OS: You've been often criticized, and sometimes very sternly, for insufficiently (in the view of your critics) embracing the notion of sort of the American principle of democracy and human rights. Now, forgetting for a minute whether the criticism is justified, what do you think the proper posture of America ought to be at this point in history towards China on those principles which, as you've pointed out, it can be very messianic about?
HK: Human rights and democracy are fundamental principles of American thinking. And they will be affirmed and should be affirmed by the United States as objectives of American policy. Where I part company on occasion is the attempt to achieve them by sanctions and pressure. I strongly favor affirming them by example, and we have every right and indeed every duty to affirm what we believe in, but I also believe that the evolution of societies, including a society with the long history of China, has, in important ways, to be left to its own internal dynamics, towards which we have attitudes, but as a basic principle I have preferred a policy of engagement to a policy of confrontations.
OS: Do you think, by that logic, then the best that this country could do is to be a better example and leave it pretty much at that?
HK: No, there can be events to which we express our opinion. But when we conduct policies that amount to a deliberate promotion of regime change in other countries, we will generate intense resistance and we have to see that in relation, we have to see those measures in relation to other objectives in which the preservation and creation of a peaceful world is also an important moral value.
OS: I think if there is one thing that you are most known for, it's this idea that there can be breakthrough moments, and in fact we did experience such a moment in the early '70s. I wonder if you imagine ...
HK: But you can't invent them. You can understand them and exploit them, but if you try to conduct foreign policies through a series of breakthrough moments you will create chaotic conditions.
OS: And to what degree do you think that the ability to seize such moments depends on having very strong leaders on both sides who can act deliberately without being bogged down in too much factionalism, debate or inner-party ...
HK: What you need is a Chinese concept, which I think is called qi, which relates to the — there is no English word for it — it is the confluence of forces, the propensity of events in their totality, and the momentum that these events generate. In order to have a breakthrough, one needs the ability to understand that events are related and have a history if one wants to project them into the future. I know the implication of your question is that democracies cannot do that, but that isn't true.
OS: Well, and yet we did it in 1972 ...
HK: That's what I mean. We did do it, and we have many examples in our history where breakthrough thinking could, but the essence of breakthrough thinking is [not only] to be able to understand the nature of the immediate situation but to project it into the future. Leaders take, the leader is to take his people from where it is to where it has never been. And that requires, above all, courage and vision. It may be in the nature of modern society that the technical problems of maintaining it on a day-to-day basis discourage this long-range thinking, but I would judge the leaders by their ability to handle it.
OS: As you look back over the last number of decades in your own life, but also the history of our country, what moments do you see of this nature that were not taken up, that were missed? And do you have any regret about a moment that in retrospect you think you could have taken up and put some dilemma to a different end?
OS: You've wrestled with some pretty tough ones.
HK: For better or worse, I served in a very turbulent time, and amidst profound national divisions. So I would like to think that while mistakes were undoubtedly made, that we didn't miss any breakthrough moments and that we seized some in the Middle East, and we had the good fortune of being able to serve at a moment when a breakthrough to China was possible. But there may be others who have a better vision.
OS: Finally, let me ask you — because I am sure everybody out here is going to want to read it — if you had to sum up in a somewhat sound-bitten way what you think your book is trying to say to us and why you wrote it, what would you say?
HK: I'd say if I can sum up 600 pages in one sentence ...
OS: Go ahead and take two.
HK: ... then I missed something. What I tried to do is three things: To explain to the best of my understanding, based on 40 years of experience, the conceptual interaction of Chinese and Americans in dealing with their problems, how each side looked at this, and to illustrate that with a series of concrete examples from the beginning of the interaction after the Communist victory in the Chinese Civil War.
The second was to illustrate how this translated itself into the actual interaction. And the third was to explain why that relationship is so crucial for peace and progress in the world and how both sides — and I repeat, both sides — have to adjust their traditional thinking, or their historic thinking, to the new necessities. And while I wind up with saying we have to go from crisis management to a sense of community of things we actually do together, I also understand, as a historian and as a practitioner, that this is not what history teaches you. History teaches you that this might lead to conflict, so the challenge of our times is to transcend that part of experience and to move towards a sense of community. Those are the themes of the book and there are many detailed examples that illustrate this.
OS: And are you optimistic?
HK: I'm determined.
OS: That you are. Thank you, Dr. Kissinger.