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The 1997 Sino-American Summit
- Introduction
Who Is Jiang Zemin?
The Perceptual, Historical, and
Domestic Context
The Regional Context
The Agenda for the Summit
- Likely "Action Items"
The Chinese Agenda
The American Agenda
- Measuring a Successful Summit
Notes
Appendix: Specialists on U.S.-China
Relations
When Chinese president Jiang Zemin enters the White House on October 28, he will be the first Chinese leader to
do so since 1985. Jiang's eight-day state visit to the United States1 symbolizes what both governments hope will be a new beginning in
U.S.-China relations, after eight years of frequent friction that began with the Beijing massacre of 1989. The
Sino-American summit is unlikely to remove most of the contentious elements in the relationship. The relationship
is multifaceted and the agenda of issues between the two countries, as detailed below, is long and complex. Only
modest progress in certain areas can be expected, as the summit is likely to be more symbolic than substantive.
But it will symbolize the willingness of both countries to arrest the downward spiral in their relations, work
to resolve issues of disagreement, and identify areas for cooperation. Without interaction there can be no cooperation--nor
can contentious issues be resolved. High-level summits also tend to energize bureaucracies to implement programs
that intensify intergovernmental interaction and stimulate exchanges between numerous sectors of the two societies,
thus having a kind of multiplier effect. Even if Presidents Clinton and Jiang are not able to announce a package
of noteworthy accomplishments at the end of their two-day summit, it will still have been worthwhile in terms of
improving direct communication and intensifying working-level cooperation. It is far better for the United States
of America and the People's Republic of China to interact positively--with as much cooperation as possible--than
for these two continental powers and nuclear-armed giants to slide into an adversarial relationship and second
cold war. To the extent that Jiang Zemin's visit to the United States can accomplish these goals, it should be
deemed a success.
Who Is Jiang Zemin?
Jiang Zemin is Deng Xiaoping's (third) chosen successor. Jiang was tapped from relative obscurity in Shanghai and
brought to Beijing in the midst of the 1989 Tiananmen crisis. Following Zhao Ziyang's dismissal as general secretary
of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) on the eve of the crackdown, Deng selected Jiang to replace Zhao as CCP chief.
Jiang later added the portfolios of president of the PRC and chairman of the Central Military Commission--a "hat
trick" that no Chinese leader (even Deng) ever held. Jiang Zemin was born on July 10, 1926, in the city of
Yangzhou in east central Jiangsu Province. Located on the Grand Canal, Yangzhou has historically been a center
of commerce and culture. Jiang comes from a family of intellectuals (mainly doctors and teachers)--unlikely parentage
for a Communist Party recruit. In fact, had it not been for an unusual circumstance Jiang may well have wound up
on a different side in the civil war. Jiang's family of intellectuals and Nationalist Party (Kuomintang) members
had one political deviant--Jiang's uncle Jiang Shanqing--who was a CCP member killed in 1939. (It is unclear how
Jiang's uncle died; some sources say that he was killed by a sniper's bullet, but revisionist communist historiography
has it that he was killed in a guerrilla skirmish with Nationalist troops.) Since Jiang Shanqing had died without
a son, Jiang Zemin's father gave up his 13-year-old boy for adoption by his brother's side of the family.2
This made the teenager the son of a "revolutionary martyr"--the equivalent of being born into the communist
aristocracy. Other than this vital familial asset, Jiang's career path was not dissimilar from others of his generation
who trained in technical subjects and graduated from university around the time of "liberation," developed
professionally during the period of Soviet tutelage, and experienced the trauma of the Cultural Revolution before
being promoted to power as part of the "third-generation" leadership in the 1980s-90s.
Jiang Zemin is an intellectual, technocrat, and longtime Communist Party cadre. His family schooled young Jiang
in the Confucian classics (which he is still fond of reciting) and the classical form of Chinese in which they
were written. Jiang is one of the few Chinese leaders today able to read classical prose (wen yan wen). He studied
electrical engineering and graduated from Shanghai Transportation and Communications University (Jiaotong Daxue)
in 1947. At university and subsequently, Jiang mastered a number of foreign languages. He is conversant in Russian,
Romanian, and English and has a reading knowledge of French and Japanese. Jiang is fond of reciting poetry, quoting
speeches, and breaking into song in these languages. (He likes to impress American hosts by reciting the Gettysburg
Address and singing Yankee Doodle.) During his university years Jiang joined the Communist Party and engaged in
underground organizing activities among the industrial proletariat.
Jiang began his career as an electrical engineer in 1953 as chief of the electric machinery section of the Shanghai
No. 2 sub-bureau of the First Ministry of Machine Building. Jiang's career would remain largely with the First
Ministry for the next 25 years. In 1955 Jiang was selected to be sent to Moscow for training at the Stalin Automobile
factory. After his return a year later, Jiang went to work at the No. 1 Automobile Works in Changchun, Jilin Province--a
model, large-scale Soviet industrial complex. There he served successively as a deputy section chief, deputy chief
engineer for automation, and director of a division of the plant. In 1962 he was transferred back to Shanghai,
rejoining the First Ministry of Machine Building administrative system (xitong), to become director of the Shanghai
Electric Machinery Institute. Around 1965 Jiang changed jobs again, to become director of the Wuhan Thermo Engineering
Machinery Institute. It appears that he held this position into the tense years of the Cultural Revolution, and
there is no direct evidence that he was persecuted during that period. In 1971 he was dispatched to Romania for
two years as leader of an experts delegation sent by the First Ministry of Machine Building. Upon his return in
1973 Jiang was appointed deputy director of the Foreign Affairs Bureau of the First Ministry of Machine Building,
moving up to the position of director two years later. In 1979 Jiang was appointed vice-minister and secretary
general of the State Council's Import and Export Control Commission, and two years later he headed up the Foreign
Investment Control Commission. In 1982 Jiang's career turned from technocratic administrator to politician (but
China's media still often refer to him as "The Great Engineer"). He was appointed vice-minister and then
minister of electronics, and was elected a member of the Communist Party's 12th Central Committee. Ironically,
during this time, Jiang served under the direct supervision of then Vice Premier Li Peng (premier today, and also
an electrical engineer by training). In 1985 Jiang's big break came. He was transferred back to Shanghai and appointed
mayor and then Party secretary of the municipality (he relinquished the mayorship to Zhu Rongji in 1988). In 1987
Jiang was elected a member of the Politburo of the 13th Central Committee, although he continued to serve in Shanghai.
During his time in Shanghai Jiang did not distinguish himself as an assertive administrator. He was locally dubbed
the "flower vase," for looking pretty but having no function. He appeared aloof and detached--particularly
in contrast to Zhu Rongji, his successor as mayor--and did not undertake any important initiatives during his tenure.
In fact, Shanghai lagged noticeably behind the economic reforms sweeping the rest of the country. The economic
boom Shanghai now enjoys began largely after Jiang's departure. Jiang did permit a more open intellectual atmosphere,
particularly by allowing the liberal World Economic
Herald to be published. However in the midst of the
1989 demonstrations, when the authorities in Beijing ordered the Herald shut down, Jiang followed orders promptly. This act, more than others,
may have proved decisive in identifying Jiang as a worthy candidate to lead the Party at a time of great instability.
Jiang was not unknown to key central leaders at this crucial moment. He had made a point of cultivating powerful
elders Chen Yun, Deng Xiaoping, and Yang Shangkun whenever they vacationed in Shanghai, and his ties to these three
proved decisive in catapulting him to the top in the midst of the Tiananmen crisis.
Since assuming the post of general secretary eight years ago, Jiang has gradually amassed a considerable base of
power. Many observers predicted Jiang would be a brief transitional figure, like Mao's successor Hua Guofeng. This
has not been the case. Jiang has stayed in power by exhibiting several key characteristics.
An astute sense of shifting political winds. Jiang has repeatedly demonstrated a knack for not committing himself
until it is clear that a preponderance of leaders and bureaucratic opinion favor a given policy. Once he ascertains
this, Jiang is decisive in aligning himself with that policy. If a policy is unpopular, Jiang has proven adept
at distancing himself from it.
An ability to build bureaucratic coalitions and co-opt
others' agendas. Until his recent Political Report
to the 15th Party Congress (which was written for him), Jiang Zemin has never articulated his own comprehensive
vision for China's future. Jiang's preferred style, which has been very effective, has been to adopt and adapt
various bureaucratic constituencies' agendas and call them his own. This tactic has proven Jiang to have a remarkable
ability to build bureaucratic coalitions and gain support from various sectors. He has made few bureaucratic enemies
and has managed relations with other leaders well. He has thus far weathered three leadership shakeups: Zhao Ziyang
in 1989, Yang Shangkun and Yang Baibing in 1994, and Qiao Shi in 1997.
Cultivation of the military. Since Jiang became chairman of the Central Military Commission in November
1989, replacing Deng Xiaoping, he has paid extraordinary attention to currying favor with the armed forces. He
has visited all seven military regions, frequently inspects units (for several years at the rate of one per month),
has personally promoted more than 40 generals, and has endorsed virtually every bureaucratic constituency within
the People's Liberation Army (PLA).3
Jiang Zemin comes to the United States in a strong political position at home. He has just overseen the 15th Congress
of the CCP, in which he was clearly in control and in the limelight. He benefited from the promotion to the Politburo
and its Standing Committee several of his former associates from Shanghai, and he engineered (together with Premier
Li Peng) the removal of the number-three Party leader Qiao Shi. Jiang's Political Report to the Congress was a
manifesto for accelerated economic reform, but it also called for the improved rule of law and institution of "socialist
democracy." China under Jiang has been notably reluctant to return to the political reform agenda of the 1980s,
and Jiang himself is seen as a political conservative. He has steadfastly refused to reevaluate or "reverse
the verdict" on the 1989 student demonstrations and their suppression. In the midst of the Party Congress
purged leader Zhao Ziyang submitted a letter calling for a reevaluation of the Tiananmen Incident. If anything
haunts Jiang about 1989, it is the threat that Zhao Ziyang--whom he replaced and who lives under house arrest--could
return to lead a more liberal regime. Still, with Qiao Shi removed from power and the increasing calls from intellectual
circles for improved accountability of government, we may see Jiang Zemin tack in a more politically reformist
direction in the future (but his record suggests that he will not do so). In addition to leading the Congress,
Jiang has this year managed the succession to paramount leader Deng Xiaoping, presided over the retrocession of
Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty, and paid a state visit to Russia.
Thus Jiang's standing in the Party and the military is secure, and he comes to Washington with a strong hand. This
does not, however, mean that he will be in a position to bargain with President Clinton and meet U.S. concerns
in a number of areas. Nonetheless, Jiang and the Chinese government seek to stabilize the relationship with the
United States. Jiang has put forward a 16-Chinese-character directive to guide the development of relations: strengthen
communication, increase contact, enhance consensus, and develop cooperation. Jiang and the Chinese government attach
great symbolic importance to this visit--the first by a Chinese head of state to the United States since former
President Li Xiannian visited 12 years ago--but, as is discussed below, their substantive agenda is considerably
shorter and different from the American side.
Jiang Zemin is married to Wang Yiping (who is never seen in public) and the couple has two sons--at least one of
whom has been educated in the United States. Jiang enjoys reading Chinese and Western literature and listens to
classical music. At 71 he is thought to be in good health, although he is significantly overweight. Like other
Politburo members, Jiang is known to dye his hair black to give a more youthful and executive appearance. Most
of the time he dresses in a Western-style suit, only occasionally donning a traditional tunic ("Mao jacket").
The Perceptual, Historical, and
Domestic Context
Jiang's state visit must be viewed in historical context. The history of the Sino-American relationship provides
important background for understanding the two leaders' discussions. This is particularly true for the Chinese
side, as historical issues--such as U.S. support for the Chinese Nationalist regime before 1949 and subsequently
on Taiwan, the Japanese occupation of China during the Second World War, and the history of imperialist encroachment
against China--do much to define contemporary Chinese diplomacy. Americans tend to have short memories and to interact
diplomatically with others based on the issues of the moment. This is not the case for China. To be certain, the
memories of the Tiananmen uprising and suppression of 1989 still provide the active--even defining--context for
American perceptions of China, but on the Chinese side a much longer and more complex history defines the nature
of the relationship.
A profound sense of aggrievement and unfulfilled aspirations has been felt by most Chinese over the last 150 years
(the so-called century of shame and humiliation). China's great and glorious past came to an abrupt and humiliating
terminus in the mid-nineteenth century with the arrival of Western gunboats, opium, and extraterritorial treaty
ports. China became, in Chairman Mao's words, a "semi-colony." The moribund Qing imperial state proved
incapable of modernizing and meeting the challenges posed by the West, Russia, and Japan. Chinese forces were resolutely
defeated in a series of wars with these powers. The imperial dynasty finally collapsed in 1911, and was succeeded
by a Republic, which never fully consolidated its rule over the country. From this time until the Communist Party
came to power in 1949, China experienced twelve years of warlordism (1916-28), nine years of relatively despotic
military rule (1928-37), eight years of Japanese occupation (1937-45), and four years of full-scale civil war (1945-49).
In declaring the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) on October 1, 1949, Mao Zedong expressed the
nationalist pride sweeping the nation by proclaiming, "The Chinese people have stood up!"
The profound sense of national crisis brought on by imperialist encroachment and invasion, and the concomitant
century-long search to regain "wealth and power" (fu-qiang) remain a defining element in the psyche of most Chinese. This is
pertinent to contemporary Sino-American relations because there exists in China today a fairly widespread perception
that the United States is seeking to restrain China's rightful attainment of great-power status, to strategically
contain the PRC, to politically subvert the Chinese Communist Party's grip on power, and to prevent the (re)unification
of Taiwan with the Chinese mainland, i.e. a policy to restrain, contain, subvert, and divide. Accordingly, the
United States is regularly depicted in the Chinese media as a "hegemonic" power seeking not only to restrict
China's rise, but also to dominate the world. The Chinese publishing industry has produced dozens of volumes in
recent years depicting America's alleged attempts to "contain" and "demonize" China, and China's
ability to "say no!" The authors of such books and articles see such U.S. efforts to hold down "New
China" as long-standing; many describe an unending series of attempts--stretching over half a century--to
contain and subvert the Chinese Communist regime.4 It is uncertain how much this popular perception permeates Chinese
leaders' thinking about the United States, but it is widely shared among intellectuals and average citizens. Certainly
the fact that the CCP propaganda apparatus fuels this perception on a daily basis through the media and publishing
industry suggests that there is high-level endorsement of it.
Chinese views of contemporary issues--such as the new U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines and China's frustrated attempt
to join the World Trade Organization--are filtered through this predisposed view of U.S. opposition and containment.
Any American China policy that is insensitive to these perceptions and national aspirations will encounter substantial
resistance from China. U.S. policy must be based on its own national interests, but it should also proceed from
an awareness of China's history, pride, nationalism, and century-long quest for territorial unity and economic
modernization.
In this context, a key element of concern for China is the perception of long-standing U.S. support for the Nationalist
regime on Taiwan. Although diplomatic relations were severed in 1979, many Chinese believe that were it not for
U.S. support, Taiwan would be "reunified" with the mainland and the "independence" forces on
the island would be dormant. The continuing U.S. sale of advanced weapons to Taiwan continues to be a particular
irritant to Beijing. Chinese leaders have never forgiven the United States for violating the August 1982 Joint
Communiqué (an allegation the U.S. government does not accept) by permitting the sale by the Bush administration
of 150 F-16 fighters to Taiwan's armed forces.
Thus, despite a decade of relatively productive relations between the United States and China from 1979-89, China
still carries considerable historical baggage about the relationship. The U.S. is less encumbered by the past,
although memories of Tiananmen still color American perceptions. Such perceptual baggage certainly existed in 1971-72
when President Richard Nixon and Chairman Mao Zedong engineered the strategic opening between the two countries,
but the two leaders shelved the past in favor of the pragmatic interests of the present. Because they failed to
address historic misunderstandings, however, the negative perceptions never really dissipated in China, and the
century-long American "missionary impulse" to transform China in its liberal image only gained force.5
Thus mutual perceptions and historical conditions provide a broad backdrop for Jiang Zemin's visit. These factors
have created an atmosphere of mutual suspicion and lack of trust. Whether Presidents Jiang and Clinton can manage
to put these constraining factors aside and act pragmatically, as President Nixon and Chairman Mao did 25 years
ago, is uncertain.
Both leaders must also engage each other in the context of domestic politics in both countries.6
In each case, the domestic scene is a further constraining factor--as the anti-China and anti-America forces are
robust in each capital. The past six months has seen an upsurge in criticism of China and President Clinton's China
policy by various groups in the United States.7 The recent criticism of China--dubbed the "anti-China wave"
(fan Hua langchao)
by China's America watchers--is notable for crossing the political spectrum, from the liberal New Republic
on the left to the Weekly Standard on the right. It started in newspaper columns but quickly spread
to newsmagazines, talk radio and television programs, congressional debate, and grassroots organizing by the Christian
Coalition and AFL-CIO labor union. Best-selling books by respected analysts, such as Samuel Huntington's The Clash of Civilizations
and Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro's The Coming
Conflict with China, further fueled public fears
as they identified China as America's new strategic adversary and predicted eventual war between the two powers.
The critics portray the Chinese Communist regime as a strategic threat, commercial danger, political pariah, and
morally repugnant dictatorship. They see the Clinton administration's policy as naïve, appeasing, and having
failed to bring about cooperative behavior on China's part.
Although a counterattack to the anti-China polemic has been mounted,8 and the intensity of bad feeling has slightly subsided since the
spring and summer, the general negative attitude toward China still permeates the nation's capital. Furthermore,
the unresolved allegations of China's illegal contributions to 1996 political campaigns in the United States ("donorgate")
remain. President Clinton thus meets his Chinese counterpart with weak domestic support for his China policy.
The president's policy toward China is one of "comprehensive engagement." The policy evolved out of the
need to repair the deteriorated relations that have existed since 1989, and to provide an overarching framework
to guide U.S. ties with China. After that year and the downturn in bilateral relations that continued through the
collapse of the former Soviet Union and other ex-communist states, the Clinton administration had found itself
pursuing a fragmented policy that was largely reactive to independent domestic interests. Competitive and contentious
elements came to dominate the relationship, restricting cooperation in important areas where national interests
converged. The new policy, announced in 1995, was thus driven by the need to stabilize the deteriorating relationship
and work together where possible. The strategy underlying the comprehensive engagement policy has three main components.
Reinstitutionalize ties. By 1995 the elaborate web of intergovernmental exchanges established during
the 1980s had eroded and needed to be rebuilt. Accordingly, the Clinton administration has sought to increase contacts
and exchanges at all levels. This has included, importantly, meetings between Presidents Clinton and Jiang when
opportunities afforded in third countries (such as the annual Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum meeting).
As part of this process, Vice President Al Gore and a series of cabinet officials have visited China in recent
months: former Secretary of Defense William Perry, Secretary of Commerce William Daley, Treasury Secretary Robert
Rubin, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs John Shalikashvili, former Secretary of State Warren Christopher and
his successor Madeleine Albright, and a series of working-level officials in the fields of arms control, immigration,
energy, environment, drug enforcement, and so on. Military exchanges have particularly picked up. In November Secretary
of Defense William Cohen will visit China. Chinese officials have also been traveling to the United States in increasing
numbers. These exchanges have generated bilateral cooperation in many spheres and represent opportunities for the
two countries to discuss their differences.
Reestablish strategic dialogue. After the cold war the United States and China still had numerous regional
and international strategic interests in common, but with the atrophying of bilateral ties after 1989 the military
and strategic establishments in each country interacted little. So-called strategic dialogue resumed in 1996--ironically
at the very time when Chinese military forces were undertaking threatening "exercises" off the coast
of Taiwan, causing the United States to respond by deploying two aircraft-carrier battle groups to the vicinity.
The dialogue was initiated by then National Security Advisor Anthony Lake and his counterpart Liu Huaqiu, director
of the State Council Office of Foreign Affairs. Lake's successor Samuel R. Berger has continued it. As noted above,
over the past year a series of high-level and working-level military-to-military exchanges, which also afford opportunities
to exchange views on issues of common strategic interest, have taken place. Integrate
China into the international institutional order. The
rationale for this leg of the comprehensive engagement policy is twofold. First, an increasing number of global
issues facing China and the United States require multilateral cooperation and action.9
Second, with China enmeshed into as wide a range of international regimes and organizations as possible, Chinese
behavior that deviates from international laws and norms (as well as U.S. foreign policy interests) will be more
easily constrained. Progress has been made in this regard, as China is now a member of most major intergovernmental
organizations and nearly 1,000 nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Of importance, the PRC has acceded to several
key multilateral security regimes and treaties: the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and its export-control arm--the
so-called Zangger Group); the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty; the Chemical Weapons Convention; the Biological Weapons
Convention; and the Land Mine Protocol of the Convention on Inhumane Weaponry. While not a member of the Missile-Technology
Control Regime, Beijing has essentially abided by its provisions since 1996. It has also recently promulgated tightened
control procedures to govern the export of weaponry, nuclear technology, and sensitive defense technologies. Thus
in international security and other realms China is increasingly acting as a good global citizen. China's eventual
accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) will also be a major step forward in giving it a stake in the rules
and norms of the global order.
These three elements of comprehensive engagement--reinstitutionalization,
strategic dialogue, and multilateral integration--are
intended to deepen a wide range of bilateral relations while further integrating China into the international order
and thereby constraining its potentially disruptive behavior. Not surprisingly, Beijing is suspicious of such a
strategy--seeing it as a policy of "soft containment."10 But it must be said that, to date, the policy is being implemented
and the strategy is working. Those who argue for the "containment" of, or confrontation with, China have
yet to enunciate a more viable strategy for eliciting Beijing's cooperation or changing its behavior. There is,
quite simply, no alternative to the policy of engaging China. A policy of containment would likely entail a trade
embargo, a wide range of punitive sanctions, attempted political isolation, and the deployment of military resources
against China. These elements require extensive multilateral cooperation from other countries, which is precisely
why such a policy would not work. Not a single nation on earth would join the United States in such efforts to
isolate China. Such a confrontational policy might satisfy some domestic constituencies in the United States. But
it would likely stimulate a wide range of Chinese behavior that would directly damage U.S. national interests.
China could, for example, increase its transfers of missiles and other arms to Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Burma,
and other rogue regimes. It could stop its behind-the-scenes help with implementing the North Korean nuclear accord,
step up coercive pressure against Taiwan, accelerate its purchases of advanced arms from Russia, restrict freedoms
in Hong Kong, and crack down further on human rights at home. A policy of confronting or containing China would
be extremely counterproductive for the United States.
The Regional Context
The 1997 Sino-American summit takes place in the context of a shifting regional environment in Asia. There are
some continuities but also some fluid factors that substantially affect the backdrop of the summit.
First, among the constants, there is probably no nation in Asia that opposes a stabilization and improvement of
relations between the United States and China. Most Asian nations see their strategic and economic security as
enhanced by sound Sino-American relations. A strategic rivalry between the U.S. and China would impact directly
on China's neighbors and America's partners in the region--causing many to face tough choices they would wish to
avoid. Asian nations seek positive-sum relations with both powers rather than a zero-sum choice between them. Excepting
perhaps Japan, no two countries would suffer more from a strategic rivalry than China and the United States--as
each would have to divert enormous resources into countering the other. In short, sound Sino-American relations
substantially enhance regional security and stability.
Relatedly, almost all Asian nations desire the continuation of the U.S. military presence as a stabilizing force
in the region. The forward deployment of 100,000 U.S. forces in East Asia serves to deter aggression, provide a
stable environment conducive to economic growth, enforce freedom of navigation through international sealanes,
and maintain the regional balance of power. Accordingly, the United States has moved to strengthen its five bilateral
alliances (with Japan, Australia, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand) and enhance mutual defense
arrangements with other friendly countries (notably Singapore and India). These alliances have been complemented
by new multilateral cooperative security forums such as the ASEAN Regional Forum. As discussed below, however,
China has been the only nation in Asia (other than North Korea) to challenge these alliances and the U.S. military
presence in the region. Even the government of Malaysian prime minister Mahathir Mohamad, a frequent critic of
the United States, has moved to shore up defense contacts with the U.S. military. For its part, the U.S. government
has reiterated on numerous occasions its commitment to maintaining its current force levels and alliances in the
region.
The third continuity in the regional environment is that China, Japan, and the United States still enjoy peaceful
and amicable relations with each other. The history of East Asian international relations over the last century
has clearly proven that when these nations are in harmony, so is the region; and when two of the three are in conflict,
so is the region. Tensions do exist in all three legs of this triangular relationship, but the cooperative ties
among them still far outweigh the competitive and conflictual elements at present. If anything, the three governments
should enhance their cooperation trilaterally in addition to improving their bilateral interactions and ties. Trilateral
cooperation at the ministerial and vice-ministerial levels across a full range of functional issue areas--security,
trade, crime, environment, immigration, and so on--should be a high priority for the three governments.11
The fourth unchanged element is the continuing standoff between North and South Korea. This dangerous holdover
from the cold war continues to be one of the hottest flashpoints on the globe. Not only could a devastating war
erupt at any time as the result of North Korean aggression, but the North is in the midst of a major humanitarian
catastrophe owing to near-famine conditions. Millions are malnourished and live on the verge of starvation. International
relief agencies estimate that between 500,000 and 2 million have already perished. The North Korean economy has
come to a standstill, registering year-on-year negative growth rates. Many factories and mines have closed, electricity
is in short supply, and trains have stopped running in many parts of the country. Although outside estimates of
the sustainability of the North Korean regime vary (with Chinese experts on the optimistic end), there is little
dispute that the situation north of the DMZ is dire. Perhaps no nation seeks to stabilize the situation more than
China, but its influence on the Pyongyang leadership is limited. China has reportedly provided nearly 800,000 tons
of foodstuffs over the last three years and is also selling heavy crude oil and other energy supplies to North
Korea.
These and other factors are familiar landmarks on the East Asian scene that continue to affect Sino-American relations.
In recent years, however, some important changes have taken place in the regional security environment that shapes
the bilateral relationship.
The first element is China's own military modernization program. Beijing's purchase of 72 advanced Suhkoi-27 fighter-bombers
and other military equipment from Russia, combined with the PLA's new doctrine of preparing to fight wars around
its periphery, has unsettled the region and alarmed some of China's neighbors. But these developments must be kept
in perspective.12 While it is a nuclear power, China's conventional forces remain largely
of 1960s vintage. Although "pockets of excellence" exist in the PLA, China's military forces remain antiquated,
resource poor, and largely cut off from external supplies of sophisticated weapons and defense technologies. Even
Russia has placed qualitative limits on what it is willing to sell Beijing, while the European Union and United
States still have embargoed weapons and defense-technology transfers to China. Thus, at present, a careful analysis
of the PLA's order-of-battle suggests that there is no "China threat." Nonetheless, China has embarked
on a comprehensive military modernization program that, in time, will change the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific
region.
The second change in the regional environment is the relative disappearance of Russia as a significant strategic
actor. The collapse of the Soviet Union, the abysmal state of the Russian armed forces, and the country's low trade
and investment levels with the region have combined to make Moscow a nonplayer in East Asian strategic affairs
at present. This may change over time, but for the present the configuration of power in the region is defined
by the United States, Japan, China, and ASEAN. Even the hyped "strategic partnership" forged between
Moscow and Beijing has failed to make many strategists or statesmen in the region sit up and take notice.
The third significant change in the regional balance is the recent strengthening of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security
Treaty. The reaffirmation of the alliance and recent promulgation of revised Defense Guidelines solidify the bilateral
relationship and marginally increase Japan's regional security roles. Under the new Defense Guidelines, Japan would,
for the first time since the Second World War, engage in military activities outside its borders (in conflicts
involving the United States). Japan would provide minesweepers and conduct search and rescue missions in international
waters, use its military ships to conduct inspections of ships at sea to enforce UN-sanctioned embargoes, and assist
with communications and surveillance in international waters and airspace. Japan would allow for its civilian airports,
ports, and hospitals to be used by U.S. troops, and it would accept refugees from war zones and receive noncombatants
evacuated from combat areas.13
This redefinition of the U.S.-Japan alliance has not sat well in Beijing. Chinese leaders, official spokesmen,
and research institute analysts have all denounced it. China is bothered by any increase in the Japanese security
role in East Asia. Of particular concern to Beijing, though, is the potential for the new guidelines to apply to
contingencies involving conflict over Taiwan. The new guidelines commit Japan to provide "logistical support"
for U.S. forces involved in conflicts "in areas surrounding Japan." Clearly this is meant to apply to
Korea, but Beijing is suspicious that it also applies to Taiwan or even the South and East China Seas (where China
has territorial disputes). This was not so much a concern for China before the 1996 Taiwan crisis, when the aircraft-carrier
battle group Independence was dispatched to the Taiwan theater from its home port in Yokosuka, Japan.
While U.S. and Japanese officials deny that the alliance is directed at any third country or applies to any specific
contingencies, some Japanese politicians have publicly opined that Taiwan does fall within the new guidelines.
The fourth regional factor that impinges on the Sino-American relationship and summit is the changed state of China's
relations with its neighbors. The last time a Chinese president visited the United States, the PRC was locked into
adversarial relationships with the former Soviet Union, India, Vietnam, and South Korea and had estranged relationships
with Indonesia and Singapore. Today China's relations in its own neighborhood could hardly be better. Beijing has
waged a concerted campaign with all of its neighbors during the 1990s to improve diplomatic and trade relations.
It has paid off, providing Beijing with a stable regional environment conducive to concentration on domestic economic
construction and reform. Relations with Tokyo are somewhat strained, and Beijing has ongoing territorial disputes
with India and several ASEAN countries, but these situations do not prevent broader relations from moving ahead.
China has similarly moved to advance its foreign relations with members of the European Union and other countries
around the world. Looking back on nearly a half century of Chinese foreign policy, it must be said that the PRC
has never enjoyed such sound diplomatic ties. In fact, the
single nation on earth with which Beijing has a relationship primarily characterized by friction is the United
States. Thus, Beijing hopes that the 1997 Sino-American
summit can begin to stabilize and pacify its relations with Washington, in line with its other foreign ties. But
China is not willing to achieve this goal at the cost of core principles in its foreign policy.
The Agenda for the Summit
The planning for Jiang Zemin's two-day visit to Washington on October 28-29 has been underway for several months.
In preparing the agenda for the summit, National Security Advisor Samuel Berger and Assistant Secretary of State
Stanley Roth led a team of officials to Beijing in August, while Secretary of State Albright met Foreign Minister
Qian Qichen in New York on September 23, and Liu Huaqiu (director of the State Council Office of Foreign Affairs)
visited Washington. It is unlikely that the two sides will produce a joint communiqué, but they are likely
to release a joint public statement and hold a news conference between the two presidents. One unresolved issue
about the public statement is how the two sides should characterize their relationship, i.e. whether to define
it as a "partnership" and, if so, what kind? The terms "strategic partnership" (which China
has used to describe its relations with Russia and France) and "constructive partnership" are being considered.
The potential agenda for the summit can be divided into two categories: "action items" (agreements that
will likely be reached) and broader issues for discussion (over which differences exist or where cooperation will
be sought).
Likely "Action Items"
Although not firm or publicly announced at this writing, several items for the two presidents to agree on at the
summit are being prepared by the two governments. These likely include:
- An agreement to regularize and enhance strategic dialogue
between the two governments. This includes agreement to hold regular annual summit meetings between heads of state,
as well as regular consultations in each capital between foreign and defense ministers and their principal deputies.
- A new and expanded set of military-to-military exchanges.
This would include agreeing on a road map for future exchanges. These exchanges will include a visit by Secretary
of Defense Cohen to China in November and a likely visit by Central Military Commission Vice Chairman General Zhang
Wannian to the United States next year. Working-level exchanges are likely to concentrate on regional security
issues, potential cooperation in humanitarian relief, and confidence-building measures in the command and control
of nuclear weapons.
- A Military Maritime Cooperation Agreement (a.k.a. an Incidents
at Sea Agreement) that would establish clear lines of communication and procedure should ships or submarines from
the two countries' navies encounter each other in international or national waters.
- The reiteration that the U.S.-China relationship should
be governed by the three existing joint communiqués (1972, 1979, 1982), including the "one-China"
principle.
- A Chinese agreement to buy up to 30 Boeing aircraft, and
perhaps other large commercial deals.
- The implementation of the 1985 U.S.-China Nuclear Cooperation
Accord. This requires the president to "certify" to Congress that China has not engaged in nuclear proliferation,
adheres fully to International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards for its nuclear facilities, and does not sell or
transfer nuclear technology to unsafeguarded facilities elsewhere. It is not certain that the executive branch
will be able to make this "certification"--and, in any event, it would not be in time for the summit,
as Congress is given 30 days to review it prior to implementation. Large U.S. companies like Westinghouse and General
Electric have been heavily lobbying the administration to implement this decade-old accord so as to permit the
sale of billions of dollars of nuclear-power equipment to China.
- The establishment of a "communications link" (
a.k.a. hot line) between the two presidents.
- The establishment of a bilateral Human Rights Commission
to be administered by nongovernmental organizations, and the regularization of human rights dialogue between the
two governments.
- The possible reactivation of the U.S. government's Trade
and Development Agency's and Overseas Private Investment Corporation's activities in China, as well as the extension
of Export-Import Bank financing for U.S. companies doing business in China. All of these activities were suspended
as part of the 1989 post-Tiananmen sanctions.
- An agreement to bolster U.S. support for development of
China's legal system, likely including a program to train lawyers, prosecutors, and judges in the United States
or in U.S.-administered programs in-country.
- An agreement to cooperate in drug enforcement and other
joint measures to combat organized crime.
- An agreement to bolster U.S. support for pollution abatement
programs in China, including programs concerning clean coal technology and rural electrification.
- An agreement to broaden cooperation and research in space
technology.
- A stated commitment to deepen academic exchanges and expand
the Fulbright program.
Given the lengthy list of important issues and disputes between the United States and China, this prospective series
of agreements is modest. Many other important issues call out to be addressed and resolved. But one should not
expect that a single summit can or should solve a multitude of difficult, often intractable, issues. To be certain,
historical experience suggests that expectations should not be falsely raised, as they often go unfulfilled, leaving
Beijing and Washington blaming each other for retrogression.14 Behind these anticipated agreements and action items, each side has
an agenda of deeper and more troubling issues.
The Chinese Agenda
Although it is difficult to know exactly, it would seem likely that the Chinese government will come to the summit
with the following items on their broad agenda with the United States.
Lifting remaining Tiananmen sanctions. Although a number of the sanctions imposed on China in 1989 have
been lifted (such as governmental and military interaction), many remain. For example, as previously mentioned,
the activities in China of the Export-Import Bank, Trade and Development Agency, and Overseas Private Investment
Corporation are still frozen. It appears that the U.S. government would also like to lift these. Unlikely to be
lifted is the ban on the sale of weapons or defense technologies to the Chinese military.
Human rights.
China would like the United States to drop its annual attempt to pass a resolution condemning its human rights
conditions at the United Nations Human Rights Commission in Geneva. American efforts have now failed for several
consecutive years, with the Western coalition splitting apart this year following the "defections" of
Italy, France, Australia, and Germany.15 China is also dissatisfied with the annual State Department condemnation.16
World Trade Organization.China seeks to join the World Trade Organization and perceives the United
States to be blocking its application and admission. Beijing would like to conclude an agreement with Washington
on entry terms similar to those recently concluded with Japan and the European Union.
Permanent MFN status.
China seeks the granting of permanent most-favored-nation (MFN) trading status, rather than the annual review system
now in place. Beijing also strongly objects to the linkage of all non-trade criteria (or for that matter trade
criteria) to the evaluation of such status by the U.S. executive and legislative branches.
Relaxed export controls.Beijing believes that the continuation of U.S. restrictions on the export
of "dual use" technologies (civilian technologies with military application) is not only inconsistent
with principles of free trade, but also evidence that the United States views China as a strategic adversary. Accordingly,
China would like to see such controls lifted (the U.S. government currently restricts the export to China of approximately
9,000 items), as well as the general ban on the sale and export of defense technologies and weapons.
Taiwan arms sales.
At a minimum, China seeks the cessation of U.S. sales, transfers, and leases of advanced weapons to Taiwan and
the return to the ceilings--quantitative and qualitative--of the 1982 Joint Communiqué. At a maximum, China
seeks the drastic curtailment of all weapons to the island.
U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty. China seeks greater transparency in the recently redefined U.S.-Japan
Defense Guidelines, is completely opposed to the inclusion of the Taiwan area in the geographical scope of the
Guidelines, and opposes any expansion of mission or role for Japan's Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) outside of its
home islands.
Nuclear "no-first-use" pledge. China is seeking an agreement of "no first use" of nuclear
weapons between the two countries. It has signed such an agreement with Russia and other nations, as well as a
nuclear "detargeting" agreement with Moscow. While the U.S. seems prepared to discuss the latter, the
former is inconsistent with U.S. strategic nuclear doctrine, and Washington is therefore unlikely to respond favorably
to any such linkage (thus providing Beijing a potential propaganda windfall).
U.S. alliances and forces in Asia. In the last year China has been increasingly critical of U.S. alliances
and military forces stationed in East Asia. This has been expressed publicly and privately. China has called for
the abolition of the alliances and withdrawal of U.S. forces from the region--although it has also said that it
does not expect this to be done overnight (these are "problems left over from history" that should be
solved "in time"). China increasingly condemns alliances as "relics of the cold war and power politics"
that should be abandoned in favor of "new" forms of "comprehensive and cooperative" security.
Criticism of China.
Beijing is very disturbed by the seemingly unremitting criticism of Chinese policies and practices in the United
States and will likely express its displeasure with such "interference in its internal affairs," claiming
that it "hurts the feelings of the Chinese people."
These are the principal issues of concern to Beijing. Whether China actually expects policy change in these areas
is uncertain, but President Clinton and his aides can expect the Chinese side to raise many of these issues during
their discussions.
The American Agenda
What, then, is on the broader U.S. agenda for the summit meeting? The list is long.
The trade deficit.
As the appended tables indicate, the United States is running a very large trade deficit with China. There are
analytical disputes about how the deficit is calculated, but official U.S. Department of Commerce statistics reveal
a $39.5 billion deficit for 1996 and a $21.2 billion deficit for the first half of 1997 (up 35 percent on the corresponding
period last year).
World Trade Organization.The U.S. government also seeks China's entry into the WTO, but on "commercially
viable terms." Differences over the terms of accession have been substantially narrowed between American and
Chinese negotiators during the past year in the Geneva Working Party, but negotiations have bogged down of late.
The fact that China has recently reached agreement on entry terms with Japan and the EU will likely be used as
leverage against the United States. China's entry into the WTO, and its concomitant impact on dismantling China's
trade monopolies, would have a very positive effect on reducing its unacceptably large trade surplus with the United
States. The U.S. will likely push for agreement on parts of the WTO entry package at the summit and the restoration
of momentum to the negotiations.
Human rights.
The United States seeks across-the-board improvement of civil, political, religious, reproductive, gender, and
worker rights in China. In particular, the U.S. seeks the release of high-profile political prisoners Wang Dan
and Wei Jingsheng, international access to Chinese prisons (by the Red Cross and other monitoring groups), an accounting
of prisoners, and the establishment of both a regular government-to-government dialogue on human rights as well
as the establishment of a joint NGO-led human rights forum.
Tibet.
The United States seeks to drastically improve the protection of Tibetan culture, religious practices, and human
rights, and for Beijing to enter into direct dialogue with the Dalai Lama.
Hong Kong.
The United States does not wish the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region government to roll back the electoral
rights implemented during the final years of British colonial rule (current plans are to reduce the pool of eligible
voters from more than 3 million to less than 800,000). Washington also seeks the strict implementation of the Sino-British
Joint Declaration and Hong Kong Basic Law.
Korea.
The United States seeks China's cooperation in implementing the Agreed Framework to freeze and dismantle North
Korea's nuclear weapons program and, more generally, in bringing about a "soft landing" for the destitute
North Korean economy. Washington would also like to intensify bilateral consultations with Beijing over: the provision
of humanitarian relief to the North and preparation for potential refugee exodus; starting four-power negotiations
to establish a permanent peace treaty among North and South Korea, the PRC, and the U.S.; and the prospective role
of U.S. military forces in Korea following eventual reunification.
Taiwan.
The United States seeks the early resumption of high-level cross-strait dialogue between government authorities
in China and on Taiwan over the terms of their relationship. The U.S. will reassure China that its official policy
toward Taiwan is that of one China and that the U.S. government does not advocate or endorse Taiwanese independence.
It is also U.S. policy that the differences between the two sides should be solved peacefully and that force or
the threat of force is inconsistent with this policy. The U.S. government has reminded China on several occasions
that any threat of force by the PRC against Taiwan would be "of grave concern" and would invoke U.S.
obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, which directs the president to inform Congress of any threat
to Taiwan's security or social or economic system, and of any danger to U.S. interests.
U.S.-China-Japan consultations. Some in the U.S. government seek to establish trilateral consultations among
government officials of Japan, China, and the United States to discuss and identify concrete areas of joint cooperation
across a range of functional issue areas--crime, environment, security, search and rescue, trade and investment,
and so on. Bill Clinton will also likely remind Jiang Zemin that the enhanced and redefined U.S.-Japan Mutual Security
Treaty is not directed against China or any other third country and that it is in the general interests of peace
and stability in the Asia-Pacific.
Military relations.
The United States seeks to increase and improve military-to-military ties between the armed forces of the two countries.
As noted above, a number of agreements to broaden and intensify exchanges will likely be agreed on at the summit,
but for the United States one of the highest priorities is to improve transparency in the Chinese defense establishment--particularly of China's military
spending, doctrine, and deployments. A further U.S. goal is to improve reciprocity in the military-exchange relationship,
as American access to Chinese military bases and personnel pales in comparison to what the U.S. military makes
available to the PLA (there has been some improvement very recently).
Proliferation and arms control.The United States seeks to improve China's participation in, and adherence
to, a wide range of multilateral arms-control agreements. As noted above, much progress has been made in this area
in recent years, but Washington is still greatly concerned about the potential for further transfers of Chinese
ballistic and cruise missiles to Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Libya, North Korea, and other rogue regimes.
These are many of the issues on Washington's agenda with Beijing at present. They may not all arise at the summit,
and they will certainly not be resolved. But this agenda is an indication of the number and complexity of issues
of concern to Washington in the Sino-American relationship.
Measuring a Successful Summit
If the two presidents can establish a genuine degree of trust and spirit of cooperation, initial progress can be
made in many of these areas. Simply to establish and regularize high-level and working-level dialogue over such
complex issues is an important accomplishment. But successful diplomacy requires hard bargaining, compromises,
and tradeoffs--and both sides will have to give to get what they want. Statesmanship is also required--the two
presidents will need to stand above the interests of domestic constituencies in each country to advance their national
interests. If these criteria are met, the 1997 Sino-American summit can be judged a success.
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David Shambaugh is professor of Political Science & International Affairs and
director of The Sigur Center for Asian Studies in the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington
University. From 1988-96 he taught at the University of London's School of Oriental & African Studies, where
he also served as editor of the China Quarterly from 1991-96. His prior experience included directing the Asia
Program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and working in the U.S. Department of State and
National Security Council. He has published, authored, and edited many studies of Chinese domestic politics, foreign
relations, military affairs, and international relations of Asia. He is presently working on a book entitled China's Military Enters the 21st Century and, together with Orville Schell, is editing The
China Reader: The Deng Era.
Notes
1. Jiang will visit Honolulu, Williamsburg, Washington, D.C., Philadelphia, Boston, and Los Angeles.
2. Some sources indicate that Jiang Shanqing
adopted Jiang Zemin prior to his death, as he was childless, when he served as a provincial commissioner in Anhui
Province. See Zhong Gong Renmin Lu (Who's Who in Communist
China) (Taipei: Institute of International Relations,
1989), p. 160.
3. For further discussion of Jiang's relations
with the PLA see David Shambaugh, "China's Commander-in-Chief: Jiang Zemin and the PLA," in Chinese Military Modernization,
ed. C. Dennison Lane et al. (Washington, D.C. and London: AEI Press and Kegan Paul International, 1996), pp. 209-45.
4. Typical is the two-volume set E'zhi Zhongguo (Containing China)
published by Yin Shi Publishing House in 1996.
5. See David Shambaugh, Beautiful Imperialist: China Perceives America, 1972-1990 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991); and Richard Madsen, China and the American Dream
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1996).
6. For an excellent assessment of this dimension
see Kenneth Lieberthal, "Domestic Forces and Sino-U.S. Relations," in Living
With China: U.S.-China Relations in the 21st Century,
ed. Ezra Vogel (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997), pp. 254-76.
7. For further discussion see David Shambaugh,
"The United States and China: Cooperation or Confrontation?" Current
History, Vol. 96, no. 611 (September 1997), pp. 241-45.
The discussion in this section draws on this previous article.
8. See, for example, Robert Ross, "Why
Our Hardliners Are Wrong," National Interest, no. 49 (Fall 1997), pp. 42-51; and Vogel, Living with China.
9. For an excellent discussion of this subject
see David M. Lampton, "A Growing China in a Shrinking World: Beijing and the Global Order," in Vogel, Living with China,
pp. 120-40.
10. See David Shambaugh, "Containment
or Engagement of China? Calculating Beijing's Responses," International
Security, Vol. 21, no. 2 (Fall 1996), pp. 180-209;
and Yan Xuetong, "Containment Policy Harms All Interests," China
Daily, June 9, 1997.
11. This is a proposal suggested in Toward the 21st Century: The Roles of China, Japan, and the United
States in the Asia-Pacific Region (Joint Report of
George Washington University Sigur Center for Asian Studies, Keio University Center for Area Studies, China Institute
for Contemporary International Relations, May 1997).
12. For more extensive discussion of China's
military modernization see David Shambaugh and Richard Yang, eds., China's
Military in Transition (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1997); and David Shambaugh, "China's Military: Real or Paper Tiger?" Washington
Quarterly, Vol. 19, no. 1 (Spring 1996), pp. 19-36.
13. Kevin Sullivan, "Albright Heralds
New Era for U.S.-Japan Alliance," International
Herald Tribune, September 26, 1997.
14. Harry Harding has best described the
pattern and impact of falsely raised and unfulfilled expectations in the U.S.-China relationship--which he characterizes
as an oscillating pattern of progress, stagnation, crisis, and consolidation. See his A Fragile Relationship: The United States and China Since 1972 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1992), p. 5.
15. See
Human Rights Watch/Asia, Chinese Diplomacy, Western Hypocrisy, and the U.N. Human Rights Commission (New York: Human Rights Watch, March 1997).
16. The 1997 report detailed a drastic deterioration
of political, gender, worker, religious, civil, and other human rights in China. See U.S.
Department of State Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, China Country Report on Human Rights Practices
for 1996 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State,
January 30, 1997).
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Australia and the Asia Pacific: Charting a New Course, Garry Woodard (August 1993)
Japan and the Asia-Pacific: Defining a New Role, James W. Morley (May 1993)
Cambodia in Crisis: The 1993 Elections and the United Nations, Frederick Z. Brown (May 1993)
Clinton and Asia: Issues for the New Administration, Don Oberdorfer (January 1993)
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