By Asia Society Australia Maitri Fellow, Dr. Premesha Saha

Countries in the Indo-Pacific are already debating the possible implications of the upcoming US election on the region, particularly when it comes to its geopolitics.

The election will have a profound impact on the geopolitical and economic landscape of the region, especially when it comes to the US’ security, trade and diplomatic relations with its allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific.

A Kamala Harris presidency will likely see a continuation of the Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific policy and strategy. A continuation of the commitment towards multilateral frameworks like ASEAN and ASEAN-led platforms, as well as minilateral frameworks like the Quad (made up of India, Japan, the US and Australia) and AUKUS (made up of Australia, the US and the UK), and continued engagements with allies like Japan, Australia and the Philippines and like-minded partners like India is expected.

It is also understood that the US under Harris would proactively engage in strengthening security alliances with countries like the Philippines amidst increasing concerns of a rising China and its belligerence in disputed waters like the South China Sea.

Under the Biden administration, the US has been seen to renew and strengthen its alliances and partnerships in the region in response to its geopolitical shifts and changes.

For instance, the US-Philippines security alliance received a boost, relations with India also saw a significant improvement, and in March 2021 the Quad was elevated to summit level meetings.

With India, the US has sought to strengthen the relationship through initiatives like the United States-India Critical and Emerging Technology (known as iCET and launched in January 2023), the India-US Defense Acceleration Ecosystem (or INDUS-X, which brings together the two countries’ defence start-ups and was initiated in June 2023), and the recent signing of the Security of supply Agreement (SOSA).

In June 2023, Prime Minister Modi was invited as a state visitor, where he addressed the joint session of the US Congress for a second time. Furthermore, Biden also visited India during the November 2023 G20 summit where he and Prime Minister Modi discussed the future course of the US-India relations in length.

Indian scholars and analysts believe that a potential Harris presidency will see India-US relations continue along a similar trajectory given the growing global importance of India and current Indo-Pacific dynamics. Additionally, under a Harris presidency, the US might also show interest in cooperating in areas like climate change, cyber security and health security.

On the other hand, there is concern that a Trump presidency might lead to greater uncertainty in the region and an intensification of great power competition between the US and China.

The latter may force countries in the Indo-Pacific, such as ASEAN member countries ordinarily averse to picking sides to make difficult choices. Moreover, with Trump’s history of making difficult decisions on economic agreements and pacts, for instance withdrawing the US from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), there is concern that he might do the same when it comes with the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF).

This might again negatively impact the US’ relations with countries in the Indo-Pacific, especially in Southeast Asia. However, it cannot be denied that the previous Trump administration re-invigorated the concept of the Indo-Pacific. Similarly, the Quad, which had remained fairly inactive since 2007, was also revived with the initiation of official-level meetings in 2017 and foreign minister meetings in 2019.

During the first Trump administration, India-US relations did very well. In fact, numerous key foundational arrangements were inked, including the 2018 Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA), the 2019 Industrial Security Annex for enabling private sector participation in defence supply chains, and the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) for the sharing of geospatial information.

The Trump administration also granted India Strategic Trade Authorization-1 status, a category for technology releases on par with the US’ NATO allies. This followed the Obama administration’s decision to declare India as a Major Defense partner in 2016.

Of course, there are notable differences between the US and India.

Examples of the challenges that exist within the relationship include:

• India’s closeness to Russia and its approach towards the Russia-Ukraine War, the US’ Afghanistan policy.
• US allegations regarding the involvement of an Indian official in the foiled assassination of a U.S. citizen of Indian-origin.
• U.S. policies in parts of South Asia and questions over India’s democracy and human rights.
• India’s recent desire to become a ‘leading voice of the Global South’ (there is concern that this might tempt India to follow an ‘anti-western’ approach).

Despite these challenges, US-India relations have grown significantly in recent times and across US administrations.

In the Indo-Pacific's current geo-political and strategic landscape, India is seen as an emerging power, a ‘balancer’ and sometimes ‘deterrent’ to a rising and belligerent China.

As scholars have pointed out, India presents “a geopolitical counterbalance, economic alternative, a more trusted technology partner, and a democratic contrast to China.”

India too recognises the need for, and importance of, a sustained US-India partnership.

Not only is India engaging with the US bilaterally, but it is also working to strengthen its own partnerships with US allies in the region, such as Japan and Australia.

India is also engaging through minilateral platforms like the Quad, the I2U2 (which aims to deepen economic cooperation between the US, India, the United Arab Emirates and Israel), the Mineral Security Partnership, and contributing to the capacity building of countries like the Philippines and Vietnam.

When it comes to China, India is also speaking out more openly against China’s aggressive actions along its own border as well as in the South China and East China Sea.

From India’s vantage, the expectation would be that whoever comes to power should continue to prioritise the Indo-Pacific, engage through minilateral platforms (especially the Quad), implement a competitive and well-crafted China policy, and maintain willingness to cooperate with India across the realms of defence, security, economic and technology.

This article originally appeared in Asia New Zealand Foundation.