Contents

Introduction

The Tiananmen Massacre, the End of the Cold War, and U.S.-China Policy

Human Rights and Taiwan in U.S.-China Relations

Resolving Weapons Proliferation and Trade Issues: The Prelude to the 1997 Washington Summit

Accomplishments of the October Summit

Toward the Beijing Summit: The International and Domestic Context

China on the Eve of the Summit
American Leadership on the Eve of the Summit
The Negotiating Dynamics

The Agenda of the Beijing Summit

Appendix: Specialists on U.S.-China Relations

• From June 1989 to the end of 1992 the Bush administration tried to contain the content of human rights in China policy to limited diplomatic and economic sanctions and vocal support for Chinese dissidents. President Bush resisted congressional efforts to link China's human rights performance with most favored nation (MFN) trade status, leading to significant tension between the White House and the Democrat-controlled Congress and to his frequent use of the veto.

• Based on campaign promises and a genuine commitment to do more for China's human rights activists, the Clinton administration entered the White House with a commitment to link human rights to MFN. In May 1993 the president issued an executive order linking China's MFN status to PRC compliance with specific human rights policy changes. Should China fail to comply with the conditions in the executive order, it would lose MFN the following June. But despite PRC noncompliance, when faced with the costs of ending U.S.-China economic ties without the support of other nations, the White House renewed China's MFN status and abandoned linkage.

• The next year the administration shifted human rights tactics to vocal criticism of China and multilateral efforts to isolate it. Beijing retaliated by awarding major economic contracts to European corporations. U.S. aircraft sales were particularly affected. Most important, the administration's inattention to other aspects of U.S.-China relations led to conflict over Taiwan. In May 1995 Congress presented the administration with a direct challengeña near unanimous though nonbinding vote to grant Taiwan president Lee Teng-hui a visa to visit Cornell University, where he had received his Ph.D. China was concerned that the combination of greater U.S.-Taiwan cooperation and emerging vocal support for independence in Taiwan's first presidential campaign might ultimately lead to a formal Taiwan declaration of independence. It thus increased diplomatic and military pressure on Taiwan, culminating in its March 1996 military exercises and missile tests in close proximity to the island and the subsequent White House dispatch of two aircraft carriers to the vicinity of Taiwan.

• Despite the initial backlash in the United States against China's threat to use force against Taiwan and in China against the U.S. deployment of the two aircraft carriers, the crisis encouraged both Chinese and American leaders to work toward better relations. Chinese leaders quickly accommodated themselves to low-profile visits by Taiwan leaders to the United States and to continued increased U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. In the United States, stunned by China's reminder of its commitment to risk war over Taiwan and its ability and will to destabilize East Asia, the administration and members of Congress reevaluated America's China policy, seeking to stabilize relations through "engagement." The White House reassured Beijing that future visits by senior Taiwan leaders to the United States would be rare and for strictly personal reasons. During this period the administration also assured China that Washington did not support Taiwan's independence, two Chinas, or Taiwan's membership in international organizations of sovereign states, including the United Nations. In the fall of 1996 the White House also engaged in serious discussions with Beijing regarding PRC membership in the WTO and first addressed the prospect of a U.S.-China summit.

• This policy shift was aborted by an alleged PRC effort to influence congressional elections. The associated criticism of the PRC and heightened attention to the so-called China threat raised the political costs for the administration's efforts to "engage" the Chinese leadership. WTO negotiations ground to a halt and the White House suspended consideration of a U.S.-China summit.

• In summer 1997, after congressional and media investigations failed to produce evidence establishing illegal PRC campaign contributions, the Clinton administration returned to its engagement policy and settled on a long-term China policy that, in many respects, was a return to the postócold war priorities of the Bush administration. During this same period, developments in China promoted an improved U.S. domestic environment for U.S.-China cooperation. Deng Xiaoping's death in February 1997 and the subsequent heightened stature of Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji suggested the passing of the Chinese leaders responsible for the violent suppression of the 1989 student protest movement. In June Beijing successfully managed the return of Hong Kong to China. China's human rights situation remained a concern of the president and his senior advisors, but it became one important interest among many. Thus, despite limited human rights concessions from China, the administration acknowledged that progress in other important areas of U.S.-China relations required bilateral stability and an overall atmosphere of cooperation. In the belief that a meeting between President Clinton and President Jiang would facilitate Chinese cooperation with U.S. interests, including human rights, the administration moved to hold the first U.S.-China summit since June 1989.

Resolving Weapons Proliferation and Trade Issues: The Prelude to the 1997 Washington Summit

While struggling over the role of human rights and Taiwan in post-1989 relations, Washington and Beijing have also contended with conflicts over weapons proliferation and trade disputes. Through nearly ten years of negotiations the two sides have reduced much of their conflict over these issues.

The United States has opposed Chinese export of missiles and nuclear technologies to so-called rogue states. Rather than risk heightened conflict with the United States, China has carefully and selectively constrained its export activities. Since the end of the cold war, it has limited its nuclear exports to the Middle East to a 1992 agreement to help Iran build two nuclear reactors, in apparent retaliation for the U.S. sale of F-16s to Taiwan. Although the program was under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), through 1997 Beijing had not commenced any significant work on the nuclear reactors, content to use the prospect of assistance to Iran as leverage over U.S. policy. U.S.-China conflict over the proliferation of missiles in the Middle East first emerged in 1988 when China sold CSS2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles to Saudi Arabia, eliciting U.S. sanctions on technology transfer to China. Since then, wary of challenging U.S. interests in the Middle East, Beijing has refrained from exporting advanced missiles to that region. China's sales to Iran have been limited to small quantities of very short-range old-technology missiles not restricted by international agreements.
The exception to PRC restraint has been its relationship with Pakistan. Concerned that if Pakistan could not withstand Indian strategic superiority it would fall under Indian influence, Beijing contributed to Pakistan's nuclear program during the 1980s and 1990s. In 1992, again in apparent retaliation against the U.S. sale of F-16s to Taiwan, it transferred to Pakistan M-11 missiles. The missiles remained undeployed.

By the early 1990s Pakistan had emerged as the primary source of U.S.-China tension over the proliferation of weapons. Although China remained unwilling to abandon its strategic alliance with Pakistan and to commit to end its arms sales, Washington recognized that Chinese transfers to Pakistan were the exception in an otherwise restrained PRC export policy. Thus, by 1996 Washington no longer considered PRC weapons exports an obstacle to reduced U.S.-China tension and the development of greater cooperation.

Since 1989 the United States and China have also resolved much of their conflict over Chinese piracy of intellectual property. Seeking to minimize the losses to U.S. industries of Chinese piracy, in 1992 the Bush administration negotiated an agreement with China requiring Beijing to enact legislation protecting intellectual property rights (IPR). Beijing fulfilled the agreement, but then enforcement emerged as the next issue. In 1995 the Clinton administration reached an agreement with China that required Beijing to enforce its IPR laws by closing down factories producing illegal entertainment and video software. In 1996 China shut down many prominent illegal software factories, and in 1997 its courts sentenced IPR violators to long prison terms. In this unfriendly business environment, IPR pirates moved their operations to Macau, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, and South Asia.

But even this success did not resolve the problem. Whereas before China could simply write legislation and then contend with a finite number of illegal manufacturers, now countless small stores sell smuggled pirated software to Chinese consumers. Nonetheless, as an issue in U.S.-China relations, IPR piracy assumed reduced importance, reflecting White House appreciation of China's prior efforts and of its limited ability to manage the latest manifestation of this problem. It also reflected growing American understanding that software piracy is a global problem rather than a reflection of Chinese rogue behavior. U.S. industry losses to Japanese piracy, for example, are far greater than its losses to Chinese piracy. The greatest losses occur in the United States.

Greater cooperation over IPR piracy did not eliminate U.S.-China trade conflict. In 1997 the U.S. trade deficit with China reached $49.7 billion. Although former White House officials acknowledge that U.S. figures overestimate the deficit by 25 percent, the growing deficit has caused considerable criticism of China among U.S. interest groups and has created pressure on the administration to expand U.S. access to the Chinese market. In recent years the immediacy of this issue declined but not because of Chinese concessions. Rather, the sustained growth of the American economy and the corresponding decline in domestic unemployment reduced public and congressional attention to the trade deficit. Thus, although the issue will likely reemerge, U.S. economic growth has reduced the political costs to the administration of developing greater cooperation with China. In addition much of the burden of negotiating greater access to the Chinese market has shifted to negotiations with Beijing over Chinese admission to the World Trade Organization (WTO), helping to further depoliticize the issue.

By 1997 the United States and China had resolved much of their conflict over the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and bilateral trade. These developments and the reduced prominence of human rights in U.S. policy enabled the Clinton administration to give greater consideration to holding a summit with President Jiang Zemin. It also enabled the October 1997 summit to focus on cooperation rather than acrimonious conflicts of interest.

Accomplishments of the October Summit

China and the United States approached the October summit with very different agendas. China primarily wanted the symbolism of a successful U.S.-China summit, for the summit itself would represent significant progress toward the end of America's post-Tiananmen sanctions on China. A successful summit would also enhance the stature of Communist Party Secretary Jiang Zemin in both Chinese domestic politics and international politics. Jiang had just been elected the first party leader in the postóDeng Xiaoping era and would benefit from a diplomatic success. Equally important, a successful summit would enhance China's international stature and contribute to PRC diplomacy toward Japan, Taiwan, and Southeast Asia. Chinese leaders also understood that Beijing could not affect U.S. policy toward Taiwan, the issue that mattered most to China, but that China might be compelled to make compromises to secure U.S. cooperation. Thus, emphasis on a symbolic summit might protect China from American pressure to make concessions to U.S. interests.

The White House, on the other hand, did not completely welcome the symbolism of a U.S.-China summit. President Clinton feared that a summit with the leader of the Communist Party of China could undermine his domestic stature. To compensate for the expected criticism of President Clinton's meeting with Jiang Zemin, the administration wanted to use China's need for a successful summit to negotiate agreements regarding important U.S. interests in weapons nonproliferation, trade, military-to-military cooperation, and human rights. Ultimately, Beijing cooperated with U.S. interests.

The October 29, 1997, joint U.S.-China statement created the diplomatic context for the two sides to expand cooperation. The statement announced that Beijing and Washington agreed that a "sound and stable relationship" served their "fundamental interests." It contained a long list of areas of potential cooperation, including promoting global and regional peace, facilitating world economic growth, preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, opposing international narcotics trafficking and terrorism, and enhancing the rule of law in China. To realize such cooperation, Beijing and Washington declared their mutual determination to "build toward a constructive strategic partnership."

The joint statement served two purposes. First, whereas in the past policy makers were primarily preoccupied with winning zero-sum conflicts, the joint statement established a positive agenda for Chinese and American policy makers, making it possible not only to promote national interests by seeking unilateral concessions or by stonewalling but also through cooperation. Second, the joint statement spoke to domestic critics in both countries. By forcefully stating that the two countries were moving the relationship toward cooperation, they influenced domestic debates. This was especially important for President Clinton. The American debate over the "China threat" and China's human rights policies had joined with surging populist politics to threaten to make cooperation with China politically costly. By stating in the joint statement his intent to develop a "strategic partnership" with China, the president exercised leadership over the national debate.
As the most controversial aspect of the U.S. debate over China policy, management of the human rights conflict would determine whether President Clinton could build domestic support for cooperation. Not only did President Clinton secure Chinese compromises regarding human rights, but subsequent to the summit China released from prison Wei Jingsheng, China's most well-known political dissident. Equally important, both President Clinton and President Jiang publicly and forcefully defended their respective positions on human rights at their White House press conference, inoculating themselves from their domestic critics' charges that the summit was a sellout to the other side.

But for the summit to be successful, each side also had to achieve its respective national interests. For Chinese leaders, not only did China finally hold a summit with the United States, but the summit was successful insofar as Jiang Zemin held friendly meetings with President Clinton. Unlike Clinton's past meetings with Jiang in the Philippines, New York and Seattle, on this occasion President Clinton found many occasions to smile and to praise Chinese accomplishments. Jiang also received favorable media coverage in the United States. Expecting a wooden bureaucrat with minimal facility to communicate with Americans, Americans were surprised at Jiang's ability to manage press conferences and make impromptu remarks and his eagerness to appeal to American culture and society. Thus, President Jiang succeeded in conveying to Americans a relatively positive image of both himself and of China.

Jiang Zemin's diplomacy not only enhanced his personal credibility in China and the United States, but it also bolstered Chinese diplomacy throughout Asia. Most important, the visit reinforced Beijing's edge in its competition with Taiwan over developing cooperative relations with the United States. Whereas it is highly unlikely that Taiwan's leader Lee Teng-hui will pay a second visit to the United States for the foreseeable future, China can look forward to the resumption of high-level U.S.-China exchanges. These trends have increased Taiwan's international political isolation insofar as Beijing has improved relations with Taiwan's strategic partner and other countries will likely follow America's lead in improving relations with China. The summit also helped to diminish some Southeast Asian preoccupation with the "China threat" and worries over China's claim to the disputed Spratly Islands in the South China Sea.

For its part, the United States achieved a number of important concrete objectives regarding the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, military-to-military ties, and economic relations.

• By making clear to Chinese leaders that the president's priority issue was nuclear proliferation, the White House secured a Chinese commitment not to provide Iran with any civilian or military nuclear technologies, regardless of whether the program complied with IAEA safeguards. Beijing also agreed to take into account American concerns regarding proliferation of conventional missiles to Iran.
  
  
• The Chinese commitment on ending nuclear cooperation with Iran allowed the White House to certify that China was in compliance with the terms of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, thus allowing American manufacturers of nuclear reactors to compete against France, Germany, Japan, and Russia in China's nuclear energy market. China also benefited, insofar as Beijing has long sought the more advanced and safer U.S. nuclear technology.
  
  
• China and the United States signed military-to-military agreements promoting institutional ties and greater Chinese transparency, including a safety-at-sea agreement and an agreement to share information regarding use of military forces during humanitarian crises and for disaster relief. The two sides also agreed to install a hot line connecting the two chief executives.
  
  
• In economic relations, the summit resulted in trade agreements beneficial to the United States, including Chinese commitments to purchase 50 Boeing aircraft and American wheat, and in agreements regarding Chinese launches of U.S. satellites and the operation of U.S. financial information services in China. Beijing and Washington also agreed on an initiative for the promotion of Chinese use of clean energy and the reduction of urban pollution.

Toward the Beijing Summit: The International and Domestic Context

Whereas the Washington summit was characterized by an American preference for substance and a Chinese preference for symbolism, events since October 1997 have created a situation in which both the United States and China place a high value on ceremony. It had not originally been this way. China wanted the Beijing summit to take place in March 1998, quickly after the October summit, thus minimizing the time to negotiate substantive agreements. The United States had proposed a late November summit, which would have minimized the effects of the summit on midterm elections and provided time to try to reach agreements on complex issues, such as Chinese admission to the WTO and Chinese proliferation of missiles. But in March the White House agreed to a June summit. Some analysts believe the White House decision for a June summit reflected the president's need to divert American attention from his difficult domestic agenda to great power diplomacy. Other analysts believe that the White House ultimately accepted the argument that an early summit was important to maintain the momentum in U.S.-China relations and thus consolidate the gains of the October 1997 summit.

Regardless of White House motives, the effect of the U.S. policy change and of past success at resolving conflicts is that it will be difficult for Washington to finalize new agreements regarding Chinese entry into the WTO and full Chinese compliance with the proliferation restrictions of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Hence, unlike the 1997 summit, for both the United States and China the summit has greater symbolic importance than substantive importance. But a stress on symbolism does not mean that the United States and China cannot achieve progress toward greater cooperation. Nor does it mean that the two sides approach the summit with similar perspectives. On the contrary, when Bill Clinton and Jiang Zemin meet in Beijing, each will try to advance his respective national interests as well as use the symbolism of the summit to contribute to enhanced U.S.-Chinese cooperation.


China on the Eve of the Summit

Events since October 1997 have bolstered China's international position and Jiang Zemin's diplomatic and domestic stature. Most noteworthy is Beijing's response to the Asian currency crisis. From 1992 to 1997 many countries in East Asia were preoccupied with the "rise of China" and the associated "China threat" theory and with Chinese claims to the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. By holding the value of the renminbi stable despite the negative impact on Chinese exports, China has prevented another downward spiral of regional currencies and made recovery faster and easier for the smaller East Asian economies. When President Jiang traveled to Singapore in December 1997 and reassured the region that China would not devalue the renminbi there was a nearly audible collective sigh of relief from regional leaders. A similar reaction occurred in March 1998 when Prime Minister Zhu Rongji delivered the same message in London at the second Asia-Europe Meeting. Zhu Rongji's selection in March 1998 as prime minister similarly portrayed China as a country on the move, willing to take the difficult steps necessary to reform its economy and excel in the 21st century.
Nearly overnight, China had gone from being merely an important market to having immediate influence over the global economy. Most striking, it gained this heightened influence while its regional reputation shifted from that of an irresponsible rising power to a responsible power promoting regional and global economic stability. In contrast, Japan, despite its enormous technological and economic advantages over China, appeared indecisive in the face of the economic crisis and was the frequent target of regional and global criticism.

While advancing its regional stature, China was improving ties with Japan. Whereas in 1997 Sino-Japanese relations remained mired in controversies over the U.S.-Japan alliance and Chinese accusations of Japanese militarism, since the October U.S.-China summit, Sino-Japanese cooperation has rapidly expanded. In November 1997 Prime Minister Li Peng visited Tokyo, the first visit by a Chinese head of government to Japan since 1989. In April Chinese vice president Hu Jintao visited Tokyo, where he was warmly received by Japanese leaders. Sino-Japanese military ties have also improved. In February 1998, Chinese defense minister Chi Haotian paid the first visit ever to Japan by a Chinese defense leader. Japanese defense minister Fumio Kyuma paid a reciprocal visit to China in May, the first such visit to China by a Japanese defense minister in 11 years.
These developments in Sino-Japanese relations have not only advanced China's great power diplomacy, but, in conjunction with regular U.S. briefings for Japanese leaders on the preparations for the summit and ongoing consolidation of U.S.-Japan security ties, they also ease Japanese concern over the course of U.S.-China relations. Japan fears neither a second "Nixon shock," which occurred when National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger secretly visited China in 1971, nor diplomatic isolation in the context of improving U.S.-China relations.

The combination of China's improved relationships with the United States and Japan and its heightened regional and global stature following the Asian monetary crisis has further strengthened China's position in the mainland-Taiwan conflict. Taiwan believes that it has nothing to gain and much to lose by negotiating a compromise agreement with Beijing regarding cross-strait political relations. Any compromise will bring it closer to China's wish that Taiwan's leaders formally acknowledge that Taiwan is a part of mainland China and renounce the option of achieving its ultimate yet unspoken objective of formal sovereign independence. But in April 1998 international pressure compelled Taiwan to accept Beijing's offer to reopen the cross-strait dialogue, which had been suspended since Lee Teng-hui's 1995 visit to Cornell University.

Just as China's international stature has improved, so has President Jiang Zemin's domestic stature. Jiang visited the United States in 1997 following his reappointment in October 1997 as head of the Chinese Communist Party. The June summit will occur following his March appointment at the National People's Congress as president of the People's Republic of China, the culmination of his effort to consolidate his position as Deng Xiaoping's successor. The March congress also confirmed the ouster of Jiang's political opponents and the installation of his preferred lieutenants, including former prime minister Li Peng as chairman of the National People's Congress and Zhu Rongji as prime minister. In nearly all respects, Jiang Zemin is at the top of his political game.

There are potential problems for Jiang on the horizon. During the next year an economic downturn could result from the combination of reduced direct foreign investment in China over the previous three years and from weakened Chinese exports due to the relatively stronger renminbi. Indeed, economic growth during the first quarter of 1998 was lower than expected. Such a downturn could aggravate China's already sensitive unemployment situation and create instability among China's migrant workers (the "floating population"). These concerns must be especially worrisome to Chinese leaders as they observe the implications of political instability in Jakarta for the Indonesian leadership. An economic downturn could also lead China's economic planners to further delay their schedule for reform of China's inefficient and heavily subsidized state enterprises. Nonetheless, in the first quarter of 1998 both Chinese exports and direct foreign investment in China increased. Thus, as the June summit approaches, none of China's potentially troubling economic issues have challenged Jiang's political authority.

The summit will afford Bill Clinton the opportunity to meet with Prime Minister Zhu Rongji. The context will be Zhu's recent selection in March as prime minister and his international reception as the global economy's newest superstar. Zhu graduated from Qinghua University, China's most prestigious engineering school, in 1951. He soon developed a reputation for his analytical skills and for speaking his mind. In 1958, during the anti-rightist campaign, he was labeled a rightist, expelled from the Chinese Communist Party, and compelled to do manual labor. After his rightist label was removed in 1962, Zhu began his climb up the bureaucratic ladder, developing a reputation as both a good manager and an astute economic policy maker. But in 1970, during the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution, Zhu was sent to northeastern China, where he was forced again to do manual labor.

Zhu Rongji returned to Beijing in 1975 and resumed his career in the Ministry of Petroleum Industry. In 1988 he was transferred to Shanghai as deputy municipal party secretary. The next year, shortly after becoming mayor, he faced Shanghai's student democracy movement. Unlike the Beijing leadership, Mayor Zhu peacefully defused the crisis without deploying the military while seemingly distancing himself from Beijing's violent policies. During the next two years, he reformed the Shanghai economy and established the Pudong special economic zone. Based on both Zhu's economic and political skills, in 1991 Party Secretary Jiang Zemin called him to Beijing to assume from Prime Minister Li Peng management of the economy. Zhu quickly brought China's inflation under control without causing a recession.

Zhu's appointment as prime minister is a powerful mandate to carry out thorough reform of China's economic system, including reform of state enterprises. His frankness and his insistence on fighting conservative opposition has earned him widespread domestic and international respect as one of China's most honest and capable politicians. Whether he can succeed at this very difficult task remains to be seen, but as of June 1998 he has the full authority to charge ahead.

American Leadership on the Eve of the Summit

When President Clinton arrives in Beijing, America's international and domestic circumstances will provide the immediate context in which Chinese leaders appraise his political condition. But in contrast to the diplomatic and political circumstances of his Chinese counterparts, the context of President Clinton's interactions in Beijing will be far more complex and less uniformly positive.

On the one hand, the president will bring to Beijing his stature as the leader of the world's most powerful nation. It is clear to Chinese leaders that the United States is the world's only superpower, that only the United States can dispatch troops to anywhere in the world at any time. America's technological capabilities similarly impress the People's Liberation Army (PLA). American operations during the Gulf War graphically portrayed to Chinese soldiers the technological sophistication of the U.S. military. It is also clear that the United States possesses overwhelming superiority over Chinese forces in contested areas throughout Asia. When the United States deployed two aircraft carriers to the vicinity of Taiwan during China's military exercises and missile tests, it possessed air and naval superiority over the entire Taiwan area. But not only does the United States tower over China, its strategic presence also symbolizes how far China must go before it can become a true great power in the region.

President Clinton will also be representing in Beijing the world's most important, prosperous, and stable economy. With the exception of the short-term reversal in 1991ó92, the U.S. economy has experienced uninterrupted growth since 1983. Since 1992 it has grown at rates surpassing all expectations, while inflation has been minimal and unemployment has declined to near record levels. In contrast, much of Western Europe as well as Japan have stagnated with high levels of unemployment. China's economic importance may be increasing, but during the 1997ó98 Asian currency crisis only the United States could provide the leadership and the level of financial assistance indispensable to the region's economic recovery.

American economic preeminence over China is also clear. Although China succeeded in using its economic importance to dissuade the United States from linking MFN to China's human rights policy, this victory reflected less China's economic importance and more the relative importance of human rights in United States foreign policy. The president travels to China confident that America's market and technology make vital contributions to China's efforts to modernize its economy. Indeed, whenever Washington has threatened or used sanctions in U.S.-China trade negotiations, Beijing has compromised.

But offsetting President Clinton's stature as the leader of the world's most strategically and economically powerful country is his complex domestic situation. While the American public gives the president consistently high marks for his running of the country, especially of the economy, a simultaneous impression in China and elsewhere in the world is of a president entangled in a web of accusations and lawsuits over alleged sexual harassment, extramarital affairs, and illegal financial practices. The president's reputation is also affected by his struggles with the Republican-controlled Congress and by the prospect that the Democratic Party may not fare well in the November midterm elections.

The president's difficult situation is aggravated by the continued controversy in the United States over his China policy, most recently reflected in renewed congressional and public attention to alleged Chinese contributions to President Clinton's 1996 presidential campaign and technology transfer to China. Furthermore, many members of Congress and public opinion leaders continue to insist that China is a rogue nation and that human rights issues should have priority in U.S. policy toward China. Should China fail to "give face" to President Clinton by cooperating with his human rights agenda, he could be vulnerable to charges of appeasement and of selling out U.S. values. The president must avoid the experience of Secretary of State Warren Christopher in China in April 1994, when Beijing snubbed his efforts to secure Chinese compromises on human rights. Given these factors, the president should be under considerable pressure to achieve a successful summit.

The Negotiating Dynamics

Chinese leaders benefit from their recent international accomplishments and from their successful management of domestic affairs. Nonetheless, they will be eager to help the president with his domestic agenda. China has waited nearly 10 years to establish normal relations with the United States and to hold a summit in Beijing. Moreover, the benefits of improved relations are apparent insofar as the last summit benefited Chinese diplomacy throughout Asia. A successful June summit will consolidate both U.S.-China cooperation and Chinese diplomatic gains in Asia.

Chinese leaders understand that a successful summit and further cooperation with the United States depend on American domestic politics. They realize that domestic support for the president's China policy does not run deep and that many Americans remain suspicious of Chinese economic and military power and of its authoritarian political system. They are apprehensive that the U.S. trade deficit with China could undermine the foundation of cooperation. Moreover, given the president's past reluctance to lead China policy, there remains considerable uncertainty in Beijing over his commitment to promote U.S.-China cooperation should the domestic political costs of cooperation increase due to heightened friction, especially over human rights. Chinese leaders understand that if they want to maintain U.S.-China cooperation, they must give President Clinton a successful summit.

The Agenda of the Beijing Summit

Before arriving in China, President Clinton will visit Hong Kong, where he will have the opportunity to express personally American support for continued political freedoms for the people of Hong Kong. He will then travel to China, where he will stay from the last week of June to early July. In addition to visiting Beijing, the president will visit Shanghai and perhaps Xian, site of the famous terra-cotta soldiers in the excavated tomb of Qin Shihuang, the first emperor of China (221 BC), and Guilin, renowned for its natural beauty.

Although the president will visit various sites in Beijing, the focus of his stay there will be the progress of U.S.-China diplomacy. But the administration's past success at resolving many of the issues in U.S.-China relations means that the remaining important issues are those most difficult to resolve. This is the case concerning both Chinese entry into the WTO and the negotiations over Chinese exports of missiles. Hence, as noted above, the results of the summit will focus on implementing and building on past successes, making progress toward resolving the remaining issues, and trying to create the symbolism of cooperation between the two great powers. But even within these parameters, each side approaches the bilateral agenda with its own interests and expectations.

Proliferation and Arms Control. The proliferation issue reflects continued American insistence that China fully commit to the terms of the Missile Technology Control Regime. In 1992 China agreed to do so but quickly reconsidered commitment in retaliation against U.S. F-16 sales to Taiwan. In 1994 China reconfirmed its commitment to abide by that portion of the MTCR governing weapons missile transfers, but it did not recommit to abide by that portion governing technology transfers. Recently, Washington decided to seek formal Chinese membership in the MTCR, believing that PRC participation in the regime will give Beijing greater incentive to abide by its regulations. Washington has also sought a Chinese commitment not to sell conventional short-range missiles to Iran and to establish a more effective export control regime to regulate missiles exports. It has suggested that it can reciprocate Chinese concessions by liberalizing Chinese access to U.S. satellite and missile and space launch technologies.

Although the United States now seeks Chinese membership in the MTCR, Beijing is not interested. It argues that the MTCR definition of proliferation narrowly conforms to U.S. interests. When Washington raises Chinese adherence to MTCR guidelines, Beijing counters with demands regarding U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, a proliferation issue more central to its interests. Indeed, Chinese leaders may believe that ambiguity over its commitment to the MTCR cautions America from ignoring Chinese interests vis-à-vis Taiwan. Chinese leaders are similarly also concerned about potential U.S.-Japan cooperation in the development of a theater-missile defense system, which might degrade China's nuclear deterrence capability. Beijing also departs from U.S. policy regarding Iran. It agrees with West European countries and Japan that U.S. policy toward Iran is mistaken insofar as it does not take into account changes in Iran and its foreign policy since the 1980s.

There is only a slight chance of agreement regarding Chinese membership in the MTCR. In the meantime, however, U.S.-China conflict over this issue has diminished because, with the exception of its relationship with Pakistan, China has not violated the MTCR. An agreement might be reached over Chinese conventional missiles exports. Should Beijing commit to ending conventional missile sales to Iran or develop a more rigorous missile or chemical export control regime, Washington could respond with a more liberal technology transfer policy.

The United States and China are also negotiating other arms control agreements. Washington wants to conclude with Beijing a detargeting agreement for nuclear missiles. Both China and the United States have such agreements with Russia. But China also wants to conclude an agreement on no-first-use of nuclear weapons. The United States has never signed such an agreement, concerned that it would undermine U.S. alliance commitments. The two sides are discussing a fission material production cutoff regime.

Taiwan. Despite recent PRC successes in isolating Taiwan and the recent resumption of cross-strait talks, Beijing remains a long way from achieving a formal commitment from Taiwan that it is part of China and will not declare independence. The main obstacle to PRC success is the United States. U.S.-Taiwan strategic cooperation, including U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, gives Taiwan the confidence it needs to resist Chinese pressure. Beijing would like President Clinton to declare publicly at the summit U.S. opposition to Taiwan independence and to express his support for a mainland-Taiwan agreement. It would like U.S. assurances on U.S.-Taiwan military cooperation, especially reagarding theater-missile defense and U.S. transfers to Taiwan of submarines and surface-to-surface missiles. Ideally Beijing would like a fourth U.S.-China communiqué that would further narrow U.S. options vis-à-vis Taiwan.

For its part, Washington would like to find a way to maintain the cross-strait status quo, in which Taiwan has de facto independence, the United States protects Taiwan's democracy and prosperous economy, and China is nonetheless prepared to maintain regional stability and cooperate with United States on bilateral issues. To enhance Taiwan's security and add to regional stability, Washington would like Beijing to renounce the use of force against Taiwan.

Neither the United States nor China is likely to achieve its objectives at the summit. Rather, reflecting U.S. diplomatic strength, the summit will merely reaffirm past U.S. and Chinese policies. President Clinton will publicly reaffirm America's commitment to the three U.S.-China joint communiqués and express U.S. support for the cross-strait dialogue. In private and perhaps in public he will reaffirm to Jiang Zemin his past assurances that the United States does not support Taiwan's independence, two Chinas, or Taiwan's membership in international organizations of sovereign states. In return, President Jiang will reaffirm China's intent to use peaceful measures to resolve the Taiwan issue.

Human Rights. American success in human rights is difficult to measure. Evolution of China's political system is slow and reflected in ambiguous societal developments. Hence, concrete results have been measured by American success at prodding China to release from prison well-known dissidents. But dissident releases cannot come during the summitñit would not serve the president to have Chinese dissidents be treated so cavalierly as bargaining chips. Thus the results of a summit on China's human rights situation frequently occurs afterwards, as was the case when China released Wei Jingsheng following the October 1997 summit, or before, which has been the case concerning the June 1998 Beijing summit. In March 1998, China released Xu Shuiliang from prison and announced its intention to sign the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The next day the White House announced its decision to hold an early summit. In April Beijing released political dissident Wang Dan and in May it released Catholic bishop Zeng Jingmu. The Clinton administration obviously wants China to release additional dissidents before the summit and to sign the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The administration also wants Chinese leaders to hold a dialogue on human rights in Tibet with America's Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues, which they have not yet done.

In response to American demands that improved U.S.-China relations depend on freedom for dissidents, China has used the dissidents as bargaining chips. Thus, by releasing dissidents and announcing its intention to sign the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, it successfully negotiated an end to U.S. efforts to pass a resolution condemning China at the annual meeting in Geneva of the United Nations Human Rights Commission. It would now like the United States to remove the remaining, mostly symbolic, economic sanctions imposed on China in June 1989. It also wants the United States to end its yearly review of China's most favored nation trade status and the congressionally mandated annual State Department assessment of China'sñand every other country'sñhuman rights situation.

Preceding and following the summit, Beijing may well release more dissidents. It may also formally sign the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Chinese leaders understand how important human rights is in the U.S. debate over China policy, and it will want to help the president defend his China policy against his domestic critics by helping him achieve a "successful" summit. The two sides may also reach an agreement promoting the "rule of law" in China. In return, the United States may end sanctions on Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) and trade and development assistance for China, which are the sole remaining postóJune 1989 economic sanctions. The White House lacks the domestic clout necessary to change legislation regarding the review of China's MFN status and the State Department's obligation to report to Congress on China's human rights situation.

Trade Issues and the WTO. China's entry into the WTO is one of the most difficult of the various issues to resolve. The United States is negotiating for China to accept the WTO trade and investment rules and to agree to implement these rules within a relatively short period after admission. Although the two sides have made progress on many aspects of an agreement, Washington remains dissatisfied with China's position on financial services, agriculture, and certain key industries, including automobiles. Moreover, as a bilateral trade agreement, the U.S.-China agreement on China's entry into the WTO must be approved by Congress. Hence, even more important than whether the content of China's accession agreement satisfies American economic interests is whether the agreement can pass the more stringent political test of a congressional vote.

China might like to join the WTO, but it would like to prolong for as long as possible the period in which it implements its accession agreement. It is concerned that premature exposure of its domestic economy to international competition will harm the development of emerging domestic industries, cause the collapse of the bankrupt banking system, and accelerate the demise of inefficient state-owned enterprises. Equally important, it is not clear to Chinese leaders how membership in the WTO benefits China. China already receives WTO benefits as part of the MFN trade status it has with nearly every country in world. Beijing may not like Congress's annual review of China's MFN status, but it is confident that Congress will not revoke MFN. Moreover, due to congressional opposition, it is far from clear that the White House will be able to give China permanent MFN even after it enters the WTO. Thus, it is not clear to Beijing why it should compromise its economic interests to join the WTO.

Because American leverage in the WTO negotiations is minimal, a WTO agreement depends on the White House's ability to push for congressional passage of an apparently one-sided agreement favoring China. Given congressional defeat of the administration's "fast-track" trade legislation and congressional resentment at China's trade surplus with the United States, conditions are not right for congressional passage of a controversial trade agreement with China. In these circumstances, the best that the summit can do is provide the context for reaching agreements on the pieces of a final WTO agreement, including agreements on the opening of the Chinese professional services market and a reduction of Chinese industrial tariffs.

In the absence of an agreement on Chinese membership in the WTO, Washington may find other methods to involve China in international economic leadership. One such instrument could be Chinese membership in the annual meeting of the world's leading economies. Now that Russia has joined the group, making the G-7 the G-8, Chinese membership in this group should be less controversial.

The large and growing U.S. bilateral trade deficit with China is a potentially destabilizing issue. The trade imbalance reflects primarily the economic conditions of the two countries (relative differences in savings rates, technology development, and per capita income) rather than national policies such as Chinese protectionism and U.S. sanctions. Moreover, the impact of the deficit on U.S. employment is minimal, insofar as the deficit reflects the movement of production facilities to China from South Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, which used to have deficits with the United States. Finally, the size of the deficit is exaggerated by U.S. accounting methods.

But despite all of these qualifications, the U.S. trade deficit with China will remain a volatile issue in American domestic politics for the foreseeable future. Indeed, when the U.S. economy declines, it could have a greater impact on U.S.-China relations than that of the U.S. trade deficit with Japan on U.S.-Japan relations in the 1980s and early 1990s. Thus, although the deficit is beyond the control of Beijing and Washington, the two sides want to manage the deficit to enable cooperation in other areas.

Chinese leaders understand the political sensitivity of the trade imbalance in the United States and that the burden of managing the trade deficit falls primarily on China. They have reached bilateral agreements with the United States to open certain sectors of their economy to U.S. products, such as the Chinese textile market. Nonetheless, market access negotiations have for the most part been subsumed by the WTO talks. Thus, China has used commercial contracts to try to offset the impact of the trade imbalance on the domestic politics of America's China policy. For example, Beijing's preference for Boeing aircraft partially reflects its interest in building constituencies in the United States. Its purchase of U.S. wheat reflects similar calculations. The Beijing summit is likely to be the occasion of a number of such agreements.

The summit may also produce an agreement allowing the United States to conduct postshipment inspection of Chinese enterprises purchasing dual-use American technology. This would facilitate U.S. licensing for export to China of similar technologies, contributing to a reduction of the trade deficit. The end of post-Tiananmen U.S. economic sanctions on China would also help to reduce the deficit.

Military-to-Military Cooperation. The United States would like to use the Beijing summit to build on the military-to-military agreements of the October 1997 summit. Washington believes that if the two militaries can enhance understanding of each other's operational procedures, misunderstandings and unintended conflicts can be avoided. Washington also believes that greater Chinese appreciation for American capabilities can reduce Chinese overconfidence and thus deter Beijing from challenging U.S. forces. Washington therefore favors greater transparency and greater cooperation in the nonstrategic use of military forces.

China shares Washington's interest in avoiding unintended military tension, but it is concerned that should transparency reveal its weaknesses to U.S. observers, Washington may be emboldened to challenge the PLA. In addition, the PLA retains considerable suspicion toward cooperation with other militaries. Since the October summit Washington has elicited additional PRC cooperation. In April China agreed to send officers to observe U.S. military exercises. The June summit, notwithstanding recent controversy in the United States over the role of the PLA in American politics, could lead to an agreement to regularize observation of each other's joint service operations. The summit could also move forward U.S. efforts to hold joint U.S.-China military exercises focused on disaster relief and humanitarian operations.

The other U.S.-China military issue is Chinese interest in expanded access to U.S. military technologies. This is clearly a controversial issue that will require considerable additional discussion in both Washington and Beijing. But the immediate issue concerns U.S. fulfillment of an existing U.S.-China agreement. In June 1989 Washington suspended an agreement to sell China parts for Sikorsky Blackhawk helicopters that Beijing had purchased prior to 1989. The sanction continues to create resentment in the Chinese military. The PLA's current priority is to persuade the United States to lift the sanction on the parts. Although Pentagon and other U.S. officials would like to sell the parts in an attempt to restore some goodwill for the United States in the PLA, the White House has blocked the sales, reflecting its concern for ongoing widespread American suspicion of military cooperation with the PLA.

The Symbolism of the Summit and Future High-Level Exchanges. The summit will allow each side to realize its very different symbolic interests. For China, the summit will be the final formal step in ending America's post-Tiananmen diplomatic isolation of China and thus be an important step toward developing China's objective of a postócold war "constructive strategic partnership" with the United States. The summit will also help Beijing consolidate cooperative bilateral relationships with other regional powers, including Japan, and contribute to its Taiwan policy. Finally, the visit will consolidate Jiang Zemin's domestic stature insofar as he will be the Chinese leader who compelled the American president to acknowledge finally the necessity of visiting China.

The summit will have a very different symbolic impact on the United States. The United States does not need the summit to enhance its strategic position in Asia. Rather a successful summit can help realize the president's effort to stabilize U.S.-China cooperation. His presence in Beijing can consolidate the impact of the October summit on domestic politics by legitimating engagement, further influencing public opinion, and giving pause to domestic critics of China and U.S.-China cooperation.

Indeed, his reception by Chinese leaders on the edge of Tiananmen Square (where China greets all visiting heads of state) will produce powerful images on television sets throughout the United States and call up vivid American memories of China's suppression of the 1989 student movement. Just as he did during his White House press conference with Jiang Zemin during the October summit, President Clinton will publicly speak out on human rights in Beijing, trying to show that it is possible for the United States to both cooperate with China and to give full expression to U.S. concern for human rights. The president's speech at Beijing University will also be an opportunity for him to forcefully deflect his critics' charges that he has compromised American interests to cooperate with China's authoritarian leadership.

The media can give the American people a more nuanced view of China which reflects the complex developments of the years since the 1989 Tiananmen protests. When presidents Nixon and Reagan visited China, they brought the American media to the Great Wall and the Forbidden City. President Clinton can use his visit to display to Americans a multidimensional perspective on Chinese society, which reflects not only the continued absolute dominance of the Communist Party leadership over Chinese politics but also the vibrant economic and cultural life (as well as the growing cosmopolitanism) that has developed in China as a result of nearly two decades of reform. In addition to visiting China's historic sites, the president can visit lively corners of Chinese society, including produce markets, department stores, and jazz clubs. His visits to Shanghai and elsewhere in China will reveal not only the wealth and the dynamism of post-Mao China but also the continued poverty and backwardness that continue to characterize much of contemporary Chinese society and the corruption and inequality that characterize developing countries around the world.

The balance in the reporting out of China will reflect the American debate over U.S.-China relations at the time of the president's departure. In the context of heightened domestic controversy, the coverage may tend to focus on the negative aspects of post-Mao China. This in turn will inevitably affect the impact of the summit on American support for engagement and the immediate future of U.S.-China relations. The president may discover that rather than promoting greater cooperation his visit to China could undermine American support for subsequent U.S.-China cooperation. U.S.-China leadership exchanges create the domestic and diplomatic environment in which policy makers try to realize national interests. Given the eternal controversies over U.S.-China relations, the Beijing summit can promote cooperation by giving momentum to high-level exchanges. During his visit to Beijing, President Clinton would like to formally invite Prime Minister Zhu Rongji to Washington in November 1998, following the election. Should he visit Washington, Prime Minster Zhu will try to impress American leaders and the American people with his pragmatic approach to economic issues and his easygoing ability to exchange banter on a wide range of issues. His visit could also lead to further progress on difficult WTO and MTCR negotiations. In this respect, the June 1998 summit could be one more step promoting progress on difficult issues and continued high-level meetings of importance for both China and the United States.

Appendix
Specialists on U.S.-China Relations

Frank Ching
Senior Editor
Far Eastern Economic Review
25/F Citicorp Centre
18 Whitfield Road
Causeway Bay
Hong Kong
Tel: (852) 2508-4385
Fax: (852) 2817-0771
E-mail: frank.ching@feer.com

The Honorable Chas W. Freeman, Jr.
Chairman
Projects International, Inc.
1800 K Street, NW
Suite 1018
Washington, DC 20006
Tel: (202) 333-1277
Fax: (202) 333-3128
E-mail: 104762.2074@compuserve.com

Peter F. Geithner
7 Lyons Place
Larchmont, NY 10538
Tel: (914) 833-4273
Fax: (914) 833-4273
E-mail: geithnerpf@aol.com

Merle Goldman
Research Associate
Fairbank Center for East Asian Research
Harvard University
1737 Cambridge Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
Tel: (617) 495-4570
Fax: (617) 495-9976
E-mail: mgoldman@fas.harvard.edu

Steven Goldstein
Department of Government
Smith College
Northampton, MA 01063
Tel: (413) 585-3537
Fax: (413) 585-3553
E-mail: sgoldste@sophia.smith.edu

Gerrit W. Gong
Freeman Chair in Chinese Studies
Director, Asian Studies Program
Center for Strategic and International Studies
1800 K Street, NW
Suite 400
Washington, DC 20006
Tel: (202) 775-3168
Fax: (202) 775-3199
E-mail: gongg@csis.org

Harry Harding
Dean, Elliott School of International Affairs
2023 G Street, NW
Room 640
George Washington University
Washington, DC 20052
Tel: (202) 994-6241
Fax: (202) 994-0335
E-mail: hharding@gwu.edu

Robert A. Kapp
President
U.S.-China Business Council
1818 N Street, NW
Suite 200
Washington, DC 20036
Tel: (202) 429-0340
Fax: (202) 775-2476
E-mail: bkapp@uschina.org

David M. Lampton
George and Sadie Hyman Professor of China Studies
Director of China Studies
Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies
1619 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Suite 606
Washington, DC 20036
Tel: (202) 663-5812
Fax: (202) 663-5891
E-mail: dmlampton@mail.jhuwash.jhu.edu

Burton Levin
Department of Political Science
Carlton College
Northfield, MN 55057
Tel: (507) 645-0086
Fax: (507) 646-5615

Herbert Levin
Executive Director
America-China Society
350 Park Avenue, 4th Floor
New York, NY 10022-6022
Tel: (212) 223-0588
Fax: (212) 486-3085
E-mail: amchisoc@aol.com

Kenneth Lieberthal
Arthur F. Thurnau Professor of Political Science
William Davidson Professor of Business Administration
University of Michigan
Center for Chinese Studies
202 South Thayer Street
Ann Arbor, MI 48104-1608
Tel: (734) 998-7555
Fax: (734) 998-9005
E-mail: kliebert@umich.edu

Winston Lord
Former Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State
Former Ambassador to China
740 Park Avenue
New York, NY 10021
Tel: (212) 650-0679
Fax: (212) 249-2231

Roderick MacFarquhar
Leroy B. Williams Professor of History
and Political Science
Fairbank Center for East Asian Research
Harvard University
1737 Cambridge Street
Room 310-B
Cambridge, MA 02138
Tel: (617) 495-9222
Fax: (617) 495-9976
E-mail: macfarq@husc.harvard.edu

Andrew J. Nathan
Professor
East Asian Institute
Columbia University
New York, NY 10027
Tel: (212) 854-6909
Fax: (212) 749-1497
E-mail: ajn1@columbia.edu

Barry Naughton
School of International Relations and Pacific Studies
9500 Gilman Drive
University of California, San Diego
La Jolla, CA 92093-0520
Tel: 619-534-2481
Fax: 619-534-3939
E-mail: bnaughton@ucsd.edu

Michel Oksenberg
Senior Fellow
Asia Pacific Research Center
Stanford University
200 Encina Hall
Stanford, CA 94305-6055
Tel: (650) 723-8192
Fax: (650) 723-6530
E-mail: michel.oksenberg@forsythe.stanford.edu

Douglas H. Paal
President
Asia Pacific Policy Center
1155 21st Street, NW, Suite 210
Washington, DC 20036
Tel: (202) 223-7258
Fax: (202) 223-7280
E-mail: dpaal@pop.erols.com
Minxin Pei
Assistant Professor
Department of Politics, Princeton University
Corwin Hall
Princeton, NJ 08544-1012
Tel: (609) 258-4760
Fax: (609) 258-4772
E-mail: mpei@princeton.edu

Nicholas Platt
President, Asia Society
725 Park Avenue
New York, NY 10021
Tel: (212) 288-6400
Fax: (212) 517-8315

Robert S. Ross
Research Associate
Fairbank Center for East Asian Research
1737 Cambridge Street
Harvard University
Cambridge, MA 02138
Tel: (617) 496-4518
Fax: (617) 495-9976
E-mail: rsross@fas.harvard.edu

David Shambaugh
Director & Professor of Political Science
and International Affairs
Sigur Center for Asian Studies
Elliott School of International Affairs
The George Washington University
2013 G Street, NW
Suite 301
Washington, DC 20052
Tel: (202) 994-5886
Fax: (202) 994-6096
E-mail: shambaug@gwu.edu

Richard H. Solomon
President
United States Institute of Peace
1550 M Street, NW
Suite 700
Washington, DC 20005-1708
Tel: (202) 457-1700
Fax: (202) 429-6063
E-mail: rsolomon@usip.org

Michael D. Swaine
Research Director
RAND Center for Asia-Pacific Policy
1700 Main Street
PO Box 2138
Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138
Tel: (310) 393-0411
Fax: (310) 451-7034
E-mail: swaine@rand.org

Ezra F. Vogel
Director
Fairbank Center for East Asian
Research
Harvard University
1737 Cambridge Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
Tel: (617) 495-4046
Fax: (617) 495-9976
E-mail: efvogel@fas.harvard.edu

Wang Jianwei
Assistant Professor of Political Science
Department of Political Science
University of WisconsinóStevens Point
2100 Main Street
Stevens Point, WI 54481
Tel: (715) 346-3869
Fax: (715) 346-4215
E-mail: j2wang@uwsp.edu

Shaoguang Wang
Associate Professor
Department of Political Science
124 Prospect Street
Yale University
New Haven, CT 06520
Tel: (203) 432-5262
Fax: (203) 432-6193
E-mail: shaoguang.wang@yale.edu