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Mona
Lisa Yuchengco and Rene P. Ciria-Cruz
Introduction
Visiting Philippine government officials never fail to exhort
the Filipino American community to play an active role in
shaping U.S.-Philippine relations. They appeal to the expatriates
to act as a collective lobby for Philippine economic and political
interests, often citing Israel's vibrant community of support
in the United States as a model. The officials are not mistaken
in detecting considerable potential in the nearly two-million-strong
Filipino community, the Philippines' largest expatriate group.
Filipino Americans, on the whole, are economically stable
and becoming more active in the political and civic affairs
of their adopted country.
However, expectations of an immediate political boon to the
Philippines must be tempered by an objective appraisal of
the challenges to overcome for the community to attain the
political capability to influence U.S. public policy. Perhaps
the visible protests and sustained lobbying from the 1970s
to the mid-1980s by the U.S.-based opposition to Ferdinand
Marcos have given rise to much optimism. However, that burst
of political activity was a unique phenomenon that can only
be used to illustrate the potential.
The U.S.-based opposition movement, after all, was directly
initiated by highly motivated exiled dissidents representing
the entire breadth of the ideological spectrum. Moreover,
Marcos's authoritarian rule created an unprecedented division
in the community as well as a general air of controversy that
quickly evaporated on his demise. Without such a singular
polarizing factor, Filipino Americans have naturally gravitated
back to quotidian concerns and are generally impervious to
appeals to greater political activity.
"Factionalism," "regionalism," and "lack
of collective spirit" are attitudinal and behavioral
factors often cited as hindrances to the community's political
progress. While these usual suspects do play a negative role
in the community's internal dynamics, the uniqueness, if not
the impact, of some of them (like "regionalism")
is actually overblown. Stressing their significance has as
much weight as discovering the obvious. There are far more
powerful objective factors that act as restraints to fuller
participation in civil society. Ultimately, the emergence
of undeniable Filipino American political clout rests on the
maturation of the community's sense of entitlement and self-organization,
in a process of overcoming cultural and social inhibitors
inherent in the immigrant experience.
Exclusion's Historical Impact: Protracted Assimilation
The great demand for workers by the Hawaii sugar industry
and large-scale food-crop producers on the mainland created
the first wave of Filipino immigration, which meant thousands
of able-bodied Filipino men (most of whom were bachelors)
came to the United States starting in 1906. A 1930 California
Department of Industrial Relations (DIR) study counted 31,092
Filipinos admitted to the state alone between 1920 and 1929.
There were nearly 50,000 Filipino workers according to the
1940 Census.
The Filipinos, however, were brought here for their labor
and were not allowed to integrate into the economic, social,
and political fabric. Like the U.S. bracero programs, or overseas
contract employment in the Middle East, assimilation was not
part of the contract. Filipinos could not bring wives, marry
into other races, own property, or vote--they were not allowed
to become Americans.
Official and popular racism prevented the mass of itinerant
bachelor farm workers from starting families and producing
new generations of U.S.-born Filipinos. According to the 1930
California DIR study, the ratio of unmarried Filipino males
to females was 23 to 1; there were only 217 females, of whom
only 93 were married, among 31,092 Filipinos in 1929. The
virtual absence of families precluded the establishment of
deeply rooted and enduring communities whose economic, political,
and cultural power could grow over time.
The social potential stifled by exclusion could be gauged
by the dramatic impact of a policy change that created a small
second wave of immigration at the conclusion of World War
II. Some 4,000 of the younger second-wave immigrants were
allowed access to U.S. citizenship after serving in the military
during the war (under the Immigration Act of July 2, 1946).
Most of these veterans brought back war brides from the Philippines.
The face of the Filipino minority quickly changed, with stable,
family-based communities--bolstered by a U.S.-born-baby boom--sprouting
up all over the West Coast. After years of exclusion, Filipinos
Americanized with a vengeance. This was, however, a limited
window of opportunity. Immigration restrictions would not
be relaxed again until 1965.
In 1965, U.S. immigration laws were relaxed to encourage the
entry of professionals and skilled workers, and an unending
chain of family reunifications commenced. Largely as a result
of this third wave of Filipino immigration, the Filipino American
population has grown rapidly over the last thirty years and
today totals 1.7 to 2.2 million people. The largest concentrations
of Filipinos are in California, Hawaii, Illinois, New York,
New Jersey, Washington, Virginia, Texas, Florida, and Maryland.
The Census Bureau expects Filipino Americans to spill over
the two-million mark by the year 2000 and to be over four
million by 2030.
Of the 1.4 million Filipinos officially counted by the 1990
U.S. Census, 71 percent are Philippine-born immigrants who
came after the easing of restrictions in the 1960s. Thus,
despite a presence in the United States dating back to the
second decade of this century and the existence of at least
three generations, the Filipino American population is still
primarily an immigrant community--and a fairly young one at
that.
The demands of assimilation are the Filipino Americans' biggest
challenges. With the arrival of more than 40,000 new immigrants
each year, the community's immigrant character is constantly
reinforced and reproduced, with much help from jet travel
and telecommunications. The relatively young roots of the
predominantly immigrant community hint at a very particular
social dynamic that encourages political detachment. A protracted
period of national ambivalence inhibits immigrants from comfortably
laying claim to their adopted country. This inhibition is
reinforced by the depoliticizing pull of the day-to-day demands
of establishing a new life in a different social and cultural
environment.
In addition, the largely Eurocentric mainstream culture's
resistance to ethnic diversity throws up barriers to smoother
assimilation. Racism, which tends to deflate the linguistic
and cultural "advantages" the nonwhite Filipinos
derive from their American colonial legacy, also frustrates
the "complete" or unconditional assimilation of
U.S.-born, second-generation Filipino Americans. It is a frustration
generally not shared by U.S.-born descendants of Caucasian
immigrants.
Had the first wave of immigrants been given full rights to
assimilate, the political profile of the Filipino community
would look quite different today. Several generations of U.S.-born
Filipinos, extensive economic assets, and an accumulation
of political experience would have provided a more developed
and entrenched foundation, or staging point, for the succeeding
third wave of immigration. Filipino American political presence
today would perhaps be broadly comparable to that of the Mexican
American community. Instead, the third wave came on a small
community with foundling institutions and an aging sector
of first-wave pioneers.
The chronological length of a community's presence, therefore,
is a deceiving indicator of political growth when applied
to Filipino Americans. The consequences of the previous official
policy of exclusion have negated the potential advantages
of a community that has been in this country for a relatively
long period of time. Filipino Americans' tendency to blame
their community for "achieving so little for so long"
should be taken with a dose of skepticism, because effectively
the community is only three decades old.
Building Community Pride and Unity
There are no antidotes to the negative political effects of
a protracted process of assimilation, only strategies to mitigate
them. Strengthening ethnic pride is one of these strategies.
Filipino immigrants generally bring with them a low "national
self-esteem"--lingering colonial mentality, self-blame,
submissiveness, and passivity--shaped by centuries of colonization
and the Philippines' bruising struggle with underdevelopment.
It was not so long ago that a "Philippines-U.S. statehood
movement" drew a lot of supporters and generated much
publicity. In addition, a survey of Filipino children conducted
several years ago by Ma. Luisa Doronila, of the University
of the Philippines, revealed that the majority preferred to
be "reborn" as Americans.
At the same time, Filipinos in the United States are hungry
for recognition as Filipinos, a manifestation of collective
frustration over the community's relative invisibility in
the mainstream. To illustrate, a study conducted by California
State University, Hayward found that a majority of Filipinos
surveyed admitted they "favor(ed) companies/brands which
have shown interest in and appreciation for the Filipino consumer."
The second and third highest percentages indicated they were
more likely to buy products or services that advertised in
Filipino media.1
It is important, therefore, that community advocates maximize
opportunities and means to build pride in Filipino culture
and heritage. Criticisms of poorly organized community events
notwithstanding, events like Philippine Independence Day fiestas,
award ceremonies for achievers and role models, and so forth,
if done well, are effective in raising collective self-esteem.
There are favorable trends that can boost such initiatives.
Philippine-born immigrants tend to nurse a growing appreciation
for "things Filipino"--a function of nostalgia,
homesickness, or middle age--and are extremely receptive to
cultural information they once took for granted. U.S.-born
Filipinos inevitably respond to the racial dynamics in American
society by searching for their "roots" or ethnic
identity. This social reflex is encouraged today by a growing
demand for the celebration of cultural diversity.
The Filipino American media can greatly assist in bolstering
pride by highlighting important historical events, projecting
role models, and showcasing the best of Filipino culture and
traditions. Unlike many of the other Asian American communities,
the generally English-proficient Filipino immigrants do not
have to rely on community media to translate news and information
from the mainstream. Imada Wong Communications Group's Asian
Pacific American Media Guide, 1996 counted two Filipino American
radio shows, five television programs, four magazines, and
twenty-three newspapers. Filipino American media mainly fill
the demand for community news and for homeland news and entertainment.
As such, they already function as active connectors to the
homeland, channels that Philippine institutions and interests
can use for access to the Filipino American community and
market.
Mainstream American media and political circles use (though
not frequently enough) Filipino American media as references
and "sources." (Indeed, mainstream media that are
serious about providing comprehensive coverage would do well
to consistently monitor the community's periodicals and block-time
television and radio shows.) In other words, Filipino American
media indirectly project the collective profile to the mainstream.
Shoddy publications and productions, however, undermine credibility
and impart a distorted image of the community's tastes and
values. It is important, therefore, for community media to
help the cause of collective empowerment by upgrading their
standards and improving their quality. Increased professionalism
is also the prerequisite for serving as effective interpreters
of U.S. affairs for Philippine interests. Similarly, professionalism
will enable Filipino American media to act as credible analysts
of Philippine socioeconomic and political trends for American
observers.
"Lack of unity" is often raised in criticism of
the proliferation of sometimes competing and redundant community
organizations. Indeed, there are legions of community, professional,
business, and hometown organizations--Filipino American Political
Association, National Filipino American Council, Filipino
Civil Rights Advocates, Association of Philippine Physicians
in America, Philippine Nurses Association, Philippine-American
Chamber of Commerce, Inc., University of the Philippines Alumni
Association in America, Bicolandia Association, and the Congress
of Visayan Organizations, to name only some. It is better
to accept this proliferation as a natural state, rather than
continually wish for a pie-in-the-sky single federation of
Filipino associations. Regional associations, professional
groups, religious circles, and so forth will always be around
and should be expected to promote their own agendas.
What is more important is for organizations and leaders to
develop the ability to band together in coalitions on important
issues. The community's record in this regard cannot be dismissed.
In the past 30 years, single-issue campaigns and coalitions
with limited lifetimes have emerged in many parts of the country,
dealing with a variety of issues, from local cases of police
brutality to issues that drew national attention, for example,
the Narciso/Perez case involving the wrongful prosecution
of two Filipino nurses for murder, the threat of deportation
faced by Filipino nurses who failed their licensure exams
(both in the 1970s), and (more recently) the denial of benefits
for Filipino World War II veterans. Repeated experiences in
cooperative action are building blocks for political unity
and maturity.
Economic Progress Through Immigration
Despite the political disadvantages of being a relatively
young, largely immigrant community in a racially conscious
society, Filipino Americans do not occupy the lowest rungs
of the economic ladder. Filipinos rank fourth in per capita
income ($13,616 or 9 percent lower than white per capita income)
among ten Asian groups. They have the second-highest median
family income at $46,698 in the United States (the median
family income for the United States is only $35,225). Filipinos
have the highest rate of labor participation, at 75.4 percent,
among all Asian groups. As a result, the poverty level of
Filipinos is the lowest in the nation at only 6.4 percent.
Because of Filipinos' relative proficiency in English and
familiarity with American popular culture, even recent immigrants
can integrate into the mainstream job market in a relatively
short period of time. Fifty years ago, half the total number
of Filipinos in the labor force held physically strenuous
jobs in agriculture, forestry, and the fishing industry. Today
only 1.6 percent of Filipinos in the labor force can be found
in those sectors. Up to 64 percent of the 751,000 Filipinos
in the labor force hold white collar jobs: 27 percent are
in the professions and 37 percent are in technical, sales,
or administrative support positions. Filipinos on the whole
do not depend on independent entrepreneurship for livelihood.
The median education level has also risen, from 9.7 years
in 1960 to 13 years in 1990. Up to 39 percent of Filipinos
over 25 have bachelor's degrees or higher.
Before "growth of political muscle" can be deduced
from this impressive shift in occupational status and relatively
high level of educational attainment, it must be underscored
that these gains did not result from the accumulation of power
by earlier immigrants. Much of the evident progress in the
Filipino community has been brought about by the immigration
of professionals and skilled workers after 1965. Up to 85
percent of Filipinos who came between 1965 and 1977 were professionals,
for example, part of what former Philippine foreign affairs
secretary Raul Manglapus sardonically described as "Philippine
foreign aid to the United States."
Filipino Americans have not tended to congregate in self--
contained economic enclaves, like Chinatowns, which also serve
as permanent cultural points of reference for the mainstream
public. The enclave is a survival mechanism for many other
Asian minorities which cannot integrate easily into the mainstream
labor force due to more formidable language or cultural barriers.
It is a social necessity that has become a political virtue
as it underscores the numerical strength of a community and
the concentration of economic means--factors that count considerably
in the political arena. Most Filipino concentrations are residential,
based on accessible real estate and rental prices in bedroom
communities or neighborhoods. There has been much talk in
the community of replicating the enclave, but capital-intensive,
artificial "Manilatown" projects are rare, and success
is quite uncertain.
Filipino Americans' aggregate purchasing power has been estimated
at $13 billion a year,2 and remittances from the United States
account for 70 percent of remittances to the Philippines.
Filipinos in 1987 owned 40,412 enterprises with gross revenues
of $1.9 billion, ranking fifth in business holdings after
the Chinese, Koreans, Japanese, and Indians. However, the
Filipino community does not project economic power and, as
a result, tends not to be a magnet for politicians.
Filipino Americans' economic power will probably remain understated
owing to their high level of integration into the workforce
as wage earners or skilled professionals. But there is a case
to be made for strengthening the independent entrepreneurial
sectors. There is spontaneous reliance in the community on
Filipino-oriented services or products. Filipino chambers
of commerce and similar groups can conduct standing "buy
Filipino" campaigns to firm up this market and bolster
internal support even for Filipino enterprises (car dealerships,
real estate firms, and so forth) that cater to the mainstream
market. Experience in actively supporting community-based
enterprises, combined with the previously cited preference
for "companies/brands which have shown interest in and
appreciation for the Filipino consumer," should eventually
provide the basis for future acts of negative consumership,
e.g., boycotts of companies or brands that commit acts that
are discriminatory or damaging to Filipino American interests.
The Visibility Problem
The concentration of occupational skills, educational achievement,
a relatively comfortable economic status, and a historical
presence in the United States only highlight the empowerment
puzzle: Why are Filipino Americans, the second-largest Asian
minority, still an invisible community?
A rupture in historical continuity between the first pioneering
wave of immigrants and the present, largely third-wave community
provides part of the answer. Official U.S. exclusionary policies
earlier in the century stunted the all-sided development of
the first-wave community. The lack of a substantial foundation
has undermined the advantages that should have come with the
combination of a long-standing Filipino presence in the United
States and the community's rapid numerical growth today.
Another drawback that contributes to the Filipino minority's
"invisibility" is the fact that the Philippines
is dwarfed by more ancient Asian cultures. The Philippines
is a very young nation, originally a collection of archipelagic
settlements administratively consolidated by Spanish colonialism.
The republic that emerged in the revolution against Spain
will be only a hundred years old in 1998, and the dominant
mestizo culture shaped by "400 years in the convent"
was easily diluted by "50 years in Hollywood" under
American colonization.
The more "exotic" and ancient cultures of China,
Japan, Korea, and Vietnam have tended to be more intriguing
to American public taste. For example, a cursory inspection
of index information will reveal that coverage of Japan by
both the San Francisco Chronicle and the Examiner
from 1919 to 1934 greatly exceeded coverage of Philippine
affairs--at a time when the Philippines was a direct colony
of the United States and the San Francisco Bay Area had a
growing settlement of Filipino immigrant farm workers. A 1990
study (by researcher Augusto Espiritu) of Filipino source
materials at the University of California in Los Angeles found
that only an average 2.7 works a year were published on Filipino
Americans between 1920 and 1990. Whether by design or plain
neglect, the academy, media, and popular entertainment have
served the American public very few enduring memories of historical
ties with the Philippines. For a country that served as the
United States' first experiment in imperialism--at the cost
of some 4,000 American and several hundred thousand Filipino
lives during the American conquest and subjugation of the
Philippines between 1898 and 1906--the Philippines hardly
figures in the American imagination.
Filipino American writers, scholars, artists, journalists,
and performers will be crucial in correcting cultural marginalization
by projecting the Filipino image and experience. Successful
Filipino American writers, artists, and entertainers will
serve as highly visible representatives and, for the general
public, as "cultural reference points." In this
light, Philippine and Filipino American studies programs,
community theater groups, writers workshops, and so forth
deserve collective support.
The Philippines itself will play a major role in ending Filipino
American invisibility. The United States is living proof that
what a young nation lacks in cultural stature can be more
than compensated for by economic power. What further deflates
the Philippines' international standing is its economic underdevelopment.
Filipino Americans have a real stake in the Philippines' ambition
to be a newly industrialized country, besides seeing the cycle
of poverty end in their homeland. As long as the U.S. media
project mainly images of poverty and backwardness in the Philippines,
the collective prestige of Filipino Americans will be undermined.
Filipino Americans, therefore, must include on their agenda
programs to assist Philippine economic development, by way
of direct investments, technical and educational assistance,
and ultimately, lobbying the appropriate U.S. institutions.
Issues Facing Filipino Americans
The more assimilated sectors must take the lead in confronting
political issues that affect the community. The backlash against
immigrants that has developed in the U.S. in recent years
hurts Filipino Americans in a number of concrete ways. In
addition to the expected rise in local instances of hate crimes
and workplace "English-only" language discrimination,
new federal and state policies will have a negative impact
on Filipinos across the country. While it is not yet clear
how many will be directly affected by the new welfare reform
law's exclusion of legal immigrants from public assistance
such as Aid for Families with Dependent Children, Medicaid,
and food stamps, federal statistics show that exclusion from
Supplemental Security Income will hit 26,485 aged or disabled
legal Filipino immigrants in California alone.
Filipinos must wrestle with more restrictions in the new Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act. The reforms
give immigration authorities greater, more arbitrary powers
to exclude even legal immigrants from entering the United
States. Up to 500,000 Filipinos are waiting to rejoin their
families here, but the new act, along with provisions in the
new welfare law, weakens the ability of immigrants and U.S.
citizens to petition for family members. For Filipino Americans
with limited incomes, particularly recently naturalized elderly
veterans of World War II, petitioning and sponsoring family
members is virtually impossible. The veterans themselves are
also still campaigning to get the full benefits given to all
former members of the U.S. military, which is another issue
confronting the community in a political climate heavy with
the rhetoric of budget downsizing. California's antiñaffirmative
action mood is expected to spread to other states and spawn
Proposition 209 clones. The blow against minorities in education,
hiring, and government contracts will be felt by Filipinos
too.
Community leaders and advocates must be alert to issues that
will affect the future of the U.S.-born, such as affirmative
action, education issues, youth violence, drug abuse, and
so forth. Community advocates must also grasp the significance
not only of a generation gap, but also of a cultural divide
between immigrants and the American-born. Many immigrants
tend to resent the Americanization of U.S.-born Filipinos,
their apparent lack of concern for the homeland, their seeming
disrespect for elders and traditional Filipino values, and
their businesslike, if not brash, attitude toward community
concerns. U.S.-born Filipinos, on the other hand, tend to
be disdainful of the immigrants' rowdy political culture,
their attachment to homeland affairs (even its popular culture),
their apparent lack of American savvy, and even their thickly
accented English. U.S.-born Filipinos tend to be alienated
from initiatives dominated by immigrants.
Two culturally divided camps can emerge within an older ethnic
minority, where the schism between immigrants and American-born
painfully reveals itself in conflicting positions on issues
facing the community. (For example, Mexican immigrants' active
participation in their homeland's election campaigns has been
bitterly criticized by some American-born leaders as disempowering
because it purportedly reinforces the "foreign"
image of the Mexican American community.) For now, immigrants
and U.S.-born alike still respond to "Filipino identity"
and take pride in the achievements of all Filipinos. This
communitarian spirit, however, will be challenged, if not
undermined, by the community's continuing numerical growth,
social stratification and generational differentiation. A
conscious effort to build internal coalitions between immigrants
and U.S.-born Filipinos around political issues and civic
needs could prevent or offset the negative impact of a spontaneous
cultural schism.
To ease the pressures of assimilation, more stable and active
immigrants must orient many of their activities toward assisting
recent arrivals. Advocacy for publicly or privately funded
programs that facilitate adjustment, acculturation, job searches,
and so forth, is a practical means of pursuing this goal.
Filipinos for Affirmative Action in Oakland, California and
Search to Involve Filipino Americans in Los Angeles are just
two of the community groups committed to such programs.
The aforementioned issues, while worrisome, provide opportunities
for involving the community in collective political action.
They are openings for building coalitions among community
groups, between the assimilated and the new arrivals, and
between the foreign-born and the U.S.-born Filipinos. The
issues also provide the basis for coalescing with other negatively
affected ethnic minorities and sectors. Broader contacts and
experiences with other communities and with mainstream institutions
will help break isolation and minimize parochialism in the
Filipino community. Filipino American activists have inevitably
sought greater strength by interacting with the broader "Asian
American community." (Although the "Asian American
community" is not a culturally homogeneous entity, it
does stand for a community of interests on the basis of which
Americans of various Asian origins can initiate joint, mainly
political, action.) It is a positive impulse that contributes
to the overall political maturation of Filipinos.
Bolstering the Community's Political Presence
It takes a while for first-generation immigrants to unconditionally
embrace the United States as their country. It takes a longer
stay to significantly erode the immigrant syndrome typified
by guest mentality and compliant behavior. For example, when
young activists in the 1970s began launching nationwide campaigns
against the discrimination of foreign medical graduates and
nurses, they had to overcome the usual recent-immigrant admonition,
"Don't bite the hand that feeds you," in reference
to U.S. authorities. With assimilation comes the erosion of
debilitating immigrant syndromes among the foreign-born and
a greater understanding that claiming one's place, self-organization,
and advocating for group interests are as American as apple
pie. It is an understanding that comes more naturally to the
U.S.-born as they grow inside a veritable hothouse of ethnic
survivalism.
According to the Census Information Center, there are 491,646
Filipinos who are naturalized U.S. citizens. When this figure
is added to the 505,988 U.S.-born Filipino Americans, it means
that as much as 60 percent of the community are citizens,
many of whom can already vote. (The Immigration and Naturalization
Service acknowledges that Filipinos are ahead of other ethnic
groups in naturalization.) However, there are no reliable
studies on Filipino voter registration and turnout. There
is a going assumption that most Filipinos are registered Democrats,
but this is usually countered by arguments that Filipinos
are conservatives at heart, that immigrant aspirations tend
to buy into the values of dominant establishment groups, and
therefore Filipinos could easily be attracted to the Republican
Party.
More Filipino Americans are seeking appointments to political
office or participating in local elections. These are both
valuable sources of experience, support networks, alliances,
and accumulated political savvy. Politically active Filipinos
must devote time and effort to studying the trends in the
community's political behavior in order to take appropriate
measures for influencing it. Any serious political empowerment
agenda must include definitive studies of Filipino American
electoral behavior. Indeed strategizing for empowerment must
be based on objective studies of the community's history,
present realities, and prospects. This underscores the importance
of developing academic research, Filipino studies courses,
and Filipino scholars as an indispensable sector of the Filipino
American intelligentsia.
Still, the availability of expendable funds earmarked for
lobbying or political contributions will remain limited, and
very few Filipino Americans, for example, will be able to
afford the prohibitive costs of high-powered fund-raising
dinners. Filipino Americans, therefore, must find ways to
compensate for modest political kitties. Although the decisive
role money plays in U.S. politics will remain unchanged, marginalization
resulting from lack of it can be alleviated by the active,
high-profile presence of Filipino American experts and organizers
in political and social advocacies, the media, trade unions,
and political parties and their campaigns.
Since "politics is addition," building coalitions
with other minorities and bridges to mainstream institutions
is crucial in offsetting the community's modest size and financial
means and lack of political experience. In fact, successful
politicians like Governor Benjamin Cayetano of Hawaii, Councilor
Mike Guingona of Daly City, California, Mayors Henry Manayan
and Pete Fajardo of Milpitas and Carson City, California,
respectively, won their offices by not relying solely on the
Filipino American electorate.
The current climate is quite favorable for coalitions that
are not purely based on electoral campaigns but can eventually
be translated into electoral capital. Among the lessons that
many Chinese American leaders are learning from the campaign-donations
scandal is how vulnerable their community is to stigmatization
despite--or because of--their ability to raise substantial
amounts of campaign funds. Many Asian political advocates
are warning their communities not to rely solely on huge campaign
donations to gain political access and presence, and to begin
investing more energy in grassroots efforts to change policies
and legislation.
The Filipino American Community and the Philippines
If Filipino American's ability to advocate on behalf of Philippine
national interests is intimately bound up with their collective
political maturation, the Philippine government must provide
concrete means of placing those interests on the community's
agenda. Rhetorical appeals to patriotism will not suffice.
Political advocacy on behalf of the Philippines by Filipino
Americans is best guaranteed by the establishment of real
economic stakes in the homeland. Development plans must include
the utilization of the Filipino American community as a strategic
reserve, not just as an immediate source of tourism, dollar
remittances, and trade revenues. Philippine authorities must
also reinforce their appeals to Filipino American investments
with attractive incentives and streamlined visa, permit, and
licensing processes.
Concrete programs with long-range orientations must be put
in place. For example, the current "Lakbay-Aral"
summer exchange/tour program for U.S.-born, second-generation
Filipino American youth has excellent potential for developing
deep and lasting ties with future community leaders. Filipino-community-based
"trade missions" must be encouraged and designed
not just for immediate economic results, but also for immediate
and long-range impact on the local, state, and national levels
of U.S. political leadership. In the same spirit, mobilizing
active Filipino American involvement in initiating and sustaining
official sister-cities relationships must be given high priority.
The expected granting of voting rights to Filipino citizens
overseas should increase the participation and stakes in Philippine
political affairs of Filipino nationals residing in the United
States. Ultimately, however, the readiness of Filipino Americans
to advocate for the national interests of the Philippines
will increase in proportion to the eradication of official
corruption, entrenched bureaucratic inefficiency, and gaping
social divisions in their homeland. Pride in the seriousness,
unassailability, and effectiveness of their homeland's political
leadership is one of the best antidotes to skepticism and
apathy. The all-too-brief moment of elation after the 1986
"people power" revolution provided a glimpse into
the greater potential of the Filipino American civic spirit,
when "helping the homeland" went hand-in-hand with
agitation for "political empowerment" in the United
States.
Conclusion: Looking to
the Future
Whether the entry of new Filipino immigrants continues at
its current high rate, or, as predicted, the restriction of
immigration as a whole becomes inevitable, the emergence of
greater Filipino American political power ultimately depends
on the growth of the assimilated sector of the community and
on the coming of age of the U.S.-born. First-generation foreign-born
immigrants are an aging sector, their median age being 38.7
years. In contrast to this, 35 percent of the community is
made up of U.S.-born Filipino Americans with a median age
of 14.1 years. With the United States as their principal reference
point, U.S.-born Filipinos tend to more naturally identify
with this country's political affairs. They have a natural
sense of entitlement and do not have the same ambivalence
about their claim on the United States that tends to politically
inhibit recent immigrants.
Community advocates--and those who wish to guarantee a place
for Philippine national interests on the Filipino American
agenda--must pay careful attention to the strengthening of
Filipino American identity, the development of communitarian
spirit, and the accumulation of political experiences among
the American-born. Ultimately, the U.S.-born Filipino Americans
will bear the primary responsibility for attaining greater
political power and boosting the community's visibility and
cultural impact on American society. The Filipino American
community's political presence will become more pronounced
when this generation of U.S.-born Filipinos comes into its
own to add complexity and firmer moorings to the relatively
young community.
Notes
1. A Study of Filipino American Consumer
Behavior: Media Habits, Ownership and Consumption Patterns,
Values, Attitudes and Lifestyles, researched by Christina
Marie Macabenta (Hayward, Calif.: California State University,
1995), p. 117.
2. A Study of Filipino American Consumer
Behavior, p. 21.
Unless otherwise specified,
all demographic data in this chapter come from the Census
Bureau Information Kit (Washingotn, D.C.: U.S. Department
of Commerce, Economics and Statistics Administration, 1993).
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