• Despite a successful leaders’ summit early in the new Administration, policy moves and President Trump statement's since then have dimmed initial hopes for the U.S.-Japan alliance to continue the momentum generated by the Biden Administration relationship with Japan.
• Japan is likely to continue its aggressive investment in the United States as a bid for Washington’s favor, including hoping to avoid the threatened aluminum and steel tariffs.
• The global aspect of the U.S.-Japan relationship may diminish based on different views on Ukraine and Russia, but as the Trump team develops its Indo-Pacific strategy, potential for continued regional cooperation exists through the Quad, the trilateral relationship with the Philippines, and—most tenuously—the trilateral agreement with South Korea.
   

On January 15, the Asia Society Policy Institute (ASPI) hosted a conference on the U.S.-Japan relationship, less than a week before Donald Trump was inaugurated for his second term as president. The conference, consisting of two public panels and three private sessions under Chatham House Rule, explored the U.S.-Japan alliance at a pivotal moment and delved into the security-related and economic implications for the two allies. Three weeks later, Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba visited the White House, setting the tone for relations under a second Trump administration. What did the summit reveal about prospects for the partnership? How did this meeting measure up to the conclusions and observations that the conference reached? And how do the two countries forge the difficult path ahead?

Early reviews of the summit are largely characterized by relief. Ishiba emerged unscathed from the meeting, able to list Japan’s priorities from the podium and asserting that Japan made the decision to double its defense spending on its own, not based on a U.S. demand. He complied with the expectation that he would praise Trump, calling him “powerful and sincere,” and claimed that Japanese investment in the United States gained momentum after the U.S. election.

During the press conference, Ishiba ticked off a series of commitments that echoed those established in previous administrations: affirmation that Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan security treaty covers the Senkaku Islands, the continuation of the Quad (Australia, India, Japan, and the United States) and trilateral partnerships with South Korea and the Philippines, and an agreement of no change to the status quo through the use of force or coercion in the South China Sea or East China Sea. (The addition of the term "coercion" was new and could include economic measures not only military moves.) Trump made no mention of these Japanese priorities but focused his remarks on Japan’s investment in the United States.

By emphasizing increased investment in the United States and lavishing praise on Trump, Ishiba avoided an anticipated demand by President Trump for Japan to raise its defense spending beyond the 2% of GDP goal that Japan has set. Trump made clear that energy exports would be a major priority and a possible remedy for the large trade deficit that exists with Japan. Tokyo could face pressure to invest heavily in an Alaskan pipeline that Trump has prioritized, even issuing an Executive Order outlining its benefits.

While the outcome may have allayed fears of a disastrous launch and provided a reprieve for Ishiba from his domestic skeptics, the alliance has not yet executed the pivot to its role in the America First foreign policy. One successful summit—including a Joint Statement that reiterated mostly previous language about the alliance—may not soothe the anxiety that was a central theme among conference participants. In Trump’s first month in office, his administration made several moves that could prove detrimental to the relationship. Chief among them was the imposition of steel and aluminum tariffs without an exception for Japan, a policy direction predicted by ASPI’s economic roundtable. Trump’s threatened 25% tariffs on Mexico would damage Japan’s auto industry, which has shifted much of its production to Mexico. The thorny campaign-trail issue of Nippon Steel’s bid to buy U.S. Steel persisted, with Trump resisting the deal and striking a blow to the “friendshoring” framework to secure supply chains.

The first weeks of Trump’s term brought other changes that will impact the U.S.-Japan relationship. The rapid dismantlement of USAID is likely to diminish U.S. soft power abroad, particularly in the Global South where Japan has focused diplomatic overtures and overseas development assistance. Elon Musk’s campaign to lay off large swathes of federal workers could hollow out the working-level employees who maintain the partnership across several agencies. As cautioned during the first conference panel, developing and sustaining efforts such as the nascent mini-laterals demand great amounts of staff time, energy, and patience; a reduction in workforce could stunt those initiatives. In the course of Cabinet confirmation hearings, Senate Republicans acquiesced to all of Trump’s nominees—while Japan may have been heartened by the swift and unanimous confirmation of Marco Rubio as secretary of state, other national security figures such as Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard provide less reassurance about the importance of alliances in U.S. foreign policy.

Perhaps most ominously, Trump reiterated his long-standing questioning of the value of the U.S.-Japan alliance specifically, calling it an “interesting” deal that is non-reciprocal in security commitments, followed by complaining that “[The Japanese] make a fortune with us economically. I actually ask who makes these deals?” This aside comment in the Oval Office could suggest that Trump views the Japan alliance through the same lens as NATO, and not as an exceptional case. In addition, during his confirmation hearing for Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Elbridge Colby—widely expected to be an influential figure in the Administration—stated that Japan should be spending at least 3% of its GDP on defense.

The consensus of conference participants was firm: the U.S.-Japan alliance has thrived both bilaterally and multilaterally, becoming a truly global partnership. Japan has stepped up its leadership, providing munitions in support of Ukraine, strategically deploying overseas security assistance (particularly with Indonesia and the Philippines), and conducting joint exercises with countries including Australia, to name just a few examples. Tokyo’s decision to significantly increase its defense spending has driven alliance modernization, enhancing interoperability and working toward a true bilateral command and control relationship. Japan will purchase hundreds of Tomahawk missiles from the United States, acquiring an offensive strike capability for the first time since World War II. The flourishing of new mini-laterals positioned the U.S.-Japan alliance firmly at the center of regional coordination, and Tokyo delivered on its designation as the “cornerstone” of peace and security in the Indo-Pacific. Beyond the region, Japan stepped up its cooperation with NATO, investing in the trans-Atlantic relationship and providing support for war-torn Ukraine.

Despite Japan’s disappointment  at the U.S. withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the two countries have developed meaningful economic security cooperation, with a focus on supply chain resilience for critical products such as semi-conductors and batteries. The two countries adopted a friendshoring practice, exemplified by Japanese investments in reshoring production and diversifying suppliers, though as participants noted, the Biden administration’s rejection of the Nippon Steel bid revealed the limits of this approach. Japan’s assiduous pursuit of Southeast Asian countries to sign on to the Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific Economic Partnership (IPEF) strengthened the only major U.S.-led trade initiative in the region. Agreements on Japanese investment in rare earth processing to reduce dependence on Chinese suppliers and agreements on digital trade filled out the bilateral economic relationship.

At the White House, Trump made clear he will focus on the trade deficit with Japan, in a familiar transactional approach. In response, Japan has accelerated its investments in the United States, pledging to raise its total from $800 billion to $1 trillion—but faces a steep climb to overcome its current surplus of nearly $55 billion. Trump’s emphasis on Japanese investment in an Alaskan liquified natural gas (LNG) pipeline comes with an outsized price tag that may concern relevant Japanese companies if no assurances are provided that a future Democratic administration would allow for its completion on the previously protected Arctic National Wildlife Refuge.

Conference speakers identified the particular concern of the upcoming expiration of a burden-sharing agreement that determines how much Japan pays to cover the cost of hosting U.S. troops on its territory. Host nation support negotiations—always contentious—were a target for the first Trump administration; the arrangement with South Korea collapsed when U.S. officials demanded that South Korea increase its contribution many-fold. For decades, Trump has complained that international alliances are a boon for the hosting countries, with the United States providing for the partner’s security without adequate reciprocal compensation. Japan’s commitment to double its defense spending may not sway Trump administration demands that Tokyo up its payments to the United States to defray the cost of the 50,000 military personnel stationed on the archipelago. At the heart of the difference, according to discussions at the conference, is a transactional versus cooperative, collective approach to providing for a U.S. forward-operating military presence in the Asia-Pacific theater.

Despite Trump’s generally skeptical view of multilateral arrangements, conference participants saw reason for optimism that elements of the latticework of security partnerships will continue. The Quad—embraced as a centerpiece of Trump’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy in his first term—could be seen as geopolitically advantageous, although the emphasis on “public goods” may be sidelined in favor of a more explicitly counter-China orientation. Indications of this promise include Secretary Rubio’s convening of a minister-level Quad meeting after the inauguration and the mention of the Quad during the Trump-Modi summit. The Philippines-Japan-U.S. trilateral agreement could also be continued given Manila’s current willingness to confront Beijing on its maritime disputes. Although the joint statement from President Trump and Prime Minister Ishiba in Washington reaffirmed the importance of the Japan–U.S.–Republic of Korea (ROK) trilateral partnership, prospects for trilateral cooperation are less promising, due to both political developments in Seoul and a potentially lukewarm U.S.-South Korea relationship if Trump pursues direct diplomacy with Kim Jong Un without South Korean involvement.

Developments with Ukraine since Trump took office deepen Tokyo’s concern. Not only was cooperation on Ukraine a central feature of the U.S.-Japan global partnership under the Biden Administration, Trump’s explosive meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in the Oval Office may reinforce fears that U.S. security commitments may diminish in the new Administration. Tokyo could consider fortifying its growing relationship with NATO and the European Union in its quest to diversify its set of like-minded countries

President Trump’s Taiwan and China policies have yet to emerge. While several of his national security advisors and appointments are considered China hawks, some of the conference speakers questioned whether Trump would prioritize Taiwan’s security in his overall strategy toward China. Although the joint statement issued after the Ishiba-Trump summit included text on the shared concern about stability in the Taiwan Strait and new language on the allies’ opposition to any change of the status quo by force or coercion, Trump’s stated respect for Xi Jinping may indicate that he is inclined to strike a deal with China. As conference speakers noted, Taiwan could either foster cooperation within the alliance or it could be an area of contention depending on the policy and expectations.

Under the Biden administration, the potential for a Taiwan contingency animated U.S.-Japan alliance dynamics. The conference dedicated a session to exploring how the alliance would respond to a series of Taiwan scenarios and reached several key conclusions: the limits on Japan’s ability to engage in military operations would depend on the threat to Japan’s survival; there remains a continued need to build up Taiwan’s resilience and increase channels of communication among Washington, Tokyo, and Taipei; and China is likely to pursue gray zone tactics (activities that fall between peacetime diplomacy and armed conflict) as opposed to a direct attack on Taiwan.

Without a clear indication of Trump’s Taiwan policy, alliance coordination—already challenging—becomes more fraught. Further, Ishiba and Fumio Kishida before him indicated Japan’s necessity to stabilize relations with China and preserve their economic relationship. For Tokyo, the United States should maintain deterrence against Chinese aggression but not escalate to a more involved conflict that would directly threaten Japan’s security. As the conference discussions revealed, achieving this balance requires open lanes of communication between the allies and more clarity on the direction of U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy.

The conference revealed a broad sense among the participants that the U.S.-Japan alliance would remain intact and advance the agenda of deepening bilateral defense cooperation and expanding investment and trade ties. Through shared interests, the alliance will be able to adapt to the shifting geopolitical landscape and continue to cooperate with like-minded countries. Japan’s diplomatic strategy and its strong reputation as a reliable and trusted partner in the region will help Tokyo navigate its interests in the Indo-Pacific, even if U.S. priorities shift.

Less clear was if the global aspect of the partnership would continue to thrive. As Trump’s initial weeks in office have demonstrated, U.S. foreign policy has changed dramatically. Coordination on Ukrainian and Russian policy played a central role in the alliance since the Russian invasion: if U.S.-Russian relations warm, does Tokyo adjust its stance toward Moscow? Will Japan be expected to commit major resources for the mammoth task of rebuilding Ukraine? Similarly, if Trump pursues a deal with North Korea that does not address all of Japan’s priorities, including Pyongyang’s military capabilities and the Japanese citizens abducted from Japanese territory in the 1970s and 1980s, U.S. and Japanese strategic alignment on the Indo-Pacific will diminish. Japan’s deepening of ties with NATO in the past several years may not be welcomed if the transatlantic alliance falters. The America First doctrine does not prioritize a defense of the international, rules-based order and the rule-of-law institutions on which Japan depends.

Conference participants acknowledged this potential threat to the global partnership but also reflected on the importance of nongovernmental connections. If the U.S.-Japan alliance experiences some drift at the leadership level, linkages such as Track II conferences, grassroots exchanges, and subnational engagement can help sustain the relationship. A shared commitment to executing the pivot to a new, complicated political and diplomatic landscape pervaded the participants as the two countries approach an uncertain global landscape.

The U.S.-Japan alliance has evolved in response to the changing international security environment. The Russian invasion of Ukraine and Beijing’s response to former U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taipei have changed how Japan views the world. Participants broadly agreed that the goals of the U.S.-Japan alliance remain the same: to preserve peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. However, the challenges to regional security and international order are mounting, as countries around the world face crises of leadership and focus on looking out for themselves.

• The U.S.-Japan alliance has become a truly global partnership, with Japan stepping up and taking on real leadership roles in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. Examples include coast guard cooperation, co-production of munitions in support of Ukraine, overseas security assistance (particularly with Indonesia and the Philippines), and joint exercises with countries including Australia.
• Despite anticipated difficulties under new leadership in Washington, the U.S.-Japan alliance will continue to strengthen and endure. It is also an opportunity for Tokyo to continue to demonstrate its leadership in addressing nontraditional security issues such as global health and climate resilience in the region and around the world.
• While the future of the U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral remains uncertain, there are other opportunities for Washington and Tokyo to engage in mini-lateral formats, including the U.S.-Japan-Philippines trilateral and the Quad. 
   

Some participants expressed concerns about implementation of the modernized alliance—while Tokyo and Washington have accomplished what it set out to achieve in developing new mechanisms and capabilities, the two allies may not be on the same page when it comes to policy and the broader strategic picture. Participants from both sides debated whether a second Trump administration would pursue an exclusively isolationist policy, while some argued that the United States would not withdraw from its alliances. One participant highlighted the different views within the Trump administration, from senior officials who want to prioritize getting allies and partners to step up in paying for their own defense to more traditional conservatives who value alliances in both Europe and Asia. It is worth noting that the day after Trump’s inauguration, Secretary of State Rubio hosted the Quad foreign ministers in Washington.

When pressed on whether Tokyo has a strategy for engaging with the region in the face of China and in the absence of U.S. leadership, Japanese participants restated their firm belief in Washington’s capability and intention to remain engaged in the region. From a U.S. perspective, while the United States influences Japan’s decisions, Japan is building out its own independent capabilities and pursuing its own partnerships. The U.S.-Japan alliance has evolved: Tokyo is seen as a vastly capable copilot.

The discussion also highlighted Japan’s leading role in development across the Indo-Pacific region and around the world as a remarkable testament to its soft power. Japan also excels at combating nontraditional security issues, such as democracy support, climate change, global health, and disaster response and humanitarian assistance.

On mini-lateral cooperation, participants were pessimistic about the prospects for U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral cooperation given the ongoing political crisis in Seoul following President Yoon Suk Yeol’s martial law declaration and subsequent impeachment and the likelihood that a progressive administration—usually more negative toward Japan—would assume power this spring. However, there are more reasons for the three countries to work together, such as freedom of navigation and de-risking from China. To the extent possible, trilateral cooperation can be framed around similar levels of threat perceptions, rather than on areas of threat divergence, such as on North Korea and Taiwan.

With U.S.-China strategic competition intensifying across many areas, tensions in the Taiwan Strait have emerged as a particular flashpoint. The U.S.-Japan alliance has sharpened its attention to a possible contingency in the Strait and what role each country might play if a conflict were to break out. Speakers assessed what Washington’s expectation of Tokyo would be if the U.S. military were to engage, and whether cooperation over Taiwan would be an area of strength in the alliance or a stress to the relationship. 

• “Conflict is neither imminent nor inevitable.” While recent upgrades to the U.S.-Japan alliance have made significant progress in areas of deterrence and preparation for high-end crises, speakers agreed that the more likely scenario in a Taiwan contingency would result from China’s gray zone activities and not all-out war or a full-scale invasion. 
• Nevertheless, it will be important to build up Taiwan’s resilience. Over the past four years, Taipei has very consciously embraced asymmetrical capabilities, aligned not just with investments but also in training and operational concepts. Furthermore, Japan has exceptional expertise to share with Taiwan in the areas of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.
• Despite upgrades to the alliance, there are still significant constraints on Tokyo’s support of Washington in a Taiwan contingency. Any possible response from Tokyo to a scenario in the Taiwan Strait would depend heavily on the type of scenario and the level of direct impact on Japan’s survival. 
• Communication channels with Taipei are necessary for any scenario. Tokyo and Washington will need to be able to talk to Taipei directly. While the alliance has its own process and personnel in place for an effective communication mechanism to make decisions jointly, Taiwan will also be making its own decisions. The United States and Japan will need to answer the following: What role does Taiwan have in this communications network and how to account for Taiwan’s own decisions in a crisis? 
   

With new leaderships in both Tokyo and Washington, a key question was how the new Ishiba and Trump administrations will look at China and Taiwan. For Trump 2.0, expect forward-leaning rhetoric that the United States will counter China in every facet of strategy possible, but there will also be some elements of continuity in the economic and trade space, as well as on Taiwan policy. One speaker noted that in U.S. defense secretary nominee Pete Hegseth’s written testimony, he emphasized that “the United States can help prevent miscalculation by maintaining our long-standing policy in support of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.”

In Tokyo, when former Prime Minister Kishida announced he was stepping down, Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) President Ishiba was leading a delegation of Diet members on a trip to Taipei to demonstrate his commitment on the Taiwan issue. However, Prime Minister Ishiba’s ambiguous positions regarding Japan coming to Taiwan’s defense have left observers in Taipei and Tokyo dissatisfied. Furthermore, Ishiba has indicated that he believes dialogue and engagement with Beijing can prevent large-scale war and bring peace to Asia. One speaker argued that while dialogue is necessary to maintain high-level conversations, it should also not be held to appease China and that the focus should instead be on deterrence and balancing rather than engagement.

Over the past four years, structures of the U.S.-Japan alliance have changed to include command changes and the ability to jointly develop key capabilities and hold military exercises to ensure integration and continuity. One speaker argued that these exercises have all been focused on a high-end crisis or war, the most dangerous scenario in a Taiwan contingency that could involve military ships across the Taiwan Strait or missiles hitting Taiwan, Japan, and U.S. bases. Another speaker highlighted the significance of the 2021 Biden-Yoshihide Suga joint statement that was notable for its reference to Taiwan, underscoring ongoing concerns about regional stability. This has paved the way for the two governments and militaries to be able to expand cooperation within the alliance framework.

The discussion shifted to a presentation of three possible scenarios in a Taiwan Strait contingency—a full-scale invasion, a short-of-war invasion (seizure of outer islands), or a blockade—and how Washington and Tokyo may be compelled to respond to each situation. Most importantly, speakers agreed that conversations would be needed about who has what role and responsibilities in any scenario.

A full-scale invasion scenario could include missiles hitting Taiwan and/or U.S. bases in Japan. From Washington’s perspective, there is the expectation that Japan would lean forward with other U.S. allies in the region and join the United States in the sort of military response that would be conditional on the appetite of the U.S. Congress and the American people. At a minimum, this includes the U.S. ability to begin operations and respond from its bases in Japan. From a Japanese perspective, if China were to strike U.S. bases in Japan as part of its invasion of Taiwan, Tokyo would exercise self-defense. If the survival of Japan were threatened, Tokyo would ultimately decide to exercise collective self-defense and join the United States in its military response. However, if China were to avoid striking Japan, there were concerns in Tokyo about China threatening to attack Japan if it were to allow the United States to use its bases in the country. Nevertheless, from a Japanese perspective, such a scenario of a full-scale invasion would be least likely given the costs to Beijing.

If Beijing were to seize outer islands around Taiwan without launching a full-scale invasion, the potential responses would be more varied. For Washington, it would depend on which islands were seized based on how the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) defines Taiwan, which includes the main island of Taiwan and Penghu Islands, but not Kinmen or Matsu. At a minimum, there would be an expectation of a strong diplomatic response from Washington in line with how the Biden administration responded to the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC’s) military exercises following Speaker Pelosi’s visit to Taipei and Taiwan leaders’ transits through the United States.

However, if the offshore island seizure were to impact the flow of trade, Washington’s requests for Tokyo’s support might be more significant; a Japanese speaker noted, however, that Tokyo’s response would rely heavily on how any seizure directly impacts the survival of Japan, as well as on how the United States would respond in such a scenario.

The third, more likely scenario is a complete blockade or quarantine of Taiwan. Since August 2022, China has conducted several large-scale exercises—both announced and unannounced—simulating a blockade. Even a scenario that lasts three to six months will have significant ramifications for the global economy. The main question in such a scenario is how goods and services would continue to flow, and Japan and other U.S. allies might be called upon to figure out how to break the blockade. This also raises critical questions of resilience—does Taiwan have what it needs to survive? Therefore, U.S.-Japan cooperation must also include building Taiwan’s resilience.

In any of these three scenarios, quick and direct communication with Taipei would be necessary. While Tokyo and Washington have established important communication channels, especially military-to-military, there are no official channels of communication connecting the United States, Japan, and Taiwan, where the United States would tend to broker connectivity among parties. A crisis could escalate quickly, and personnel would need to be able to communicate directly with their counterparts and not wait for one side to play the role of broker. It was recognized that trilateral conversations at the Track I level were very sensitive given political constraints. Track II dialogues between academics and retired government officials could play an extremely important role in facilitating communications with Taipei.

The Indo-Pacific region faces significant economic and security challenges amid shifting global dynamics. The U.S.-Japan alliance, while traditionally strong, confronts new pressures from various directions including evolving trade policies, economic security concerns, and changing regional dynamics. Recent developments, such as the Nippon Steel case and potential new tariff policies, have created additional complexity in the bilateral relationship.

• Supply Chain Resilience as a Strategic Priority. Participants agreed that securing supply chains has emerged as a critical aspect of regional economic security. Discussions highlighted the U.S.-Japan partnership’s role in enhancing supply chain resilience, particularly in critical sectors such as semiconductors, batteries, and rare earths. Japan’s recent investments in reshoring production and diversifying suppliers were seen as aligning well with U.S. efforts to friendshore supply chains among trusted partners. This cooperation extends to other economic security priorities such as digital infrastructure and cybersecurity.
• The Role of Regional Trade Frameworks. The roundtable underscored the importance of multilateral frameworks such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) in shaping regional trade rules. While participants acknowledged U.S. reluctance to rejoin the CPTPP, they stressed that its absence risks ceding influence to China, which has actively pursued trade agreements across Asia. Some participants advocated a more active U.S. engagement, including sectoral agreements within IPEF that address areas such as digital trade.
• Trump Administration’s Trade Policies. The Trump administration’s emphasis on bilateral trade deals and its withdrawal from multilateral agreements including the TPP were viewed as shaping the current trade landscape. Participants discussed the administration’s potential second-term policies, with expectations of continued tariff measures and a focus on reducing dependency on Chinese imports. Concerns were raised about the economic impact of such policies on regional allies and the need for coordination to mitigate unintended consequences, particularly in sensitive sectors that include technology and critical minerals.
• Balancing Economic and Geopolitical Interests. The roundtable examined the balance between economic cooperation and geopolitical competition in U.S. trade policy. Several participants emphasized that trade agreements should serve both economic and strategic goals, enhancing resilience while countering unfair practices by China. However, some cautioned against framing trade solely as a countermeasure to China, advocating instead a positive vision that highlights shared benefits with allies. This includes opportunities for U.S.-Japan collaboration in third markets, especially in Southeast Asia and India, through infrastructure and energy partnerships.
• Challenges in Domestic and Regional Coordination. The discussion also explored challenges in building a coherent trade strategy amid domestic political constraints. Participants pointed to the need for stronger public messaging around the economic benefits of trade and the geopolitical risks of disengagement. A recurring theme was the importance of aligning U.S. and Japanese trade strategies, particularly in light of Japan’s growing leadership role in the region. Additionally, the role of the private sector was highlighted as a vital channel for sustaining bilateral cooperation, even when government relations face challenges.
   

The roundtable opened with an acknowledgment of the Indo-Pacific’s growing importance as a hub for global trade and innovation. Participants agreed that trade policies must reflect the region’s strategic significance, with the U.S.-Japan alliance playing a pivotal role in shaping the economic architecture.

The conversation then shifted to supply chain security, with participants emphasizing the need for robust partnerships to reduce vulnerabilities. Examples included U.S.-Japan collaboration on semiconductor production and Japan’s investments in rare earth processing to diversify from Chinese suppliers. Participants highlighted the need for transparent and enforceable agreements to sustain these efforts, while also exploring new areas of cooperation such as cybersecurity and digital infrastructure development.

Regional trade frameworks, particularly CPTPP and IPEF, were another focal point. Participants discussed the impact of the U.S. decision to remain outside CPTPP, with some arguing it undermines U.S. credibility as a regional leader. Others noted opportunities within IPEF to address specific challenges, such as digital trade and supply chain resilience, without the political hurdles of a comprehensive agreement.

The Trump administration’s policies elicited mixed reactions. While some saw opportunities in a bilateral approach, others criticized the lack of a cohesive regional strategy. Participants agreed that future U.S. trade policies should prioritize collaboration with allies to address shared challenges, including unfair trade practices by China and the economic risks of protectionism.

Public perception and domestic politics emerged as key barriers to advancing trade initiatives. Participants stressed the importance of crafting a narrative that links trade to job creation, innovation, and competitiveness. They also called for a stronger partnership between Congress and the administration to advance a unified trade agenda.

The roundtable underscored the strategic importance of trade and economic security in the Indo-Pacific. Participants highlighted the need for enhanced U.S.-Japan cooperation, proactive engagement in regional frameworks, and a balanced approach to managing competition with China. Moving forward, crafting a compelling trade vision that resonates domestically and aligns with regional partners will be essential to securing U.S. economic and strategic interests in the region. The enduring strength of U.S.-Japan economic cooperation, particularly in areas such as supply chain resilience and regional development, offers promising avenues for continued partnership despite uncertainties in traditional trade policies.