Remarks
by Senator Sartaj Aziz, Foreign Minister of Pakistan, at
the Asia Society, New York
October 1,
1998
Mr. Nicholas Platt, distinguished members of the Asia Society,
Ladies and Gentlemen.
I am honoured by the opportunity to address such a distinguished
gathering of scholars and businessman, diplomats and executives,
journalist and fellow compatriots on the subject of nuclear
South Asia and Pakistan-U.S. relations. A visit to the prestigious
Society has always been a rewarding experience for me. This
prestigious Society has introduced to the American public
so many facets of Pakistan that it deserves our public acknowledgment
and tribute.
Today, I will endeavour to share with you my thinking on
the issues relevant to the recent nuclear developments in
South Asia and the U.S.-Pakistan relations. I will try to
address these broad issues as concisely and meaningfully
as possible.
Over 50 years ago the new state of Pakistan began is independent
life with a positive disposition towards the nations of
the world, guided by the parameters defined by the founding
father of the country who had stated and I quote
"Our foreign policy is one of friendliness and good
will towards all nations of the world. We do not cherish
aggressive designs against any country. We believe in the
principles of honesty and fair play in national and international
dealings and are prepared to make our utmost contribution
to the promotion of peace and prosperity among the nations
of the world. Pakistan will never be found lacking in extending
its material and moral support to the oppressed and suppressed
peoples of the world and in upholding the principles of
the United Nations Charter."
The circumstances of Pakistan's independence, however, were
not entirely congenial. The upheavals of the partition were
compounded by a legacy of inequities and problems symbolized
by the Jammu and Kashmir dispute. The new state had to contend
with a serious threat to its security. Psychologically,
despite partition, the Congress leadership in India had
not accepted the two-nation theory. A conflict ensued over
Kashmir within one year of our independent existence. Our
fears of Indian hegemony were, similarly, reinforced soon
after independence by Indian self-proclaimed role as the
dominant power in the region and the successive Indian military
action to absorb the state of Hyderabad and Junagadh and
later Goa in addition to Kashmir.
Against this backdrop the central and abiding concern of
Pakistan has been to safeguard the security and territorial
integrity of the country in an environment of regional threats
and global tension spawned by the Cold War. The Kashmir
problem and the consequent active confrontation with India
shaped Pakistan's thinking and policies which developed
a regional orientation and were predicated on preserving
a strategic balance with India.
The problem between Pakistan and India do not have an ideological
dimension and were essentially political. The Kashmir dispute
had been at the heart of Pakistan's security concern and
the principal source of tension in the security environment
of South Asia. It has been tragic that a just solution of
the Kashmir problem as envisaged in the UN Security Council
resolutions and attempted over the years through bilateral
dialogue and some tentative international efforts, remained
elusive. A solution to the problem could have transformed
the political and economic landscape of South Asia.
Nevertheless, the Kashmir problem cannot be wished away.
Two of the three conflicts between Pakistan and India had
originated in Kashmir. For the last 10 years, an active
insurgency is raging in Kashmir and has often exacerbated
tensions between Pakistan and India. The recent nuclear
developments in South Asia only underscore the urgency to
address this long-standing issue.
Pakistan's need for security, accentuated by the dispute
over Kashmir, obliged Pakistan to rely on the global alliance
system to bolster its defence. However the passage of time
proved that the alliances, which were also based on an ideological
doctrine did not help Pakistan to address the political
issues central to its problems with India. At the same time,
Pakistan was exposed to the risks inherent in being a part
of U.S. policy of containment. This inherent disconnect
was responsible for the ups and downs in the Pakistan-U.S.
relationship over the decades. From a Pakistani perspective,
while we desire close cooperative relations with the United
States, our appraisal of the history of these relations
is marked by a feeling of a let down.
Pakistan has been an important strategic ally during the
last front of the cold war in Afghanistan. Pakistan's policy
to oppose the Soviet military intervention has been pivotal
to the U.S. response to what appeared to be expanding Soviet
influence around the world in the late 70s. Most scholars
and political analysts agree that Soviet entanglement in
Afghanistan helped the survival and development of freedom
movements in Eastern Europe and hastened the collapse of
the Soviet Union. Earlier, in 1970 and 71 Pakistan played
a key role in the rapprochement between the U.S. and China.
The understanding forged through the confidential but trusted
Pakistani channel was critical to the opening with the United
States which bolstered the pragmatists led by Premier Chou
En-Lai in their seminal struggle against the radicals who
wanted to re-embrace the Soviet Union.
I have cited these historical examples to point out how
as a strategic ally Pakistan had helped the U.S. interests
and later contributed to the resurgence forces of freedom
and democracy in the world in the 1990s. This is a miracle
of our times.
On the other hand, following the 1965 India-Pakistan war,
the United States decided to place an arms embargo on both
countries which principally hurt Pakistan. A further embargo
was imposed in 1976 halting economic and military assistant.
Following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, Pressler
Amendment got activated specifically prohibiting military
assistance to Pakistan.
The successive sanctions impaired Pakistan's conventional
capabilities, its defence and also weakened its economy.
The sense of let down was especially acute when Pressler
was imposed in 1990. Pakistan had suffered the consequences
of the Afghan war and expected the West especially the U.S.
to be sympathetic to its economic needs. We also advocated
a generous economic engagement by donor countries in Afghanistan,
to stabilize and rebuild our war ravaged country. Instead,
Pakistan faced economic sanctions under Pressler and stoppage
of military equipment and planes for which it had paid more
than $1.3 billion. It was obvious that the end of the Cold
War had changed priorities for the United States in which
the needs of an erstwhile ally did not figure.
Since the nuclear issue is central to the U.S. sanctions
which have governed the vicissitude of Pakistan-U.S. relations
in the last two decades, it will be important to trace the
imperatives and motivations underlying the nuclear developments
in South Asia.
Since early days of its independence, India had retained
the nuclear options as a basic tenant of its security policy
and as a key to major power status. It opposed the global
nuclear paradigm defined by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT). In the Indian perception, the Treaty imposed
a nuclear apartheid. While retaining the nuclear option,
India advocated general and complete disarmament. In contrast,
Pakistan showed sensitivity to international non-proliferation
concerns and was ready to accept the NPT along with India.
Pakistan recognized the reality of the global equilibrium
maintained through nuclear deterrence, and it has little
interest in retaining a nuclear option to challenge this
equilibrium.
Our concerns for security increased manifold when in 1974
India carried out what is described a peaceful nuclear explosion
and ironically coded the operation "Smiling Buddha".
The world's response was passive. The French atomic Agency
sent its congratulations. The U.S. accepted India' claim
that this was a peaceful nuclear explosion and continued
nuclear fuel supply for India's Tarapur reactor. Canada,
though upset, offered continued cooperation if India signed
a new agreement not to misuse the plutonium acquired from
the Canadian reactor for another explosion. No sanctions
were adopted against India.
On the other hand, to our surprise and disappointment, restraints
were imposed on Pakistan's modest nuclear programme which
was under safeguards. To begin with, Canada terminated supply
of fuel to KANNUP, our only nuclear reactor built with Canadian
help. The U.S. also adopted a series of measures aimed at
scuttling Pakistan's nascent nuclear programme. The 1976
Symington Amendment, later modified by 1997 Glenn Amendment,
halted economic and military assistance to any country which
acquired, after 1976, nuclear enrichment equipment, materials
and technologies unless it accept full scope safeguards.
This, India which had already acquired reprocessing capability
was excluded from the purview of the U.S. legislation. The
1985 Pressler Amendment specifically prohibited U.S. assistance
to Pakistan unless there was an annual Presidential Certification.
This was denied in 1990, soon after the Afghan war ended.
Given the history of our relations with India, Pakistan
was obliged to acquire nuclear capability in our security
interest. Yet we continued to show sensitivity to non-proliferation
concerns. Since 1974, Pakistan made every possible effort
bilaterally and in multilateral forums to keep South Asia
free of nuclear weapons. We took several initiatives over
the years to establish a nuclear free zone in South Asia
and initiated a number of other bilateral proposals including
simulations adherence by Pakistan and India to NPT or acceptance
to full scope IAEA Safeguards. In 1987, Pakistan suggested
a bilateral or regional test ban treaty. In June 1991, Pakistan
proposed a five-nation Conference to prevent possible nuclear
escalation in South Asia. Last year, our Prime Minster proposed
mutual and equal restraint by Pakistan and India on development
of nuclear and ballistic missiles and offered negotiations
on a non-aggression pact.
Indian nuclear test in May did not come as a surprise to
us as the BJP had publicly announced its intention to go
nuclear before its election victory early this year. Our
Prime Minister had written letters to the leaders of all
major powers that India was poised to escalate its nuclear
weapons and missile capability. We were assured by some
powers that India did not have any plan to cross the threshold.
India's nuclear tests have destroyed the prospects of a
nuclear non-proliferation regime in South Asia. The Indian
argument of security threats from China and Pakistan carry
little credibility. Nothing had changed in the security
environment to warrant these tests. China Indian relations
have been steadily improving over the year. As for Pakistan,
despite serious conventional imbalance and constant military
provocations, it resisted the temptation of demonstrating
its nuclear capability which India had done in 1974. India
on the other hand, took the fateful step to test in defiance
of a global nuclear regime which it did not accept. Clearly
the Indian tests were status driven and the culminating
expression of its nuclear ambitions. India did not need
nuclear weapons for defence or deterrence.
Regardless of the Indian motives, the Indian tests posted
a serious dilemma for Pakistan. But we did not act in haste
and carefully watched the international reaction which turned
out to be tentative and weak. Once again the focus of international
attention appeared to be preventing Pakistan from responding
to India' nuclear tests.
Following the tests, the Indian leadership adopted an extraordinary
belligerent tone towards Pakistan verging on nuclear blackmail.
Equally significant was the speculation in the India media
doubting Pakistan's nuclear capability and claiming that
by testing India had called Pakistan's "bluff".
If this perception in India had turned to conviction there
was a risk of India miscalculation and military misadventure
which could lead to disastrous consequences. Pakistan also
knew, and our contacts with major powers following the Indian
tests confirmed it, that no country could extend security
assurances to Pakistan against a nuclear India. We had therefore
no option but to redress the disturbed strategic balance.
The international community must recognize the compulsion
which obliged us to respond wit hour own tests on 28 May.
We did not do this to challenge the global non-proliferation
regime or to fulfill any great power ambitions. We had no
choice but to establish nuclear deterrence in the interest
of our defence. We believe that our decision to respond
to India served the cause the peace and stability in South
Asia.
Pakistan therefore regrets that some of the G-7 countries
especially the U.S. have imposed sanction and other restriction
against Pakistan. These are unjust and will not help the
interests of non-proliferation or stability in South Asia.
On its part, Pakistan has acted with restraint. Pakistan
has no desire whatsoever to enter into a nuclear arms race
in South Asia. IN fact immediately after the tests we showed
restraint by:
- declaring unilateral
moratorium testing
- offering to
India a regional test ban treaty
- offering a dialogue
for nuclear conventional stabilization and restraint and
CBMs for avoidance of conflict
- reaffirming
our commitment not to transfer sensitive technology to
any other states or entity
- agreeing to
commencement of negotiations on fissile material treaty
Pakistan has also commenced a dialogue with the U.S. and
other friendly countries to advance the objective of security
and restraint in South Asia and global non-proliferation.
When bilateral dialogue between Pakistan and India resumes
as has been agreed between the two Prime Ministers last
week in New York, we will seek discussion with India on
these issues under the item "Peace and Security".
As for the CTBT, Pakistan has consistently supported its
conclusion. We voted for the Treaty in 1996 when it was
adopted in UN General Assembly. Pakistan is prepared, as
our Prime Minister told the General Assembly last week,
to adhere to the treaty before the Conference of States
Parties to the Treaty scheduled to be held in September
1999. However, Pakistan's adherence to the treaty can only
take place in an atmosphere free from coercion or pressure
which means that the arbitrary restrictions imposed on Pakistan
by multilateral financial institutions and the discriminatory
sanctions must be removed.
In the post-test environment of South Asia, it is necessary
for the international community to engage in the region
with the aim of arresting escalation and helping to build
a stable and secure environment. Pakistan has a strategic
view of security and development in the region. Under the
circumstance, it has to be based on nuclear deterrence,
conventional balance, resolution of underlying causes of
tension, especially Kashmir and rapid socioeconomic progress.
It is important to realize that the nuclearization of South
Asia cannot be reversed. Similarly, sanctions and policies
of discrimination cannot help the cause of non-proliferation
in the south Asia. There is paramount need to help both
Pakistan and India to stabilize the situation in order to
avoid nuclear arms race and conflict. In this context, it
is essential to address the core issue of Kashmir. A deterioration
of the security climate on account of the persistence of
the unresolved Kashmir dispute can lead to nuclear escalation
which must be avoided. It is important that the major powers,
especially the U.S., remain actively involved with the Kashmir
issue to help India and Pakistan move forward towards a
just solution.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
When the Indian Prime Minister addressed the Asia Society
three days ago, he said "In order to successfully meet
this challenge, leaders around the world need a new mind
set. And the mind set necessary to sustain the world in
the 21st century demands that all of us must learn the lessons
of the 20th century. The greatest lesson of this century
is that peace is the highest ideal."
I intend to present this quote to the Indian Foreign Secretary
when he visits Islamabad within a fortnight from now, to
start the dialogue between India and Pakistan on Kashmir
and other issues. We will also remind him that it is the
suppression of human rights and the persistent humiliation
of a people that is the main barrier to peace. They spawn
extremism and violence. This is one of the most important
lessons we have to learn from the 20th century.
Our vision and priority for Pakistan and indeed for the
whole of South Asia go beyond security concerns and nuclear
deterrence. We want progress and prosperity, economic and
social development, in short a qualitative uplift in the
lives of the peoples of South Asia.
South Asia is home to over one billion people. It has a
tremendous economic potential, provided we optimally harness
our resources and factor endowments. Given the right motivation
and commitment, we can transform South Asia into a vibrant
and strong economic market which is the objective of the
SAARC.
The tragedy of Afghanistan continues. Pakistan has paid
a heavy price as a result of the turmoil in Afghanistan.
The prospects of economic cooperation between Pakistan and
the newly independent Central Asian States is dependent
on the return of normalcy to Afghanistan. The Afghan conflict
has also resulted in a wide range of problems such as drug
trafficking, gun running, large scale smuggling and above
all, the inability of over 1.5 million Afghan refugees,
still living in Pakistan, to return to their homes.
Thus for both strategic and economic reasons, Pakistan has
profound interest in promoting peace and stability in Afghanistan.
We are deeply concerned with the ongoing confrontation between
the fraternal countries of Iran and Afghanistan and have
appealed to both to exercise restraint. Within Afghanistan
it is essential that conditions be created to enable the
people to involved themselves with the task of reconstruction
and rehabilitation. This requires dialogue and engagement
by the international community with the effective authorities
in Afghanistan. To ostracize them will only compound problems
and engender alienation and extremism. We must not forget
the international community owes a debt to the Afghan people
for their courageous defiance of the Soviet Union which
accelerated its collapse and the end of the Cold War.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
In a radically transformed global environment where geo-politics
has yielded to geo-economics, Pakistan desires close cooperation
with the United States in grappling with both the opportunities
and the challenges that the new evolving global order has
thrown up. We need multiple points of interaction with the
United States to promote our common goals of peace and stability,
security and disarmament, fight against drugs, crime and
terrorism, socioeconomic development and promotion of global
harmony and understanding.
Soon we would be entering a new century and a new millennium.
the end of the Cold War has consolidated the prospects for
peace. New and powerful democratic forces are sweeping across
the globe. Market friendly policies are being widely embraced
in a liberal and deregulated environment. The world can
witness a prolonged period of peace and prosperity if we
manage to discard old prejudices, resolve the remaining
regional and local disputes and evolve more effective international
mechanisms for economic development to benefit all peoples.
In these endeavours, Pakistan shares a vision and commitment
with the United States.
Thank you.
For more on
Pakistan's foreign relations and policy, visit the website of the Pakistani Embassy in Washington.
