-for-india-eu-fta-says-ties-more-important-than-ever-9817808.
35. Jana Puglierin and Pawel Zerka, “Keeping America Close, Russia Down, and China Far Away: How Europeans Navigate a Competitive World,” European Council on Foreign Relations, June 7, 2023, https://ecfr.eu/publication/keeping-america-close-russia-down-and-china….
36. Angela Pennisi di Floristella and Xuechen Chen, “Strategic Narratives of Russia’s War in Ukraine: Perspectives from China,” Policy Studies 45, no. 3–4 (2024): 573–94.
37. “India, UK Looking to Resume Talks on Proposed Trade Agreement in Feb: Commerce Ministry,” Economic Times, January 15, 2025, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/foreign-trade/india-u….
38. Pankaj Saran and Raj Kumar Sharma, “Russia-Ukraine War: Takeaways for India,” NatStrat, April 10, 2024, https://www.natstrat.org/articledetail/publications/russia-ukraine-war-….
39. “Raisina Dialogue,” Observer Research Foundation, https://www.orfonline.org/forums/raisina-dialogue.
40. “India: EU Trade Relations with India. Facts, Figures, and Latest Developments,” European Commission, https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/india_en.
41. “India: EU Trade Relations with India. Facts, Figures, and Latest Developments.”
42. See the FEBI website at https://febi.co.in.
43. “FEBI Business Sentiment Survey 2025: EU Business in India,” FEBI, https://febi.co.in/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/FEBI-Business-Sentiment-S….
44. See the EU Chamber of Commerce in China website at https://www.europeanchamber.com.cn/en/home.
45. “5 Countries That Are Making Big in India,” Make in India, https://www.makeinindia.com/5-countries-are-making-big-india.
46. “Joint Statement: EU-India Leaders’ Meeting,” European Council, May 8, 2021, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/49523/eu-india-leaders-meeting-jo….
47. “First EU-India Trade and Technology Council Focused on Deepening Strategic Engagement on Trade and Technology,” European Commission, Press Release, May 16, 2023, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/api/files/document/print/en/ip_23_2728/IP_23_2728_EN.pdf.
48. Jeet Kar, “The EU and India Are Close to Finalizing a Free Trade Agreement. Here’s What to Know,” World Economic Forum, March 7, 2025, https://www.weforum.org/stories/2025/03/eu-india-free-trade-agreement.
49. “India, UK Looking to Resume Talks on Proposed Trade Agreement in Feb: Commerce Ministry.”
50. Rajeev Jayaswal, “India-EU FTA: 9th Round of Negotiations to Start on September 23,” Hindustan Times, September 23, 2024, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/indiaeu-fta-9th-round-of-nego….
51. Interview with a senior Indian diplomat, November 6, 2024.
52. Siddharth Singh Bhaisora, “Understanding the Rise of Luxury Consumption from Affluent India,” Wright, November 3, 2024, https://www.wrightresearch.in/blog/understanding-the-rise-of-luxury-consumption-from-affluent-india.
53. Chris Buckley, “‘The East Is Rising’: Xi Maps Out China’s Post-COVID Ascent,” New York Times, March 3, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/03/world/asia/xi-china-congress.html.
54. Priya Pareek, “What Is India–Middle East–Europe Corridor and How Will It Benefit India?” India Today, February 13, 2025, https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/what-is-india-middle-east-europe-corridor-and-how-will-it-benefit-india-2679305-2025-02-13.
55. Liu Zhihua, Wang Yu, and Zhong Nan, “Sino-EU Ties Seen as Key to Global Growth,” China Daily, February 4, 2025, https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202502/04/WS67a14ee8a310a2ab06eaa04f.ht….
56. Ursula von der Leyen, “The Consequential Partnership: Reimagining and Realigning EU and India Ties for Today’s World,” President of the European Commission, February 27, 2025, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_25_641.