This paper first explores the growing relationship between the European Union and Taiwan by focusing on recent interactions. It then discusses the broader geopolitical implications of Trump’s “America First” policy and how the U.S.-China competition impacts the EU’s ability to strategically balance the China-Taiwan dynamic. The paper demonstrates how a number of variables, including Europe’s strategic interests in the region, the U.S. position on China, and the U.S.-EU relationship under the second Trump administration, will influence ties between the EU and Taiwan.

The shift in EU-Taiwan ties has gone largely unnoticed. The EU has started paying more attention to Taiwan’s security, shifting away from its former focus on China for its importance in trade and investment. This shift is partly due to supply chain and security concerns and partly due to growing political apprehension about China’s long-term goals. In the coming years, Europe will be influenced by the Trump administration when deciding how to handle Taiwan. The EU will have to find a balance between the need for steady access to vital technology and U.S.-EU relations. At the same time, the EU and the United States seem to have entered a critical phase in their bilateral relationship, especially concerning the war in Ukraine and Washington’s warming relationship with Moscow. This indeterminate situation may also impact the EU’s relationship with both Taiwan and China, the consequences of which will take several months to fully gauge.

The European Union and Taiwan have steadily deepened economic ties in recent years, forging closer cooperation in trade, technology, and geopolitics. Despite Taiwan’s lack of formal diplomatic recognition by the EU and its member countries, Taiwan’s pivotal role in global supply chains — especially in semiconductors and advanced technology — has made it an essential economic partner. At the same time, the growing U.S.-China rivalry has added layers of complexity, with Taiwan at the center of the geopolitical struggle.

The first Donald Trump administration marked a significant shift in U.S. foreign policy toward the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan. Trump’s “America First” policy and confrontational stance toward China reshaped the United States’ approach to Taiwan and its role in the broader global economy. Trump first referred to China as a “strategic competitor” in his 2017 National Security Strategy, and he used strong language to describe how China is threatening American interests and the rules-based order.

In the past decade, as China’s economic and military might has grown, U.S. economic and security interests have faced greater risks from China’s economic activities, which include trafficking illegal commodities, using forced labor, and stealing critical technologies. At the same time, the capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) continue to improve, and its more aggressive stance concerns the U.S. military.

As a focal point in the U.S.-China rivalry, Taiwan’s geopolitical importance will continue to grow. However, U.S. policy toward Taiwan could become more erratic and premised on larger payments in exchange for increased military support, or Taiwan could be turned into a card to be played against China. If things play out as they did during Trump’s first presidency, this could enhance Taiwan’s geostrategic significance and its role in global supply networks but might also make the EU’s China-Taiwan balancing act more difficult. Europe would have to strike a balance between its diplomatic and economic relations with China and its support for Taiwan, especially in sectors like commerce, technology, and climate change. Therefore, in the changing context of U.S.-China competition, Taiwan’s place in world geopolitics and its relationship with the EU will continue to be a crucial subject of attention.

The extent of Europe’s engagement with Taiwan, however, will largely depend on how the geopolitical dynamics unfold and how both the United States and China position themselves in this high-stakes geopolitical game. In light of the United States’ shifting position on the Russia-Ukraine War, the U.S.-EU relationship is bound to take a turn for the worse. This could either bring the EU closer to China or it could push the EU to try and carve a more independent and autonomous path for itself, both economically and in security, which would allow the continent more maneuvering space when it comes to maintaining relations with Taiwan.

Over the last few years, EU-Taiwan relations have reached several significant milestones despite Chinese efforts to isolate Taiwan. These developments are most evident in trade, technology, and political cooperation.

In 2023, the European Parliament (EP) passed a resolution calling for stronger economic ties with Taiwan, stressing the island’s crucial role for Europe.¹ This marked a clear shift toward a more proactive EU policy toward Taiwan, particularly as tensions with China have escalated and national security concerns have percolated through Europe’s trade and investment strategy toward China. Among others, the EU has closely scrutinized PRC imports as a result of unfair market practices and for economic and national security reasons, leading to more import controls on China’s electric vehicles and other commodities to protect local markets.² Recent scandals in Europe concerning Chinese interference, espionage,³ and security threats, rendered more acute by China’s aggressive posture toward Taiwan and other countries in the region, have negatively charged what was previously a mere business relationship free of geopolitical tension.⁴ European politicians have sought to balance economic and security interests by increasing engagement with Taiwan, which they consider an alternative to China for more stable and resilient supply chains and high-tech products.

Taiwan has likewise sought to diversify its economic partnerships beyond China, including enhancing its relationship with the EU and other advanced economies. The New Southbound Policy (NSP),⁵ revised this year under the new Lai Ching-te administration,⁶ seeks to reduce Taiwan’s economic reliance on China.⁷ This policy mostly targets countries located in Taiwan’s geographical proximity,⁸ but the island has also sought to forge closer EU-Taiwan ties in sectors such as high-tech manufacturing, green energy, and digital transformation, especially since Taiwan became more isolated in the Tsai Ing-wen era.⁹ Taiwan has renewed efforts for an investment and trade deal with the EU — an agreement that would be both economically and politically important for Taiwan, given its growing diplomatic isolation and exclusion from most global organizations and treaties.¹⁰ Despite the lack of a deal, Taiwan’s economic relationship with the EU remains strong. Per 2023 statistics, bilateral trade reached $77 billion, foreign direct investment from the EU to Taiwan accounted for $58.1 billion, and the EU was Taiwan’s fourth-largest trading partner while Taiwan was the EU’s 13th-largest trading partner.¹¹

In the past five years, shifting geopolitical dynamics have brought about stronger EU-Taiwan collaboration in the digital realm. In 2021, the EU introduced the Digital Compass plan to enhance its technological capacity and societal transformation.¹² Taiwan is central to the EU’s efforts to reduce dependence on China for high-tech products, especially semiconductors — an area in which the EU has struggled with shortages in recent years. Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) is one of the world’s most advanced semiconductor manufacturers, and Taiwan’s pivotal role in global technology supply chains makes it indispensable to the EU.

TSMC is leveraging the EU Chips Act¹³ to build a semiconductor fab in Dresden, Germany, expected to become a key supplier to European industries and automakers. It began construction of its first semiconductor fabrication facility in Europe in August 2024 with an investment of more than $10.7 billion and will mainly produce chips for the industrial and automotive sectors. TSMC is demonstrating a strong commitment to the region by planning several fabs throughout Europe. For example, the strategy in Germany lays the groundwork for TSMC’s further penetration into the European market, which will be aided by significant alliances with Bosch, Infineon, and NXP, even though the precise locations for future factories have not yet been determined. The German fab will concentrate on manufacturing chips with advanced manufacturing technologies, such as 28 nm, 22 nm, and 16/12 nm, which are essential for industrial and automotive applications.¹⁴ The plant is expected to produce 40,000 silicon wafers per month once it is operational in 2027, helping to secure Europe’s place in the world’s semiconductor supply chain.

A major factor in TSMC’s decision to invest outside of Taiwan is geopolitics in response to growing tensions between Beijing and Taipei. Europe offers TSMC many good conditions because of its robust industrial base and government backing through programs like the EU Chips Act. Additionally, by expanding, TSMC is able to take advantage of the rising demand for semiconductors in Europe. Despite producing only 10% of the world’s semiconductors, the EU’s industrial and automotive sectors remain major buyers. By 2030, the region will produce 20% of the world’s semiconductors thanks to TSMC’s new factories.¹⁵

Especially after the COVID-19 pandemic and its impressive management by the Taiwanese authorities, the EU has increasingly expressed support for the island’s inclusion in international organizations, such as the World Health Organization, from which Taiwan is excluded.¹⁶ In recent years, the EP has passed resolutions advocating for Taiwan’s increased role in global governance, despite Beijing’s diplomatic pressure.¹⁷ Rhetorical efforts, however, have amounted to little in practice, as Taiwan remains excluded from important international fora, such as the Conference of the Parties or the World Health Assembly, in which it previously took part as an observer.¹⁸

Given tensions across the Taiwan Strait and the intensification of PLA military exercises around Taiwan, the EP has passed several resolutions expressing its concern. Among the European institutions, the EP has articulated the most support for expanding ties with Taipei. In its first-ever standalone report on EU-Taiwan relations, EP members recommended multiple engagement measures, including exploring the option of an EU-Taiwan Bilateral Investment Agreement,¹⁹ and emphasized the importance of Taiwan and the EU sharing values and political systems. The EU backtracked from a comprehensive trade deal with China in early 2021 when relations soured.²⁰ As the EU faces rising economic burdens due to increased defense spending and Trump’s tariffs, China might become a more essential economic lifeline, and both sides might be more open to reviving a trade deal.²¹ With U.S.-EU relations further disarrayed by the Ukraine war, both EU-China relations and EU-Taiwan relations may see changes that are difficult to predict.

Furthermore, in 2021, members of the EP’s special committee on foreign interference traveled to Taipei to discuss joint strategies to counter disinformation.²² However, it is important to note that these parliamentarians represented themselves and not the EP, in an evident effort to avoid irritating China.

Following the U.S. Senate’s vote on Taiwan after Nancy Pelosi’s visit to the island in August 2022,²³ the EP passed a resolution on September 15, 2022, condemning China’s military aggression against Taiwan.²⁴ The resolution stated that China’s provocative actions must have consequences and that the EU and Taiwan are “like-minded partners” that adhere to the values of “freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.” It further stated that between August 4 and 10, 2022, China had intensified its “long-standing military intimidation against Taiwan” and that “provocative actions against Taiwan and in the South China Sea must have consequences for EU-China relations and that the possibility of contingency planning must be considered.”²⁵ On February 28, 2024, the EP passed two resolutions concerning the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Common Security and Defence Policy.²⁶ These resolutions included language such as “neither Taiwan nor China is subordinate to the other” and “only Taiwan’s democratically elected government can represent the Taiwanese people on the international stage.” Both strongly condemned China’s attempts to unilaterally change the status quo and alter the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait.²⁷

Finally, on October 24, 2024, ten days after PLA military exercises around Taiwan following Lai’s National Day speech,²⁸ the EP plenary debate conveyed important headway in Taiwan’s relation with the EU. In a nonbinding resolution, it “strongly reject[ed] and refute[ed] the PRC’s attempts to distort history and international rules,”²⁹ referring to China’s efforts to persuade the international community that UN Resolution 2758 settled the “Taiwan question” once and for all as an internal PRC matter (while in fact it dealt only with China’s UN seat).³⁰ Despite the resolution being symbolic, it countered China’s narrative regarding Taiwan’s sovereignty and openly called for a strengthening of cooperation with the island in key areas, such as countering disinformation.³¹ Finally, the EP stressed “the independent right of the EU and its Member States to develop relationships with Taiwan in line with their interests and shared values of democracy and human rights without foreign interference.”

In short, EU policy toward Taiwan has evolved, with increasing vocal support for its participation in multilateral dialogues and forums. While the EU has been cautious about challenging China directly, the rise of Beijing’s assertiveness toward Taiwan has prompted a more outspoken stance. As stated in its 2021 Indo-Pacific Strategy,³² the EU is fully aware that the increasing tensions in the region “may have a direct impact on European security and prosperity.” This increases the importance of maintaining stability in the Taiwan Strait, a crucial shipping lane for 40% of the EU’s external trade, with approximately 100,000 vessels per year supplying Japan, Korea, and others.³³

However, while Brussels has taken the lead in building a more resilient strategy for Europe vis-à-vis China, most member states have been more cautious about implementing measures or changing their posture in regard to Taiwan, with mostly rhetorical actions. How Europe will deal with both Taiwan and China in the future depends on how the U.S.-China relationship — as well as the U.S.-Europe relationship — will evolve during the second Trump administration.

Taiwan has faced escalating economic and diplomatic pressures from China since at least 2016. This pressure has taken many forms, including economic coercion and growing attempts to isolate Taiwan from the international community by poaching its few remaining diplomatic allies.³⁴ However, Taiwan has demonstrated remarkable resilience through diversification, innovation, and strategic partnerships.³⁵ Through various geopolitical shifts, Taiwan’s resilience has enhanced its economic and technological importance.

Taiwan has reduced its dependence on China by strategically diversifying its economic and trade relations with other countries, including the EU, Japan, the United States, and Southeast Asia. Conscious policies like the aforementioned NSP and the 2023 United States–Taiwan Initiative on 21st-Century Trade First Agreement Implementation Act address pertinent trade concerns such as multinational cooperation, small and medium-sized businesses, anticorruption, and sound regulatory procedures. In 2024, the United States once again became the number-one destination for Taiwan’s exports, supplanting China after decades. Shipments rose 65.7% year-on-year in March 2024 to $9.1 billion; exports to mainland China grew just 6% to $7.9 billion.³⁶ The island exported $24.6 billion worth of goods to the United States in the first three months of 2024, compared with $22.4 billion to China, according to Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs. At the same time, Taiwan’s investments in China have tumbled to their lowest level in more than twenty years, dropping nearly 40% to $3 billion in 2023.³⁷ Diversifying renders Taiwan more resilient to Chinese economic coercion and reinforces its position as a key player in global trade.

Despite Beijing’s efforts to disrupt Taipei’s position in the global economy, Taiwan’s technological prowess has cemented its status as a critical economic partner for the EU and the broader West. Taiwan’s semiconductor industry is of such strategic importance for global supply chains that even third countries have become aware of the mounting need to protect it.³⁸ Growing international support for Taiwan, which also enhances its resilience, was partly spurred during the COVID-19 pandemic, when, due to extended disruptions of PRC supply chains, China’s economic prowess in Europe was suddenly diminished. Another factor was the changed security architecture in Europe following the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the mounting awareness that a similar scenario could potentially take place in Asia. One of the war’s most significant consequences has been the growing distance between China and Europe. With the current Trump administration warming to Moscow and rapidly weakening support toward Ukraine, Europe’s security architecture may be undergoing another epochal change, the concrete outcome of which may not be clear for another year or two.

Donald Trump’s first term as president was marked by a dramatic shift in U.S. foreign policy, particularly toward China. His America First policy³⁹ and combative stance on trade and technology led to a significant deterioration in U.S.-China relations, with profound implications for Taiwan.

Trump’s trade war with China, launched in 2018, covered a wide range of goods and high-tech sectors, such as semiconductors, telecommunications, AI, and advanced manufacturing.⁴⁰ His focus on technological decoupling aimed to reduce U.S. reliance on China. This approach further elevated Taiwan’s role in global supply chains, as the United States and the EU increasingly turned to Taiwan to secure these high-tech products. The U.S.-Taiwan bilateral relationship saw a huge boost following the passage of the Taiwan Travel Act in 2018.⁴¹ The act has three relevant provisions, which permit:

1. Officials at all levels of the U.S. government to travel to Taiwan to meet their Taiwanese counterparts;
2. High-level Taiwanese officials to enter the United States under respectful conditions and to meet with U.S. officials; and
3. The Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office and any other instrumentality established by Taiwan to conduct business in the United States.

Within this framework of increased interaction between Taiwanese and American officials, large arms sales to Taiwan were swiftly approved by the first Trump administration,⁴² several high-ranking government officials met with the Taiwanese leadership, and the U.S. Navy expanded patrols in the Taiwan Strait. These actions marked a stark departure from previous administrations, which had taken a more cautious approach to the island so as not to risk antagonizing China.

For Trump, Taiwan became a key strategic asset in the broader U.S.-China rivalry and a card to play against China. The way Taiwan was handled had much to do with the fact that his foreign affairs and security teams included advisors like Robert O’Brien and Mike Pompeo, who were sympathetic to Taiwan and critical of China. Trump’s policies reinforced Taiwan’s position as a counterbalance to China’s growing regional influence and helped frame the island as a critical player in the competition for global technological dominance. Taiwan’s semiconductor industry played a central role in Trump’s broader strategy of decoupling from China. With China becoming increasingly self-reliant in technology, the United States sought to ensure that Taiwan’s superiority in semiconductor production capacity remained a key source of competition for China and a strategic advantage in the hands of the United States.

Trump’s approach to Taiwan aligned with his broader foreign policy of confronting China’s assertiveness, particularly in the South China Sea and East Asia. In short, during the first Trump administration, Taiwan was seen as an essential element for countering China’s ambitions.

Trump’s second term will have significant implications for U.S.-China relations and, by extension, for EU-Taiwan ties. These two actors have both debated how to position themselves in the U.S.-China competition amidst the reverberations it has on their own security and trade spheres.⁴³ The first Trump administration’s foreign policy was characterized by aggressive actions against China; what happens during his second term will depend on several factors: first, the evolution of geopolitics (in particular the U.S.-China and U.S.-EU relationships); second, Taiwan’s own domestic political situation; third, how China will act toward the Lai administration and his divided parliament; and finally, on whether Trump’s team will be able to maneuver without Trump’s own proclivities taking the lead, although the opposite seems to be happening now.

The choice of Representative Mike Waltz as national security advisor and Senator Marco Rubio as secretary of state will influence U.S. policy toward Taiwan. Rubio, for example, has long been a vocal supporter of human rights in China and was the co-sponsor of the 2021 Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, which supposes that all goods from Xinjiang are produced using forced labor unless proven otherwise and blocks them from being imported into the United States.⁴⁴ Given that Rubio has long advocated for greater engagement with Taiwan, it is possible that there could be a revision to the U.S. Department of State’s contact guidelines with the island to allow for more high-level connection with the Taiwanese government. Waltz has also frequently voiced the need for the United States to be prepared for any threat from China.⁴⁵

Another interesting person to watch is Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, who, during his confirmation hearing for office, stated, “We will work with our partners and allies to deter aggression in the Indo-Pacific from the Communist Chinese.”⁴⁶ During his recent trip to NATO headquarters, he likewise said, “We are focusing on security of our own borders. We also face a peer competitor in the Communist Chinese with the capability and intent to threaten our homeland and core national interests in the Indo-Pacific,”⁴⁷ therefore making clear his position. Finally, Elise Stefanik, Trump’s choice for ambassador to the United Nations, is a member of the House Taiwan Caucus and supportive of Taiwan. An ambassador to the UN is crucial for trying to improve Taiwan’s inclusion in the international arena. Such stances on China by important persons in the second Trump administration could sway the White House to pressure U.S. national security agencies to assign resources in a way that supports their stance and is harsher on China.

On the other side of the spectrum, and pulling Trump’s policy toward China, is Elon Musk, in charge of a new task force dealing with governmental efficiency, who owns a gigantic factory in Shanghai for his electric vehicle company Tesla and is known for his China-friendly positions on Taiwan.⁴⁸

In any case, Trump’s election is difficult to evaluate. On February 13, 2025, the U.S. State Department deleted a symbolic phrase from its usual update on Taiwan, which previously noted, “We do not support Taiwan independence.” While the sentence disappeared, on the same day, Trump’s new government likewise emphasized the need for a peaceful and coercion-free resolution to the China-Taiwan issue. These may seem like insignificant changes, but they are meant as a signal to China and could suggest that the current U.S. administration is, in fact, ready to take a much stronger stance when it comes to maintaining the island’s de facto independence.⁴⁹ It is also possible that such comments may have a secondary scope and be intended to improve the United States’ position at the bargaining table in the U.S.-China trade war.

Taiwan will remain a key player in geopolitics in the near future. However, comments regarding Taiwan made by Trump in the electoral campaign seem to shift the focus of the island’s importance from the realm of ideological support for its democratic system and transparent institutions to a more economic-based, transaction-led support, conditional on how much Taiwan is able to contribute and pay the United States for its assistance, including increased costs for defensive weapons.⁵⁰ President Trump will also try to further pressure Taiwan’s high-value industrial production to relocate to the United States.⁵¹ A case in point is the TSMC factory in Arizona, which foreshadows what Trump might wish for, namely, for more Taiwanese investments to relocate to the United States to shield American interests in case China invades Taiwan.

It is therefore difficult to surmise whether the second Trump term will see increased support for Taiwan, including sustained arms sales and greater official exchanges. Should this be the case, it could lead to further friction with China. Many factors indicate that there will be continuity in Trump’s Taiwan strategy during his second administration. The treatment of Ukrainian President Zelensky and his country, however, worries many in Taiwan that they could incur the same fate — be treated with boorish indifference by Washington.⁵²

During Trump’s first term in office, the EU’s actions toward Taiwan were moderate and focused on avoiding an escalation of tensions to maintain economic and geopolitical ties to China. During the Biden administration, the EU’s support for Taiwan aligned more closely with that of the United States, one of growing distrust toward China. Nonetheless, Europe continued to take a more prudent and diplomatic stance than the United States, emphasizing the preservation of economic ties with China while nonconfrontationally advancing Taiwan’s interests. Despite the realization that the use of force in the Taiwan Strait would have direct consequences for the EU’s own peace and prosperity, it remains deeply divided concerning its stance on Taiwan.⁵³ This division complicates the EU’s delicate balancing act between China, Taiwan, and the United States.

U.S.-Europe relations. During the Biden administration’s transatlantic approach, and given the security threat posed by Russia, European countries were more inclined toward a close alliance with the United States rather than adjusting the bloc’s foreign policy to appease China. Recent meetings between Trump’s teams and their Russian counterparts⁵⁴ have created a profound shock and doubt among U.S. allies in Europe regarding security commitments. Should the United States be less committed to NATO security, this could push European countries and the EU to better coordinate their own defense industries to reduce dependence on U.S. assistance.

Whether the EU will continue to align with U.S. policies on Taiwan will therefore depend on the evolution of the U.S.-China relationship as well as on how Trump acts toward Russia, Ukraine, and Europe. After barely over one month in power, Trump has made it quite clear that Europe is neither an interlocutor nor a partner that he considers worthy of involvement.⁵⁵ His actions could push the EU to have a more autonomous position toward Taiwan, with continued rhetoric and ideological support for the island under Ursula von der Leyen’s leadership. However, given current U.S.-EU tensions, it is possible that the EU may seek to avoid direct confrontation with China by continuing a careful balancing act so as not to be caught in a conflict on multiple fronts.

Europe-China relations. For its part, China will continue a “divide and conquer” strategy in the hope that Trump chooses to grow closer to Russia, attenuate U.S. support for Ukraine, retreat from European allies, and withdraw from multilateral organizations, after which China could fill the vacuum and build a better relationship with Europe. China will use this geopolitical opportunity to drive a wedge among the transatlantic partners, arguing that Europeans cannot rely on U.S. support and need to seek strategic autonomy — a strategy that could gain traction if Trump ultimately decides to target the EU in his global trade war.⁵⁶ In the coming months, China will likely reach out to European leaders by visiting individual countries, easing the business environment for European companies, and even investing in Europe. Beijing has already signaled its willingness to work with Europe to implement the Paris Agreement. It is unclear whether China’s renewed efforts to warm relations with the EU and individual European countries will gain momentum, but a sizable opportunity has opened up as the United States repositions itself with respect to Russia, Ukraine, and its transatlantic allies.⁵⁷

Despite charm offensives by Beijing, Brussels is unlikely to halt its efforts to rebalance trade relations with China. There are two main reasons why Chinese efforts may falter. First, over the past few years, Europe has become much more protective of its markets and fears Chinese overcapacity and unfair trade practices. Second, China’s direct support of the war in Ukraine is openly discussed by European politicians.⁵⁸

However, Europe does not speak with one voice, and different countries have different attitudes toward China. This diversity among the 27 member states has in the past made it difficult to reach unitary decision-making when determining a collective China strategy. Should Trump continue to simultaneously pursue his trade war with both China and the EU, increase pressure on European tech companies to support U.S. export controls or sanctions against China, continue to develop a relationship with Russia, and attenuate U.S. support for NATO, EU members could seek closer ties with Beijing. A secondary reaction if Trump decides to impose further tariffs on Chinese goods could be for China to salvage its markets by diverting its attention to Europe. This, in turn, would increase the European Commission’s resistance toward China but could also divide Europe’s response, thus weakening it.⁵⁹

Europe-Taiwan relations. Trump’s recent threat to impose tariffs on imported steel, semiconductors, and medications in an attempt to encourage manufacturers to move production of their goods to U.S. shores has worried several countries, among them Taiwan.⁶⁰ In particular, Trump’s proposal to slap tariffs on Taiwanese semiconductors may complicate U.S.-Europe relations by upsetting supply networks essential to European businesses. In order to safeguard its economic interests, Europe may oppose such tariffs, which could strengthen commercial relations with Taiwan. However, as European countries weigh the necessity of stable access to vital technologies against their relationship with the United States, this may create tension between the two continents and prompt Europe to look for alternatives, which could lead to a deeper relationship with China. The EU-Taiwan relationship may further weaken if China, which is attempting to establish its own semiconductor industry, increases its influence in Europe through agreements that substitute for what Taiwan provides or by encouraging closer trade links.

Finally, against the background of U.S.-China competition, Europe-Taiwan relations have the potential for expansion, despite the self-imposed constraints of European countries, to avoid retaliation from China. People-to-people exchanges and digital industries are particularly promising. The recent upward trend in Taiwanese foreign direct investment in Europe is also a positive development that will continue to nurture sympathy and goodwill for Taiwan across the continent.⁶¹

Path forward for Taiwan and the EU in shifting geopolitical times. Trump and his supporters have continuously prioritized trade deficits, burden-sharing, and the revival of American manufacturing. The Taiwanese government should concentrate on these three areas if it wants to win over a broader audience among the American public. At the same time, it would do well to invest more in self-defense while increasing military cooperation with the United States, particularly following Trump’s controversial remark that Taiwan should allocate 10% of its GDP to defense.⁶² Taiwan should diversify its economy and strengthen ties with Indo-Pacific and European partners. Building regional alliances, especially with Japan and the Philippines, will help mitigate risks associated with U.S. unpredictability, foster economic stability and growth, and create a collective deterrent against Chinese aggression.

The second Trump administration could alter transatlantic relations and significantly impact EU-Taiwan relations, sometimes in ways counter to their immediate interests. Both Europe and Taiwan would benefit from increased bilateral relations to augment their independence vis-à-vis China and the United States to improve their resilience to external shocks.⁶³

A complex interplay of geopolitical issues, such as U.S.-China tensions, EU strategic interests, changing transatlantic relations due to the U.S.-Russia-Ukraine triangle, and Taiwan’s changing role in global security and economic dynamics, will influence Europe-Taiwan relations during the early days of the second Trump administration. The EU’s posture will probably remain cautious, striking a balance between its economic links with Beijing and its rising support for Taiwan’s democratic values. Recent milestones in EU-Taiwan relations underscore the growing importance of Taiwan as a strategic economic partner for the EU, particularly in technology and semiconductor production. Taiwan’s economic resilience in the face of increasing PRC coercion is notable, as it continues to expand its international ties, particularly with the EU and other like-minded partners.

The first Trump administration played a key role in reshaping U.S.-China competition, with Taiwan becoming a central point of contestation. With Trump’s return to the White House, the U.S. confrontation toward China will likely continue, further elevating Taiwan’s importance in global supply chains and geostrategic value. As such, Taiwan’s role in global geopolitics and its relationship with the EU will remain a critical area of focus in the evolving landscape of U.S.-China competition. Because of their common security interests and ideals, the EU should be more oriented toward the United States than China — although this assumption has now been put under pressure with a potential fracture in the transatlantic relationship.

Given Trump’s strategic unpredictability, Europe and Taiwan should move toward increasing resilience, both individually and in concert, to strengthen their positions regardless of how Trump’s presidency unfolds. Trump’s second term creates additional uncertainty about the recent European divergence on China and Taiwan. Member states are not in agreement when it comes to Europe’s own geopolitical strategy and on how Taiwan fits in it. Despite differences between individual states, the EU and Taiwan share a pledge to the importance of the rule of law and fundamental democratic freedoms. Likewise, they both experience a mounting concern regarding China’s global ambitions and influence.

In short, Taiwan and the EU have much in common when facing both a more unpredictable U.S. administration under Donald Trump as well as a more globally aggressive China. The positive momentum reached in bilateral relations should be built upon and improved, as this would be in both of their interests. The volatility of the seismic shifts currently taking place on the European continent with an unresolved war and the oppressor party increasingly growing closer to the United States is sobering European policymakers and politicians, who, for the first time since the end of World War II, are questioning the U.S. commitment to Pax Americana and its rule-based international system.

The author would like to express their gratitude to Jennifer Choo, Rorry Daniels, Lyle Morris, Ian Lane Smith, and the anonymous reviewers for their insightful suggestions and thoughtful feedback, which greatly enhanced the quality of this paper. Additional thanks are due to all those who contributed to the improvement of this work through their invaluable support and expertise.

1. “MOFA Sincerely Thanks European Parliament for Unanimous Passage of Resolution on EU-Taiwan Trade and Investment Relations,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China (ROC), December 13, 2023, https://en.mofa.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=1328&sms=273&s=116168.
2. Plamen Tonchev, “Is European Equidistance Between the U.S. and China Feasible?” Tovima, December 22, 2024, https://www.tovima.com/opinions/is-european-equidistance-between-the-us-and-china-feasible.
3. Šejla Ahmatović and James Angelos, “German MEP Embroiled in China Spy Scandal Refuses to Step Down,” Politico, April 24, 2024, https://www.politico.eu/article/far-right-german-mep-maximilian-krah-ch…; Sam Francis, “UK Will Not Accept Chinese Interference – Sunak,” BBC, September 11, 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-66780515; and Ralph Weber, “Unified Message, Rhizomatic Delivery: A Preliminary Analysis of PRC/CCP Influence and the United Front in Switzerland,” Sinopsis, December 18, 2020, https://sinopsis.cz/en/switzerland-rhizome.
4. Going forward, European states will likely continue implementing guidelines that include national security concerns as they pertain to their overall economic attitude toward China.
5. President Tsai Ing-Wen launched the NSP in 2016 to enhance ties between Taipei and its neighbors in South and Southeast Asia, Australia, and New Zealand. The policy seeks to strengthen Taiwan’s regional integration and advance the Indo-Pacific region’s overall development by utilizing Taiwan’s cultural, educational, technological, agricultural, and economic resources. Even more crucial in light of its increasing lack of diplomatic recognition, the plan relies on developing a “sense of economic community” and “a consensus for cooperation” with the eighteen countries Taipei has selected as possible partners.
6. Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao, “Taiwan’s Approach to Materialize the Indo-Pacific Strategies: Building on the New Southbound Policy+,” Global Taiwan Institute, Global Taiwan Brief 9, no. 23, December 11, 2024, https://globaltaiwan.org/2024/12/taiwans-approach-to-materialize-the-indo-pacific-strategies-building-on-the-new-southbound-policy.
7. Until 2024, reducing trade dependence on the PRC had not been particularly effective. Taiwan’s latest official statistics, however, clearly show that the United States accounted for 24% of Taiwan’s total exports in the first ten months of 2024, rising from 15% in 2020. In comparison, China’s (to include Hong Kong) shares in Taiwan’s total exports shrank from 44% to 32% during the same period. See Ministry of Finance (ROC), Trade Statistics Database, https://web02.mof.gov.tw/njswww/webmain.aspx?sys=100&funid=edefjsptgl.
8. Felix Brender, “Taiwan’s ‘Look South’ Policy Aims to Reduce Dependency on China,” China Global South Project, June 2, 2023, https://chinaglobalsouth.com/analysis/taiwans-look-south-policy-aims-to-reduce-dependency-on-china.
9. Shin Kawashima, “Taiwan’s Growing Diplomatic Isolation,” Diplomat, August 22, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/08/taiwans-growing-diplomatic-isolation.
10. “Chip Powerhouse Taiwan Calls for Economic Partnership Deal with EU,” Reuters, November 18, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/technology/chip-powerhouse-taiwan-calls-economic-partnership-deal-with-eu-2024-11-18.
11. “Taiwan: EU Trade Relations with Taiwan. Facts, Figures, and Latest Developments,” European Commission, https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/taiwan_en.
12. “2030 Digital Compass: The European Way for the Digital Decade,” European Commission, March 9, 2021, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52021DC0118.
13. “The European Chips Act will bolster Europe’s competitiveness and resilience in semiconductor technologies and applications, and help achieve both the digital and green transition. It will do this by strengthening Europe’s technological leadership in the field.” From “European Chips Act,” European Commission, https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/europe-fit-digital-age/european-chips-act_en.
14. Sarah Rudge, “TSMC Ramps Up European Chip Manufacturing with Plans for Multiple Plants by 2027,” Manufacturing Today, October 21, 2024, https://manufacturing-today.com/news/tsmc-ramps-up-european-chip-manufacturing-with-plans-for-multiple-plants-by-2027.
15. Rudge, “TSMC Ramps Up European Chip Manufacturing with Plans for Multiple Plants by 2027.”
16. Niklas Swanström, Reihuan Wu, and Lwanga Egbewatt Arrey, “Revisiting Taiwan’s Case: Need for Meaningful Participation in the 76th World Health Assembly,” Institute for Security and Development Policy, April 17, 2023, https://www.isdp.eu/revisiting-taiwans-case-need-for-meaningful-participation-in-the-76th-world-health-assembly.
17. “Taiwan’s Participation in Global Health Affairs Will Not Stop: Lai,” Focus Taiwan, June 1, 2024, https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202406010008.
18. Taiwan was allowed to attend the World Health Assembly as an observer under “Chinese Taipei” from 2009 to 2016 when cross-strait relations were stable under President Ma Ying-Jeou.
19. “European Parliament Recommendation of 21 October 2021 to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on EU-Taiwan Political Relations and Cooperation,” European Parliament, October 21, 2021, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2021-0431_EN.html.
20. See “EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (EU-China CAI),” European Parliament, January 24, 2025, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-international-trade-inta/file-eu-china-investment-agreement.
21. Lili Pike, “Trump’s Europe Shock Creates an Opening for China,” Foreign Policy, February 20, 2025, https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/02/20/trump-europe-china-tariffs-defense-spending.
22. “European Parliament Delegation Ends Visit to Taiwan,” European Parliament, Press Release, November 5, 2021, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20211104IPR16624/european-parliament-delegation-ends-visit-to-taiwan.
23. The U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee passed the Taiwan Policy Act, with substantial increases in monetary and military aid to Taiwan in an attempt to bolster its international standing. It also ensured that Taiwan would enjoy the status of a “major non-NATO ally,” a strategic partnership on military and technology exchange and assistance. See the text at “Taiwan Policy Act of 2022,” U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Taiwan%20Policy%20Act%20One%20Pager%20FINAL.pdf.
24. “EU Parliament Resolution Slams China’s Aggression Towards Taiwan,” Al Jazeera, September 16, 2022, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/9/16/eu-parliament-resolution-slams…; and “European Parliament Resolution of 15 September 2022 on the Situation in the Strait of Taiwan,” European Parliament, September 15, 2022, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2022-0331_EN.html.
25. “China, Taiwan Play High-Seas ‘Cat and Mouse’ as Drills Wrap Up,” Al Jazeera, August 7, 2022, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/8/7/china-taiwan-play-high-seas-cat-and-mouse-as-drills-wrap-up.
26. Simona Grano, “Taiwan’s Growing Importance for Europe,” in Why Taiwan Matters to Europe, ed. Niklas Swanström, Agust Börjesson, and Yi-Chieh Chen (Stockholm: Institute for Security and Development Policy, 2024), https://www.isdp.eu/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/Special-Taiwan-Europe-May-2024-final.pdf.
27. “MOFA Welcomes European Parliament Resolutions Expressing Concern over China’s Escalation of Taiwan Strait Tensions and Supporting Deeper Comprehensive Partnership with Taiwan,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs (ROC), February 29, 2024, https://en.mofa.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=1328&s=116665.
28. Lim Min Zhang, “Beijing Accuses Taiwan President Lai Ching-te of Undermining Peace in Taiwan Strait,” Straits Times, October 10, 2024, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/beijing-accuses-taiwan-president-lai-ching-te-of-undermining-peace-in-taiwan-strait.
29. “China Is Trying to Distort History and International Law in Taiwan, MEPs Warn,” European Parliament, Press Release, October 24, 2024, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20241017IPR24739/china-is-trying-to-distort-history-and-international-law-in-taiwan-meps-warn.
30. Bonnie S. Glaser and Jacques deLisle, “Exposing the PRC’s Distortion of UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 to Press its Claim Over Taiwan,” German Marshall Fund, April 30, 2024, https://www.gmfus.org/news/exposing-prcs-distortion-un-general-assembly-resolution-2758-press-its-claim-over-taiwan.
31. The European Parliament adopted the “Report on Foreign Interference in All Democratic Processes in the European Union, Including Disinformation” on March 9, 2022. The report acknowledges that Taiwan, which has experience fighting disinformation from China, has built an advanced system to counter malicious interference and attacks. Measures have been taken to harmonize cooperation between the various branches of government as well as independent NGOs that fact-check and promote media literacy among the public. It also encourages the EU and its member states to deepen cooperation with Taiwan to counter foreign interference operations and disinformation campaigns from hostile third parties. See “The European Parliament Encourages the EU and Its Member States to Deepen Cooperation with Taiwan in Countering Interference and Disinformation Campaigns,” Taipei Representative Office in the EU and Belgium, March 10, 2022, https://www.roc-taiwan.org/be_en/post/11688.html.
32. “The EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific,” European Commission, September 16, 2021, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/jointcommunication_2021_24_1_en.pdf.
33. Philippe Le Corre, “Europe Must Prepare Militarily and Economically for a Taiwan War,” Nikkei Asia, July 25, 2024, https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/Europe-must-prepare-militarily-and-econ…; Zsuzsa Anna Ferenczy, “Trump Presidency Impact on EU-Taiwan Relations. How to Maintain the Momentum?” University of Nottingham, Taiwan Research Hub, https://www.nottingham.ac.uk/research/groups/taiwan-research-hub/docume…; and Philippe Le Corre, “The ‘Rebirth’ of Europe-Taiwan Relations: Explaining Europe’s New Balance Between Beijing and Taipei,” January 10, 2024, Asia Society Policy Institute, Center for China Analysis, January 10, 2024, https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/rebirth-europe-taiwan-relations-explaining-europes-new-balance-between-beijing-and-taipei.
34. Colin Alexander, “Taiwan’s Public Diplomacy Since 2016,” in Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Taiwan, ed. Gunter Schubert (London: Routledge, 2024), 593–605.
35. Simona Grano, “Taiwan in the World: Nation Brand Promotion and National Identity Building in a Changing Geopolitical Context,” Sulla via del Catai 30, no. 1 (2024):135–55.
36. Samson Ellis and Miaojung Lin, “U.S. Buys More Taiwan Exports than China for First Time Since 2003,” Bloomberg, April 10, 2024, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-04-11/china-taiwan-trade-data-reveal-growing-divide-as-xi-ma-meet.
37. Didi Tang, “Taiwan Is Selling More to the U.S. than China in Major Shift Away from Beijing,” Associated Press, May 17, 2024, https://apnews.com/article/china-taiwan-us-exports-investment-308c4efe8e54bef3b65f68db565437f3.
38. Wu Jieh-min, “Silicon Shield 2.0: A Taiwan Perspective,” Diplomat, September 14, 2024, https://thediplomat.com/2024/09/silicon-shield-2-0-a-taiwan-perspective.
39. "America First” is a populist term coined by President Woodrow Wilson that places “Americans’ interests first.” As a logical consequence, proponents of the theory usually advocate for a greater disregard for international affairs and a focus on domestic issues, which can result in noninterventionism, American nationalism, and protectionist trade policies. See Lynne Olson, Those Angry Days: Roosevelt, Lindbergh, and America’s Fight Over World War II, 1939–1941 (New York: Random House, 2013), 220, 227, 234, and 242–43.
40. Chad P. Bown and Melina Kolb, “Trump’s Trade War Timeline: An Up-to-Date Guide,” Peterson Institute for International Economics, Trade and Investment Policy Watch, December 31, 2023, https://www.piie.com/blogs/trade-and-investment-policy-watch/2018/trumps-trade-war-timeline-date-guide.
41. “Taiwan Travel Act,” 115th U.S. Congress, https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/535.
42. Arms sales to Taiwan increased from $14 billion during the eight-year Obama presidency to $18 billion in Trump’s first four years. See Gabriel Dominguez, “Taiwan Braces for Trump’s Return, but Much Will Depend on His Team,” Japan Times, November 11, 2024, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2024/11/11/asia-pacific/politics/taiwan-us-relations-trump.
43. Ferenczy, “Trump Presidency Impact on EU-Taiwan Relations.”
44. Amy Mackinnon, “Trump’s China Hawks Are Also Uyghur Advocates,” Foreign Policy, November 15, 2024, https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/11/15/rubio-waltz-china-xinjiang-uyghurs-human-rights.
45. “Mike Waltz Wants America to Focus on the Threat from China,” Economist, November 13, 2024, https://www.economist.com/united-states/2024/11/13/mike-waltz-wants-america-to-focus-on-the-threat-from-china.
46. “To Conduct a Confirmation Hearing on the Expected Nomination of Mr. Peter B. Hegseth to Be Secretary of Defense,” U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, January 14, 2025, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/hearings/to-conduct-a-confirmation-hearing-on-the-expected-nomination-of-mr-peter-b-hegseth-to-be-secretary-of-defense.
47. Morgan Philipps, “Hegseth Warns Europeans ‘Realities’ of China and Border Threats Prevent U.S. from Guaranteeing Their Security,” Fox News, February 12, 2025, https://www.foxnews.com/politics/hegseth-warns-europeans-realities-china-border-threats-prevent-us-from-guaranteeing-security.
48. Akanksha Sharma and Michelle Toh, “Taiwan Hits Back at Elon Musk’s Claim That It Is ‘Part of China,’” CNN, September 14, 2023, https://edition.cnn.com/2023/09/14/business/elon-musk-taiwan-china-comments-intl-hnk/index.html.
49. Chee Meng Tan, “Trump’s Quiet Change to U.S. Position on Taiwan Is All About the Economy,” Conversation, February 18, 2025, https://theconversation.com/trumps-quiet-change-to-us-position-on-taiwan-is-all-about-the-economy-250106.
50. Seema Mody, “Trump Accuses Taiwan of Stealing U.S. Chip Industry. Here’s What the Election Could Bring,” CNBC, October 28, 2024, https://www.cnbc.com/2024/10/28/trump-accuses-taiwan-of-stealing-us-chip-business-on-joe-rogan-podcast.html.
51. Min-Hua Chiang, “Trump’s Return to Power and the Potential Impact on Taiwan’s Economy,” University of Nottingham, Taiwan Research Hub, Taiwan Insight, December 2, 2024, https://taiwaninsight.org/2024/12/02/trumps-return-to-power-and-the-potential-impact-on-taiwans-economy.
52. Chris Buckley and Amy Chang Chien, “Taiwan Watches Trump Undercut Ukraine, Hoping It Won’t Be Next,” New York Times, February 25, 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/25/world/asia/trump-ukraine-taiwan.html.
53. Nina Miholjčić Ivković, “The Future of Taiwan-Europe Relations: How a New Trump Administration Could Reshape These Ties,” Global Taiwan Institute, Global Taiwan Brief 10, no. 4, February 19, 2025, https://globaltaiwan.org/2025/02/the-future-of-taiwan-europe-relations-how-a-new-trump-administration-could-reshape-these-ties.
54. “Secretary Rubio’s Meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov,” U.S. Department of State, Press Release, February 18, 2025, https://www.state.gov/secretary-rubios-meeting-with-russian-foreign-minister-lavrov.
55. Jeremy Shapiro, “Letter from Washington: Why Trump Ignores Europe,” European Council on Foreign Relations, February 18, 2025, https://ecfr.eu/article/letter-from-washington-why-trump-ignores-europe.
56. This was the exact spirit of Wang Yi’s speech at the Munich Security Conference. See “Foreign Minister Wang Yi at the MSC 2025: China Is Committed to a Multipolar World,” BR24, video, February 14, 2025, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zq0i__If120.
57. Sam Meredith, “Trump’s Climate Retreat Stirs a Sense of Déjà Vu—And Prompts a Warning from the UN,” CNBC, January 21, 2025, https://www.cnbc.com/2025/01/21/davos-trumps-paris-climate-agreement-retreat-prompts-warning-from-un.html.
58. Chels Michta, “NATO Wakes Up to the Chinese Threat,” CEPA, July 25, 2024, https://cepa.org/article/nato-wakes-up-to-the-chinese-threat; and Emanuele Bonini, “Ukraine, EU Insists: ‘China Supports Russia, Stop This Cooperation,’” Eunews. February 27, 2025, https://www.eunews.it/en/2025/02/27/ukraine-eu-insists-china-supports-russia-stop-this-cooperation.
59. “Watching China in Europe,” German Marshall Fund, www.gmfus.org.
60. Christopher Rugaber and Darlene Superville, “Trump to Impose 25% Steel and Aluminum Tariffs in Latest Trade Escalation,” Time, February 10, 2025, https://time.com/7215924/trump-steel-aluminum-tariffs.
61. “Economic Relations Between Taiwan and the EU,” Taipei Representative Office in the EU and Belgium, February 05, 2024, https://www.roc-taiwan.org/be_en/post/143.html.
62. Wu Che-yu, Liu Wan-lin, and Jake Chung, “Trump’s 10% Defense Demand Panned,” Taipei Times, October 3, 2024, https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2024/10/03/2003824726.
63. Le Corre, “The ‘Rebirth’ of Europe-Taiwan Relations.”