Prabowo's Indonesia and the Future of India-Indonesia Strategic Ties

By Asia Society Australia Maitri Fellow, Dr. Premesha Saha
Indonesian President Prabowo Subinato is on a state visit to India from 25-26 January 2025. This marks his first visit to the country since he took office in October last year and it comes at a time when India and Indonesia are celebrating the 75th year of their bilateral partnership. Both countries upgraded their relationship to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2018, during the visit of former Indonesia President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) to India. But there is still significant unfulfilled potential in the relationship which begs the question of what practical steps can be taken to strengthen the relationship across a range of fields.
There is a consensus that Prabowo will have a hands-on approach when it comes to foreign and defence policy and will play an active role in shaping and implementing foreign policy during his tenure. Will this present an opportunity for India to further strengthen its partnership with Indonesia? Can this visit pave the way for stronger bilateral ties between the two countries?
Before taking off for his visit to India, President Prabowo had stated, “India is our friend and an important partner to Indonesia. India was one of the countries that strongly supported our struggle for independence during the war until 1949.” It is expected that the two leaders will be inking several Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) to strengthen bilateral cooperation on issues ranging from health, education, culture, security and maritime safety. President Prabowo is also being accompanied by Representatives from the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Kadin) on this visit so that there can be meetings with the Indian business communities who are looking to invest in Indonesia. The Indonesian Foreign Ministry (KEMLU) has described the visit to India as “an affirmation of the deepening and widening strategic cooperation between the two countries, especially in the economic, security, and maritime sectors”.
Under Prabowo, a more robust iteration of Indonesia’s independent and active (bebas dan aktif) foreign policy and non-aligned stance in responding to regional and international dynamics is being expected. However, there will be some major shifts from the previous Jokowi era in Indonesia’s foreign policy approach under Prabowo. What will these changes be and will they help in pushing forward the India-Indonesia Comprehensive Strategic Partnership? How can India use these shifts/ changes to its advantage in terms of strengthening its partnership with the biggest country in Southeast Asia and also probably the most dominant voice within the ASEAN?
Indonesia’s foreign policy outlook under President Prabowo
Since assuming office, when it comes to foreign policy, President Prabowo has taken some decisions that reflect a monumental shift from the foreign policy approach that was undertaken during the Jokowi era. First and foremost, the selection of Sugiono as his Foreign Minister, a loyalist from Prabowo’s political party and is described by some as his “ideological son” was a break in tradition. Usually, seasoned diplomats from the Indonesian Foreign Ministry have been selected as Foreign Ministers in the past. Indonesian scholars and analysts have pointed out that this shows that Prabowo himself wants to be in charge of deciding the future steps and direction of Indonesian foreign policy. Most scholars and analysts regard Prabowo as an “arch nationalist and a realist who believes that wealth and military might undergird a country’s prosperity in an anarchical world”. In his presidential debates and subsequent statements, he has stated that Indonesia will be a “good neighbour”—continuing the “many friends, zero enemies” posture. Prabowo has put his spin on this motto by rephrasing it as ‘friends to all, enemy to none’. Prabowo’s foreign trips to China, the United States (US), Russia, also to a few ASEAN countries like Malaysia reflect his willingness to meet diverse partners in Asia and Europe to shore up Indonesia’s positions in trade, defence, security, and other areas.
Prabowo will continue to work towards enhancing Indonesia’s military capabilities and modernising the military to safeguard national interests. During his tenure as Indonesian Defence Minister, he signed defence agreements with countries like Australia and Singapore. He had even visited India during the pandemic to discuss the possibilities and opportunities of strengthening India-Indonesia defence ties. His recent visit to Russia just after winning the elections in July 2024 also reflects ‘a potential recalibration of Indonesia’s foreign policy and a desire to explore future military acquisitions and defence deals’.
Indonesia, under Prabowo, though continuing its non-aligned stature is pursuing a policy of multi-alignment, maintaining its strategic autonomy and this can be seen with Indonesia continuing to balance its ties with China and the United States. His visits to both China and the US immediately after being the President-elect are reflective of this. There is also the continued attempt at diversifying partnerships and engagements with other countries in the Indo-Pacific region.
Indonesia’s desire to be seen as one of the leading voices in the Global South and be seen on the global stage as a “bridge between developing and developed nations” explains why Indonesia was so enthusiastic about joining the BRICS. Many in Indonesia have questioned if by joining the BRICS, Indonesia is getting more closely aligned with China and Russia. Is this compromising Indonesia’s long-time non-aligned stand? But both President Prabowo and Foreign Minister Sugiano have asserted that “Indonesia can use its position in BRICS to change the course of development that safeguards the interests of both developed North and Global South.” It is also being speculated that, to push for Indonesia’s economic development, President Prabowo can even decide to join all economic organizations to open up economic opportunities and collaboration with nearly all developed countries. This explains Indonesia’s application for membership in the OECD as well.
Indonesia, under Prabowo, is looking to emerge as a global player in the Indo-Pacific region and have a foreign policy which is not just heavily focused on the ASEAN. For long, Indonesia has been seen as a middle power and as a de-facto leader within the ASEAN. Under Prabowo the aim is to have a bigger role, a bigger voice on the global stage.
Will the India-Indonesia bilateral partnership finally get the much-needed push?
India extending the invite to President Prabowo for being the Chief Guest for India’s Republic Day celebrations is a welcome move and shows the importance of Indonesia in India’s Act East policy. There are several areas that the two countries can look into to further cement this partnership. India is looking to finalise a US$450 million deal to sell Russian-backed Brahmos supersonic cruise missiles to Indonesia. This is likely to be discussed between the two leaders during their meeting. But still, given that Indonesia is trying to secure its finances to be able to seal this deal, hurdles remain. India and Indonesia have been negotiating for about a decade for the sale of the BrahMos cruise missile. Another hurdle which can be an issue is Indonesia’s attempt to grow its domestic defence manufacturing capacity. It has also implemented an initiative called the ‘Made in Indonesia’. For future defence deals, this might become a roadblock. Therefore, there is a need to discuss what complementaries exist between India’s ‘Make in India’ and Indonesia’s ‘Made in Indonesia’ and how these can be leveraged.
Besides this, maritime security is another potential area that the two countries should focus on. The two countries signed a joint vision statement for maritime cooperation in the Indo-Pacific in 2018. It is time to talk about an implementation plan or an operationalisation plan for this joint vision statement and see if this can be transformed into a joint action plan for maritime security in the Indo-Pacific. Given Indonesia sits on some of the critical sea lanes of communication like the Strait of Malacca, Sunda, Lombok, Makassar, and Omboi Wetar Straits, sea lane security/ SLOC security should become an important discussion point between the two countries. In this context entering into talks to further elevate or give the much-needed push to the Australia-India-Indonesia Trilateral Cooperation is also important.
In his first foreign policy speech early this month, Foreign Minister Sugiono stressed that “Indonesia’s diplomacy and foreign policy should be implemented in line with domestic development priorities.” He highlighted two main development priorities of the President: food security and the nationwide campaign of nutrition intervention through the free meals program. Indonesia has long wanted to implement the Free Meal Programme. In India the Mid-Day Meal Programme has been operational for the last 30 years, therefore this creates another opportunity for the two countries to work together.
Much of the foreign policy approach that is being undertaken by Indonesia under the current government aligns with India’s own foreign policy posture. India, too, being a non-aligned nation, is pursuing issue-based partnerships to fulfil its own global and domestic ambitions. India, in spite of being a part of many minilateral groupings like the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, has still managed to keep up its strategic autonomy. This, again, is the policy line that Prabowo is looking to pursue. Both countries are a part of the Global South and are members of the G20, and now the BRICS. This presents a great opportunity for India to seek ways and explore areas that will give much-needed momentum to the India-Indonesia ties.
This article originally appeared in Observer Research Foundation.