Back From the Brink?

A Strategy for Stabilizing Afghanistan-Pakistan
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Tom Freston
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Foreword

There has never been a more crucial time to examine our policies towards Afghanistan and Pakistan. Both countries are struggling to limit the spread of violent insurgencies, curb losses in public confidence, and address major weaknesses in governance while being faced with a growing economic crisis. Although both these countries share fundamentally different histories, the menace of terrorism has inextricably linked the future stability of both. As a result, any examination of Afghanistan needs to involve a critical examination of the cross border issues in Pakistan. The relative failure of American and international policies towards Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the region over recent years have made many of these challenges even more difficult to overcome.

Clearly, the time has come to set a new path in the region that can do a better job of curbing the activities of al-Qaida and its allies, providing for long-term development and stabilization of the region, and fostering far more meaningful regional cooperation. The policies that will be implemented in the coming years will not only define the future of Afghanistan, Pakistan and the region, but also play a very important role in determining America’s role in Southwest Asia for decades to come.

The Asia Society Independent Task Force on Afghanistan-Pakistan came together to help define the objectives and the related polices needed to curb al-Qaida activities and stabilize the region. The report recommends both short and long term policies for a comprehensive strategy that integrates counter-terrorism, governance, economic development and regional objectives to achieve lasting stability in the region. It is our hope that the recommendations highlighted in this report lead to a successful engagement with the region that in turn allows for durable peace and stability to flourish in the years to come.

This project owes enormous gratitude to former Asia Society Chairman, and current U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Ambassador Richard C. Holbrooke. Ambassador Holbrooke’s dedication to the plight of this volatile region was the impetus for the development of the Asia Society’s Afghanistan Initiative and for this very important and timely Task Force report. Ambassador Holbrooke and former Task Force member General James L. Jones, however, both stepped down from the Task Force following their government appointments and before the first draft of the report was written. They are therefore not associated in any way with this report or its content.

We are also extremely grateful to Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering and Dr. Barnett R. Rubin who co-chaired this Task Force. We would like to especially thank Dr. Rubin for the many hours he contributed to the writing and editing of this report. Dr. Rubin was tasked with the most difficult responsibility of not only drafting the report but also diligently incorporating many rounds of comments from the members to reflect the common vision of a group of diverse and highly opinionated experts. We are also extremely grateful to the Task Force members themselves (listed at the end of the report), who used their deep knowledge of the region to contribute substantially to the policy recommendations included in this report. Although
Task Force members support the arguments and recommendations made in this report, their signature, of course, does not necessarily imply adherence to every word.

In addition, we would like to express our sincere appreciation to Dr. Jamie Metzl, Executive Vice President of the Asia Society and Project Director of the Task Force Report, for his leadership and dedication in moving this critical project to its fruition and to Robert Hsu, for his superb assistance in managing the process.

This report could not have been made possible without the generous financial support of Asia Society Trustee and Task Force Member Tom Freston, as well as the Rockefeller Brothers Fund.

America and the international community will face tremendous challenges in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the region in the coming years. It is our sincere hope that the recommendations made in this report, along with the wide range of Asia Society programs and activities addressing this set of issues, can play a meaningful role in helping us all make the best possible decisions as we work together to address them.

Charles R. Kaye
Chairman (interim), Asia Society

Vishakha N. Desai
President, Asia Society
Executive Summary

The governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan are at risk from a combination of violent insurgency, loss of public confidence, and economic crisis. These trends threaten not only the loss of control by the Afghan and Pakistani governments, but also the spread of terrorist safe havens and, in the most extreme situation, the loss of control over some of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons or materials.

The policies of the previous administration toward this conflict zone fell short. The administration did not match its proclaimed objectives with the necessary resources and strategic effort, although resources began to increase in recent years, and it did not develop a sufficiently integrated approach to the two countries and the region. Its ideological “war on terror” mind-set blinded the administration to significant strategic realities of this region, which led to a fundamentally dysfunctional relationship with Pakistan that exacerbated regional tensions, failed to prevent al-Qaida from reestablishing a safe haven in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Agencies (FATA), enabled the Taliban to regroup and rearm from their strongholds in Quetta and FATA, and offered no significant response to the upsurge of the Pakistan Taliban movement.

The time has come to change course dramatically. Incremental changes alone, such as more troops or more money, will not be sufficient to address the monumental challenge we face. In the context of this deteriorating situation, the United States must now define far more clearly the objectives that it and its allies and partners can achieve. While this may appear to involve scaling back goals, in reality, it is only an attempt to match objectives with capabilities and resources.

NATO forces in Afghanistan, including those from the United States, should work to defeat al-Qaida, protect the local population, and train and support the national security forces in Afghanistan and Pakistan for their counterinsurgency and counterterrorism missions. The military effort will also require changes in detention policies and the legal status of international forces and contractors.

On the political front, the new policy would encourage the Afghan and Pakistani governments to seek reconciliation with insurgent elements that break with al-Qaida. This distinction between insurgents with a political agenda or local grievances who may be amenable to joining the political process and those who are dedicated to a global jihad is critical to achieving regional stability and creating conditions for badly needed economic reconstruction and improved governance.

The United States has an opportunity to recast its policies in this region to promote political solutions rather than open-ended conflict, to work more effectively with local partners and with allies, and to help Afghanistan and Pakistan achieve greater stability. The United States and the international community must rely much more on political means and work far more closely with the governments and peoples of the region, including many who have joined insurgencies for a variety of reasons, to define common interests in ending
decades of war and to begin rebuilding their societies and economies.

This report recommends policies for a comprehensive strategy that integrates counterterrorism, governance, economic development, and regional objectives to achieve lasting stability in the region.

The most important recommendation—a precondition for ensuring that the others work as intended—is that the U.S., Afghan, and Pakistani governments, together with their other international partners, should design an integrated civil-military plan for the entire operation. That plan would:

• Explicitly end the rhetorical emphasis on the “war on terror” and define our enemy as those who attacked our nation—al-Qaida and its allies.
  ○ Change policies on detention and sanctions to treat Afghan and Pakistani insurgents differently from international terrorists, and support the use of Afghan and Pakistani legal processes and policing to bring appropriate cases against insurgents for criminal behavior wherever possible.
  ○ Strengthen political efforts by the Afghan and Pakistani governments to reconcile with local insurgents at the expense of global terrorists.

• End Operation Enduring Freedom, the counterterrorism command in Afghanistan, because al-Qaida’s sanctuary is now in Pakistan, not Afghanistan.
  ○ Integrate all troops and operations in Afghanistan under a single NATO-ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) command with a mandate to protect the population.
  ○ Begin negotiations on a Status of Forces Agreement to be concluded after the next round of elections in Afghanistan.

• Separate funding for Afghanistan, including for security forces, from Iraq.
  ○ Move such funding from supplemental to continuing appropriations.
  ○ Develop long-term international funding mechanisms to enable the Afghan government to plan for institution building over a multiyear time frame.
  ○ Undertake a study in cooperation with the Afghan government to evaluate the size of security forces needed, the funding necessary to sustain them, and the possibilities for ensuring these funds over the long term.

• Engage with the Afghan government and the United Nations to ensure an accepted and legitimate constitutional transition of presidential power and a more effective government.
  ○ Deal directly and confidentially with the Afghan government, ending negative press leaks and unclear messages.

• Transfer assistance to the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund and security duties to official institutions, Afghan and international, as soon as possible, consistent with transparency and fiduciary oversight.
  ○ Consolidate and build on existing national ministry programs designed to increase ministerial capacity.
• Develop a job creation initiative that maps Afghan value chains and facilitates investment in strategic sectors.
• Work with international partners to develop and fund an emergency economic rescue plan for Afghanistan and Pakistan in the face of the international economic crisis, drought, and shortages of food and fuel.
• Reduce as much as possible the use of private contractors for security and implementation of aid.
• Investigate corruption, waste, and malfeasance in the use of private contractors in Afghanistan, both to improve U.S. efforts and to assist Afghan authorities in anticorruption efforts.

• Combat narcotics by
  • Destroying major heroin laboratories.
  • Removing the protectors of trafficking from influential positions.
  • Opening markets to Afghan products.
  • Increasing employment through infrastructure projects and a regional labor migration regime.
  • Taking a gradual approach to this huge industry, rather than artificially trying to make economic transformation a quick-fix counterinsurgency strategy.

• Support efforts in Pakistan to
  • Integrate the Federally Administered Tribal Agencies into the mainstream of Pakistan.
  • Reform the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas.
  • Strengthen administration in both the North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan to create conditions under which Pakistan can take direct responsibility for the security of its borders, and Afghanistan can recognize them as open borders.
  • Encourage Pakistan to develop a long-term (ten-year) plan to create economic development and institutional capability, with carefully monitored budget support and/or a trust fund, backed by a small consortium of partner countries, whereby funders would provide up-front support and Pakistan would demonstrate that, with increasing revenues and tax reform, it would meet the cost of the programs.

• Focus regional policy on creating conditions for the transformation of Pakistan’s security doctrine so that it no longer requires the use of covertly supported guerrilla forces against neighbors, including
  • Reducing reliance on Pakistan as a logistics route.
  • Clearly communicating that the United States does not accept denials of actions of which we have clear evidence.
  • Directing aid at strengthening counterinsurgency capacities.
  • Supporting the lowering of tensions with India, especially through the composite dialogue.
  • Engaging in a dialogue on how to meet Pakistan’s long-term defense and security requirements without support for jihadi organizations.
• Supporting civilian institutions and civilian oversight of the military.
• Exploring a dialogue to seek a common approach with China and Saudi Arabia, the other suppliers and supporters of the Pakistan military.
• Ensuring oversight of all military assistance by both the United States and Pakistan’s elected authorities.
• Establish regular dialogue and exchanges over Afghanistan and Pakistan with Russia, China, India, Iran, Turkey, the Central Asian states, and Saudi Arabia, seeking a means of cooperation with all in conjunction with our NATO allies and other international partners to
  • Seek agreement with regional and global powers over the stabilization of Afghanistan.
  • Establish mechanisms for ensuring and building confidence that no power uses that country against another.
  • Support the regional economic cooperation initiative that started with the international conference hosted by Afghanistan in December 2005 to support cooperation on power, water, rail, road and air transit, customs reform, and education.

This report outlines steps that must be taken in both the short and long term with our allies in coordination with the government of Afghanistan to prevent further deterioration of security, support development, and promote regional engagement for lasting peace and stability in the region.
Defining Objectives

By shifting the United States’ strategic foreign policy objectives away from Iraq, the Barack Obama administration has already begun to address growing concerns in Afghanistan and the region. In order to address these concerns, the Obama administration must define objectives in counterterrorism, governance and development, and regional diplomacy. These goals must be integrated into a combined civil-military plan and supported with public diplomacy efforts that communicate specific goals and desired outcomes to the people of the region, the U.S. public, and our allies.

The Task Force recommends that the following objectives be pursued:

Counterterrorism Objectives

The primary objectives of the U.S. war in Afghanistan have been to destroy the safe haven from which al-Qaida planned and directed the 9/11 attacks, to eliminate any further safe havens in the region, and to prevent the formation of future safe havens. Preventing the collapse of state authority in Pakistan and ensuring that its nuclear weapons or materials do not fall into the hands of al-Qaida or similar groups is a high priority, but one for which war does not appear to offer any solution. Even if the United States and its allies are willing to wage war for these essential security objectives, they should do so only insofar as war, combined with other policy instruments, is the best means to achieve those objectives, and insofar as the risks are proportionate to the gains.

Narrowing the scope of war aims does not mean abandoning other goals, nor does it mean abandoning the use of force when those other goals are opposed by violence. Ignoring medium- to long-term issues leads to recurrence or exacerbation of underlying problems, as occurred in the aftermath of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and following the George W. Bush administration’s underresourced intervention in that country. But these are not primarily military challenges, and they cannot be addressed through primarily military means. Nor can they be addressed within the urgent time frame required to confront terrorist threats.

The U.S. policy of eliminating and preventing the reemergence of terrorist safe havens in this region must be integrated into a coherent global strategy against al-Qaida and similar movements. The United States should publicly and explicitly end the “war on terror” and redefine its primary counterterrorism objective as defeating those who attacked our nation—al-Qaida and its allies. Such a strategy would use military, law enforcement, and intelligence tools as required, but would also incorporate the characteristics of a global counterinsurgency policy, thereby addressing the political opposition to many U.S. policies that has created enabling conditions for recruitment among al-Qaida and its allies. Policies that reduce Muslim hostility to the United States will contribute to the stabilization of this region, although recommending such policies for other regions of the world is beyond the mandate of this Task Force.
An organization without a national, territorial, or ethnic base of support, al-Qaida depends for its operation on sanctuaries that are secured through alliances with other groups. The “war on terror” policy of treating in the same way as al-Qaida those groups that form temporary or opportunistic alliances with that organization, or that use violence in support of some of the same causes as al-Qaida but have no link to that organization, has united and strengthened rather than divided and weakened our enemies.

Without an alliance with the Taliban and other locally based insurgent groups (some of which have been linked to Pakistan’s intelligence agency, the Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence), al-Qaida would not be able to operate in the Afghanistan-Pakistan area. Breaking that alliance requires different approaches in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In Afghanistan, it requires offering political negotiations to insurgents who are willing to separate themselves from al-Qaida and enter the political system, recognizing that Afghan political institutions may be altered by legitimate constitutional processes. Any political agreement should recognize the authority of the Afghan government and its security forces throughout the territory of Afghanistan. Such a policy requires that these offers be reinforced with changes in detention, sanctions, and military policy (discussed later).

In Pakistan, the United States should support efforts by the government to separate insurgents from al-Qaida and other foreign fighters. The United States should work with the federal and provincial government to develop a plan to implement the government’s stated goal of reforming the status of the Federally Administered Tribal Agencies (FATA) so as to integrate the area with the rest of Pakistan. The apparent capture of Swat by militants points to the need for reform in the Provincially Administered Tribal Agencies (PATA) and in the rest of the North-West Frontier Province. Support for such a strategy could eventually render unnecessary the United States’ reported use of drones to attack al-Qaida in the area, which has sparked significant opposition in Pakistan.

In neither country is a political settlement with insurgents a quick-fix substitute for other policies. Without policy changes implemented by the Taliban’s sponsors and supporters in Pakistan, a political settlement in Afghanistan may not be sustainable. Unless the Pakistan military comes to see its domestic insurgents as a greater threat than India, it is unlikely to support the plans needed to integrate FATA, close militant bases, and develop counterinsurgency capacity. Insurgents in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, many of whom are recruited because of unemployment or local political conflicts, cannot be reintegrated unless both governments become more credible and effective. Reintegration will require guarantees of security and employment to both former insurgents and those who have been fighting them—a fact that the global economic crisis renders even more difficult. Therefore, sustained expansion of both the Afghan and Pakistani economies is a critical step toward the long-term stability of the region.

In Pakistan, perhaps the most urgent priority is to prevent economic collapse, which could undermine state authority even in major urban areas in the next few months. Such a collapse could create yet more ungoverned space into which insurgents and terrorist groups could move.
To summarize, the United States should redefine counterterrorism objectives to:

1. Distinguish war aims from other goals of the U.S. commitment to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the region.
2. End the “war on terror” and redefine its primary counterterrorism objective as defeating al-Qaida and its allies.
3. Support dialogue and negotiations with insurgents who are willing to separate themselves from al-Qaida in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, and reinforce these offers with changes in detention, sanctions, and military policy.
4. Ensure that any political agreement in Afghanistan recognizes the authority of the Afghan government and its security forces throughout the territory of Afghanistan.
5. Support efforts by the Pakistani government to separate insurgents from al-Qaida and other foreign fighters, and assist in the government’s stated goal of reforming the Federally Administered Tribal Agencies so as to integrate the area with the rest of Pakistan.
6. Understand that in neither country is a political settlement with insurgents a quick-fix substitute for other policies.

Governance and Development Objectives

Military efforts combined with political agreements can eliminate the immediate threat of terrorist safe havens, as has occurred in Afghanistan, though not yet in Pakistan. Preventing the reemergence of these safe havens requires addressing the challenge of governance and development in both countries, as well as working diplomatically to remove the factors that have led Pakistan to use armed militants as asymmetrical weapons against larger regional competitors.

Afghanistan is one of a small handful of the poorest countries in the world, and it has one of the weakest and most corrupt governments. The weakness of the Afghan government derives not only from infrastructural and technical gaps, but also from a lack of legitimacy connected to political issues. These weaknesses are not the result of the actions of any particular leader or regime, but of structural and historical factors that can be addressed only over a long period of time, with sustained support from the international community.

An immediate task in the coming year is to support a legitimate transition of power at the end of President Hamid Karzai’s current term. In this context, “legitimacy” means agreement that the president and other top leaders exercise their powers lawfully, even if they and their policies are unpopular; now, for instance, Afghans agree that the government of President Karzai is the legitimate government, even though many judge its performance harshly.

Strengthening state institutions requires far more than conducting elections. Afghanistan’s basic institutions of administration, law enforcement, and service delivery are weak, corrupt, or nonexistent. The weakness of Afghanistan’s government means
that stability may require a long-term international security presence. Current operations of international forces, especially the counterterrorism command, Operation Enduring Freedom, have, unintentionally, eroded Afghan support for such a presence. Support for the international military presence has been decimated by civilian casualties, arbitrary detention and torture, intrusive house searches, the use of dogs against villagers, and other practices that dishonor local communities, provoke revenge, and communicate the message that foreign forces are at war with Afghans rather than protecting and assisting them.

U.S. and international assistance has enabled Afghanistan to reestablish its systems of basic education and health and construct some infrastructure; the way in which this assistance has been delivered, however, has weakened government institutions and promoted corruption. The United States should lead international donors in revising the way in which they deliver aid to Afghanistan so as to build Afghan institutions and link the Afghan people to their own state and government.

Both military deployments and assistance programs must be made sustainable over the long term by restructuring them so that they communicate clearly that the United States and the international community are in Afghanistan to protect its people and strengthen its institutions without using its territory as a base against its neighbors. The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) will require sustainable financing; Afghanistan cannot support forces of the size now thought to be needed, and the ANSF are currently dependent on annual supplemental appropriations from the U.S. Congress. Ultimately, the sustainability of the Afghan state will depend on lowering the threat level that it faces, both by improving governance and by providing support for regional diplomacy and cooperation.

Strengthening institutions will depend on long-term programs for the rule of law, economic development, and employment creation. Such programs would also eventually reduce the relative size of the narcotics industry in the Afghan economy, making it relatively marginal, as it is in most countries. Additional large infrastructure projects for water, power, and transport, few of which have been started, could provide employment for young men who would otherwise join the insurgency, illegal armed groups, or the narcotics industry. The Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) provides a long-term framework for such development. Such efforts must be moved from yearly budgets to long-term commitments, not only to be technically effective, but also to send an essential political signal. But these measures cannot be artificially accelerated to compensate for political or military failings.

The ANDS was approved by the international community at the Paris Conference in June 2008; $21.4 billion of new pledges were committed for the next two to three years. This sum, when added to the remainder of pledges committed at the 2006 London Conference and the projected contribution of the Afghan government, totals about $34 billion. These funds will go a long way toward providing the services that the population is demanding and meeting some of the basic economic challenges that the country faces. Effective use of these resources, however, requires addressing two concerns: aid coherence and Afghan capacity.
Currently, there is inadequate coordination and communication among the donors and between the donors and the Afghan government. About 20 percent to 25 percent of pledged aid for the period 2002–2008 has been delivered; almost half of the aid is tied to specific projects; 67 percent to 80 percent of aid bypasses the government; only 40 percent of technical assistance is coordinated with the government; an estimated 40 percent of aid goes back to donor countries; the profit margin on private infrastructure contracts ranges from 30 percent to 50 percent; the Afghan government does not receive in a consistent and timely manner information on the type and cost of projects carried out by the donors, and it is claimed that for comparable projects, the cost is 65 percent to 70 percent higher if it is carried out by the donor organizations. The distribution of aid has also contributed to corruption in the country.

The second problem is the lack of capacity in both the public and the private sector in Afghanistan. Capacity must be increased to absorb the needed resources from abroad, reform the institutions of government, meet the needs of the population, and work with the international community to manage the transformations required for security, governance, and economic progress. Thus far, attempts to reform the civil service and build new capacity have failed. Without building new capacity in the government, as well as in the private sector, the legitimacy of the government, the reputation of donors, and the effectiveness of international aid will be adversely affected.

Afghanistan and Pakistan are both facing an immediate economic crisis. Pakistan has agreed to a $7.6 billion rescue package with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which is likely to require cutbacks in subsidies of essential goods for the urban poor, risking riots. While southern Afghanistan is wracked by insurgency, northern and central Afghanistan are suffering from drought and food shortages, leading to mass emigration and the potential for instability, including the spread of insurgency. Despite the huge resources required by our own economic crisis, the United States must lead the international community in crafting an emergency rescue package for the economies of both Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Despite its present destitution, Afghanistan possesses significant mineral resources. Priority should be given to analyzing how Afghanistan could use these resources to enhance government revenue. Any such program to develop resource-based industries must use current best practices to avoid the “resource curse” that has brought corruption and stagnation to other resource-rich countries.

To summarize, with respect to governance and development objectives, the United States should:

1. Help the Afghan and Pakistani governments address challenges of governance and development to prevent the reemergence of terrorist safe havens.
2. Mobilize international efforts to prevent rapid economic collapse in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, which could undermine state authority even in major urban areas in the course of the next few months.
3. Support a legitimate transition of power in Afghanistan at the end of President Hamid Karzai’s current term while remaining neutral among presidential candidates.

4. Change the operations of international military forces and aid organizations so that they build rather than erode support for their presence.

5. Lower the threat level that the Afghan state faces by improving civilian governance and by providing support for regional diplomacy and cooperation.

6. Support the Afghanistan National Development Strategy, which provides a long-term framework for development, including measures to gradually marginalize the narcotics industry.

7. Reform aid delivery to support the growth of Afghan institutions rather than create parallel systems that weaken government institutions and promote corruption.

8. Develop a fully coordinated approach to integrating U.S., partner, and international military and civilian efforts to allow for the stabilization of vulnerable provinces and districts.

9. Focus international efforts on programs that will increase the sustainable revenue of the Afghan government through natural resource extraction, among other means.

Regional Objectives

For years, Pakistan has been used as a base of international terrorism by al-Qaida and its allies. Since 9/11, al-Qaida has had no bases in Afghanistan, and no international terrorist attack has been traced to Afghanistan. Instead, al-Qaida has established a new safe haven in the tribal agencies of Pakistan, and most major terrorist attacks since 9/11 have been traced to FATA. An overriding regional objective is the elimination of that safe haven.

The use of armed extremist groups for asymmetrical warfare to confront threats from larger countries has created a military-extremist-industrial complex in Pakistan. The November 2008 Mumbai attacks appear to have been carried out by organizations that form a part of this complex. While the Pakistan military and intelligence agencies have lost many men in the fight against some extremist groups, their continued support for others—such as the Afghan Taliban and fighters in Kashmir—has created an infrastructure that is used by all of these organizations, including al-Qaida. The expansion of Taliban control in northwest Pakistan is threatening the main NATO and U.S. supply lines to Afghanistan.

The civilian government of Pakistan, despite its institutional and political weakness, has tried to articulate a vision of Pakistan’s national interest in which armed extremists constitute a threat rather than an asset. It has supported cooperation rather than confrontation with neighbors. The United States and the international community, therefore, have an interest in strengthening civilian institutions in Pakistan and supporting economic development outside the military-controlled sectors of the economy. Such changes could ultimately lead to a civilian-military pact in Pakistan that would empower the government to define the national interest and the country’s security posture. Support for such a transformation should be reinforced by regional efforts to address Pakistan’s security concerns about its
borders and territorial integrity, especially through the dialogue processes on outstanding issues between Pakistan and its neighbors, India and Afghanistan. Rightly or wrongly, Pakistan’s security establishment believes that it faces an existential threat, and it is unlikely to eliminate the means it has developed to counter that threat unless its most basic concerns—threats to Pakistan’s survival and territorial integrity—are addressed.

Such a change would support the strategic objective of establishing an international consensus on the stabilization of Afghanistan. Among the states involved are Pakistan, Iran, Russia, China, Saudi Arabia, and India. A consistent diplomatic effort led by the United States could move the region in that direction, toward the goals of recognition of territorial integrity, noninterference in and nonaggression from Afghanistan, as well as the stabilization of a Pakistan that abandons the use of armed extremist groups as a tool of policy and guarantees the security of its nuclear weapons and materials.

A precondition for such an outcome is a solution to the long-standing issues surrounding the status of Pashtuns in both Afghanistan, where they are the largest ethnic group, and Pakistan, where twice as many live as a minority. Al-Qaida has exploited the problems in Pashtun lands to establish a safe haven among people who do not support its ideology but whose poverty, isolation, and weak governance leave them vulnerable. Resolving these problems will require working with both governments and their people to reform the status of FATA, improve governance and security throughout the North-West Frontier Province, enable Afghanistan to recognize the Durand Line as an official open border, guarantee Afghanistan’s access to the port of Karachi, assure free land transit of Afghan products across Pakistan to India, and eliminate suspicions of support for separatism or subversion from either side. Such political and diplomatic efforts are necessary to enable the delivery of aid, so as to provide the people of these areas with alternatives to emigration, smuggling, the drug trade, and extremism. Such efforts must be balanced, especially in Afghanistan, by measures to assure other ethnic groups that the Pashtuns’ problems will not be resolved at their expense.

Equally important is public opinion among our NATO allies and at home. It is useless to pressure allies into supporting an effort that they find difficult to justify to their publics, which are wary of being dragged into ill-defined and expanding U.S. operations about which they are not consulted. The Obama administration must consult and discuss objectives in the region with allies before announcing them. Such joint objectives, aimed at isolating al-Qaida and broadening dialogue and cooperation with the Muslim world, will be easier for allied governments to mobilize their people to support. For many countries whose militaries are overstretched, finding nonmilitary mechanisms that nonetheless provide significant support for the overall effort could be optimal, especially in Europe, where opening up trade access and facilitating economic development could have a significant impact on job creation and thus stability.

There are potential conflicts and trade-offs among these objectives. The United States and its international partners must work with Afghan authorities to develop an integrated civil-military plan to identify priorities, sequences, and required resources for these
objectives. Such a plan would also make it possible to develop a coherent division of labor among the many actors involved in the stabilization of Afghanistan and Pakistan.

**To summarize, with respect to regional cooperation, the United States should:**

1. **Ensure that the overriding regional objective is the elimination of al-Qaida safe havens in Pakistan.** Since 9/11, al-Qaida has had no bases in Afghanistan, and no international terrorist attack has been traced to Afghanistan.

2. **Support the civilian institutions and government of Pakistan.**

3. **Reinforce the transformation of Pakistan’s view of its national interest by supporting regional efforts to address Pakistan’s security concerns about its borders, territorial integrity, and long-term defense needs.**

4. **Support the strategic objective of establishing an international consensus on the stabilization of Afghanistan, based on promoting conditions for the recognition of territorial integrity, noninterference in and nonaggression from Afghanistan, including the use of economic incentives.**

5. **Provide a solution to the long-standing issues surrounding the status of Pashtuns in both Afghanistan, where they are the largest ethnic group, and Pakistan, where twice as many live as a minority, as a condition for the foregoing outcome.**

**Public Diplomacy**

High-level policy changes will be required to achieve these objectives, but it is also essential to formulate and communicate the objectives in such a way as to mobilize domestic and international support for them:

- In reformulating objectives and strategy, the United States should consult with the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as with the United Nations (UN), NATO allies, and other partners, rather than simply announcing unilateral decisions. The Obama administration’s agreement to include the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan in the policy review, and its solicitation of the views of NATO allies for that review, are welcome.

- In addition to announcing the new objectives and policy at the NATO summit scheduled for April 3–4, 2009, President Obama should also use his planned speech addressed to the Muslim world to announce the end of the “war on terror” and the development of policies in this region based on the new approach.

- There is a dire need to provide public information to the Afghan population explaining the activities of the government and the international community, as well as individual projects and accomplishments. There should be a continuous dialogue between government officials and civic leaders using print media and television to explain the problems and accomplishments of different organizations. Afghan citizens should be invited to participate in community development and other ventures. The President of Afghanistan, its ministers, the heads of the UN, and some ambassadors could participate in this communication effort.
Policy Recommendations

Political Settlement to Isolate al-Qaida and Stabilize the Region

Creating conditions for a political settlement requires the credible communication of a policy of distinguishing Afghan and Pakistani insurgents who are fighting for national or local goals from those who are allied with al-Qaida. The United States should clearly communicate (publicly or confidentially, depending on the circumstances) its support for the stated principles of the Saudi-sponsored dialogue initiative with the Quetta Shura, which asks Taliban leaders to break with al-Qaida and present an Afghan program as a basis for discussion with other Afghans. All political negotiations with insurgents should be carried out by Afghans. The United States, in full consultation with the Afghan government, should develop channels of communication with insurgent leaders in order to support those negotiations and provide a means for clarification of intentions and, eventually, confidence-building measures.

The primary U.S. and international conditions placed on any agreement between insurgents and other Afghans should be (1) that it exclude al-Qaida and its allies, in accord with the principles of the Saudi initiative, and (2) that while it may provide for inclusion of former insurgents in the government or security forces, it must recognize the government formed under the 2004 constitution (which may be amended) and the security forces of that government as the sole sovereign authority and national security forces throughout the territory of Afghanistan. These principles are necessary to prevent the reestablishment of safe havens.

As part of President Obama’s overall review of U.S. detention policies, which aims to bring these policies into conformity with international and domestic law, the administration should also review the status of all Afghan detainees, in cooperation with the Afghan government, with a view toward distinguishing those, if any, who have genuine al-Qaida affiliations, those who are involved only in the Taliban government or military actions in Afghanistan, and others who have been detained without substantial cause. This review should extend to all Afghan detainees of the United States, including the remaining Afghan detainees at Guantánamo (estimated at twenty-six) and the larger number detained at Bagram and elsewhere. Available unclassified information indicates that, at most, six of the Afghan detainees at Guantánamo were alleged to be members of al-Qaida, and only one is classified as a High-Value Detainee; none of them held a senior or decision-making position, and none was associated with activities outside Afghanistan. An additional eight detainees were alleged to be “associated” with al-Qaida, and the rest had no al-Qaida affiliation. To the extent possible, Afghan detainees should be returned to Afghan authority. Those who have been detained wrongfully or for relatively trivial causes should be compensated.

Both international and U.S. national sanctions regimes dating from the 1990s subject members of the Taliban and al-Qaida to the same restrictions. Those imposed by resolution
of the UN Security Council can be changed only through appropriate multilateral procedures. This requires the agreement of all permanent members, including Russia, which in the past has rejected the delisting of even former Taliban officials not engaged in armed struggle and living in Kabul under the government’s protection. The United States should support efforts by the Afghan government to persuade Russia and other nations to modify these sanctions in accord with current realities.

The U.S. and Afghan governments should jointly develop a program to guarantee the security and employment of insurgents and other former combatants who agree to lay down their weapons. The large number of agencies involved in the counterterrorism campaign has made it difficult to guarantee that insurgents who reconcile with the Afghan government will also be protected from U.S. counterterrorism measures. In addition, several former Taliban officials who have laid down their arms have been assassinated, and others are under threat and need to be fully protected. As many join the insurgency and other illegal armed groups for economic reasons, those who have been reconciled or demobilized must be integrated into programs that provide for their livelihood and security.

A process of dialogue and negotiation with insurgents should aim to isolate al-Qaida, weaken regional state actors who support insurgency as a tool of policy, and stabilize Afghanistan and Pakistan—not to realign groups in order to pursue narrow U.S. strategic objectives. Throughout the course of such a dialogue and any negotiations, the Afghan government, the United States, and other involved parties should seek to involve and keep informed other Afghan political groups, including those that are most concerned about a revival of Taliban power, as well as regional powers such as Iran, Russia, and India, which may suspect that such a policy is aimed at them or their friends in Afghanistan.

The framework for seeking a political settlement with Pakistani insurgent groups is different, and the challenges are, if anything, more complex. It is possibly even more important, as Pakistani militants protect al-Qaida’s leadership, as well as training and logistical facilities for even the most extreme elements of the Afghan insurgency. Furthermore, the security establishment in Pakistan has an ambiguous attitude: It has always considered both the Afghan Taliban and militant groups fighting in Kashmir to be strategic assets. Transfixed by what it views as a far greater Indian threat, it has been reluctant to recognize that the support structures and networks for these groups have also provided a safe haven for al-Qaida and groups fighting the Pakistani state under the banner of the Pakistan Taliban Movement (Tehrik-i Taliban-i Pakistan), led by Baitullah Mehsud.

The administrative structure of Pakistan fragments the authorities responsible for military/police or political actions. Many militant groups are based in FATA, the indirect administration of which answers to the president of Pakistan through the governor of the North-West Frontier Province, although the Pakistan Army is now the main state presence there. Some of the same groups, as well as others, operate in the “settled” or administered areas of the North-West Frontier Province, which, in turn, is divided among administered divisions, Frontier Regions, and the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas, which includes the Malakand Division. The Malakand Division encompasses the district
of Swat, which links Afghanistan and FATA to Kashmir and has largely fallen under the control of Pakistani Taliban-like groups. Many militant groups that were originally active in Kashmir and based in southern Punjab have recently shifted their activities to FATA and increased their involvement in Afghanistan. Southern Punjab is also becoming a base for militant activity. All of these regions have different political and administrative authorities and different security forces.

It is difficult to provide general policy guidelines for all aspects of this complex situation. But there are several key points to note. First of all, the United States should support Pakistan’s federal and provincial authorities, under elected leadership, in their efforts to regain control of their territory, integrate local militant groups politically, and separate local groups from al-Qaida and other foreign militants. These efforts include political negotiations, but must also encompass credible threats and the use of force. Combined political and security efforts aimed at solving the problems of the local people will provide the most sustainable means of isolating al-Qaida and foreign militants and depriving them of sanctuary.

The United States should also oppose negotiated settlements that are aimed at displacing insurgent or militant activity from Pakistan to Afghanistan, or vice versa; Pakistan, Afghanistan, and their international partners must coordinate efforts to address the entire regional problem, not to solve one country’s problem at another’s expense. The United States will also need to provide full political and financial backing for efforts to reform the administration and develop the economies and social services of FATA and the North-West Frontier Province, including PATA. It is also important to work with the Pakistan military and police to train and equip forces for counterinsurgency operations. This is not mainly a technical question, as the perception that India poses a greater threat than armed extremists, and the continued use of armed extremists as assets against India and Afghanistan, have made the Pakistan military unwilling to integrate counterinsurgency tactics into its doctrine. We address these political challenges under “Regional Issues” in this report.

To summarize, in order to achieve a political settlement to isolate al-Qaida and stabilize the region, the United States should:

1. Communicate (publicly or confidentially, and in consultation with the Afghan government) full support for the principles of the Saudi-led dialogue process, which offers inclusion to the Taliban movement if it breaks with al-Qaida and presents an Afghan program as a basis for discussion with other Afghans.
2. Develop channels of communication with insurgent leaders in order to support the dialogue among Afghans.
3. Require agreements between the Afghan government and insurgents to exclude al-Qaida and its allies and to recognize the government and the security forces throughout the territory of Afghanistan.
4. Review the status of all Afghan detainees in Guantánamo, Bagram, and elsewhere, in cooperation with the Afghan government, with a view toward distinguishing those, if any, who have genuine al-Qaida affiliations from those who are involved only in the Taliban government or military actions in Afghanistan, and end all detention policies equating Afghan and Pakistani insurgents to international terrorists.

5. Review all U.S. sanctions against organizations and individuals to make the same distinction, and support efforts by the Afghan government to persuade Russia and other nations to modify the UN sanctions regime in accordance with current realities.

6. Develop, with the Afghan government, a program to guarantee the security and employment of any insurgents and other former combatants who reach agreement.

In Pakistan, the United States should:

1. Support Pakistan’s federal and provincial authorities, under elected leadership, in their efforts to regain control of their territory, integrate local militant groups politically, and separate local groups from al-Qaida and other foreign militants.

2. Oppose negotiated settlements that are aimed at displacing insurgent or militant activity from Pakistan to Afghanistan, or vice versa.

3. Provide full political and financial backing for efforts to reform the administration and to develop the economies and social services of FATA, PATA, and the North-West Frontier Province, including efforts that work through community mechanisms similar to the National Solidarity Program, which devolves decision making to local communities.

4. Work with the Pakistan military and police to train and equip forces for counterinsurgency operations.

Economic Rescue Package for Stability

While the insurgency has spread throughout southern Afghanistan, much of northern and central Afghanistan is experiencing severe drought and famine. The World Food Program estimates that as many as 9 million people in Afghanistan (out of an estimated population of 30 million) are experiencing severe food shortages. There are reports of mass migration of young men from the area to Iran and elsewhere in search of employment, at a time when levels of employment are collapsing globally as a result of the economic crisis. In the past year, insurgent incidents in the north have increased significantly: According to one study, there were nearly five times as many security incidents caused by antigovernment elements in the first two months of 2009 as there were in 2008.

In Pakistan, the annual economic growth rate has plummeted from 7 percent to 2.5 percent or less, meaning that per capita income is stagnant or declining. Poverty—defined as per capita income under $1.25 per day—is estimated to reach 40 percent of the population in the next couple of years, while 70 percent of the population will be living on $2 per day or less. A million workers have joined the ranks of the urban unemployed in the past six
months, raising the unemployment rate to 12 percent. In FATA, per capita income is one-third that of the rest of Pakistan. Remittances and the trucking industry, both mainstays of the FATA economy, have suffered serious declines.

Experts estimate that halting this economic deterioration in Pakistan might require a five-year package of $40 billion to $50 billion. While the United States can help lead this effort, it will have to be multilateral and coordinated with Pakistan’s existing $7.6 billion IMF bailout. Creating and funding such an urgent rescue package should be the focus of the UN’s Friends of Pakistan group. This multilateral group first met during the visit of President Asif Ali Zardari to the UN General Assembly in September 2008. It has been moving slowly, but the current crisis provides an opportunity for the U.S. mission to the UN to mobilize donors around this pressing issue.

President Obama should direct the U.S. Departments of State and Treasury to convene international working groups, through the Friends of Pakistan and existing coordination mechanisms for Afghanistan, to urgently design, fund, and implement economic rescue packages for both Afghanistan and Pakistan. These packages should include immediate employment creation, humanitarian assistance, and measures to ensure the supply and availability of food and energy. Either direct budget support with a clear road map of conditions, and/or a World Bank–administered trust fund, should be the instrument of disbursement.

In summary, to ensure economic stability in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, the United States should:

1. Convene a task force that involves the U.S. State and Treasury departments to launch a multilateral effort aimed at developing an economic rescue package for the region that includes immediate employment creation, humanitarian assistance, and measures to ensure the supply and availability of food and energy, using additional new funds or requesting appropriation of funds to maintain programs from which funds may be taken.

2. Focus the activities of the UN’s Friends of Pakistan group, Afghanistan’s Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board, and other multilateral forums on funding and implementation for such a rescue package.

International Military Forces and Objectives

President Obama has approved the deployment of approximately 17,000 additional troops (two combat brigades plus support troops) to Afghanistan in an attempt to halt the deterioration of security. In addition, after virtually ignoring the main Taliban leadership in Quetta, Pakistan, for eight years, the outgoing Bush administration recommended to the Obama administration that it work with Pakistan on operations to disrupt the Quetta Shura’s operations in Pakistani Baluchistan. (As Quetta is a densely populated city, the operations would have to differ significantly from those in FATA.) The primary stated goals
of this escalation of military and covert operations are to provide sufficient security for presidential elections, currently scheduled for August 20, 2009, and to place the Afghan government and its international backers in a better position for a political settlement with insurgents.

This increase in troops is occurring at the same time that rising civilian casualties caused by international military operations are eroding the Afghan public’s support for the international military presence, states in the region are demonstrating increased opposition to that presence, and the Quetta Shura is showing signs of willingness to distance itself from al-Qaida and seek a political settlement.

Military operations in Afghanistan should be reorganized to serve the objectives outlined in the first section of this report, in particular by protecting the Afghan people and strengthening Afghan institutions. In so doing, the United States should end Operation Enduring Freedom and integrate all U.S. forces (military and others) into the NATO-ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) command, which has a mandate and rules of engagement for counterinsurgency, not counterterrorism. As there are no international terrorist bases in Afghanistan, and no international terrorist actions have been traced to Afghanistan since 9/11, Operation Enduring Freedom’s “kill and capture” operations, which cause the most civilian casualties, should be ended. If there is a need to conduct such operations outside the borders of Afghanistan, appropriate commands and frameworks should be established for them.

In addition, the United States should close the Bagram detention center and other U.S. detention centers where captured Afghan insurgents are held. It is important to treat Afghan insurgents captured in Afghanistan as Afghan nationals who are subject to Afghan law and jurisdiction and to work with Afghan authorities to create an effective and humane detention system. When it is deemed necessary that an Afghan must be apprehended in Afghanistan, he or she should be subject to police arrest and prosecution under Afghan law.

The United States should also begin discussions aimed at negotiating a Status of Forces Agreement to cover all international forces and contractors in Afghanistan. More than seven years after the establishment of an Afghan government pursuant to the Bonn Agreement, it is no longer appropriate for U.S. and other international forces to operate without an agreement with a government whose sovereignty we claim to recognize and whose institutions it is our policy to strengthen. Such an agreement would have to be approved by the National Assembly of Afghanistan, in accordance with Article 90 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. While such negotiations could not be concluded until after the next round of Afghan national elections, discussions with the Afghan government and the National Assembly should begin immediately as a sign of goodwill. The Status of Forces Agreement should make clear that the United States and NATO are fully committed to the stabilization of Afghanistan over the long term, and that they do not intend to exploit support for such an objective to establish permanent military bases that could be used against Afghanistan’s neighbors. It is important to ensure
that additional troop deployments complement rather than undermine efforts to seek a political solution by developing and strengthening communications with insurgent leaders. Deployments should treat those elements of the insurgency that are engaged in the Saudi-coordinated dialogue track differently from those who refuse to participate and are closely linked to al-Qaida.

There are no U.S. forces openly deployed in Pakistan. Press reports indicate that the United States carries out attacks on al-Qaida and insurgent leaders in Pakistan using unmanned drones, primarily in FATA. These actions have aroused political opposition within Pakistan and have been denounced by the government of Pakistan, which may nonetheless discreetly cooperate with them. It is difficult for a public task force to comment on such a covert program, but we note that, although this program has apparently succeeded in targeting a number of high-level al-Qaida leaders and disrupting terrorist and insurgent operations, it is not a sustainable solution to the problems that have allowed al-Qaida to find sanctuary in Pakistan’s border regions. The United States should pursue close collaboration with the government of Pakistan to develop a comprehensive security, political, and economic strategy for the border areas, including the resolution of claims made by Afghanistan, in order to eventually replace the use of remote targeting with a sustainable strategy.

To summarize, with respect to reorienting international military operations in Afghanistan, the United States should:

1. End Operation Enduring Freedom and integrate all U.S. forces (military and others) into the NATO-ISAF command in order to end “kill and capture” operations, which cause the most civilian casualties.
2. Transfer the Bagram detention center and other U.S. detention centers where captured Afghan insurgents are held to Afghan authorities.
3. Treat all Afghan insurgents captured in Afghanistan as Afghan nationals who are subject to Afghan law and jurisdiction.
4. Begin discussions aimed at negotiating a Status of Forces Agreement to cover all international forces and contractors in Afghanistan.
5. Collaborate with the government of Pakistan to develop a comprehensive security, political, and economic strategy for the border areas in order to eventually replace the use of remote targeting with a sustainable strategy.

Development of National Security Forces

Current plans call for building an Afghan National Army of 134,000 and an Afghan National Police of 82,000. Even without an air force and other enablers that Afghanistan would need to become reasonably self-sufficient in security under current threat levels, the cost of maintaining ANSF of this size greatly exceeds the current and future fiscal capacity of Afghanistan. Currently, funding for the ANSF depends almost entirely on
U.S. congressional supplemental appropriations for Iraq and Afghanistan, which links Afghanistan to a very different operation and does not allow for long-term planning. The Task Force recommends the following:

- Funding for the ANSF and other components of assistance to Afghanistan should be separated from funding for Iraq. It should either be integrated into the omnibus foreign assistance act or become the subject of independent legislation.
- Funding for ANSF, as well as other forms of institution building and long-term development for Afghanistan, should be moved from supplemental appropriations to continuing appropriations in the permanent budget. The United States, NATO, the UN, and others should also develop mechanisms for long-term, multiyear, and predictable shared international funding of the ANSF and other Afghan institutions.
- Funding for and expenditures by the ANSF should be subject to examination by the government and the National Assembly of Afghanistan, even if the funds are appropriated from foreign assistance, to ensure accountability and civilian oversight of the security forces.

The long-term goal should be to make Afghanistan self-sufficient in its security forces through a combination of threat reduction, restructuring of security forces, and increase in the fiscal capacity of the Afghan state. Restructuring proposals include moving from an all-volunteer force to one that also includes conscripts and partly changing compensation from cash to in-kind, particularly in the form of housing, education, and family benefits.

Some members of the Task Force believe that Afghan security forces need to be substantially expanded in order to meet the twin goals of securing the population and allowing the eventual drawdown of foreign military forces. Afghanistan has a much lower ratio of police to population than countries without an insurgency (the U.S. ratio, for example, is nearly double that of Afghanistan). The current targets (not yet met) for building Afghan security forces are one-third of those already formed in Iraq. By any standard, they are woefully inadequate for the critical task of securing the population in homes, workplaces, and travel. Without a substantial increase, it is unclear how we can avoid maintaining large international forces that are well beyond the likely limits of U.S. and Afghan domestic political support. Support in NATO nations is already fraying.

Some members of the Task Force worry about building Afghan forces that are larger than the country can sustain and pay. Others counter that if the war is lost militarily, there will be no need to worry about long-term sustainability. Therefore, the Task Force recommends the following:

- An immediate and rapid reevaluation of the Afghan force levels needed to secure the population against an ongoing and spreading insurgency.
- U.S. and international commitment to pay the equipment and recurrent costs necessary to build whatever expanded force such an evaluation recommends.
There is considerable debate about proposals to create paramilitary or auxiliary police forces by organizing or arming communities or tribes, partly inspired by the experience of the Awakening in Anbar Province, Iraq. Afghans are largely opposed to the creation of more unofficial or quasi-official armed groups, from which they have suffered greatly over the past several decades, and the Iraqi model cannot simply be transferred to the very different context of Afghanistan. Currently, the U.S. and Afghan governments have agreed on a trial of such a program in Wardak Province for a period of several months. We urge careful and detailed political as well as security evaluations of the results of this trial before proceeding further with such plans.

The challenge of national security forces is different in Pakistan, a nuclear power with a large conventional army, navy, and air force. Pakistan’s defense establishment is trained, equipped, and deployed almost exclusively for a potential conflict with India. To confront the threat of loss of territorial control to the Taliban and other militants, the United States has offered training and equipment to transform the Pakistan military into a more effective counterinsurgency force, but the Pakistan security establishment has resisted diverting resources from its primary anti-Indian mission, and has instead designated the Frontier Corps, a locally recruited paramilitary body in the North-West Frontier Province and FATA, for counterinsurgency training.

While the United States should continue to offer equipment and training for counterinsurgency, the main obstacle to the transformation of the Pakistan military is not technical but political. As long as the Pakistan military remains in effective control of its own finances and doctrine, it, not the government, will define the national security interests of Pakistan. The U.S. Department of Defense, and in particular CENTCOM, has long become accustomed to direct military-military relations with Pakistan. The $11 billion for operational funding that the United States has supplied to the Pakistan military since 2001 has gone directly into military coffers without monitoring by the United States or oversight by Pakistani civilian authorities. Reforming the way in which the United States deals with the Pakistan military, with the goal of helping to establish civilian control, would be the most important contribution we could make to its transformation. All U.S. military aid to Pakistan should be fully transparent to the civilian authorities and subject to monitoring by both them and the United States.

To summarize, for the continued development of the Afghan National Security Forces, the United States should:

1. Work with other international actors to pay for required increases in the size of the ANSF, as Afghanistan is not and will not be in a position to do so.
2. Separate funding for the ANSF, as well as other forms of institution building and long-term development for Afghanistan, from funding for Iraq, and move the Afghanistan supplemental appropriations budget to continuing appropriations in the permanent budget.
3. Develop mechanisms for long-term, multiyear, and predictable shared international funding of the ANSF and other Afghan institutions with NATO, the UN, and other actors.

4. Ensure that this funding is subject to examination by the government and National Assembly of Afghanistan.

With respect to Pakistan, the United States should:

1. Continue to offer equipment and training for counterinsurgency, recognizing that the main obstacle to the transformation of the Pakistan military is not technical but political.

2. Reform the way in which the United States deals with the Pakistan military so as to help establish civilian control, and ensure that all U.S. military aid to Pakistan is fully transparent to the civilian authorities and subject to monitoring by both them and the United States.

Elections and Presidential Succession in Afghanistan

This year will test the current state structure in Afghanistan; the first term of the president elected under the 2004 constitution will come to an end, and new rounds of elections will be required this year and the next for the presidency, the National Assembly, and local bodies. Second elections are always a more difficult test than first elections, and Afghanistan will be no exception. Failure to carry out a legitimate presidential succession would place the entire system at risk.

According to Article 61 of the Afghan constitution, the president’s term ends on the first of Jawza of the fifth year after his inauguration (May 21, 2009). Presidential elections must be held thirty to sixty days before the end of the president’s term—that is, between March 21 and April 21, 2009. As it is impossible for several reasons to hold the elections as scheduled, the Independent Electoral Commission has set the date for presidential elections as August 20, 2009. Many political forces, including the leadership of the National Assembly and influential opposition politicians, have taken the position that, even if the elections are postponed, President Karzai’s term ends on May 21, and some interim arrangement is necessary. Hence, there is a chance that during what will probably be the most violent season of insurgent violence to date (May–August 2009), the legitimacy and authority of the president will be contested.

An essential international goal in Afghanistan is to ensure that the government retains its legitimacy until the election and that the presidential transition takes place according to the constitution so that the government can retain and strengthen its legitimacy. The election will strengthen the legitimacy of the next president only if the outcome is not significantly disputed and does not spark ethnic or factional conflict. National institutions in Afghanistan are far from strong enough for the counting of votes alone to determine an enforceable distribution of power. If Taliban control or intimidation reduces turnout
in predominantly Pashtun areas, the outcome may lack legitimacy, and any resulting
government may fail to be recognized by some segments of the population. Others are
concerned that seeking to reach ethnic agreement over the elections will undermine efforts
to establish good—or at least better—government and reduce corruption, as it could lead
to the distribution of positions by patronage rather than competence and responsibility.
To the extent possible, the United States and the international community should not take
sides in these debates, but should stick to certain principles as conditions for providing the
necessary security and financial assistance to carry out the process.

The transition must respect the rules in the constitution through an agreed-upon
process, including the National Assembly and the judiciary as appropriate. The constitution
contains provisions (legislation, Loya Jirga, state of emergency) to cope legally with all
manner of practical difficulties and obstacles. The international community should
generally support efforts by Afghans to reduce the likelihood of ethnic or other conflict
over the election outcome, as well as to ensure that the electoral process results in a
more effective government. As a stakeholder, though not a voter, in Afghanistan, the
international community should insist on procedures and an oversight role to strengthen
public confidence in the honesty and transparency of the elections. The United States, other
international actors, and especially those present at the provincial level, such as Provincial
Reconstruction Teams, should monitor attempts by power holders to manipulate election
outcomes (which have already begun in some areas) and should use whatever means they
have at their disposal to promote the fairness and freedom of the electoral process.

Some political groups demand that any agreement on holding elections after the end
of the president’s term should also include amendments to the constitution to establish
a semipresidential form of government with a prime minister who is accountable to the
National Assembly. While constitutional revision is acceptable and even desirable, it
requires careful preparation and deliberation. No constitutional changes should be
hurriedly introduced as part of a political deal; such an agreement could, however, provide
for an appropriate constitutional review of fixed duration.

In security measures over the coming months, priority must be given to those that
will make it possible to hold elections throughout the country, including those areas where
the insurgency is most active, though some limitations may be inevitable. In any dialogue
or negotiations that take place with insurgents before the elections, noninterference in
elections should figure as a subject of discussion.

The United States, NATO, the UN, and other actors must accelerate the implementation
of plans to provide security and logistical and financial assistance for the August elections.
NATO’s North Atlantic Council promised funding in the fall of 2007, but it has not
materialized. This requires immediate review by the new administration to see where the
effort is falling behind. In addition, it is necessary to plan for a possible second round of
presidential elections. Afghanistan has adopted the French presidential electoral system,
which requires the winning candidate to gain an absolute majority of the valid votes
cast, and provides for a second round within two weeks if no candidate gains an absolute
majority in the first round. In 2004, it took nearly six weeks to certify the official results of the election; if similar delays take place this time, the president’s term could end before the second round of elections is held. Under circumstances of an ethnically tinged insurgency and ethnic candidacies, the period before the announcement of the results could well be a time of mass mobilization, charges and countercharges of rigging, and violence that would make the second round of elections impossible or not credible.

There has been much speculation in the press, mostly based on anonymous sources and leaks, that the Obama administration may not support President Karzai in his bid for reelection and may seek to replace him. The Task Force does not take any position for or against any candidate, including President Karzai. Until the end of his term, Hamid Karzai is the president of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, an important ally of the United States. Trustworthy and respectful communication and close cooperation between these two governments is essential to both. Press leaks and whispering campaigns should cease. All messages for the government of Afghanistan, including criticism, should be delivered directly, respectfully, and confidentially to that government.

Some in the United States have argued that by criticizing U.S. and NATO forces for civilian casualties, President Karzai is effectively running against the United States and therefore is less of an ally. The Task Force believes that such criticisms express widespread public opinion in Afghanistan, as substantiated by polls, and are a legitimate expression of the democratic process. The United States and others would do better to listen and learn from these criticisms, even if some seem erroneous or unfair, rather than reject the message or the messenger.

President Karzai, like any political leader, is subject to legitimate criticism. Others might perform better as president of Afghanistan. That is a decision for the voters of Afghanistan to make. Nonetheless, some of the criticisms aimed at President Karzai do not take into account the inherent limitations on a president who does not control most of the armed forces or public expenditures in his country and who is constantly subject to contradictory pressures from foreign governments on which the country depends.

The most important result of the presidential transition will be the legitimacy—or lack thereof—of the outcome. Any process that is viewed as being manipulated or controlled by foreigners will weaken the government, regardless of the qualifications of the winning candidate.

To summarize, with respect to elections and presidential succession, the United States should:

1. Insist that the transition respect the constitution through an agreed-upon Afghan process, including the National Assembly and the judiciary as appropriate.
2. Support efforts by Afghans to reduce the likelihood of ethnic or other conflicts over the election outcome.
3. Insist on procedures and an oversight role to strengthen public confidence in the honesty and transparency of the elections.
4. Give priority to security measures that will make it possible to hold elections throughout the country.
5. Review and accelerate existing plans to provide security and logistical and financial assistance for the August elections and, if necessary, a second round thereafter.

Governance, Corruption, and Aid Delivery in Afghanistan

The corruption and poor performance of the Afghan government and international aid system have become main sources of public discontent. Although they may oppose the Taliban, many Afghans find it difficult, if not impossible, to support or trust the government. Many observers, however, misunderstand the source of Afghanistan’s governance problems. A common misconception is that the United States and the international community imposed a centralized government on a decentralized Afghanistan and organized their aid program around support for that centralized government, resulting in waste, corruption, and failure. Therefore, some propose that international actors should now engage with provincial and local leaders rather than with the central government to help Afghans create a decentralized state that would better meet their needs.

Unfortunately, terms such as “centralized” or “decentralized” provide only the illusion of understanding. The administrative and fiscal structure of the state apparatus in Afghanistan has been extremely centralized since the reign of Amir Abdul Rahman Khan (1879-1901). That centralized state, however, performed a very limited range of functions. Many of the functions handled by governments elsewhere were performed by communities operating outside the framework of the state or were not performed at all. The centralized state interacted with this decentralized and largely self-governing society through many institutions, including security forces, courts, mosques, local and national representation and co-optation, and, above all, by informal networks of kinship and patronage. The forms of interaction varied among regions, ethnic groups, and tribes, not all of which had the same relation to the state.

The social and political conflicts of the past decades destroyed and transformed much of the centralized state, the society’s decentralized self-governing institutions, and the networks and institutions through which they interacted, resulting in the emergence of a variety of new forms of authority. All governments of the past thirty years, however—communist, mujahideen, Taliban, and the current one—have accepted the centralized administrative state structure as their de jure framework. When the UN convened the Bonn Talks in November 2001, the Taliban had already abandoned Kabul to the Northern Alliance, and the participants had only eight days to reach agreement. It was not possible for a hastily convened, unrepresentative group of Afghans to restructure the state in eight days, and the Bonn Agreement reaffirmed the existing de jure system, as formalized in the 1964 constitution. During the constitutional process in 2003 and 2004, the constitutional commission, the Afghan government, and the Loya Jirga rejected all suggestions for decentralization of the state offered by international experts and representatives of some Afghan ethnic groups. National programs were the vehicles that provided, within a national framework of the rule of law, some decentralization of decision making, including the National Solidarity Program,
which decentralized decision making to the village level, empowering communities to make their own decisions over grants.

It is equally misleading to claim that the United States and the international community focused aid efforts on the central government. The United States and the international community have implemented their aid programs mainly through international contractors, agencies, and nongovernmental organizations, not the Afghan government. The pattern is beginning to change, but too slowly. The Afghan minister of foreign affairs recently estimated that 80 percent of all international aid is spent directly by donors, not by the government. This pattern of aid disbursement has created a fragmented and uncoordinated internationally run parallel system larger than the state that undermines the latter’s capacity and authority. It has ensured that the Parliament has no effective oversight over public expenditure. The Provincial Reconstruction Teams have created arbitrary provincial aid budgets outside the framework of the Afghan constitution and legal system that are unaccountable to Afghan institutions or political processes.

The largest item of foreign assistance has been the Afghan National Army, which, of course, is part of the central state. A large portion of the government expenditures that are financed by foreign aid have gone to the National Solidarity Program (NSP) and the government’s basic package of health services, both of which involve experiments with decentralized and participatory development and service delivery. In an effort to restructure the administration so as to make it more effective and accountable, the Afghan government has also established the Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG) in the Office of the President. The IDLG has developed proposals for gradually linking local administration to elected bodies and providing budgets to local administration through block grants. Various political groups are proposing different schemes of decentralization, including federalism, and these are the subject of intense discussion. All of these proposals are new to Afghanistan, a country with very limited financial and human resources that is currently one of the main theaters of an escalating regional war. The international community should support the NSP, IDLG, and other efforts by the Afghan government to reform its system of administration and service delivery. It should allow the Afghan political process to generate alternatives and make decisions on such complex and often divisive issues. The international community should also support efforts to build accountability systems within each ministry, as epitomized by the National Program system, and institute a system of certification of ministries, through which ministries that meet certain standards can receive programmatic budget support.

Proposals for direct engagement by international actors with provincial or local leaders to bypass the government and restructure the state on short order cannot possibly succeed. International actors do not have the linguistic, cultural, or political skills required for such engagement, nor do they possess the political legitimacy to do so. Such engagement would substitute international actors for the Afghan government, making any exit strategy impossible. The equivalent would be to expect Chinese administrative experts who do not speak English to engage with U.S. local officials to streamline our federal system.
Any attempt to engineer the restructuring of the Afghan state as a response to insurgency will fail. The insurgency poses an immediate security and political problem. Afghan and international experts disagree on how much time would be required to reform Afghan state institutions, even if the country were not at war, but it is unrealistic to expect such complex and major changes to occur quickly and predictably enough to provide a solution to immediate security threats. The United States and the international community should engage with Afghanistan over the long term to support such efforts, but restructuring the Afghan state cannot substitute for the political and military efforts needed to reduce the level of violent conflict over the next few years.

The immediate focus in governance should be on helping the existing system, however flawed, to function better, principally by changing international policies that undermine that system, and on supporting Afghan programs, such as the NSP and IDLG, that introduce gradual modifications. The NSP, in particular, through which elected councils choose and implement internationally funded development projects, can serve as a model for participatory development within the existing centralized, unitary system.

The NSP is financed primarily through the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), which is administered by the World Bank. The ARTF provides a model and a mechanism for aid delivery through the Afghan government’s budget. Donors contribute to a common fund that pays for programs of the Afghan government. This model consolidates foreign aid into a budget that is transparent and can be monitored. In this context, however, “coordination” means holding meetings to agree on policies while leaving the implementation up to dozens or more agencies that report separately to their donors and parliaments, with no one accountable for the overall results. There is not even a database with information about how much aid has been spent for what and with what results. As always, lack of accountability breeds waste and corruption.

Coordination is a particularly inappropriate model for a country in which foreign assistance finances nearly all public expenditure. In countries where aid finances a few discrete projects that supplement the government’s budget, direct implementation by donors can be coordinated by the government. In Afghanistan, where virtually all public expenditure is financed by aid, routing assistance outside the government creates massive aid dependency with little monitoring or accountability—this in an operation in which the strategic goal has been defined as state building.

The Obama administration and other donors in Afghanistan should take a fresh look at the mode of delivering assistance to Afghanistan, in particular by examining how to channel more aid through the ARTF or similar mechanisms as quickly as possible in order to increase transparency and accountability, decrease wasteful overhead and duplication, and strengthen the legitimacy and capacity of Afghan national institutions. They should also overhaul technical assistance—the provision of “international experts” to aid the Afghan government—which is a major source of waste and corruption. Currently, donors decide which experts to send on which subjects and employ them directly. There are virtually no criteria or procedures to evaluate their performance. Technical assistance should be
restructured so that the Afghan beneficiaries can hire the experts they need and have the contractual powers required to make them accountable for their performance.

Aid should mainly finance national government programs that are designed to implement the ANDS, which the Afghan government has integrated with its budgetary mechanisms. The ANDS calls for making agriculture, energy, and transport high-priority sectors. National programs should be developed for each of these sectors to catalyze the preparation of accountability systems and projects to adequate standards.

While preparing for the transition to this model of aid delivery, several immediate changes could make the current system more effective. USAID staffing should be increased to manage both province-level contracting to the $100,000 level (could be extended to $500,000) of individual projects with $10 million per province where AID officers are assigned, as well as increased Afghan and American staff to coordinate national projects at the local level.

The United States must also be more willing to take bureaucratic risks. Approximately one-third of U.S. small business start-ups fail within two years. By seeking a much higher rate of project success in Afghanistan (where many Afghan nongovernmental organizations lack the capacity for the business plans and cost analyses required by our current low appetite for risk), we impose bureaucratic constraints that both slow project implementation and require us to pay for expensive and wasteful oversight of large foreign contractors. We could do better at the provincial level by allowing greater risk taking and staffing our personnel on the ground to manage small projects.

It is important to identify a limited number of AID and embassy positions in Kabul and in the provinces that require more expertise than can be gained in one year and for which personal relations with senior Afghans are particularly important. Through a mix of two-year tours and repeat tours, we could improve on our current practice of one year’s experience seven times. In addition, it is important to expand AID and embassy staffing to provide full-time coverage of Provincial Reconstruction Teams. With one State Department and one USAID officer per team, the normal leave package alone guarantees that we will have staff in place only ten months a year, and gaps are often much longer because of the timing of transfers. This is not a serious way to deal with a war, and pushes the military to take on more civilian functions when positions are vacant for long periods of time.

Implementing aid through national government programs rather than donor-operated projects would not increase the risk of corruption. Donors have found relatively little corruption in programs operated by the Afghan government and funded through the ARTF. Much of the massive corruption in Afghanistan arises from interactions between the international parallel sector and Afghan networks that capture relations with foreigners. Even in cases in which the interactions largely involve only Afghans (as in the corruption in state land transactions and import licensing), the beneficiaries sometimes enjoy international protection as a result of their role in counterterrorism. There are few sources of money in Afghanistan other than the narcotics industry and international organizations, and these are the two main sources of funding for corruption.
In many cases of impunity for corruption, international officials claim that Afghan officials have rebuffed attempts to act against the guilty parties, while Afghan officials claim that foreign officials or intelligence agencies have prevented them from acting. We are unable to determine the overall share of responsibility, but we feel confident that much, if not most, corruption in Afghanistan involves relations between Afghans and internationals, and that measures to control and prevent it must be a joint venture.

International military and aid operations, for instance, have created a lawless sector of private security companies that compete with and undermine the legal security sector. Virtually every foreign operation in Afghanistan, military or civilian, relies on private security companies, not the authorities, for its protection. These private security companies are sometimes purely Afghan and sometimes joint ventures with international partners. The Afghan partners in these ventures are men who lead armed groups—that is, commanders. These were supposed to be demobilized and disarmed, but in many cases, they have simply been reconstituted as private security companies that could easily revert to warring militias. The process of contracting with these companies is unaccountable by any public authority.

Afghans welcomed Vice President (then Senator) Joseph Biden’s criticism of the privatization of U.S. defense functions in his acceptance speech at the Democratic National Convention. According to a U.S. Government Accountability Office report (Contingency Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, GAO-09-19), the Defense and State departments and USAID together employ approximately 50,000 private contractors in Afghanistan, at a cost of approximately $5.5 billion per year. The low quality of data available on these contractors indicates a low degree of accountability for their performance. The impact of their performance on the security situation has not been investigated.

The Obama administration should immediately review the impact of the use of private contractors for security and other purposes in Afghanistan, as well as all contracts currently under implementation, and develop a plan for the gradual transfer of functions to the appropriate Afghan national institutions. It is particularly urgent to develop plans for the demobilization and reintegration of private security companies, which are not covered by current programs for demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration and disarmament of illegally armed groups.

The U.S. Government Accountability Office, the U.S. Justice Department, and the Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction should undertake immediate investigations and, as appropriate, prosecutions, of U.S. and international corrupt practices in Afghanistan. Such investigations will also identify Afghan partners in such corrupt practices, and thus provide a starting point for confronting the endemic corruption in the Afghan government and administration.

Corruption in the Afghan government takes several forms, including the sale of offices, especially in the Ministry of the Interior, that enable incumbents to profit from drug trafficking; licensing for imports of key commodities such as fuel; and transactions in urban land. Strict transparency requirements for all official appointments, licensing, contracting, and land transactions, including public announcement and postings of all such decisions in
mosques and on the Internet, would facilitate anticorruption efforts. International donors could also help Afghans organize and strengthen existing civil society organizations to monitor and publicize such transactions.

To summarize, with respect to governance, corruption, and aid delivery in Afghanistan, the United States and the international community should:

1. Support long-term Afghan efforts to restructure the Afghan state to meet current and future needs, recognizing that restructuring the Afghan state cannot substitute for the political and military efforts needed to reduce the level of violent conflict over the next few years.
2. Focus immediate governance efforts on helping the existing system to function better.
3. Channel more aid through the ARTF or similar mechanisms as quickly as possible in order to increase transparency and accountability, decrease wasteful overhead and duplication, and strengthen the legitimacy and capacity of Afghan national institutions.
4. Develop implementation mechanisms for the use of funding under the ARTF, including a portfolio of large infrastructure projects prepared to international standards, and ensuring that each sector has a National Program whereby donors can be assured accountability standards are met, institutional capability can be met, and services can be delivered through harnessing capability of all sectors—state, market and civil society.
5. Remove bureaucratic constraints that both slow project implementation and require expensive and wasteful oversight of foreign contractors.
6. Immediately review the impact of the use of private contractors for security and other purposes in Afghanistan and develop a plan for the gradual transfer of functions to the appropriate Afghan national institutions.
7. Instruct the U.S. Government Accountability Office, the U.S. Justice Department, and the Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction to undertake immediate investigations and, as appropriate, prosecutions, of U.S. and international (and their Afghan partners) corrupt practices in Afghanistan.

Counternarcotics
The production of illicit narcotics, the basis of a global industry supplying a global demand, migrates to areas with the required natural endowments and where the cost of engaging in illegal activities is least. Hence, poppy cultivation and heroin production have become concentrated in Afghanistan and, within Afghanistan, in the least secure areas. Drug trafficking and its associated corruption, however, affect much larger areas of Afghanistan, including provinces that have been certified as “poppy free.” (Some poppy-free provinces have become centers of cannabis production.)

The U.S. government and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime use the wrong metric to measure progress in counternarcotics: acreage planted with opium poppy. Production of the raw material accounts for less than one-third of the narcotics economy in Afghanistan.
Processing and trafficking are far more profitable, and these activities are the sources of the money that corrupts the government and funds the insurgency. The most relevant metric of success is the proportion of Afghan domestic income derived from the drug industry. This figure appears to have remained constant at approximately one-third of the total. (Gross profits of the narcotics industry as estimated by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime have remained close to half of Afghanistan’s estimated gross domestic product.) There are few signs of the marginalization of this industry, though its spatial organization has changed, with raw material production now concentrated in a few areas.

Narcotics is the largest industry in Afghanistan’s economy. Participation in the country’s largest industry cannot be considered a deviant activity to be suppressed by law enforcement. The purpose of counternarcotics policy in Afghanistan is to reduce the harm done by narcotics-funded insurgency and corruption, while gaining the support of the millions of people who currently depend on the industry for their employment or livelihood.

The core tools of counternarcotics policy are crop eradication, interdiction (arrest and prosecution of traffickers and destruction of heroin labs), and development (alternative livelihoods). These go hand in hand with public information and improved governance and reform of the justice sector. All of these tools are necessary in a coordinated counternarcotics policy, but they need not be simultaneous. They must be sequenced to achieve the right outcome. One example, though limited in its applicability, is Thailand, where the government invested in development for ten years before introducing eradication. Because the people had confidence in the alternatives by then, they accepted eradication of what little cultivation was left. Currently, according to the former coordinator for counternarcotics and rule of law in Afghanistan, Ambassador Thomas Schweich, the United States and the international community are unable to implement the coordinated policy they claim to have adopted.

The United States and European Union must open their markets to licit Afghan products, including cotton and textiles. An effective and sustainable counternarcotics strategy for Afghanistan has to include increased access to regional and global markets for products made in Afghanistan. Investing in production without ensuring markets will not convince rural communities living in high-risk environments to change their economic activities. The passage of the Regional Opportunity Zones project that is now before Congress would be a significant step in this direction. We recommend its immediate passage.

The United States should work with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and regional governments to develop an institutional framework for labor migration and transfer of remittances, so as to relieve some of the pressures of unemployment that lead Afghans to participate in the narcotics economy (as well as insurgency).

Within Afghanistan, investment in development—especially infrastructure and industry development—should increase in all provinces as part of the implementation of Afghanistan’s provincial development plans. These programs must target, first of all,
provinces that are not planting poppy or that are reducing production. Otherwise, there will be perverse incentives. Simultaneously, the interdiction effort must be enhanced to go beyond seizing containers from traffickers. It must start at the top, with the destruction of heroin laboratories and the removal of high-level officials benefiting from the trade. The United States and other states and international organizations operating in Afghanistan should also strive to ensure that none of their contractors, especially private security contractors, are involved with or benefit from drug trafficking.

The matter of how best to pursue poppy eradication and the relationship of eradication to counterinsurgency presents the greatest challenge—and controversy—for the United States, the international community, and the Afghan government. The goal should be to work with the 98 percent of Afghan poppy cultivators (according to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime) who say they are willing to abandon poppy cultivation if they can count on earning at least half as much income from legal economic activities (not only crops). Crop eradication should be pursued only in areas where communities have access to substantial alternative livelihoods.

The United States and international financial institutions should not impose on Afghan agriculture a level of deregulation that the United States and other developed countries refuse for themselves. Subsidies, price supports, microloans, guaranteed purchase, and other forms of insurance for farmers will be needed as they make the transition to licit economic activities. It is not necessary to purchase the opium production, as some have suggested; farmers are interested in money, not opium, and they will be even more satisfied if they can sell other commercial crops profitably.

Alternative livelihood programs must provide all of the services that are currently provided to farmers by drug traffickers: financing and technical assistance (extension services). Microfinance must be made easily available so that poor farmers and regions can avail themselves of new opportunities. Such programs have begun implementation in the last couple of years, but they need to be significantly enhanced in order to yield returns and to gain the confidence of Afghans. A serious effort to develop agriculture and value-added industries based on agricultural products in Afghanistan is needed to reduce poppy cultivation. This requires investment in irrigation, such as building dams and developing markets and transportation systems. A large and serious alternative livelihood program is needed to address the shift from illicit to licit cultivation, and to reduce poverty in the country.

Efforts to accelerate counternarcotics in order to meet security or political goals are counterproductive and self-defeating. Replacing one-third of the economy of one of the poorest countries in the world is not a reasonable counterterrorism tactic. It will require well over a decade and cannot be rushed. The state in Afghanistan can be built only by using the limited force available in a highly focused and economical way against hard-core opponents, while greatly expanding the incentives (where international actors should have a decisive advantage) to win people over to the side of the government and its international supporters. Counternarcotics, done properly, will remove criminal power holders and bring
security and development. Done the wrong way, counternarcotics could further reduce popular support.

To summarize, with respect to counternarcotics, the United States and the international community should:

1. Open markets to licit Afghan products, including cotton and textiles.
2. Increase investment in development in all Afghan provinces, including peaceful ones.
3. Provide political and security support for the destruction of heroin laboratories and the removal of high-level officials benefiting from the trade.
4. Pursue crop eradication only in areas where communities have substantial alternative livelihoods.
5. Provide subsidies, price supports, microloans, guaranteed purchase, and other forms of insurance to farmers as they make the transition to licit economic activities.
6. Implement alternative livelihood programs that provide all of the services that are currently provided to farmers by drug traffickers: financing and technical assistance (extension services).

Regional Issues
Since the U.S. presidential election, there has been much discussion of President Obama’s plan for a “regional approach” to Afghanistan and related issues. A regional approach means a diplomatic initiative that seeks to establish a durable consensus among regional stakeholders in Afghanistan to support the government and does not use the country’s territory against others. One necessary condition for such a consensus is acceptance by Pakistan of the political dispensation in Afghanistan and demobilization of the armed extremist part of the military-extremist-industrial complex in Pakistan, which, in turn, requires diplomatic work to address some of Pakistan’s legitimate security concerns and regional relationships. This process will require interlocking efforts—grand bargaining—rather than any single “grand bargain.”

The civilian government of Pakistan, led by President Asif Ali Zardari, has tried to articulate a vision of Pakistan’s national interest in which armed militants constitute a threat rather than an asset. Zardari has stated that India poses no threat to Pakistan. He has also called for a change in Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine, to one of “no first use,” which would remove the nuclear shield against conventional response to asymmetrical warfare. A Pakistan with a national interest such as that articulated by Zardari would have no need to support armed militants, who could only pose threats to its peaceful development. Therefore, the United States and NATO have a strong interest in supporting a civilian-military pact in Pakistan that empowers the government to define the national interest and the country’s security posture.

But Pakistan’s civilian institutions are too weak at this point to exert full control. Hence, engaging with the leadership of the military is equally important. It is not likely
that the Pakistan military would accept full civilian control and the demobilization and reintegation of its militant auxiliaries unless such efforts were accompanied by measures to address Pakistan’s security and political concerns.

The United States should clearly support the civilian government’s authority over the military and intelligence apparatus, not just in words, but also in the way in which it manages its relations with the Pakistan military. All aid should go through the government budget with full transparency to and oversight by the civilian leadership. The United States can do as much to strengthen civilian institutions in Pakistan by changing how it deals with the Pakistan military as it can by increasing civilian aid, as provided for in the very welcome Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act (commonly called the Biden-Lugar-Obama Act, now being followed up by the Kerry-Lugar Act).

Together with the civilian government of Pakistan, the United States, NATO, and others should convey a clear message to the military and to the Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence that maintaining the militant auxiliaries of the military—Afghan, Pakistani, and others—is no longer acceptable. This requires intelligence about the actual relationships. This approach must be combined with a clear message of support for Pakistan’s territorial integrity and measures to address its political and security concerns.

The United States and NATO should continue to develop alternative logistical and supply routes to Afghanistan in order to lessen that nation’s dependence on Pakistan. In addition to recently concluded agreements with Russia and the Central Asian states, the United States and NATO should also explore the use of the transport corridor that was jointly developed by India and Iran to link the Persian Gulf port of Chahar Bahar to the Afghan ring road. While U.S.–Iran relations are unlikely to reach the stage anytime soon where the United States can transport military equipment through Iran, transit of nonlethal supplies and supplies for NATO members with normal relations with Iran should be feasible starting points.

The United States should ask the Pakistani government to develop concrete plans to implement the political and administrative integration of FATA into the “mainstream” of Pakistan, a plank in the platform of the ruling parties in both the national and North-West Frontier provincial governments. It should also request such a blueprint for the stabilization of PATA, including Swat, and the rest of the border areas, and offer both technical and financial assistance for the implementation of such plans, including economic development of the border region. When Pakistan signals a clear intention to extend the direct security responsibilities of the Pakistani state up to the Durand Line, the United States should explore with Kabul how the Afghan government can finally recognize that line as an open international border at the center of a zone of cooperation.

In working with Pakistan, the United States should collaborate with NATO, the Friends of Pakistan, and other multilateral forums to develop a consistent international approach to the country. It is particularly important for the United States to actively engage with China and Saudi Arabia. Along with the United States, these two countries provide funding and technical support to the Pakistan military. While both have been close and
consistent allies of Pakistan, especially the military, both have recently developed serious concerns about the inroads made by al-Qaida and the Taliban in Pakistan, the danger of further deterioration of security or economic collapse, and the threat of war with India provoked by terrorist attacks such as the one in Mumbai.

To signal support for the needs of the Pakistani people, the United States should lead the international community in developing a multiyear economic rescue package for the country. President Obama could start by asking Richard Holbrooke, his special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, to convene a joint task force of the U.S. State and Treasury departments. This would also be an appropriate subject for the work of the Friends of Pakistan. The United States should open its markets to Pakistani textiles, a long-standing demand that might prove more beneficial than foreign aid. The deeper engagement created by such a program will provide opportunities to strengthen civilian institutions and promote regional economic cooperation as an antidote to confrontation.

The United States should continue to encourage Pakistan and India to build on their existing composite dialogue to normalize their relations, including their behind-the-scenes efforts to deescalate tensions over Kashmir and find a lasting settlement to this dispute. These efforts are especially important given the history of three wars and several crises between these two nuclear weapons states. Moreover, Kashmir has provided the rationale for decades for support of guerrilla and terrorist operations by groups based in Pakistan that have escaped the control of the state apparatus that established and protected them.

The United States should seek out ways to incorporate Pakistan into the global nuclear nonproliferation regime. The Task Force took note of a 2005 statement by International Atomic Energy Agency director Mohamed ElBaradei that “India, Pakistan and Israel, in my view, are not going to come to the NPT [Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty] through the normal route.” ElBaradei suggested accepting that India and Pakistan are declared nuclear weapons states as a fact and endorsed the U.S.–India civilian nuclear agreement as a way to bring a declared nuclear state closer to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Under existing circumstances (especially given concerns over terrorism and proliferation), it is not possible to duplicate that agreement with Pakistan, but it is worth starting a dialogue with Pakistan to explore what might be possible, and under what conditions, to acknowledge Pakistan’s nuclear weapons status, provide assistance to ensure the safety and security of its nuclear assets, and bring Pakistan into greater conformity and closer cooperation with the global nonproliferation regime.

An opening to Iran, perhaps starting with counternarcotics, strategic dialogue over al-Qaida and the Taliban, economic cooperation, and discussions of the use of that country as a logistical route for some supplies to Afghanistan, could both provide confidence-building measures for other aspects of the U.S.–Iran relationship and impress on the Pakistan military that it has no permanent logistical monopoly on access to Afghanistan. Some signals indicate Iranian interest in reviving a proposal from 2005: After the Joint Declaration of the U.S.–Afghanistan Strategic Partnership in May of that year, Iran proposed such an agreement between itself and Afghanistan, providing, among other things, that Afghanistan would not
permit its territory to be used against Iran. Iranian intentions are unclear; does that 
nation seek a security guarantee, largely from the United States, or does it want future 
leverage over the Afghan government in order to demand limitations on where ISAF can 
operate within Afghanistan? The current administration should examine whether direct U.S.–Iran 
contacts or even an agreement could reduce Iranian concerns. Such moves would build on 
the policies followed by the United States until 2003, when it halted cooperation with Iran 
in Afghanistan, which had been essential to the original military and political gains. One 
cautionary note is that cooperation on Afghanistan should not provide Iran with a stalling 
technique over other policies of concern. The recent invitation for Iran to join the UN-
chaired international conference on Afghanistan in the Netherlands on March 31, 2009, is 
a promising avenue for the United States to open a diplomatic channel to Iran concerning 
issues related to Afghanistan.

The United States should continue to enhance cooperation with Russia and the Central 
Asian states in Afghanistan. These nations have already agreed on using former Soviet 
territory to deliver nonlethal supplies to NATO in Afghanistan. Russia’s main concern is 
the expansion of NATO to all of its borders—while it supports the fight against the Taliban 
and al-Qaida, Russia also sees the expansion of NATO into Central Asia in support of that 
mission as a serious long-term threat. Expanding U.S.–Russia cooperation in Afghanistan 
and taking Russia into confidence on issues about which it has strong reservations, 
such as reconciliation with the Taliban, would help dispel some suspicions. So could 
opening discussions about a possible role in Afghanistan for the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization.

The United States must establish and maintain a consistent, high-level dialogue with 
China on security and stability concerns in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In addition to its 
close relationship to the Pakistan military, China is the largest foreign investor in Pakistan 
and is poised to become the largest foreign investor in Afghanistan, starting with a $3.5 
billion copper mine project in Logar Province south of Kabul, a commitment of $5.5 billion 
for a railroad, and about $3 billion for a power plant and other facilities.

India is an indispensable regional actor. The United States should undertake to relieve 
Pakistan’s anxiety about the Indian consulates in Afghanistan (which, contrary to what 
Pakistan says, do have legitimate consular functions) by encouraging transparency and 
dialogue between the two countries in Afghanistan. Specifically, the United States should 
courage Pakistan and India to speak directly about their mutual suspicions toward 
each other’s interests in Afghanistan. India will argue that it has legitimate interests in 
Afghanistan and that it is a major donor to the international effort to rebuild that country. 
Pakistan will charge that India is running operations out of its consulates in Afghanistan 
in order to stir up trouble across the border. Pakistan sees itself as caught in a vice between 
its western and eastern neighbors. But these long-standing concerns are now being trumped 
by a new reality—the need for India and Pakistan to look beyond their traditional rivalries 
and to agree on a joint strategy to confront the extremists operating along the Pakistan–
Afghanistan border and in their respective countries.
The central strategic objective for Afghanistan is to reconstitute the type of international consensus that enabled the country to enjoy a century of relative stability (1878–1978). Such an objective is far more demanding under current conditions, where there are many more actors and Afghanistan is far more integrated into international economic, political, and social networks. Afghanistan would now have to become a connector between its neighboring regions rather than an isolated buffer state. At the initiative of Kabul and with the support of the G8, the Afghan government and its neighbors have convened a series of conferences on regional cooperation in support of the reconstruction of Afghanistan. While such policies are necessary and deserve full U.S. support, their success depends on resolving the security issues around Afghanistan’s status so that neighboring countries do not fear such cooperation will strengthen their enemies. Some have suggested an international process of negotiation and consultation that would culminate in a conference adopting a declaration or treaty on noninterference in and nonaggression from Afghanistan. Such a conference, or the process leading to such a conference, could provide a context in which Afghanistan could recognize its border with Pakistan, and Pakistan could take measures to ensure that its government could prevent the subversion of Afghanistan, including from the territories now in FATA. The advancement of Pakistan–India détente would certainly make a positive contribution to this overall effort. A multilateral framework might enable the countries of the region to address their interrelated problems without the explicit quid pro quos that they reject.

To summarize, with respect to Pakistan, the United States should

1. Support the authority of Pakistan’s civilian government over the military and intelligence apparatus, not just in words, but also in the way in which it manages its relations with the Pakistan military.
2. Convey to the military that maintaining its militant auxiliaries is no longer acceptable.
3. In conjunction with NATO, continue to develop alternative logistical and supply routes to Afghanistan, including transit through Iran, in order to lessen that nation’s dependence on Pakistan.
4. Ask the Pakistani government to develop concrete plans to implement the political and administrative integration of FATA into the “mainstream” of Pakistan; request such a blueprint for the stabilization of PATA, including Swat, and the rest of the border areas; and offer technical and financial assistance for the implementation of such plans.
5. Explore with Kabul how the Afghan government can finally recognize the Durand Line as an open international border, perhaps through a process that first makes it the center of a zone of economic cooperation.
6. Support the existing composite dialogue between India and Pakistan, which is currently on hold, to normalize their relations and to address the most difficult issues dividing them, especially Kashmir, and inform Pakistan that active support and engagement for this process will depend on its concrete action against the perpetrators of the Mumbai attacks and similar events.
7. Start a dialogue with Pakistan to explore what might be possible, and under what conditions, to acknowledge Pakistan’s nuclear weapons status, provide assistance to better ensure the safety and security of its nuclear assets, and bring Pakistan into greater conformity and closer cooperation with the global nonproliferation regime.

With other regional actors, the United States should:

1. Actively engage with China and Saudi Arabia to share views on the Pakistan military, especially support for militants.
2. Signal willingness to support an Afghanistan–Iran agreement that neither government will permit its territory to be used against the other, and open direct discussions with Iran over the issues in Pakistan and Afghanistan, perhaps starting with counternarcotics, a strategic dialogue over al-Qaida and the Taliban, economic cooperation, and discussions of use of Iran as a logistical route for supplies to Afghanistan.
3. Enhance cooperation with Russia and the Central Asian states in Afghanistan, discussing in particular a role for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

Conclusion

American interests and objectives in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the region are critical to our security and the threat we face from al-Qaida and its allies. Moving forward, our policies in the region must be far better defined, well resourced, and grounded in a realistic understanding of what is achievable. It is time for a new look at our policy goals, and time to work with the Afghan and Pakistani governments in coordination with our international partners to develop a comprehensive plan to achieve those goals. The United States has an opportunity to recast its policies in this region in ways that promote political solutions rather than open-ended conflict, to work more effectively with local partners and with allies, and to help Afghanistan and Pakistan achieve greater stability. Denying safe haven to al-Qaida, as well as to members of the Taliban and other local groups who are allied with that organization, must be our primary focus and our highest priority. Achieving this goal will require a focused military effort, and a series of political and economic steps that will lay the foundation for long-term stability and a regional dialogue to ensure our chances for success in creating lasting peace and stability in the region.
Task Force Co-Chairs and Members

Co-Chairs

Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering  
Vice Chairman  
Hills & Company

Dr. Barnett Rubin  
Director of Studies and Senior Fellow  
Center for International Cooperation, NYU

Project Director

Dr. Jamie F. Metzl  
Executive Vice President, Asia Society

Members

Mr. Peter Bergen  
Schwartz Senior Fellow, New America Foundation

Mr. Thomas E. Freston  
Principal, Firefly3 and Asia Society Trustee

Ambassador Karl F. Inderfurth  
John O. Rankin Professor  
Elliot School of International Affairs, George Washington University

Ms. Ellen Laipson  
President and Chief Executive Officer, Henry L. Stimson Center

Ms. Clare Lockhart  
Co-founder and Director, Institute for State Effectiveness

Dr. M. Ishaq Nadiri  
Jay Gould Professor of Economics, New York University

Ambassador Ronald E. Neumann  
President, American Academy of Diplomacy

Mr. Ahmed Rashid  
Pakistani Journalist and Author

Ambassador Teresita Schaffer  
Director, South Asia Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies

Mr. Rory Stewart  
Director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, Harvard University
Biographies of Chairmen and Members

Peter Bergen is a print and television journalist. He is the author of *Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden* (2001), which has been translated into eighteen languages, and *The Osama bin Laden I Know: An Oral History of Al Qaeda's Leader* (2006). Both books were named among the best nonfiction books of the year by the *Washington Post*, and documentaries based on them were nominated for Emmy Awards in 2002 and 2007. Mr. Bergen is CNN’s National Security Analyst and a Fellow at New York University’s Center on Law and Security. He has written for the *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, *Vanity Fair*, *New Republic*, *Los Angeles Times*, *Wall Street Journal*, *International Herald Tribune*, and *Foreign Affairs*, and has testified on Capitol Hill. He has also worked as a correspondent for National Geographic Television and the Discovery Channel. In 2008, he was an Adjunct Lecturer at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. Mr. Bergen holds a master’s degree in modern history from New College, Oxford University. As a Schwartz Senior Fellow at the New America Foundation, Mr. Bergen researches and writes on the al-Qaida network and on the problem of global terrorism.

Thomas E. Freston is a Principal of Firefly3, an investment and consultancy firm focusing on the media and entertainment industries. He is the former Chief Executive Officer of Viacom Inc., where he also served as Chief Operating Officer. For seventeen years, Mr. Freston was Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of MTV Networks (including MTV, Nickelodeon, VH1, Comedy Central, and other networks). Prior to that, Mr. Freston ran a textile business in Afghanistan and India. Currently, he is Chairman of the ONE Campaign, an advocacy organization for global poverty issues, and serves on the boards of the American Museum of Natural History, DreamWorks Animation, Product (RED), and Emerson College. Mr. Freston consults with Oprah Winfrey and others in the media and entertainment industries. He also serves as a trustee of the Asia Society.

Ambassador Karl F. Inderfurth is currently a John O. Rankin Professor at the Elliot School of International Affairs, George Washington University. He has served as Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs (1997–2001), Special Representative of the President and Secretary of State for Global Humanitarian Demining (1997–1998), and U.S. Representative for Special Political Affairs to the United Nations, with ambassadorial rank, where he also served as Deputy U.S. Representative on the UN Security Council (1993–1997). Ambassador Inderfurth has worked as a National Security and Moscow Correspondent for ABC News (1981–1991) and received an Emmy Award in 1983. He has also served on the staffs of the Senate Intelligence and Foreign Relations Committees and the National Security Council. He coauthored *Fateful Decisions: Inside the National*
Security Council (2004), along with Professor Loch K. Johnson. He is member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the International Institute for Strategic Studies, and serves on the board of the Asia Foundation.

Ellen Laipson is President and Chief Executive Officer of the Henry L. Stimson Center, having joined that organization in 2002 after twenty-five years of government service. She served as Vice Chair of the National Intelligence Council (NIC) (1997–2002) and Special Assistant to the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations (1995–1997). At the NIC, Laipson co-managed the interdisciplinary study Global Trends 2015 and directed outreach to think tanks and research organizations on national security topics. Her government career focused on analysis and policy making on Middle East and South Asian issues. She was Director of Near East and South Asian Affairs for the National Security Council (1993–1995), National Intelligence Officer for Near and South Asia (1990–1993), a member of the State Department’s policy planning staff (1986–1987), and a specialist in Middle East affairs for the Congressional Research Service. At the Stimson Center, Ms. Laipson directs the Southwest Asia Project. She is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, International Institute of Strategic Studies, Middle East Institute, and Middle East Studies Association, and a board member of the Asia Foundation and Education and Employment Foundation. Ms. Laipson holds a master’s degree from the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, and a bachelor’s degree from Cornell University.

Clare Lockhart is Cofounder and Director of the Institute for State Effectiveness, established in 2005 to refine approaches to institution building and state building. She and her colleagues advise on the design and implementation of transitions from instability to stability. From 2001 to 2005, she lived and worked in Afghanistan, first as a member of the United Nations team designing and negotiating the Bonn Agreement, then in Afghanistan working to establish the UN role, and supporting the establishment of the Afghan cabinet and development framework. She was then seconded to the Afghan government to advise on the establishment of the government’s reconstruction agency and the Afghan budget process and coordination systems. In 2006–2007, she returned to Afghanistan as an advisor to General Richards, commander of ISAF/NATO, and served on General Petraeus’s Commander’s Assessment Team. Prior to this, Ms. Lockhart managed a program on Institutions and Organizations at the World Bank, and practiced human rights and public law at the English Bar. She holds degrees from Oxford University, Harvard University, and the Inns of Court School of Law. She is the coauthor, with Ashraf Ghani, of Fixing Failed States (2008). She contributes frequently to the media on state functionality, accountability, and Afghanistan in particular.
Jamie F. Metzl is Executive Vice President of the Asia Society. He is responsible for overseeing the institution’s strategic directions and overall program activities globally. An expert on Southeast Asian history and politics, Dr. Metzl has extensive government experience. His appointments have included Deputy Staff Director and Senior Counselor of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senior Coordinator for International Public Information and Senior Advisor to the Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs at the Department of State, and Director for Multilateral and Humanitarian Affairs on the National Security Council. At the White House, he coordinated U.S. government international public information campaigns for Iraq, Kosovo, and other crises. He was a Human Rights Officer for the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia from 1991 to 1993, where he helped establish a nationwide human rights investigation and monitoring unit. In 2004, he ran unsuccessfully for U.S. Congress from the Fifth District of Missouri in Kansas City. Dr. Metzl is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, a Founder and Co-Chair of the Board of the Partnership for a Secure America, a former White House Fellow, and a former Aspen Institute Crown Fellow. He holds a PhD in Southeast Asian History from Oxford University, a juris doctorate from Harvard Law School, and is a magna cum laude, Phi Beta Kappa graduate of Brown University.

Professor M. Ishaq Nadiri emigrated from Afghanistan to the United States at the age of nineteen. He received a bachelor’s degree from the University of Nebraska, and master’s and doctoral degrees from the University of California, Berkeley. He has taught at UC Berkeley, Northwestern University, the University of Chicago, and Columbia University. He joined New York University in 1970 and has been Chair of the Economics Department and Director of the C. V. Starr Center for Applied Economics. He was named a Jay Gould Professor of Economics in 1975. Professor Nadiri has been actively involved with the National Bureau of Economic Research, where he is currently a member of the Program in Productivity. He is also a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, American Economics Association, C. V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, Center for Japan–U.S. Business and Economic Studies, and Committee for Economic Development. His fields of specialization are the economics of technical change and productivity growth, investment theory and modeling, monetary economics, and quantitative analysis and applied economics. He has served as a consultant to the Ford Foundation, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, several government agencies and foreign governments, and the United Nations Agencies Association. Professor Nadiri is presently a Senior Economic Advisor to the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.
Ronald E. Neumann is currently President of the American Academy of Diplomacy. He has served as Ambassador to Algeria, Bahrain, and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Previously, Mr. Neumann, a career member of the Senior Foreign Service, served in Baghdad with the Coalition Provisional Authority and then as Embassy Baghdad’s principal interlocutor with the Multinational Command, where he helped coordinate the political end of military operations in Fallujah, Najaf, and other areas. Prior to working in Iraq, he was Chief of Mission in Manama, Bahrain (2001–2004) and Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Near East Affairs (1997–2000), where he directed the organization of the first separately funded NEA democracy programs. Before that assignment, he was Ambassador to Algeria (1994–1997) and Director of the Office of Northern Gulf Affairs (Iran and Iraq, 1991–1994). Earlier in his career, he was Deputy Chief of Mission in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, and in Sanaa, Yemen; Principal Officer in Tabriz, Iran; and Economic/Commercial Officer in Dakar, Senegal. His previous Washington assignments include service as Jordan Desk Officer, Staff Assistant in the Middle East Bureau, and Political Officer in the Office of Southern European Affairs. He served as an army infantry officer in Vietnam and holds a Bronze Star, Army Commendation Medal, and Combat Infantry Badge. In Baghdad, he was awarded the Army Outstanding Civilian Service Medal. He earned a bachelor’s degree in history and a master’s degree in political science from the University of California, Riverside.

Ambassador Thomas Pickering is Vice Chairman of Hills & Company, an international consulting firm that provides advice to U.S. businesses on investment, trade, and risk assessment issues abroad, particularly in emerging market economies. He retired in 2006 as Senior Vice President of International Relations for Boeing. He has had a career spanning five decades as a U.S. diplomat, serving as Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, Ambassador to the United Nations, and Ambassador to Russia, India, Israel, Nigeria, Jordan, and El Salvador. He also served on assignments in Zanzibar and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. He holds the personal rank of Career Ambassador, the highest in the U.S. Foreign Service. He has held numerous other positions at the State Department, including Executive Secretary and Special Assistant to Secretaries William Pierce Rogers and Henry Kissinger and Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs. He is based in Washington, D.C.

Dr. Barnett R. Rubin is Director of Studies and Senior Fellow in the Center on International Cooperation at New York University, where he directs the program on the Reconstruction of Afghanistan. During 1994–2000, he was Director of the Center for Preventive Action and Director of Peace and Conflict Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. Rubin was Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for the Study of Central Asia at Columbia University from 1990 to 1996. Previously, he was a Jennings Randolph Peace Fellow at the United States Institute of Peace and Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University. In 2001, he served as Special Advisor to the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General for Afghanistan during the negotiations that produced the Bonn Agreement. He advised the United Nations on the drafting of the constitution of Afghanistan, the Afghanistan Compact, and the Afghanistan National Development Strategy. Dr. Rubin is currently Chair of the Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum, a member of the executive board of Human Rights Watch/Asia, and a board member of the Open Society Institute’s Central Eurasia Project. During 1996–1998, he served on the Secretary of State’s Advisory Committee on Religious Freedom Abroad. Dr. Rubin is the author of several books, including The Search for Peace in Afghanistan: From Buffer State to Failed State (1995), The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System (1995, 2002), and Blood on the Doorstep: The Politics of Preventing Violent Conflict (2002).

Ambassador Teresita Schaffer joined the Center for Strategic and International Studies in 1998 after a thirty-year career in the U.S. Foreign Service. She devoted most of her career to international economic issues and to South Asia, on which she was one of the State Department’s principal experts. From 1989 to 1992, she served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia, at that time the senior South Asia position in the department; from 1992 to 1995, she was the U.S. Ambassador to Sri Lanka; and from 1995 to 1997, she served as Director of the Foreign Service Institute. Her earlier posts included Tel Aviv, Islamabad,
New Delhi, and Dhaka, as well as a tour as Director of the Office of International Trade in the State Department. She spent a year as a consultant on business issues relating to South Asia after retiring from the Foreign Service. Her publications include *Rising India and U.S. Policy Options in Asia* (2002), *Pakistan’s Future and U.S. Policy Options* (2004), *Kashmir: The Economics of Peace Building* (2005), and several reports on the HIV/AIDS epidemic in India. Schaffer has taught at Georgetown University and American University. She speaks French, Swedish, German, Italian, Hebrew, Hindi, and Urdu, and has studied Bangla and Sinhala.

**Rory Stewart** is the Ryan Professor of Human Rights at the Harvard’s Kennedy School and the Director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy and of its Afghanistan-Pakistan program. He is also the Executive Chairman of the Turquoise Mountain Foundation, a nonprofit, nongovernmental organization specializing in urban regeneration, business development, and education in traditional arts and architecture in Afghanistan. Mr. Stewart previously served as coalition deputy governor of Maysan and Dhi Qar, two provinces in southern Iraq, an experience that is described in his book *The Prince of the Marshes: And Other Occupational Hazards of a Year in Iraq*. Between 2000 and 2002, he walked on foot across Pakistan, Iran, Afghanistan, India, and Nepal, a journey of 6,000 miles. His book *The Places in Between* chronicles his walk across Afghanistan shortly after the U.S. invasion. Mr. Stewart was born in Hong Kong and grew up in Malaysia. He served briefly as an officer in the British Army (the Black Watch) and has also worked for the British Diplomatic Service, serving in the British embassy in Indonesia and, in the aftermath of the Kosovo campaign, as the British representative in Montenegro.
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